us-irs-notices-irb-2002-14-pdf•Internal Revenue Bulletin 2002-14 (PDF rendition): IRS Notices
Internal Revenue Bulletin 2002-14 (PDF rendition): IRS Notices
us-irs-notices-irb-2002-14-pdfInternal Revenue Bulletin 2002-14 (PDF rendition): IRS NoticesGuidance
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HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS ISSUE These synopses are intended only as aids to the reader in identifying the subject matter covered. They may not be relied upon as authoritative interpretations. SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS Announcement 2002–41, page 739. The Director of Practice has extended all enrollment cards of enrolled agents until April 30, 2002. Announcement 2002–42, page 739. The Director of Practice has extended all existing continuing professional education sponsor agreements through August 31, 2002. INCOME TAX Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Federal rates; adjusted federal rates; adjusted federal long-term rate and the long-term exempt rate.For pur- poses of sections 382, 1274, 1288, and other sections of the Code, tables set forth the rates for April 2002. T.D. 8985, page 707. Final regulations under section 1221 of the Code relate to the determination of the character of gain or loss from hedging transactions. Notice 2002–21, page 730. This notice addresses a transaction generating tax losses based on an inflated basis in assets acquired from another party. The inflated basis is claimed as a result of a transfer of assets in which a taxpayer becomes jointly and severally liable on indebtedness of the transferor, with the indebtedness hav- ing a stated principal amount substantially in excess of the fair market value of the assets transferred. The notice states that the taxpayer’s basis in the assets transferred is equal to the fair market value of such assets upon their acquisition by the tax- payer rather than the stated principal amount of the indebted- ness. Rev. Proc. 2002–20, page 732. Guidance is provided to individuals who fail to meet the eligibil- ity requirements of section 911(d)(1) of the Code because adverse conditions in a foreign country preclude the individual from meeting those requirements. A current list of countries and the dates those countries are subject to the section 911(d)(4) waiver is provided. Rev. Proc. 2001–27 supple- mented. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS Announcement 2002–39, page 738. Section 911(d)(4) waiver.This document contains correc- tions to final regulations (T.D. 8978, 2002–7 I.R.B. 500) relat- ing to the excise taxes on excess benefit transactions. (Continued on the next page) Finding Lists begin on page ii. Bulletin No. 2002–14 April 8, 2002 EXCISE TAX Ct. D. 2073, page 718. The Supreme Court has concluded, that under sections 4401(a), 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I of the Code, tribes are not exempt from paying the gambling-related taxes that Chapter 35 of the Code imposes.Chickasaw Nation v. United States. Announcement 2002–39, page 738. This document contains corrections to final regulations (T.D. 8978, 2002–7 I.R.B. 500) relating to the excise taxes on excess benefit transactions. TAX CONVENTIONS Page 725. The bilateral agreement between the United States and the Republic of Ghana, providing for the reciprocal tax exemption of income from the international operation of ships and/or air- craft, is set forth. ADMINISTRATIVE Notice 2002–22, page 731. Guidance priority list.Public comments are requested about items that should be included in the Guidance Priority List for 2002–2003. All comments should be submitted by April 30, 2002. Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Undivided fractional interests in real estate.This proce- dure specifies the conditions under which the Service will con- sider a request for a ruling that an undivided fractional interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in section 614) is not an interest in a business entity within the meaning of section 301.7701–3 of the regulations. Rev. Proc. 2000–46 superseded. Rev. Proc. 2002–3 modified. Announcement 2002–38, page 738. This document contains corrections to proposed regulations (REG–112991–01, 2002–4 I.R.B. 404) relating to the compu- tation of the research credit. April 8, 20022002–14 I.R.B. The IRS Mission Provide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all. Introduction The Internal Revenue Bulletin is the authoritative instrument of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for announcing official rulings and procedures of the Internal Revenue Service and for publishing Treasury Decisions, Executive Orders, Tax Conven- tions, legislation, court decisions, and other items of general interest. It is published weekly and may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents on a subscription basis. Bulletin contents are consolidated semiannually into Cumulative Bulle- tins, which are sold on a single-copy basis. It is the policy of the Service to publish in the Bulletin all sub- stantive rulings necessary to promote a uniform application of the tax laws, including all rulings that supersede, revoke, modify, or amend any of those previously published in the Bul- letin. All published rulings apply retroactively unless otherwise indicated. Procedures relating solely to matters of internal management are not published; however, statements of inter- nal practices and procedures that affect the rights and duties of taxpayers are published. Revenue rulings represent the conclusions of the Service on the application of the law to the pivotal facts stated in the rev- enue ruling. In those based on positions taken in rulings to tax- payers or technical advice to Service field offices, identifying details and information of a confidential nature are deleted to prevent unwarranted invasions of privacy and to comply with statutory requirements. Rulings and procedures reported in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations, but they may be used as precedents. Unpublished rulings will not be relied on, used, or cited as precedents by Service personnel in the disposition of other cases. In applying published rulings and procedures, the effect of subsequent legislation, regulations, court decisions, rulings, and procedures must be considered, and Service personnel and others concerned are cautioned against reaching the same conclusions in other cases unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the same. The Bulletin is divided into four parts as follows: Part I.—1986 Code. This part includes rulings and decisions based on provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Part II.—Treaties and Tax Legislation. This part is divided into two subparts as follows: Subpart A, Tax Conventions and Other Related Items, and Subpart B, Legisla- tion and Related Committee Reports. Part III.—Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous. To the extent practicable, pertinent cross references to these subjects are contained in the other Parts and Subparts. Also included in this part are Bank Secrecy Act Administrative Rul- ings. Bank Secrecy Act Administrative Rulings are issued by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of the Assistant Secre- tary (Enforcement). Part IV.—Items of General Interest. This part includes notices of proposed rulemakings, disbar- ment and suspension lists, and announcements. The first Bulletin for each month includes a cumulative index for the matters published during the preceding months. These monthly indexes are cumulated on a semiannual basis, and are published in the first Bulletin of the succeeding semiannual period, respectively. The contents of this publication are not copyrighted and may be reprinted freely. A citation of the Internal Revenue Bulletin as the source would be appropriate. For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. 2002–14 I.R.B.April 8, 2002 Part I. Rulings and Decisions Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 Section 42.—Low-Income Housing Credit The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 267.—Losses, Expenses, and Interest With Respect to Transactions Between Related Taxpayers 26 CFR 1.267(a)–1: Deductions disallowed. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in § 614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of § 301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 280G.—Golden Parachute Payments Federal short-term, mid-term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 382.—Limitation on Net Operating Loss Carryforwards and Certain Built-In Losses Following Ownership Change The adjusted applicable federal long-term rate is set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 412.—Minimum Funding Standards The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 467.—Certain Payments for the Use of Property or Services The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 468.—Special Rules for Mining and Solid Waste Reclamation and Closing Costs The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 482.—Allocation of Income and Deductions Among Taxpayers Federal short-term, mid-term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 483.—Interest on Certain Deferred Payments The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 511.—Imposition of Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Charitable, etc., Organizations 26 CFR 1.511–1: Imposition and rates of tax. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in § 614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of § 301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 512.—Unrelated Business Taxable Income 26 CFR 1.512(a)–1: Definition. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in § 614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of § 301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 642.—Special Rules for Credits and Deductions Federal short-term, mid-term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 707.—Transactions Between Partner and Partnership 26 CFR 1.707–1: Transactions between partner and partnership. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in § 614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of § 301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 761.—Terms Defined 26 CFR 1.761–1: Terms defined. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in § 614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of § 301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 807.—Rules for Certain Reserves The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. 2002–14 I.R.B.706April 8, 2002 Section 846.—Discounted Unpaid Losses Defined The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 856.—Definition of Real Estate Investment Trust 26 CFR 1.856–1: Definition of real estate invest- ment trust. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in§614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of §301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 1031.—Exchange of Property Held For Productive Use or Investment 26 CFR 1.1031(a)–1: Property held for productive use in trade or business or for investment. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in§614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of §301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 1221.—Capital Asset Defined 26 CFR 1.1221–2: Hedging transactions. T.D. 8985 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY Internal Revenue Service 26 CFR Parts 1 and 602 Hedging Transactions AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. ACTION: Final regulations. SUMMARY: This document contains final regulations relating to the character of gain or loss from hedging transactions. The regulations reflect changes to the law made by the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999. The regulations affect businesses entering into hedging transactions. DATES:Effective Date: These regula- tions are effective March 20, 2002. Applicability Dates: For dates of appli- cability of these regulations, see the dis- cussion in the Dates of Applicability para- graph in the Supplementary Information portion of the preamble. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CON- TACT: Elizabeth Handler, (202) 622– 3930 or Viva Hammer at (202) 622–0869 (not toll-free numbers). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Paperwork Reduction Act The collections of information con- tained in these final regulations have been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) under control number 1545–1480. Some responses to these collections of information are man- datory, and others are required to obtain the benefit of the separate-entity election. An agency may not conduct or spon- sor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid control number assigned by the Office of Management and Budget. The estimated annual burden per respondent or recordkeeper varies from .1 to 40 hours, depending on individual cir- cumstances, with an estimated average of 5.9 hours. Comments concerning the accuracy of this burden estimate and suggestions for reducing this burden should be sent to the Internal Revenue Service, Attn: IRS ReportsClearanceOfficer,W:CAR: MP:FP:S, Washington, DC 20224, and to theOffice of Management and Budget, Attn: Desk Officer for the Department of the Treasury, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503. Books or records relating to a collec- tion of information must be retained as long as their contents may become mate- rial in the administration of any Internal Revenue law. Generally, tax returns and tax return information are confidential, as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103. Background This document contains amendments to 26 CFR Part 1 under section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). Prior to amendment in 1999, section 1221 gen- erally defined a capital asset as property held by the taxpayer other than: (1) Stock in trade or other types of assets includible in inventory; (2) property used in a trade or business that is real property or prop- erty subject to depreciation; (3) certain copyrights (or similar property); (4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of a trade or business; and (5) U.S. government publications. In 1994, the IRS published in theFed- eral Register(T.D. 8555, 1994–2 C.B. 180 [59 FR 36360]) final Treasury regu- lations under section 1221 providing for ordinary character treatment for certain business hedges. The regulations gener- ally apply to transactions that reduce risk with respect to ordinary property, ordi- nary obligations, and borrowings of the taxpayer and that meet certain identifica- tion requirements. (§1.1221–2). In 1996, the IRS published in theFederal Regis- ter(T.D. 8653, 1996–1 C.B. 67 [61 FR 517]) final regulations on the character and timing of gain or loss from hedging transactions entered into by members of a consolidated group. In this preamble, the final regulations published in 1994 and 1996 are referred to collectively as the Treasury regulations. On December 17, 1999, section 1221 was amended by section 532 of the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improve- ment Act of 1999 (113 Stat 1860) to pro- vide ordinary gain or loss treatment for hedging transactions and consumable supplies. Section 1221(a)(7) provides ordinary treatment for hedging transac- tions that are clearly identified as such before the close of the day on which they were acquired, originated, or entered into. The statute defines a hedging transac- tion as a transaction entered into by the taxpayer in the normal course of business primarily to manage risk of interest rate, price changes, or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property, ordi- nary obligations, or borrowings of the April 8, 20027072002–14 I.R.B. taxpayer. Sections 1221(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). The statutory definition of hedging transaction also includes transactions to manage such other risks as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations. Section 1221(b)(2)(A)(iii). Further, the statute grants the Secretary the authority to pro- vide regulations to address the treatment of nonidentified or improperly identified hedging transactions, and hedging trans- actions involving related parties (sections 1221(b)(2)(B) and (b)(3), respectively). The statutory hedging provisions are effective for transactions entered into on or after December 17, 1999. Congress intended that the hedging rules be the exclusive means through which the gains and losses from hedging transactions are treated as ordinary. S. Rep. No. 201, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1999). Section 1221(a)(8) provides that sup- plies of a type regularly consumed by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of a tax- payer’s trade or business are not capital assets. That provision is effective for sup- plies held or acquired on or after Decem- ber 17, 1999. A notice of proposed rulemaking (REG–107047–00, 2001–14 I.R.B. 1002) was published in theFederal Register (66 FR 4738) on January 18, 2001. On May 16, 2001, the IRS held a public hear- ing on the proposed regulations. Written comments responding to the notice of proposed rulemaking were also received. In response to these comments, the pro- posed regulations were modified and as so modified are adopted as final regula- tions. The principal changes to the pro- posed regulations are discussed below. Explanation of Provisions Coordination with International Provisions of the Code The provisions of these regulations generally apply to determine the character of gain or loss from transactions that are also subject to various international pro- visions of the Code. Paragraph (a)(4) of the regulations, however, provides that the character of gain or loss on section 988 transactions is not determined under these regulations because gain or loss on those transactions is ordinary under sec- tion 988(a)(1). In addition, no implication is intended as to what constitutes“risk management”or“managing risk”for pur- poses of proposed or final regulations under section 482. Paragraph (a)(4) of the proposed regu- lations provided that the definition of a hedging transaction under§1.1221–2(b) of the proposed regulations would apply for purposes of certain other international provisions of the Code only to the extent provided in regulations issued under those provisions. Technical changes have been made in the final regulations to eliminate references to proposed regula- tions as well as Code sections for which the relevant regulations have not been issued in final form. Subsequent regula- tions will specify the extent to which the rules relating to hedging transactions that are contained in§1.1221–2 will be appli- cable for purposes of those other regula- tions and related Code sections. Risk Management Standard Several commentators noted that the proposed regulations used risk reduction as the operating standard to implement the risk management definition of hedg- ing introduced by section 1221(b)(2)(A). These commentators found that risk reduction is too narrow a standard to encompass the intent of Congress which defined hedges to include transactions that manage risk of interest rate, price changes or currency fluctuations. They urged the IRS and Treasury to adopt a broader definition of hedging to reflect Congress’intent. With one exception, the commentators did not suggest a definition of risk management. In response to these comments, the final regulations have been restructured to implement the risk management standard. No definition of risk management is pro- vided, but instead, the rules characterize a variety of classes of transactions as hedg- ing transactions because they manage risk. Risk reducing transactions still qualify as one class of hedging transac- tions, but there are also others. In addi- tion, specific provision is made for the recognition of additional types of qualify- ing risk management transactions through published guidance or private letter rul- ings. Under the final regulations, as under the proposed regulations, transactions entered into for speculative purposes will not qualify as hedging transactions. See S. Rep. No. 201, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1999). Application on the Basis of Separate Business Units The proposed regulations provided that a taxpayer has risk of a particular type only if it is at risk when all of its operations are considered. That is, risk must exist on a“macro”basis. For this purpose, under the proposed regulations, a taxpayer has to show that hedges of par- ticular assets or liabilities, or groups of assets or liabilities, are reasonably expected to reduce the overall risk of the taxpayer’s operations. Commentators pointed out that this entity-based approach to hedging is no longer uniform business practice. Instead, businesses often conduct risk manage- ment on a business unit by business unit basis. In response to these comments, the final regulations permit the determination of whether a transaction manages risk to be made on a business unit basis provided that the business unit is within a single entity or consolidated return group that adopts the single-entity approach. An example was added to the final regula- tions in which for one taxpayer, the deter- mination of whether hedging activities reduce risk is made at the business unit level. In the example, the conduct of risk management activities within separate business units is undertaken as part of a program to reduce the overall risk of the taxpayer’s operations. Fixed-to-floating Interest Rate Hedges Paragraph (c)(1) of the proposed regu- lations recognized that a transaction that economically converts an interest rate or price from a fixed rate or price to a float- ing rate or price may manage risk. Com- mentators suggested that the rule in the proposed regulations provides insufficient guidance in that it states only that fixed- to-floating interest rate or price hedges may be hedging transactions. In response to these comments, the regulations have been restructured to separately address interest rate hedges and price hedges. Commentators suggested that in the case of interest rate conversions, a tax- payer may choose to convert from a float- ing to a fixed rate to fix the amount pay- able on the obligation. However, a taxpayer could also elect to convert from a fixed to a floating rate to insure that the value of the liability remained relatively 2002–14 I.R.B.708April 8, 2002 constant. In response to these comments, the final regulations provide that a trans- action that converts an interest rate from a fixed rate to a floating rate or from a floating rate to a fixed rate manages risk. With respect to fixed-to-floating price hedges, the final regulations adopt the proposed rules without change. Transactions Not Entered into Primarily to Manage Risk Paragraph (c)(3) of the proposed regu- lations provided that the purchase or sale of certain assets will not qualify as a hedging transaction if the assets are not acquired primarily to manage risk. This rule was illustrated by the example of a taxpayer that has an interest rate risk from a floating rate borrowing and that acquires debt instruments bearing a com- parable floating interest rate. Although the taxpayer’s interest rate risk from the floating rate borrowing may be reduced by the purchase of the floating rate debt instruments, the proposed regulations pro- vided that the acquisition of the debt instruments is not made primarily to reduce risk and, therefore, is not a hedg- ing transaction. The IRS and Treasury understand that some employers may invest in assets (such as shares of a mutual fund) that are used as a reference investment for pur- poses of computing their liability to employees under a nonqualified deferred compensation plan. A question may arise whether such an investment may consti- tute a hedging transaction and, if so, whether income from the investment may be deferred by the employer until pay- ments of deferred compensation are made to employees. See§1.446–4(b); but com- pareAlbertson’s, Inc. v. Commissioner,42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994). The rule in the proposed regulations is based on§1.1221–2(c)(1)(vii). The rule has been restated in the final regulations to refer specifically to investments in debt instruments, equity securities, and annuity contracts so as to provide greater cer- tainty in its application. For this purpose certain transactions in instruments that are not themselves debt instruments may include a debt investment. See,e.g., §1.446–3(g)(4). Further, the final regula- tions provide that the IRS may identify by future published guidance specified trans- actions that are determined not to be entered into primarily to manage risk. An example has been added to the final regu- lations to illustrate that an investment in mutual fund shares in the case described in the preceding paragraph does not qualify as a hedging transaction. A similar example is added with respect to an investment in an annuity contract. Hedging Risks Other Than Interest Rate or Price Changes, or Currency Fluctuations Paragraph (c)(8) of the proposed regu- lations provided that the Commissioner may, by published guidance, provide that hedging transactions include transactions entered into to manage risks other than interest rate or price changes, or currency fluctuations. The notice of proposed rulemaking solicited comments regarding the expan- sion of the definition of hedging transac- tions to include transactions that manage risks other than interest rate or price changes, or currency fluctuations with respect to ordinary property, ordinary obligations or borrowings of the taxpayer. Some comments were received in response to that request. Because the comments described hedging transactions that related to the general operating results of a business (such as gross sales) rather than specific ordinary property, ordinary obligations or borrowings of the taxpayer, the implementation of rules respecting such hedges would present a number of issues not easily dealt with by the rules contained in the final regula- tions. Thus, the expansion of the scope of operation of the hedging rules is not being proposed at this time, so as not to delay the publication of guidance on the matters that are covered by the final regu- lations. However, the IRS is continuing to consider whether to expand the definition of hedging transactions to cover hedges of such other risks. The IRS and Treasury invite comments on the types of risks that should be covered, including specific examples of derivative transactions that may be incorporated into future guidance, as well as the appropriate timing of inclu- sion of gains and losses with respect to such transactions. Send submissions to: CC:ITA:RU (REG–107047–00), room 5226, Internal Revenue Service, POB 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. “Gap”Hedges The status of so-called gap hedges was not separately addressed in the proposed regulations and is not covered in the final regulations. Insurance companies, for example, sometimes hedge the gap between their liabilities and the assets that fund them. Under the final regulations, a hedge of those assets would not qualify as a hedging transaction if the assets are capital assets. Whether a gap hedge quali- fies as a liability hedge is a question of fact and depends on whether it is more closely associated with the liabilities than with the assets. Identification Requirement A rule has been added specifying addi- tional information that must be provided for a transaction that counteracts a hedg- ing transaction. Dates of Applicability The regulations generally apply to all transactions entered into on or after March 20, 2002. However, the IRS will not challenge any transaction entered into on or after December 17, 1999, and before March 20, 2002, that satisfies the provisions of either§1.1221–2ofREG– 107047–00 (2001–14 I.R.B. 1002), pub- lished in theFederal Register(66 FR 4738) on January 18, 2001, or the provi- sions of this final regulation. Special Analyses It has been determined that this Trea- sury decision is not a significant regula- tory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assess- ment is not required. It is hereby certified that the collection of information in these regulations will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This certification is based upon the fact that very few small businesses enter into hedging transactions due to their cost and complexity. Further, those small businesses that hedge enter into very few hedging transactions because hedging transactions are costly, complex, and require constant monitoring and a sophisticated understanding of the capital markets. Therefore, a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis under the Regulatory April 8, 20027092002–14 I.R.B. Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) is not required. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Code, the notice of proposed rulemak- ing preceding these regulations was sub- mitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business. Drafting Information The principal author of these regula- tions is Elizabeth Handler, Office of the Associate Chief Counsel (Financial Insti- tutions and Products). However, other personnel from the IRS and Treasury Department participated in their develop- ment. ***** Adoption of Amendments to the Regulations Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1 and 602 are amended as follows: PA RT 1—INCOME TAXES Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 is amended by revising the entry for§1.1221–2 to read as follows: Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805*** Section 1.1221–2 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 1221(b)(2)(A)(iii), (b)(2)(B), and (b)(3); 1502 and 6001.*** Par. 2. In the list below, for each loca- tion indicated in the left column, remove the language in the middle column from that section, and add the language in the right column. Affected sectionRemoveAdd 1.446–4(d)(2), first sentence1.1221–2(e)1.1221–2(f) 1.446–4(d)(2), last sentence1.1221–2(e)(2)1.1221–2(f)(2) 1.446–4(d)(3), first sentence1.1221–2(e)1.1221–2(f) 1.446–4(d)(3), last sentence1.1221–2(a)(4)(i)1.1221–2(a)(4) 1.446–4(e)(7), first sentence1.1221–2(c)(2)1.1221–2(d)(4) 1.446–4(e)(9)(ii), first sentence1.1221–2(d)(2)1.1221–2(e)(2) 1.446–4(e)(9)(ii), last sentence1.1221–2(d)(2)(ii)1.1221–2(e)(2)(ii) 1.475(b)–1(d)(2)1.1221–2(e)1.1221–2(f) 1.954–2(a)(4)(ii)(A), first sentence1.1221–2(a) through (c)1.1221–2(a) through (d) 1.954–2(a)(4)(ii)(B), first sentence1.1221–2(e)1.1221–2(f) 1.954–2(g)(2)(ii)(B)(2), last sentence1.1221–2(c)(7)1.1221–2(c)(3) 1.954–2(g)(3)(i)(B), last sentence1.1221–2(c)(7)1.1221–2(c)(3) 1.1256(e)–1(b), first and last sentences1.1221–2(e)(1)1.1221–2(f)(1) 1.1256(e)–1(c), first sentence1.1221–2(e)(1)1.1221–2(f)(1) 1.1256(e)–1(c), last sentenceparagraph (f)(1)(ii) of§1.1221–21.1221–2(g)(1)(ii) Par. 3. Section 1.1221–2 is revised to read as follows: §1.1221–2 Hedging transactions. (a)Treatment of hedging transact- ions—(1)In general. This section gov- erns the treatment of hedging transactions under section 1221(a)(7). Except as pro- vided in paragraph (g)(2) of this section, the term capital asset does not include property that is part of a hedging transac- tion (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section). (2)Short sales and options. This sec- tion also governs the character of gain or loss from a short sale or option that is part of a hedging transaction. Except as provided in paragraph (g)(2) of this sec- tion, gain or loss on a short sale or option that is part of a hedging transaction (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section) is ordinary income or loss. (3)Exclusivity. If a transaction is not a hedging transaction as defined in para- graph (b) of this section, gain or loss from the transaction is not made ordinary on the grounds that property involved in the transaction is a surrogate for a noncapital asset, that the transaction serves as insur- ance against a business risk, that the transaction serves a hedging function, or that the transaction serves a similar func- tion or purpose. (4)Coordination with section 988. This section does not apply to determine the character of gain or loss realized on a section 988 transaction as defined in sec- tion 988(c)(1) or realized with respect to any qualified fund as defined in section 988(c)(1)(E)(iii). (b)Hedging transaction defined. Sec- tion 1221(b)(2)(A) provides that a hedg- ing transaction is any transaction that a taxpayer enters into in the normal course of the taxpayer’s trade or business primarily— (1) To manage risk of price changes or currency fluctuations with respect to ordi- nary property (as defined in paragraph (c)(2) of this section) that is held or to be held by the taxpayer; (2) To manage risk of interest rate or price changes or currency fluctuations with respect to borrowings made or to be made, or ordinary obligations incurred or to be incurred, by the taxpayer; or (3) To manage such other risks as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations (see paragraph (d)(6) of this section). (c)General rules—(1)Normal course. Solely for purposes of paragraph (b) of this section, if a transaction is entered into in furtherance of a taxpayer’s trade or business, the transaction is entered into 2002–14 I.R.B.710April 8, 2002 in the normal course of the taxpayer’s trade or business. This rule includes man- aging risks relating to the expansion of an existing business or the acquisition of a new trade or business. (2)Ordinary property and obligations. Property is ordinary property to a tax- payer only if a sale or exchange of the property by the taxpayer could not pro- duce capital gain or loss under any cir- cumstances. Thus, for example, property used in a trade or business within the meaning of section 1231(b) (determined without regard to the holding period specified in that section) is not ordinary property. An obligation is an ordinary obligation if performance or termination of the obligation by the taxpayer could not produce capital gain or loss. For pur- poses of this paragraph (c)(2), the term termination has the same meaning as it does in section 1234A. (3)Hedging an aggregate risk. The term hedging transaction includes a trans- action that manages an aggregate risk of interest rate changes, price changes, and/or currency fluctuations only if all of the risk, or all but ade minimisamount of the risk, is with respect to ordinary prop- erty, ordinary obligations, or borrowings. (4)Managing risk—(i)In general. Whether a transaction manages a taxpay- er’s risk is determined based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the taxpayer’s business and the transaction. Whether a transaction manages a taxpay- er’s risk may be determined on a business unit by business unit basis (for example by treating particular groups of activities, including the assets and liabilities attrib- utable to those activities, as separate busi- ness units), provided that the business unit is within a single entity or consoli- dated return group that adopts the single- entity approach. A taxpayer’s hedging strategies and policies as reflected in the taxpayer’s minutes or other records are evidence of whether particular transac- tions were entered into primarily to man- age the taxpayer’s risk. (ii)Limitation of risk management transactionstothosespecifically described. Except as otherwise deter- mined by published guidance or by pri- vate letter ruling, a transaction that is not treated as a hedging transaction under paragraph (d) does not manage risk. Moreover, a transaction undertaken for speculative purposes will not be treated as a hedging transaction. (d)Transactions that manage risk— (1)Risk reduction transactions—(i)In general. A transaction that is entered into to reduce a taxpayer’s risk, manages a taxpayer’s risk. (ii)Micro and macro hedges—(A)In general. A taxpayer generally has risk of a particular type only if it is at risk when all of its operations are considered. None- theless, a hedge of a particular asset or liability generally will be respected as reducing risk if it reduces the risk attrib- utable to the asset or liability and if it is reasonably expected to reduce the overall risk of the taxpayer’s operations. If a tax- payer hedges particular assets or liabili- ties, or groups of assets or liabilities, and the hedges are undertaken as part of a program that, as a whole, is reasonably expected to reduce the overall risk of the taxpayer’s operations, the taxpayer gener- ally does not have to demonstrate that each hedge that was entered into pursuant to the program reduces its overall risk. (B)Example. The following example illustrates the rules stated in paragraph (d)(1)(ii)(A) of this section: Example. Corporation X manages its business operations by treating particular groups of activities, including the assets and liabilities attributable to those assets, as separate business units. A separate set of books and records is maintained with respect to the activities, assets and liabilities of separate business unity. As part of a risk management pro- gram that Corporation X reasonably expects to reduce the overall risks of its business operations, Corporation X enters into hedges to reduce the risks of separate business unity. Corporation X may dem- onstrate that the hedges reduce risk by taking into account only the activities, assets and liabilities of business unity. (iii)Written options. A written option may reduce risk. For example, in appro- priate circumstances, a written call option with respect to assets held by a taxpayer or a written put option with respect to assets to be acquired by a taxpayer may be a hedging transaction. See also para- graph (d)(3) of this section. (iv)Fixed-to-floating price hedges. Under the principles of paragraph (d)(1)(ii)(A) of this section, a transaction that economically converts a price from a fixed price to a floating price may reduce risk. For example, a taxpayer with a fixed cost for its inventory may be at risk if the price at which the inventory can be sold varies with a particular factor. Thus, for such a taxpayer a transaction that con- verts its fixed price to a floating price may be a hedging transaction. (2)Interest rate conversions. A trans- action that economically converts an interest rate from a fixed rate to a floating rate or that converts an interest rate from a floating rate to a fixed rate manages risk. (3)Transactions that counteract hedg- ing transactions. If a transaction is entered into primarily to offset all or any part of the risk management effected by one or more hedging transactions, the transaction is a hedging transaction. For example, if a written option is used to reduce or eliminate the risk reduction obtained from another position such as a purchased option, then it may be a hedg- ing transaction. (4)Recycling. A taxpayer may enter into a hedging transaction by using a position that was a hedge of one asset or liability as a hedge of another asset or liability (recycling). (5)Transactions not entered into pri- marily to manage risk—(i)Rule. Except as otherwise determined in published guidance or private letter ruling, the pur- chase or sale of a debt instrument, an equity security, or an annuity contract is not a hedging transaction even if the transaction limits or reduces the taxpay- er’s risk with respect to ordinary property, borrowings, or ordinary obligations. In addition, the Commissioner may deter- mine in published guidance that other transactions are not hedging transactions. (ii)Examples. The following examples illustrate the rule stated in paragraph (d)(5)(i) of this section: Example 1. Taxpayer borrows money and agrees to pay a floating rate of interest. Taxpayer purchases debt instruments that bear a comparable floating rate. Although taxpayer’s interest rate risk from the floating rate borrowing may be reduced by the pur- chase of the debt instruments, the acquisition of the debt instruments is not a hedging transaction, because the transaction is not entered into primarily to manage the taxpayer’s risk. Example 2. Taxpayer undertakes obligations to pay compensation in the future. The amount of the future compensation payments is adjusted as if amounts were invested in a specified mutual fund and were increased or decreased by the earnings, gains and losses that would result from such an investment. Taxpayer invests funds in the shares of the mutual fund. Although the investment in shares of the mutual fund reduces the taxpayer’s risk of fluctuation in the amount of its obligation to employees, the investment was not made primarily to manage the taxpayer’s risk. Accordingly, the transaction is not a hedging transaction. April 8, 20027112002–14 I.R.B. Example 3. Taxpayer provides a nonqualified retirement plan for employees that is structured like a defined contribution plan. Based on a schedule that takes into account an employee’s monthly sal- ary and years of service with the taxpayer, the tax- payer makes monthly credits to an account for each employee. Each employee may designate that the account will be treated as if it were used to pay pre- miums on a variable annuity contract issued by the M insurance company with a value that reflects a specified investment option. M offers a number of investment options for its variable annuity contracts. Taxpayer invests funds in M company variable annuity contracts that parallel the investment options selected by the employees. The investment is not made primarily to manage the taxpayer’s risk and is not a hedging transaction. (6)Hedges of other risks. The Com- missioner may, by published guidance, determine that hedging transactions include transactions entered into to man- age risks other than interest rate or price changes, or currency fluctuations. (7)Miscellaneous provision—(i)Ex- tent of risk management. A taxpayer may hedge all or any portion of its risk for all or any part of the period during which it is exposed to the risk. (ii)Number of transactions. The fact that a taxpayer frequently enters into and terminates positions (even if done on a daily or more frequent basis) is not rel- evant to whether these transactions are hedging transactions. Thus, for example, a taxpayer hedging the risk associated with an asset or liability may frequently establish and terminate positions that hedge that risk, depending on the extent the taxpayer wishes to be hedged. Simi- larly, if a taxpayer maintains its level of risk exposure by entering into and termi- nating a large number of transactions in a single day, its transactions may nonethe- less qualify as hedging transactions. (e)Hedging by members of a consoli- dated group—(1)General rule: single- entity approach. For purposes of this sec- tion, the risk of one member of a consolidated group is treated as the risk of the other members as if all of the members of the group were divisions of a single corporation. For example, if any member of a consolidated group hedges the risk of another member of the group by entering into a transaction with a third party, that transaction may potentially qualify as a hedging transaction. Con- versely, intercompany transactions are not hedging transactions because, when con- sidered as transactions between divisions of a single corporation, they do not man- age the risk of that single corporation. (2)Separate-entity election. In lieu of the single-entity approach specified in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, a consoli- dated group may elect separate-entity treatment of its hedging transactions. If a group makes this separate-entity election, the following rules apply: (i)Risk of one member not risk of other members. Notwithstanding para- graph (e)(1) of this section, the risk of one member is not treated as the risk of other members. (ii)Intercompany transactions.An intercompany transaction is a hedging transaction (an intercompany hedging transaction) with respect to a member of a consolidated group if and only if it meets the following requirements— (A) The position of the member in the intercompany transaction would qualify as a hedging transaction with respect to the member (taking into account para- graph (e)(2)(i) of this section) if the mem- ber had entered into the transaction with an unrelated party; and (B) The position of the other member (the marking member) in the transaction is marked to market under the marking member’s method of accounting. (iii)Treatment of intercompany hedg- ing transactions. An intercompany hedg- ing transaction (that is, a transaction that meets the requirements of paragraphs (e)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section) is subject to the following rules— (A) The character and timing rules of §1.1502–13 do not apply to the income, deduction, gain, or loss from the inter- company hedging transaction; and (B) Except as provided in paragraph (g)(3) of this section, the character of the marking member’s gain or loss from the transaction is ordinary. (iv)Making and revoking the election. Unless the Commissioner otherwise pre- scribes, the election described in this paragraph (e)(2) must be made in a sepa- rate statement saying“[Insert Name and Employer Identification Number of Com- mon Parent] HEREBY ELECTS THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1.1221– 2(e)(2) (THE SEPARATE-ENTITY APPROACH).”The statement must also indicate the date as of which the election is to be effective. The election must be signed by the common parent and filed with the group’s Federal income tax return for the taxable year that includes the first date for which the election is to apply. The election applies to all transac- tions entered into on or after the date so indicated. The election may be revoked only with the consent of the Commis- sioner. (3)Definitions. For definitions of con- solidated group, divisions of a single cor- poration, group, intercompany transac- tions, and member, see section 1502 and the regulations thereunder. (4)Examples.General Facts. In these examples, OandHare members of the same consolidated group.O’s business operations give rise to interest rate risk“A,”whichOwishes to hedge.Oenters into an intercompany transaction withHthat trans- fers the risk toH.O’s position in the intercompany transaction is“B,”andH’s position in the transac- tion is“C.”Henters into position“D”with a third party to reduce the interest rate risk it has with respect to its positionC.Dwould be a hedging transaction with respect to riskAifO’s riskAwere H’s risk. The following examples illustrate this para- graph (e): Example 1.Single-entity treatment—(i)General rule. Under paragraph (e)(1) of this section,O’s risk Ais treated asH’s risk, and thereforeDis a hedging transaction with respect to riskA. Thus, the charac- ter ofDis determined under the rules of this section, and the income, deduction, gain, or loss fromD must be accounted for under a method of account- ing that satisfies§1.446–4. The intercompany trans- actionB-Cis not a hedging transaction and is taken into account under§1.1502–13. (ii)Identification.Dmust be identified as a hedging transaction under paragraph (f)(1) of this section, andAmust be identified as the hedged item under paragraph (f)(2) of this section. Under para- graph (f)(5) of this section, the identification ofAas the hedged item can be accomplished by identifying the positions in the intercompany transaction as hedges or hedged items, as appropriate. Thus, sub- stantially contemporaneous with entering intoD,H may identifyCas the hedged item andOmay iden- tifyBas a hedge andAas the hedged item. Example 2.Separate-entity election; counter- party that does not mark to market. In addition to theGeneral Factsstated above, assume that the group makes a separate-entity election under para- graph (e)(2) of this section. IfHdoes not markCto market under its method of accounting, thenBis not a hedging transaction, and theB-Cintercompany transaction is taken into account under the rules of section 1502.Dis not a hedging transaction with respect toA, butDmay be a hedging transaction with respect toCifCis ordinary property or an ordinary obligation and if the other requirements of paragraph (b) of this section are met. IfDis not part of a hedging transaction, thenDmay be part of a straddle for purposes of section 1092. 2002–14 I.R.B.712April 8, 2002 Example 3.Separate-entity election; counter- party that marks to market. The facts are the same as inExample 2above, except thatHmarksCto market under its method of accounting. Also assume thatBwould be a hedging transaction with respect to riskAifOhad entered into that transaction with an unrelated party. Thus, forO, theB-Ctransaction is an intercompany hedging transaction with respect toO’s riskA, the character and timing rules of §1.1502–13 do not apply to theB-Ctransaction, andH’s income, deduction, gain, or loss fromCis ordinary. However, other attributes of the items from theB-Ctransaction are determined under §1.1502–13.Dis a hedging transaction with respect toCif it meets the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section. (f)Identification and recordkeeping— (1)Same-day identification of hedging transactions. Under section 1221(a)(7), a taxpayer that enters into a hedging trans- action (including recycling an existing hedging transaction) must clearly identify it as a hedging transaction before the close of the day on which the taxpayer acquired, originated, or entered into the transaction (or recycled the existing hedg- ing transaction). (2)Substantially contemporaneous identification of hedged item—(i)Content of the identification. A taxpayer that enters into a hedging transaction must identify the item, items, or aggregate risk being hedged. Identification of an item being hedged generally involves identify- ing a transaction that creates risk, and the type of risk that the transaction creates. For example, if a taxpayer is hedging the price risk with respect to its June pur- chases of corn inventory, the transaction being hedged is the June purchase of corn and the risk is price movements in the market where the taxpayer buys its corn. For additional rules concerning the con- tent of this identification, see paragraph (f)(3) of this section. (ii)Timing of the identification. The identification required by this paragraph (f)(2) must be made substantially contem- poraneously with entering into the hedg- ing transaction. An identification is not substantially contemporaneous if it is made more than 35 days after entering into the hedging transaction. (3)Identification requirements for cer- tain hedging transactions. In the case of the hedging transactions described in this paragraph (f)(3), the identification under paragraph (f)(2) of this section must include the information specified. (i)Anticipatory asset hedges.Ifthe hedging transaction relates to the antici- pated acquisition of assets by the tax- payer, the identification must include the expected date or dates of acquisition and the amounts expected to be acquired. (ii)Inventory hedges. If the hedging transaction relates to the purchase or sale of inventory by the taxpayer, the identifi- cation is made by specifying the type or class of inventory to which the transac- tion relates. If the hedging transaction relates to specific purchases or sales, the identification must also include the expected dates of the purchases or sales and the amounts to be purchased or sold. (iii)Hedges of debt of the taxpayer— (A)Existing debt. If the hedging transac- tion relates to accruals or payments under an issue of existing debt of the taxpayer, the identification must specify the issue and, if the hedge is for less than the full issue price or the full term of the debt, the amount of the issue price and the term covered by the hedge. (B)Debt to be issued. If the hedging transaction relates to the expected issu- ance of debt by the taxpayer or to accru- als or payments under debt that is expected to be issued by the taxpayer, the identification must specify the following information: the expected date of issu- ance of the debt; the expected maturity or maturities; the total expected issue price; and the expected interest provisions. If the hedge is for less than the entire expected issue price of the debt or the full expected term of the debt, the identifica- tion must also include the amount or the term being hedged. The identification may indicate a range of dates, terms, and amounts, rather than specific dates, terms, or amounts. For example, a taxpayer might identify a transaction as hedging the yield on an anticipated issuance of fixed rate debt during the second half of its fiscal year, with the anticipated amount of the debt between $75 million and $125 million, and an anticipated term of approximately 20 to 30 years. (iv)Hedges of aggregate risk—(A) Required identification. If a transaction hedges aggregate risk as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section, the iden- tification under paragraph (f)(2) of this section must include a description of the risk being hedged and of the hedging pro- gram under which the hedging transaction was entered. This requirement may be met by placing in the taxpayer’s records a description of the hedging program and by establishing a system under which individual transactions can be identified as being entered into pursuant to the pro- gram. (B)Description of hedging program.A description of a hedging program must include an identification of the type of risk being hedged, a description of the type of items giving rise to the risk being aggregated, and sufficient additional information to demonstrate that the pro- gram is designed to reduce aggregate risk of the type identified. If the program con- tains controls on speculation (for example, position limits), the description of the hedging program must also explain how the controls are established, commu- nicated, and implemented. April 8, 20027132002–14 I.R.B. (v)Transactions that counteract hedg- ing transactions. If the hedging transac- tion is described in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, the description of the hedg- ing transaction must include an identifica- tion of the risk management transaction that is being offset and the original under- lying hedged item. (4)Manner of identification and records to be retained—(i)Inclusion of identification in tax records. The identifi- cation required by this paragraph (f) must be made on, and retained as part of, the taxpayer’s books and records. (ii)Presence of identification must be unambiguous. The presence of an identi- fication for purposes of this paragraph (f) must be unambiguous. The identification of a hedging transaction for financial accounting or regulatory purposes does not satisfy this requirement unless the taxpayer’s books and records indicate that the identification is also being made for tax purposes. The taxpayer may indicate that individual hedging transactions, or a class or classes of hedging transactions, that are identified for financial accounting or regulatory purposes are also being identified as hedging transactions for pur- poses of this section. (iii)Manner of identification. The tax- payer may separately and explicitly make each identification, or, so long as para- graph (f)(4)(ii) of this section is satisfied, the taxpayer may establish a system pur- suant to which the identification is indi- cated by the type of transaction or by the manner in which the transaction is con- summated or recorded. An identification under this system is made at the later of the time that the system is established or the time that the transaction satisfies the terms of the system by being entered, or by being consummated or recorded, in the designated fashion. (iv)Principles of paragraph (f)(4)(iii) of this section illustrated. Paragraphs (f)(4)(iv)(A) through (C) of this section illustrate the principles of paragraph (f)(4)(iii) of this section and assume that the other requirements of this paragraph (f) are satisfied. (A) A taxpayer can make an identifica- tion by designating a hedging transaction for (or placing it in) an account that has been identified as containing only hedges of a specified item (or of specified items or specified aggregate risk). (B) A taxpayer can make an identifica- tion by including and retaining in its books and records a statement that desig- nates all future transactions in a specified derivative product as hedges of a speci- fied item, items, or aggregate risk. (C) A taxpayer can make an identifica- tion by designating a certain mark, a cer- tain form, or a certain legend as meaning that a transaction is a hedge of a specified item (or of specified items or a specified aggregate risk). Identification can be made by placing the designated mark on a record of the transaction (for example, trading ticket, purchase order, or trade confirmation) or by using the designated form or a record that contains the desig- nated legend. (5)Identification of hedges involving membersofthesameconsolidated group—(i)General rule: single-entity approach. A member of a consolidated group must satisfy the requirements of this paragraph (f) as if all of the members of the group were divisions of a single corporation. Thus, the member entering into the hedging transaction with a third party must identify the hedging transac- tion under paragraph (f)(1) of this section. Under paragraph (f)(2) of this section, that member must also identify the item, items, or aggregate risk that is being hedged, even if the item, items, or aggre- gate risk relates primarily or entirely to other members of the group. If the mem- bers of a group use intercompany transac- tions to transfer risk within the group, the requirements of paragraph (f)(2) of this section may be met by identifying the intercompany transactions, and the risks hedged by the intercompany transactions, as hedges or hedged items, as appropriate. Because identification of the intercom- pany transaction as a hedge serves solely to identify the hedged item, the identifica- tion is timely if made within the period required by paragraph (f)(2) of this sec- tion. For example, if a member transfers risk in an intercompany transaction, it may identify under the rules of this para- graph (f) both its position in that transac- tion and the item, items, or aggregate risk being hedged. The member that hedges the risk outside the group may identify under the rules of this paragraph (f) both its position with the third party and its position in the intercompany transaction. Paragraph (e)(4)Example 1of this sec- tion illustrates this identification. (ii)Rule for consolidated groups mak- ing the separate-entity election. If a con- solidated group makes the separate-entity election under paragraph (e)(2) of this section, each member of the group must satisfy the requirements of this paragraph (f) as though it were not a member of a consolidated group. (6)Consistencywithsection 1256(e)(2). Any identification for pur- poses of section 1256(e)(2) is also an identification for purposes of paragraph (f)(1) of this section. (g)Effect of identification and non- identification—(1)Transactions identi- fied—(i)In general. If a taxpayer identi- fies a transaction as a hedging transaction for purposes of paragraph (f)(1) of this section, the identification is binding with respect to gain, whether or not all of the requirements of paragraph (f) of this sec- tion are satisfied. Thus, gain from that transaction is ordinary income. If the transaction is not in fact a hedging trans- action described in paragraph (b) of this section, however, paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section do not apply and the character of loss is determined without reference to whether the transaction is a surrogate for a noncapital asset, serves as insurance against a business risk, serves a hedging function, or serves a similar function or purpose. Thus, the taxpayer’s identification of the transaction as a hedg- ing transaction does not itself make loss from the transaction ordinary. (ii)Inadvertent identification. Not- withstanding paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section, if the taxpayer identifies a trans- action as a hedging transaction for pur- poses of paragraph (f) of this section, the character of the gain is determined as if the transaction had not been identified as a hedging transaction if— (A) The transaction is not a hedging transaction (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section); (B) The identification of the transac- tion as a hedging transaction was due to inadvertent error; and (C) All of the taxpayer’s transactions in all open years are being treated on either original or, if necessary, amended returns in a manner consistent with the principles of this section. 2002–14 I.R.B.714April 8, 2002 (2)Transactions not identified—(i)In general. Except as provided in paragraphs (g)(2)(ii) and (iii) of this section, the absence of an identification that satisfies the requirements of paragraph (f)(1) of this section is binding and establishes that a transaction is not a hedging transaction. Thus, subject to the exceptions, the rules of paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this sec- tion do not apply, and the character of gain or loss is determined without refer- ence to whether the transaction is a surro- gate for a noncapital asset, serves as insurance against a business risk, serves a hedging function, or serves a similar function or purpose. (ii)Inadvertent error. If a taxpayer does not make an identification that satis- fies the requirements of paragraph (f) of this section, the taxpayer may treat gain or loss from the transaction as ordinary income or loss under paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this section if— (A) The transaction is a hedging trans- action (as defined in paragraph (b) of this section); (B) The failure to identify the transac- tion was due to inadvertent error; and (C) All of the taxpayer’s hedging transactions in all open years are being treated on either original or, if necessary, amended returns as provided in para- graphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section. (iii)Anti-abuse rule. If a taxpayer does not make an identification that satisfies all the requirements of paragraph (f) of this section but the taxpayer has no rea- sonable grounds for treating the transac- tion as other than a hedging transaction, then gain from the transaction is ordinary. The reasonableness of the taxpayer’s fail- ure to identify a transaction is determined by taking into consideration not only the requirements of paragraph (b) of this sec- tion but also the taxpayer’s treatment of the transaction for financial accounting or other purposes and the taxpayer’s identi- fication of similar transactions as hedging transactions. (3)Transactions by members of a con- solidated group—(i)Single-entity app- roach. If a consolidated group is under the general rule of paragraph (e)(1) of this section (the single-entity approach), the rules of this paragraph (g) apply only to transactions that are not intercompany transactions. (ii)Separate-entity election. If a con- solidated group has made the election under paragraph (e)(2) of this section, then, in addition to the rules of para- graphs (g)(1) and (2) of this section, the following rules apply: (A) If an intercompany transaction is identified as a hedging transaction but does not meet the requirements of para- graphs (e)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this sec- tion, then, notwithstanding any contrary provision in§1.1502–13, each party to the transaction is subject to the rules of paragraph (g)(1) of this section with respect to the transaction as though it had incorrectly identified its position in the transaction as a hedging transaction. (B) If a transaction meets the require- ments of paragraphs (e)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of this section but the transaction is not identified as a hedging transaction, each party to the transaction is subject to the rules of paragraph (g)(2) of this section. (Because the transaction is an intercom- pany hedging transaction, the character and timing rules of§1.1502–13 do not apply. See paragraph (e)(2)(iii)(A) of this section.) (h)Effective date. The rules of this section apply to transactions entered into on or after March 20, 2002. Par. 4. Section 1.1256(e)–1 is revised to read as follows: §1.1256(e)–1 Identification of hedging transactions. (a)Identification and recordkeeping requirements. Under section 1256(e)(2), a taxpayer that enters into a hedging trans- action must identify the transaction as a hedging transaction before the close of the day on which the taxpayer enters into the transaction. (b)Requirements for identification. The identification of a hedging transac- tion for purposes of section 1256(e)(2) mustsatisfytherequirementsof §1.1221–2(f)(1). Solely for purposes of section 1256(f)(1), however, an identifi- cation that does not satisfy all of the requirements of§1.1221–2(f)(1) is nev- ertheless treated as an identification under section 1256(e)(2). (c)Consistency with§1.1221–2. Any identification for purposes of§1.1221– 2(f)(1) is also an identification for pur- poses of this section. If a taxpayer satis- fies the requirements of§1.1221– 2(f)(1)(ii), the transaction is treated as if it were not identified as a hedging trans- action for purposes of section 1256(e)(2). (d)Effective date. The rules of this section apply to transactions entered into on or after March 20, 2002. PART 602—OMB CONTROL NUM- BERS UNDER THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT Par. 5. The authority citation for part 602 continues to read as follows: Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805. Par.6.In§602.101, paragraph (b) is amended by removing the entries for “1.1221–2,”“1.1221–2(d)(2)(iv),” “1.1221–2(e)(5),”“1.1221–2(g)(5)(ii),” “1.1221–2(g)(6)(ii),”“1.1221– 2(g)(6)(iii),”and“1.1221–2T(c)”and adding an entry in numerical order to the table to read as follows: §602.101 OMB Control numbers. ***** (b)*** CFR part or section where identified and described Current OMB control No. ***** 1.1221–2 ...................................................................................................................................................................1545–1480 ***** April 8, 20027152002–14 I.R.B. Robert E. Wenzel, Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Approved March 14, 2002. Mark Weinberger, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. (Filed by the Office of the Federal Register on March 15, 2002, 8:54 a.m., and published in the issue of the Federal Register for March 20, 2002, 67 F.R. 12863) Section 1274.—Determin- ation of Issue Price in the Case of Certain Debt Instruments Issued for Property (Also sections 42, 280G, 382, 412, 467, 468, 482, 483, 642, 807, 846, 1288, 7520, 7872.) Federal rates; adjusted federal rates; adjusted federal long-term rate and the long-term exempt rate. For pur- poses of sections 382, 1274, 1288, and other sections of the Code, tables set forth the rates for April 2002. Rev. Rul. 2002–17 This revenue ruling provides various prescribed rates for federal income tax purposes for April 2002 (the current month). Table 1 contains the short-term, mid-term, and long-term applicable fed- eral rates (AFR) for the current month for purposes of section 1274(d) of the Inter- nal Revenue Code. Table 2 contains the short-term, mid-term, and long-term adjusted applicable federal rates (adjusted AFR) for the current month for purposes of section 1288(b). Table 3 sets forth the adjusted federal long-term rate and the long-term tax-exempt rate described in section 382(f). Table 4 contains the appropriate percentages for determining the low-income housing credit described in section 42(b)(2) for buildings placed in service during the current month. Finally, Table 5 contains the federal rate for deter- mining the present value of an annuity, an interest for life or for a term of years, or a remainder or a reversionary interest for purposes of section 7520. REV. RUL. 2002–17 TABLE 1 Applicable Federal Rates (AFR) for April 2002 Period for Compounding AnnualSemiannualQuarterlyMonthly Short-Term AFR2.88%2.86%2.85%2.84% 110% AFR3.17%3.15%3.14%3.13% 120% AFR3.46%3.43%3.42%3.41% 130% AFR3.75%3.72%3.70%3.69% Mid-Term AFR4.65%4.60%4.57%4.56% 110% AFR5.12%5.06%5.03%5.01% 120% AFR5.60%5.52%5.48%5.46% 130% AFR6.07%5.98%5.94%5.91% 150% AFR7.02%6.90%6.84%6.80% 175% AFR8.21%8.05%7.97%7.92% Long-Term AFR5.62%5.54%5.50%5.48% 110% AFR6.18%6.09%6.04%6.01% 120% AFR6.76%6.65%6.60%6.56% 130% AFR7.33%7.20%7.14%7.09% 2002–14 I.R.B.716April 8, 2002 REV. RUL. 2002–17 TABLE 2 Adjusted AFR for April 2002 Period for Compounding AnnualSemiannualQuarterlyMonthly Short-term adjusted AFR2.08%2.07%2.06%2.06% Mid-term adjusted AFR3.52%3.49%3.47%3.46% Long-term adjusted AFR4.87%4.81%4.78%4.76% REV. RUL. 2002–17 TABLE 3 Rates Under Section 382 for April 2002 Adjusted federal long-term rate for the current month4.87% Long-term tax-exempt rate for ownership changes during the current month (the highest of the adjusted federal long-term rates for the current month and the prior two months.)5.01% REV. RUL. 2002–17 TABLE 4 Appropriate Percentages Under Section 42(b)(2) for April 2002 Appropriate percentage for the 70% present value low-income housing credit8.20% Appropriate percentage for the 30% present value low-income housing credit3.51% April 8, 20027172002–14 I.R.B. REV. RUL. 2002–17 TABLE 5 Rate Under Section 7520 for April 2002 Applicable federal rate for determining the present value of an annuity, an interest for life or a term of years, or a remainder or reversionary interest5.6% Section 1288.—Treatment of Original Issue Discounts on Tax-Exempt Obligations The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 1361.—S Corporation Defined 26 CFR 1.1361–1: S Corporation defined. Under what conditions will the Internal Revenue Service consider a request for a ruling that an undi- vided interest in rental real property (other than a mineral property as defined in§614) is not an inter- est in a business entity within the meaning of §301.7701–3 of the Procedure and Administration Regulations? See Rev. Proc. 2002–22, page 733. Section 4401.—Imposition of Ta x Ct. D. 2073 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 00–507 CHICKASAW NATIONv. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 27, 2001* Syllabus The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (Gaming Act) provides, as relevant here, that Internal Revenue Code (Code) provi- sions“(including [Secs.] 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35...) concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes”with respect to gambling opera- tions shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. 25 U.S.C.Sec.2719(d)(i).Chapter35 imposestaxes from which it exempts cer- tain state-controlled gambling activities, but says nothing about taxreporting or withholding. Petitioners, the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, claim that the Gam- ing Act subsection’s explicit parenthetical reference exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which the States are exempt. Rejecting that claim, the Tenth Circuit held that the subsection applies only to Code provisions concern- ing tax withholding and reporting. Held: Section 2719(d)(i) does not exempt tribes from paying the gambling- related taxes that chapter 35 imposes. Pp. 3–11. (a) The subsection’s language outside the parenthetical says that the subsection applies to Code provisions concerning reporting and withholding, and the other four parenthetical references arguably concern reporting and withholding. The Tribes nonetheless claim that the subsec- tion’s explicit parenthetical reference to chapter 35 expands the Gaming Act’s scope beyond reporting and withholding provisions—to the tax-imposing provi- sions that chapter 35 contains—and at the very least gives the subsection an ambiguity that can be resolved by apply- ing the canon that statutes are to be con- strued liberally in favor of Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit. Rejecting their argument reduces the chapter 35 phrase to surplusage, but there is no other reasonable reading of the statute. Pp. 3–4. (b) The statute’s language is too strong to give the chapter 35 reference indepen- dent operative effect. The unambiguous language outside the parenthetical says without qualification that the subsection applies to“provisions...concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes”; and the language inside the parenthetical, prefaced with the word“including,”liter- ally says the same, since to“include” means to“contain.”The use of parenthe- ses emphasizes the fact that that which is within is meant simply to be illustrative. To give the chapter 35 reference indepen- dent operative effect would require seri- ously rewriting the rest of the statute. One would have to read“including”to mean what it does not mean, namely,“includ- ing. . . and.”To read the language outside the parenthetical as if it referred to (1) Code provisions concerning tax reporting and withholding and (2) those“concern- ing...wagering operations”would be far too convoluted to believe Congress intended it. There is no reason to think Congress intended to sweep within the subsection’s scope every Code provision concerning wagering. The subject matter at issue—tax exemption—also coun- sels against accepting the Tribes’inter- pretation. This Court can find no com- parable instance in which Congress *Together withChoctaw Nation of Oklahoma v. United States(see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court. 2002–14 I.R.B.718April 8, 2002 legislated an exemption through a paren- thetical numerical cross-reference. Since the more plausible role for the parentheti- cal to play in this subsection is that of providing an illustrative list of examples, common sense suggests that“chapter 35” is simply a bad example that Congress included inadvertently, a drafting mistake. Pp. 4–6. (c) The Gaming Act’s legislative his- tory on balance supports this Court’s con- clusion. And the canons of interpretation to which the Tribes point—that every clause and word of a statute should be given effect and that statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit—do not determine how to read this statute. First, the canons are guides that need not be conclusive.Cir- cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115. To accept these canons as con- clusive here would produce an interpreta- tion that the Court firmly believes would conflict with congressional intent. Sec- ond, specific canons are often countered by some maxim pointing in a different direction.Ibid. The canon requiring a court to give effect to each word“if pos- sible”is sometimes offset by the canon permitting a court to reject words as mere surplusage if inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute. More- over, the pro-Indian canon is offset by the canon warning against interpreting fed- eral statutes as providing tax exemptions unless the exemptions are clearly expressed. Given the individualized nature of this Court’s previous cases, one cannot say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger, particularly where the interpretation of a congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at issue. Pp. 6–11. 208 F.3d 871 (first judgment); 210 F.3d 389 (second judgment), affirmed. BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, and GINS- BURG, JJ., joined, and in all but Part II-B of which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O’CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 00–507 CHICKASAW NATION, PETITIONERv. UNITED STATES CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, PETITIONERv. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 27, 2001 JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.* In these cases, we must decide whether a particular subsection in the Indian Gam- ing Regulatory Act, 102 Stat. 2467–2486, 25 U.S.C. Secs. 2701–2721 (1994 ed.), exempts tribes from paying the gambling- related taxes that chapter 35 of the Inter- nal Revenue Code imposes—taxes that States need not pay. We hold that it does not create such an exemption. I The relevant Indian Gaming Regula- tory Act (Gaming Act) subsection, as codified in 25 U.S.C. Sec. 2719(d)(i), reads as follows: “The provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986] (including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and chapter 35 of such Code) concerning the reporting and with- holding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations conducted pursu- ant to this chapter, or under a Tribal- State compact entered into under section 2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in the same manner as such provisions apply to State gam- ing and wagering operations.” The subsection says that Internal Revenue Code provisions that“concer[n] the reporting and withholding of taxes”with respect to gambling operations shall apply to Indian tribes in the same way as they apply to States. The subsection also says in its parenthetical that those provi- sions“includ[e]”Internal Revenue Code “chapter 35.”Chapter 35, however, says nothing about thereportingor thewith- holdingof taxes. Rather, that chapter sim- plyimposestaxes—excise taxes and occupational taxes related to gambling— from which it exempts certain state- controlled gambling activities. See,e.g., 26 U.S.C. Sec. 4401(a) (1994 ed.) (imposing 0.25% excise tax on each wager); Sec. 4411 (imposing $50 occupa- tional tax on each individual engaged in wagering business); Sec. 4402(3) (exempting state-operated gambling operations, such as lotteries). In this lawsuit two Native American Indian Tribes, the Choctaw and Chick- asaw Nations, claim that the Gaming Act subsection exempts them from paying those chapter 35 taxes from which States are exempt. Brief for Petitioners 34–36. They rest their claim upon the subsec- tion’s explicit parenthetical reference to chapter 35. The Tenth Circuit rejected their claim on the ground that the subsec- tion, despite its parenthetical reference, applies only to Code provisions that con- cern the“reporting and withholding of taxes.”208 F.3d 871, 883–884 (2000); see also 210 F.3d 389 (2000). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, how- ever, reached the opposite conclusion. Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1361, 1366 (2000). We granted certiorari in order to resolve the conflict. We agree with the Tenth Circuit. II The Tribes’basic argument rests upon the subsection’s explicit reference to “chapter 35”—contained in a parentheti- cal that refers to four other Internal Rev- enue Code provisions as well. The sub- section’slanguageoutsidethe parenthetical says that the subsection applies to those Internal Revenue Code provisions that concern“reporting and withholding.”The other four parentheti- cal references are to provisions that con- cern, or at least arguably concern, report- ing and withholding. See 26 U.S.C. Sec. 1441 (withholding of taxes for nonresi- dent alien); Sec. 3402(q) (withholding of *JUSTICE SCALIA and JUSTICE THOMAS join all but Part II-B of this opinion. April 8, 20027192002–14 I.R.B. taxes from certain gambling winnings); 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6041 (reporting by busi- nesses of payments, including payments of gambling winnings, to others); Sec. 6050I (reporting by businesses of large cash receipts, arguably applicable to cer- tain gambling winnings or receipts). But what about chapter 35? The Tribes correctly point out that chapter 35 has nothing to do with“reporting and with- holding.”Brief for Petitioners 28–29. They add that the reference must serve some purpose, and the only purpose that the Tribes can find is that of expanding the scope of the Gaming Act’s subsection beyond reporting and withholding provi- sions—to the tax-imposing provisions that chapter 35 does contain. The Gaming Act therefore must exempt them (like States) from those tax payment require- ments. The Tribes add that at least the reference to chapter 35 makes the subsec- tion ambiguous. And they ask us to resolve the ambiguity by applying a spe- cial Indian-related interpretative canon, namely,“‘statutes are to be construed lib- erally in favor of the Indians’with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”Brief for Petitioners 13 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). We cannot accept the Tribes’claim. We agree with the Tribes that rejecting their argument reduces the phrase “(including...chapter 35)...”to sur- plusage. Nonetheless we can find no other reasonable reading of the statute. A The language of the statute is too strong to bend as the Tribes would wish —i.e., so that it gives the chapter 35 ref- erence independent operative effect. For one thing, the language outside the paren- thetical is unambiguous. It says without qualification that the subsection applies to “provisions...concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes.”And the lan- guage inside the parenthetical, prefaced with the word“including,”literally says the same. To“include”is to“contain”or “comprise as part of a whole.”Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 609 (1985). In this instance, that which“con- tains”the parenthetical references—the “whole”of which the references are “parts”—is the phrase“provisions... concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes....”The use of parentheses emphasizes the fact that that which is within is meant simply to be illustrative, hence redundant—a circumstance under- scored by the lack of any suggestion that Congress intended the illustrative list to be complete. Cf. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 3406 (backup withholding provision not men- tioned in parenthetical). Nor can one give the chapter 35 refer- ence independent operative effect without seriously rewriting the language of the rest of the statute. One would have to read the word“including”to mean what it does not mean, namely,“including... and.”One would have to read the statute as if, for example, it placed“chapter 35” outside the parenthetical and said“provi- sions of the...Codeincluding chapter 35 and also provisions. . . concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes....” Or, one would have to read the language as if it said“provisions of the...Code . . . concerningthe taxation andthe reporting and withholding of taxes....” We mention this latter possibility because the congressional bill that became the law before us once did read that way. But when the bill left committee, it contained not the emphasized words (“the taxation and”) but the cross-reference to chapter 35. We recognize the Tribes’claim (made here for the first time) that one could avoid rewriting the statute by reading the language outside the parenthetical as if it referred to two kinds of“provisions of the . . . Code”: first those“concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming,” and, second, those“concerning... wagering operations.”See Reply Brief for Petitioners 8–10. The subsection’s gram- mar literally permits this reading. But that reading, even if ultimately comprehen- sible, is far too convoluted to believe Congress intended it. Nor is there any reason to think Congress intended to sweep within the subsection’s scope every Internal Revenue Code provision concerning wagering—a result that this unnatural reading would accomplish. The subject matter at issue also coun- sels against accepting the Tribes’inter- pretation. That subject matter is tax exemption. When Congress enacts a tax exemption, it ordinarily does so explic- itly. We can find no comparable instance in which Congress legislated an exemp- tion through an inexplicit numerical cross-reference—especially a cross- reference that might easily escape notice. As we have said, the more plausible role for the parenthetical to play in this subsection is that of providing an illustra- tive list of examples. So considered, “chapter 35”is simply a bad example— an example that Congress included inad- vertently. The presence of a bad example in a statute does not warrant rewriting the remainder of the statute’s language. Nor does it necessarily mean that the statute is ambiguous,i.e.,“capable of being under- stood in two or more possible senses or ways.”Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 77 (1985). Indeed, in ordinary life, we would understand an analogous instruction—say,“Test drive some cars, including Plymouth, Nissan, Chevrolet, Ford, and Kitchenaid”—not as creating ambiguity, but as reflecting a mistake. Here too, in context, common sense sug- gests that the cross-reference is simply a drafting mistake, a failure to delete an inappropriate cross-reference in the bill that Congress later enacted into law. Cf. Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1383, 1385 (CA Fed. 2000) (Dyk, J., dis- senting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The language of the provision has all the earmarks of a simple mistake in legis- lative drafting”). B The Gaming Act’s legislative history on balance supports our conclusion. The subsection as it appeared in the original Senate bill applied both to taxation and to reporting and withholding. It read as fol- lows: “Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code . . . concerningthe taxation andthe reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to gambling or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations...the same as they apply to State opera- tions,”S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1987). With the“taxation”language present, it would have made sense to include chap- ter 35, which concerns taxation, in a par- enthetical that included other provisions that concern reporting and withholding. But the Senate committee deleted the taxation language. Why did it permit the 2002–14 I.R.B.720April 8, 2002 cross-reference to chapter 35 to remain? Committee documents do not say. The Tribes argue that the committee intentionally left it in the statute in order to serve as asubstitutefor the word “taxation.”Anamicustries to support this view by pointing to a tribal representa- tive’s testimony that certain Tribes were “opposed to any indication where Internal Revenue would be collecting taxes from the tribal bingo operations.”Hearings on S. 555 and S. 1303 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 109 (1987) (state- ment of Lionel John, Executive Director of United South and Eastern Tribes). Other Tribes thought the“taxation”lan- guage too“vague,”preferring a clear statement“that the Internal Revenue Ser- vice is not being granted authority to tax tribes.”Id., at 433, 435 (statement of Charles W. Blackwell, Representative of the American Indian Tribal Government and Policy Consultants, Inc.). Substitution of“chapter 35”for the word“taxation,”however, could not have served the tribal witnesses purposes, for doing so took from the bill the very words that made clear the tribes would notbe taxed and substituted language that made it more likely they would be taxed. Nor can we believe that anyone seeking to grant a tax exemption would intention- ally substitute a confusion-generating numerical cross-reference, see Part A, supra, for pre-existing language that unambiguously carried out that objective. It is far easier to believe that the drafters, having included the entire parenthetical while the word“taxation”was still part of the bill, unintentionally failed to remove what had become a superfluous numerical cross-reference—particularly since the tax-knowledgeable Senate Finance Com- mittee never received the opportunity to examine the bill. Cf. S. Doc. No. 100–1, Senate Manual, 30 (1987) (proposed leg- islation concerning revenue measures shall be referred to the Committee on Finance). Finally, the Tribes point to a letter written by one of the Gaming Act’s authors, stating that“by including refer- ence to Chapter 35,”Congress intended “that the tax treatment of wagers con- ducted by tribal governments be the same as that for wagers conducted by state gov- ernments under Chapter 35.”App. to Pet. for Cert. 113a. This letter, however, was written after the event. It expresses the views of only one member of the commit- tee. And it makes no effort to explain the critical legislative circumstance, namely, the elimination of the word“taxation” from the bill. The letter may express the Senator’s interpretive preference, but that preference cannot overcome the language of the statute and the related consider- ations we have discussed. SeeHeintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298 (1995) (A “statement [made] not during the legisla- tive process, butafterthe statute became law...isnotastatement upon which other legislators might have relied in vot- ing for or against the Act, but it simply represents the views of one informed per- son on an issue about which others may (or may not) have thought differently”). Cf.New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 564, n. 18 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The comments...ofasingle Congressman, delivered long after the original passage of the [act at issue], are of no aid in deter- mining congressional intent...”). In sum, to adopt the Tribes’interpreta- tion would read back into the Act the very word“taxation”that the Senate commit- tee deleted. We ordinarily will not assume that Congress intended“‘to enact statu- tory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.’”INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987) (quotingNachman Corp. v. Pen- sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U.S. 359, 392–393 (1980));Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (same);Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 157 (1973) (same). There is no special reason for doing so here. C The Tribes point to canons of interpre- tation that favor their position. The Court has often said that“‘every clause and word of a statute’”should,“‘if possible,’” be given“‘effect.’”United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–539 (1955) (quotingMontclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). The Tribes point out that our interpretation deprives the words “chapter 35”of any effect. The Court has also said that“statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766;South Carolina v. Catawba Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 520 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Tribes point out that our interpretation is not to the Indians’benefit. Nonetheless, these canons do not determine how to read this statute. For one thing, canons are not mandatory rules. They are guides that“need not be conclusive.”Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001). They are designed to help judges determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied in par- ticular statutory language. And other cir- cumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force. In this instance, to accept as conclusive the can- ons on which the Tribes rely would pro- duce an interpretation that we conclude would conflict with the intent embodied in the statute Congress wrote. Cf.Cho- teau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931) (upholding taxation where congressional intent reasonably clear);Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935) (same);Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra(same). In light of the considerations discussed ear- lier, we cannot say that the statute is “fairly capable”of two interpretations, cf. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, supra, at 766, nor that the Tribes’interpretation is fairly “possible.” Specific canons“are often countered ...bysome maxim pointing in a differ- ent direction.”Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, supra, at 115. The canon requir- ing a court to give effect to each word“if possible”is sometimes offset by the canon that permits a court to reject words “as surplusage”if“inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute ....”K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 525 (1960). And the latter canon has particular force here where the surplus words consist simply of a numeri- cal cross-reference in a parenthetical. Cf. Cabell Huntington Hospital, Inc. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 990 (CA4 1996) (“A parenthetical is, after all, a parentheti- cal, and it cannot be used to overcome the operative terms of the statute”). Moreover, the canon that assumes Congress intends its statutes to benefit the tribes is offset by the canon that warns us against interpreting federal statutes as April 8, 20027212002–14 I.R.B. providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed. See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988) (“[E]xemptions from taxation...must be unambiguously proved”);Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956) (“[T]o be valid, exemptions to tax laws should be clearly expressed”); United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939) (“Exemptions from taxation do not rest upon implication”). Nor can one say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger—particularly where the interpretation of a congres- sional statute, rather than an Indian treaty, is at issue. Cf.post, at 7. This Court’s earlier cases are too individualized, involving too many different kinds of legal circumstances, to warrant any such assessment about the two canons’relative strength. Compare,e.g.,Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675–676 (1912) (interpret- ing statement in treaty-related Indian land patents that land is“nontaxable”as creat- ing property right invalidating later con- gressional effort to tax);Squire, supra,at 3 (Indian canon offsetting tax canon when related statutory provision and history make clear that language freeing Indian land“‘of all charge or incumbrance what- soever’”includes tax);McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (state tax violates principle of Indian sovereignty embodied in treaty), withMescalero, supra(relying on tax canon to find Indians taxable);Choteau, supralanguage makes clear no exemp- tion);Five Tribes, supra(same). Consequently, the canons here cannot make the difference for which the Tribes argue. We conclude that the judgments of the Tenth Circuit must be affirmed. It is so ordered. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 00–507 CHICKASAW NATION, PETITIONERv. UNITED STATES CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, PETITIONERv. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT November 27, 2001 JUSTICE O’CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins, dissenting. The Court today holds that 25 U.S.C. Sec. 2719(d) (1994 ed.) clearly and unambiguously fails to give Indian Nations (Nations) the exemption from federal wagering excise and related occu- pational taxes enjoyed by the States. Because I believe Sec. 2719(d) is subject to more than one interpretation, and because“statutes are to be construed lib- erally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit,”Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985), I respectfully dis- sent. I I agree with the Court that Sec. 2719(d) incorporates an error in drafting. I disagree, however, that the section’s ref- erence to chapter 35 is necessarily that error. As originally proposed in the Senate, the bill that became the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) would have applied all gambling and wagering- related sections of the Internal Revenue Code to the Nations in the same manner as the States: “Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, concerning the taxa- tion and the reporting and withhold- ing of taxes with respect to gam- bling or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations conducted pursuant to this Act the same as they apply to State opera- tions.”S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 37 (1987). The Senate Indian Affairs Committee altered the language of this bill in two contradictory ways. It restricted the appli- cable Code sections to those relating to the“reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings”from gam- ing operations. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 2719(d). It also added a parenthetical listing specific Code sections to be applied to the Nations in the same manner as the States, includ- ing chapter 35, a Code provision that relates to gambling operations generally, but not to the reporting and withholding of gambling winnings.Ibid. One of these two changes must have been made in error. There is no reason to assume, however, that it must have been the latter. It is equally likely that Con- gress intended Sec. 2719(d) to apply chapter 35 to the Nations, but adopted too restrictive a general characterization of the applicable sections. The Court can do no more than specu- late that the bill’s drafters included the parenthetical while the original restriction was in place and failed to remove it when that restriction was altered. Seeante,at7. Both the inclusion of the parenthetical and the alteration of the restriction occurred in the Senate committee, S. Rep. No. 100–446 (1988), and there is no way to determine the order in which they were adopted. If the parenthetical was added after the restriction, one could just as eas- ily characterize therestrictionas an unin- tentional holdover from a previous ver- sion of the bill. True, reading the statute to grant the Nations the exemption requires the sec- tion’s reference to the“reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings”from gaming operations to sus- tain a meaning the words themselves can- not bear. But the Court’s reading of the statute fares no better: It requires excising from Sec. 2719(d) Congress’explicit ref- erence to chapter 35. This goes beyond treating statutory language as mere sur- plusage. SeePotter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 446 (1894) (the presence of statutory language“cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; it means something”); cf.ante, at 3. Surplusage is redundant statutory language,Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 697–698 (1995); W. Pop- kin, Materials on Legislation: Political Language and the Political Process 214 (3d ed. 2001)—the Court’s reading negates language that undeniably bears separate meaning. This is not a step to be undertaken lightly. Bothapproaches, therefore, require rewriting the statute, seeante, at 4. Nei- ther of these rewritings is necessarily more“serious”than the other: At most, each involves doing no more than revers- ing a change made in committee. Cf. ante,at4–5. 2002–14 I.R.B.722April 8, 2002 The Court argues that because the ref- erence to chapter 35 occurs in a paren- thetical, negating this language does less damage to the statute than concluding that the restrictive language outside the paren- thetical is too narrowly drawn. I am aware of no generally accepted canon of statutory construction favoring language outside of parentheses to language within them, see,e.g., W. Eskridge, P. Frickey, & E. Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation, App. C (2000) (listing can- ons), nor do I think it wise for the Court to adopt one today. The importance of statutory language depends not on its punctuation, but on its meaning. See United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Inde- pendent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454 (1993) (“[A] purported plain-meaning analysis based only on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk of distorting a statute’s true meaning”). The fact that the parenthetical is illus- trative does not change the analysis: If Congress’illustration does not match its general description, there is as much rea- son to question the description as the illustration. Where another general description is possible—and was in fact part of the bill at an earlier stage—Con- gress’choice of an example that matches the earlier description is at least ambigu- ous. Moreover, as Sec. 2719(d)’s paren- thetical specifically lists statutory sections to be applied to the Nations, one might in fact conclude that the doctrine that the specific governs the general,Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987), makes this specific parenthetical even more significant than the general restriction that follows. Nor is negating Congress’clear refer- ence to chapter 35 required by the policy behind the statute. If anything, congres- sional policy weighs in favor of the Nations. Congress’central purpose in enacting IGRA was“to provide a statu- tory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self- sufficiency, and strong tribal govern- ments.”Sec. 2702(1). Exempting Nations from federal gaming taxation in the same manner as States preserves the Nations’ sovereignty and avoids giving state gam- ing a competitive advantage that would interfere with the Nations’ability to raise revenue in this manner. II Because nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying policies of Sec. 2719(d) clearly resolves the contradiction inherent in the section, it is appropriate to turn to canons of statutory construction. The Nations urge the Court to rely upon the Indian canon, that“statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit,”Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S., at 766, as a basis for deciding that the error in Sec. 2719(d) lies in the restriction of the subclass, not in the spe- cific listing of chapter 35.“[R]ooted in the unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians,”County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985), the Indian canon presumes congressional intent to assist its wards to overcome the disadvan- tages our country has placed upon them. Consistent with this purpose, the Indian canon applies to statutes as well as trea- ties: The form of the enactment does not change the presumption that Congress generally intends to benefit the Nations. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, supra; County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992). In this case, because Con- gress has chosen gaming as a means of enabling the Nations to achieve self- sufficiency, the Indian canon rightly dic- tates that Congress should be presumed to have intended the Nations to receive more, rather than less, revenue from this enterprise. Of course, the Indian canon is not the only canon with potential applicability in this case. Also relevant is the taxation principle, that exemptions from taxation must be clearly expressed.United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939); see alsoante, at 10. These canons pull in opposite directions, the former favoring the Nations’preferred reading, and the latter favoring the Government’s. This Court has repeatedly held that, when these two canons conflict, the Indian canon predominates. InChoate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912), a State attempted to rely on the taxation principle to argue that a treaty provision making land granted to Indians nontaxable was merely a bounty, capable of being with- drawn at any time. The Court acknowl- edged the taxation principle, responding: “But in the Government’s dealings with the Indians, the rule is exactly the contrary. The construction, instead of being strict, is liberal; doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of [Indian nations.]Id.,at 674–675. InSquire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 3 (1956), the Federal Government had con- veyed land to the Nations“‘free of all charge or encumbrance whatsoever.’” Although this phrase did not expressly mention nontaxability, the Court held that the language“might well be sufficient to include taxation,”id., at 7. Invoking the Indian canon,id.,at6–7, we found the Nations exempt. Likewise, inMcClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), this Court inferred an exemption from state taxation of property inside reservations from a treaty reserving lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Nations. In doing so, the Court noted that: “It is true, of course, that exemptions from tax laws should, as a general rule, be clearly expressed. But we have in the past construed language far more ambigu- ous than this as providing a tax exemp- tion for Indians.”Id., at 176 (citing Squire,supra,at6). As the purpose behind the Indian canon is the same regardless of the form of enactment,supra, at 5, there is no rea- son to alter the Indian canon’s relative strength where a statute rather than a treaty is involved. Cf.ante, at 10. The primacy of the Indian canon over the taxation principle should not be surpris- ing, as this Court has also held that the general presumption supporting the legal- ity of executive action must yield to the Indian canon, a“counterpresumption spe- cific”to Indians.Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 194, n. 5 (1999). This Court has failed to apply the Indian canon to extend tax exemptions to the Nations only when nothing in the lan- guage of the underlying statute or treaty suggests the Nations should be exempted. The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616, 618–620 (1871) (finding no exemption for the Nations from language imposing April 8, 20027232002–14 I.R.B. taxes on certain“‘articles produced any- where within the exterior boundaries of the United States’”);Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691, 693–694 (1931) (finding no exemption in provisions“subject[ing] the income of‘every individual’to tax,” including“income‘from any source whatever’”);Superintendent of Five Civi- lized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935) (same);Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 155 (1973) (refusing to exempt the Nations from taxes on land use income based on lan- guage that“[o]n its face...exempts land and rights in land, not income derived from its use”).Mescaleroalso went fur- ther, suggesting that because of the taxa- tion principle, the Court would refuse to find such an exemption absent“clear statutory guidance.”Id., at 156.Mescale- ro’sformulation is admittedly in tension with the Court’s precedents giving the Indian canon primacy over the taxation principle where statutory language is ambiguous. AsMescalerowas decided on the same day as one of those very prece- dents,theunanimousdecisionin McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, supra, however, it cannot have intended to alter the Court’s established practice. Section 2719(d) provides an even more persuasive case for application of the Indian canon than any of our prece- dents. Here, the Court is not being asked to create out of vague language a tax exemption not specifically provided for in the statute. Instead, the Nations simply ask the Court to use the Indian canon as a tiebreaker between two equally plausible (or, in this case, equally implausible) con- structions of a troubled statute, one which specifically makes chapter 35’s tax exemption applicable to the Nations, and one which specifically does not. Breaking interpretive ties is one of the least contro- versial uses of any canon of statutory construction. See Eskridge, Frickey, & Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Inter- pretation, at 341 (“The weakest kind of substantive canon operates merely as a tiebreakerat the end of the interpretive analysis”). Faced with the unhappy choice of determining which part of a flawed statu- tory section is in error, I would thus rely upon the long-established Indian canon of construction and adopt the reading most favorable to the Nations. Section 7520.—Valuation Tables The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page 716. Section 7872.—Treatment of Loans With Below-Market Interest Rates The adjusted applicable federal short-term, mid- term, and long-term rates are set forth for the month of April 2002. See Rev. Rul. 2002–17, page716. 2002–14 I.R.B.724April 8, 2002 Part II. Treaties and Tax Legislation Subpart A.—Tax Conventions and Other Related Items April 8, 20027252002–14 I.R.B. 2002–14 I.R.B.726April 8, 2002 April 8, 20027272002–14 I.R.B. 2002–14 I.R.B.728April 8, 2002 April 8, 20027292002–14 I.R.B. Part III. Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous Tax Avoidance Using Inflated Basis Notice 2002–21 The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department have become aware of a type of transaction, described below, that is used by taxpayers to generate tax losses. This Notice alerts taxpayers and their representatives that the tax benefits purportedly generated by these transac- tions are not allowable for federal income tax purposes. This Notice also alerts tax- payers, their representatives, and promot- ers of these transactions of certain respon- sibilities that may arise from participating in these transactions. FACTS In general, the transaction involves the use of a loan assumption agreement to claim an inflated basis in assets acquired from another party. This inflated basis is claimed as a result of a transfer of assets in which a U.S. taxpayer (Taxpayer) becomes jointly and severally liable on indebtedness of the transferor of the assets (Transferor), with the indebtedness having a stated principal amount substan- tially in excess of the fair market value of the assets transferred. Transferor may not be subject to U.S. tax or otherwise may be indifferent to the federal income tax consequences of the transaction. In one variation of the transaction, Transferor borrows money from a lender (Lender) on a long term basis such as 30 years (the“Loan”). The amount borrowed may be in a foreign currency. Interest is payable at regular intervals, and principal is due at maturity. The Loan may permit prepayment. The Loan is made with full recourse to Transferor. Transferor uses the proceeds to pur- chase assets (the“Assets”), such as short- term deposits, government bonds, or high-grade corporate debt, which may be denominated in a foreign currency. The Assets serve as collateral for the Loan pursuant to a loan agreement. As each interest payment becomes due, the collat- eral is used to satisfy such payments. Upon maturity or earlier payment, the Loan is satisfied, by its terms, first from the collateral, and only then against Transferor (or Transferor and any party that has assumed the liability as a joint and several obligor) to satisfy any short- fall. Pursuant to a separate agreement between Transferor and Taxpayer, Transf- eror transfers a portion of the Assets to Taxpayer in consideration for Taxpayer’s agreement to pay a portion of the Loan and become jointly and severally liable to Lender as a co-obligor on the Loan. The fair market value of the Assets transferred to Taxpayer (the“Conveyed Assets”) equals the present value of the Loan’s principal payment at maturity, determined by using a market rate of interest. Thus, the fair market value of the Conveyed Assets is substantially less than the Loan’s stated principal amount. Taxpayer provides substitute collateral for the Loan, equal in value to the Conveyed Assets. The remainder of the Assets owned by Transferor continue to serve as collateral for the Loan. Also pursuant to the agreement between Transferor and Taxpayer, Transf- eror agrees to make all interest payments on the Loan, and Taxpayer agrees to pay the principal due at maturity. The co-obligors and Lender anticipate that the collateral will be substantially (if not entirely) sufficient to repay the Loan. Taxpayer subsequently disposes of the Conveyed Assets for their fair market value. Taxpayer claims that, as a result of its assumption of joint and several liabil- ity on the Loan, the entire principal amount of the Loan is included in Tax- payer’s basis in the Conveyed Assets. As a result, Taxpayer claims a loss for fed- eral income tax purposes in an amount equal to the excess of the stated principal amount of the Loan over the fair market value of the Conveyed Assets. If the Con- veyed Assets are nonfunctional currency, Taxpayer claims an ordinary loss. ANALYSIS Section 1012 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the basis of property is equal to the cost of the property. Sec- tion 1.1012–1(a) of the Income Tax Regu- lations defines“cost”to mean the “amount paid”for the property in cash or other property. Under general tax law principles, the amount paid for property generally includes the amount of the sell- er’s liabilities assumed by the buyer. Commissioner v. Oxford Paper Co., 194 F.2d 190 (2d. Cir. 1952). The inclusion of liabilities in basis by a buyer, however, is predicated on the assumption that the liabilities will be paid in full by the buyer. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 308 (1983), 1983–1 C.B. 120, 123. In appropriate cases, the courts have rejected attempts to assign an inflated basis to property and have limited the basis of property to its fair market value. For example, the basis of property acquired with the issuance or assumption of recourse indebtedness has been limited to the acquired property’s fair market value where“a transaction is not con- ducted at arm’s-length by two economi- cally self-interested parties or where a transaction is based upon‘peculiar cir- cumstances’which influence the pur- chaser to agree to a price in excess of the property’s fair market value.”Lemmen v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1326, 1348 (1981) (citingBixby v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 757, 776 (1972));Webber v. Commis- sioner, T.C. Memo. 1983–633,aff’d, 790 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1986).See also Majestic Securities Corp. v. Commis- sioner, 42 B.T.A. 698, 701 (1940),aff’d, 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941) (“The general rule that the price paid is the basis for determining gain or loss on future dispo- sition presupposes a normal business transaction.”) Other cases have limited the portion of an assumed indebtedness that may be taken into account for federal income tax purposes. For example, where two or more persons are liable on the same indebtedness, or hold separate properties subject to the same indebtedness, the amount taken into account for federal income tax purposes by each person gen- erally is based on all the facts and cir- cumstances, including the economic reali- ties of the situation and the parties’ expectations as to how the liabilities will be paid.See Maher v. United States, No. 16253–1 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (property was not in substance“subject to”liability where lender was not actually relying on 2002–14 I.R.B.730April 8, 2002 property as collateral);Maher v. Commis- sioner, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972) (cor- poration’s assumption of primary liability on shareholder’s indebtedness becomes taxable dividend only as corporation makes payments as promised);Snowa v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1995–336, rev’d on other grounds, 123 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 1997) (co-obligor’s cost of a new residence included only her ratable share of the liability due to state law’s right of contribution). Under the facts and circumstances of the transaction described in this Notice, as a matter of economic reality, the par- ties will bear responsibility for repayment of the Loan in accordance with their rela- tive ownership of the Assets immediately after the transfer from Transferor to Tax- payer. Accordingly, the Service and the Treasury believe that Taxpayer’s basis in the Conveyed Assets is equal to the fair market value of such assets upon their acquisition by Taxpayer. The losses pur- portedly resulting from the transaction described in this Notice (or substantially similar to the transaction described in this Notice) are not allowable to the extent Taxpayer derives a tax benefit that is attributable to a basis in excess of the fair market value of the Conveyed Assets. The purported tax benefits from these transactions also may be subject to chal- lenge under other provisions of the Code and regulations, including but not limited to§988 and, in the case of individuals, §§165(c)(2) and 465. In addition, the Service may impose penalties on participants in these transac- tions or, as applicable, on persons who participate in the promotion or reporting of these transactions, including the accuracy-related penalty under§6662, the return preparer penalty under§6694, the promoter penalty under§6700, and the aiding and abetting penalty under §6701. Transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, the transaction described in this Notice 2002–21 are identified as“listed transactions”for the purposes of§§1.6011–4T(b)(2) of the Temporary Income Tax Regulations and 301.6111–2T(b)(2) of the Temporary Pro- cedure and Administrative Regulations. See also§301.6112–1T, A–4. It should be noted that, independent of their classi- fication as“listed transactions”for pur- poses of§§1.6011–4T(b)(2) and 301.6111–2T(b)(2), such transactions may already be subject to the tax shelter registration and list maintenance require- ments of§§6111 and 6112 under the regulations issued in February 2000 (§§301.6111–2T and 301.6112–1T, A–4), as well as the regulations issued in 1984 and amended in 1986 (§§301.6111–1T and 301.6112–1T, A–3). Persons required to register these tax shelters who have failed to register the shelters may be sub- ject to the penalty under§6707(a), and to the penalty under§6708(a) if the require- ments of§6112 are not satisfied. The Service and the Treasury recog- nize that some taxpayers may have filed tax returns taking the position that they were entitled to the purported tax benefits of the type of transaction described in this Notice. These taxpayers are advised to take prompt action to file amended returns. The principal author of this Notice is Christina A. Morrison of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Financial Insti- tutions and Products). For further infor- mation regarding this Notice, contact Ms. Morrison at (202) 622–3950 (not a toll- free call). Request for Comments on Items for 2002–2003 Published Guidance Priority List Notice 2002–22 The Department of Treasury and Inter- nal Revenue Service request public com- ment about items that should be included in the Guidance Priority List for 2002– 2003. IRS and Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy use the Guidance Priority List (“Priority List”) each year to identify and prioritize the tax issues that should be addressed through regulations, rulings, and other published administrative guid- ance. The Priority List will set forth guid- ance Treasury and the IRS intend to issue from July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2003. Public input is invited as part of the pro- cess of formulating the Priority List to ensure that the agencies’resources focus on the guidance items that are most important to taxpayers and tax adminis- tration. As Treasury and the IRS draft guid- ance and consider suggestions for guid- ance, we will focus on providing needed guidance on a timely basis and consider the following questions: 1. Whether the guidance is consistent with the letter and the intent of the statu- tory language. 2. Whether the guidance is easily under- stood and applied by taxpayers. 3. Whether the guidance is enforceable on a uniform basis by the IRS. 4. Whether the guidance provides bright- line rules and resolves issues rather than raises issues. 5. Whether the guidance reduces contro- versy and lessens the burden on taxpayer and IRS resources. No particular format is required for comments submitted in response to this Notice. However, it will be helpful for comments both to briefly describe the item that is recommended for inclusion on the Priority List and to explain why there is a need for guidance. In addition, comments may present an analysis of how the issue should be resolved. Please submit all comments by April 30, 2002. Written comments should be sent to: Internal Revenue Service Attn: CC:ITA:RU (Notice 2002–22) Room 5226 P.O. Box 7604 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 or hand delivered between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. to: Courier’s Desk Internal Revenue Service Attn: CC:ITA:RU (Notice 2002–22) 1111Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20224 Alternatively, comments may be sub- mitted electronically via e-mail to the fol- lowing address:Notice.Comments@irs counsel.treas.gov. Please include“Notice 2002–22”in the subject line. All com- ments will be available for public inspec- tion and copying in their entirety. April 8, 20027312002–14 I.R.B. For further information regarding this notice, contact Brenda Wilson of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting) at (202) 622–4800 (not a toll-free call). 26 CFR 601.105: Examination of returns and claims for refund, credit, or abatement; determination of correct tax liability. (Also Part I,§911, 1.911–1) Rev. Proc. 2002–20 SECTION 1. PURPOSE 01. This revenue procedure provides information to any individual who failed to meet the eligibility requirements of §911(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code because adverse conditions in a foreign country precluded the individual from meeting those requirements for taxable year 2001. 02. The Internal Revenue Service has previously listed countries for which the eligibility requirements of§911(d)(1) of the Code are waived under§911(d)(4) because of adverse conditions in those countries on and after the date stated. See Rev. Proc. 2001–27 (2001–19 I.R.B. 1155), Rev. Proc. 2000–14 (2000–1 C.B. 960), and Rev. Proc. 99–20 (1999–1 C.B. 872) . This revenue procedure lists the country added to the list in 2001, for which the eligibility requirements of §911(d)(1) are waived. Rev. Proc. 2001– 27, Rev. Proc. 2000–14, and Rev. Proc. 99–20 remain in full force and effect. SECTION 2. BACKGROUND 01. Section 911(a) of the Code allows a“qualified individual,”as defined in §911(d)(1), to exclude foreign earned income and housing cost amounts from gross income. Section 911(c)(3) of the Code allows a qualified individual to deduct housing cost amounts from gross income. 02. Section 911(d)(1) of the Code defines the term“qualified individual”as an individual whose tax home is in a for- eign country and who is (A) a citizen of the United States and establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Trea- sury that the individual has been abona fideresident of a foreign country or coun- tries for an uninterrupted period that includes an entire taxable year, or (B) a citizen or resident of the United States who, during any period of 12 consecutive months, is present in a foreign country or countries during at least 330 full days. 03. Section 911(d)(4) of the Code pro- vides an exception to the eligibility requirements of§911(d)(1). An indi- vidual will be treated as a qualified indi- vidual with respect to a period in which the individual was abona fideresident of, or was present in, a foreign country if the individual left the country during a period for which the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that individuals were required to leave because of war, civil unrest, or similar adverse conditions that precluded the normal conduct of business. An individual must establish that but for those conditions the individual could rea- sonably have been expected to meet the eligibility requirements. 04. For 2001, the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Secre- tary of State, has determined that war, civil unrest, or similar adverse conditions that precluded the normal conduct of business existed in the following country beginning on the specified date: Date of Departure CountryOn or After MacedoniaJuly 27, 2001 05. Accordingly, for purposes of§911 of the Code, an individual who left Mace- donia on or after July 27, 2001, shall be treated for 2001 as a qualified individual with respect to the period during which that individual was present in, or was a bona fideresident of Macedonia, if the individual establishes a reasonable expec- tation of meeting the requirements of §911(d) but for those conditions. 06.Toqualifyforreliefunder §911(d)(4) of the Code, an individual must have established residency on or prior to July 27, 2001, or have been physically present in Macedonia on July 27, 2001, the date that the Secretary of the Treasury determined that individuals were required to leave the foreign coun- try. Individuals who establish residency or are first physically present in Mace- donia after July 27, 2001, shall not be treated as qualified individuals under §911(d)(4) of the Code for taxable year 2001. 07. In order to assist those individuals who are filing prior year or amended tax returns, the Internal Revenue Service is republishing the countries listed for tax years 1998, 1999, and 2000, for which the eligibility requirements of§911(d)(1) of the Code are waived under§911(d)(4): 2002–14 I.R.B.732April 8, 2002 Tax Year 1998— Date of Departure CountryOn or After AlbaniaAugust 14, 1998 Democratic Republic of the CongoAugust 5, 1998 EritreaJune 5, 1998 Guinea-BissauJune 10, 1998 IndonesiaMay 15, 1998 PakistanAugust 16, 1998 Sierra LeoneDecember 23, 1998 Serbia-MontenegroOctober 11, 1998 Tax Year 1999— Date of Departure CountryOn or After EritreaFebruary 12, 1999 EthiopiaFebruary 12, 1999 Serbia-MontenegroMarch 20, 1999 Tax Year 2000— Date of Departure CountryOn or After EritreaMay 19, 2000 SECTION 3. INQUIRIES A taxpayer who needs assistance on how to claim this exclusion, or on how to file an amended return, should contact a local IRS Office or, for a taxpayer resid- ing or traveling outside the United States, the nearest overseas IRS office. SECTION 4. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS Rev. Proc. 2001–27 (2001–19 I.R.B. 1155) is supplemented. DRAFTING INFORMATION The principal author of this revenue procedure is Kate Y. Hwa of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (International). For further information regarding this revenue procedure contact Ms. Hwa at (202) 622–3840 (not a toll-free call). 26 CFR 601.201: Rulings and determination letters. (Also Part I,§§267, 511, 512, 707, 761, 856, 1031, 1361; 1.761–1, 1.761–2; 301.7701–1, 301.7701–2, 301.7701–3, 301.7701–4.) Rev. Proc. 2002–22 SECTION 1. PURPOSE This revenue procedure specifies the conditions under which the Internal Rev- enue Service will consider a request for a ruling that an undivided fractional interest in rental real property (other than a min- eral property as defined in section 614) is not an interest in a business entity, within the meaning of§301.7701–2(a) of the Procedure and Administration Regula- tions. This revenue procedure supersedes Rev. Proc. 2000–46 (2000–2 C.B. 438), which provides that the Service will not issue advance rulings or determination letters on the questions of whether an undivided fractional interest in real prop- erty is an interest in an entity that is not eligible for tax-free exchange under §1031(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code and whether arrangements where taxpayers acquire undivided fractional interests in real property constitute sepa- rate entities for federal tax purposes under §7701. This revenue procedure also modifies Rev. Proc. 2002–3 (2002–1 I.R.B. 117) by removing these issues from the list of subjects on which the Ser- vice will not rule. Requests for advance rulings described in Rev. Proc. 2000–46 that are not covered by this revenue pro- cedure, such as rulings concerning min- eral property, will be considered under procedures set forth in Rev. Proc. 2002–1 (2002–1 I.R.B. 1) (or its successor). SECTION 2. BACKGROUND Section 301.7701–1(a)(1) provides that whether an organization is an entity sepa- rate from its owners for federal tax pur- poses is a matter of federal law and does not depend on whether the entity is recog- nized as an entity under local law. Section 301.7701–1(a)(2) provides that a joint venture or other contractual arrangement April 8, 20027332002–14 I.R.B. may create a separate entity for federal tax purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or venture and divide the profits therefrom, but the mere co-ownership of property that is maintained, kept in repair, and rented or leased does not constitute a separate entity for federal tax purposes. Section 301.7701–2(a) provides that a business entity is any entity recognized for federal tax purposes (including an entity with a single owner that may be disregarded as an entity separate from its owner under§301.7701–3) that is not properly classified as a trust under §301.7701–4 or otherwise subject to spe- cial treatment under the Internal Revenue Code. A business entity with two or more members is classified for federal tax pur- poses as either a corporation or a partner- ship. Section 761(a) provides that the term “partnership”includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorpo- rated organization through or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and that is not a corporation or a trust or estate. Section 1.761–1(a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that the term“part- nership”means a partnership as deter- mined under§§301.7701–1, 301.7701–2, and 301.7701–3. The central characteristic of a tenancy in common, one of the traditional concur- rent estates in land, is that each owner is deemed to own individually a physically undivided part of the entire parcel of property. Each tenant in common is entitled to share with the other tenants the possession of the whole parcel and has the associated rights to a proportionate share of rents or profits from the property, to transfer the interest, and to demand a partition of the property. These rights generally provide a tenant in common the benefits of ownership of the property within the constraint that no rights may be exercised to the detriment of the other tenants in common. 7 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property§§50.01–50.07 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000). Rev. Rul. 75–374 (1975–2 C.B. 261) concludes that a two-person co-ownership of an apartment building that was rented to tenants did not constitute a partnership for federal tax purposes. In the revenue ruling, the co-owners employed an agent to manage the apartments on their behalf; the agent collected rents, paid property taxes, insurance premiums, repair and maintenance expenses, and provided the tenants with customary services, such as heat, air conditioning, trash removal, unattended parking, and maintenance of public areas. The ruling concludes that the agent’s activities in providing custom- ary services to the tenants, although imputed to the co-owners, were not suffi- ciently extensive to cause the co-ownership to be characterized as a partnership. See also Rev. Rul. 79–77 (1979–1 C.B. 448), which did not find a business entity where three individuals transferred ownership of a commercial building subject to a net lease to a trust with the three individuals as beneficiaries. Whereasponsorpackages co-ownership interests for sale by acquir- ing property, negotiating a master lease on the property, and arranging for financ- ing, the courts have looked at the rela- tionships not only among the co-owners, but also between the sponsor (or persons related to the sponsor) and the co-owners in determining whether the co-ownership gives rise to a partnership. For example, inBergford v. Commissioner, 12 F.3d 166 (9th Cir. 1993), seventy-eight investors purchased“co-ownership”interests in computer equipment that was subject to a 7-year net lease. As part of the purchase, the co-owners authorized the manager to arrange financing and refinancing, pur- chase and lease the equipment, collect rents and apply those rents to the notes used to finance the equipment, prepare statements, and advance funds to partici- pants on an interest-free basis to meet cash flow. The agreement allowed the co-owners to decide by majority vote whether to sell or lease the equipment at the end of the lease. Absent a majority vote, the manager could make that deci- sion. In addition, the manager was entitled to a remarketing fee of 10 percent of the equipment’s selling price or lease rental whether or not a co-owner termi- nated the agreement or the manager per- formed any remarketing. A co-owner could assign an interest in the co-ownership only after fulfilling numer- ous conditions and obtaining the manag- er’s consent. The court held that the co-ownership arrangement constituted a partnership for federal tax purposes. Among the factors that influenced the court’s decision were the limitations on the co-owners’ability to sell, lease, or encumber either the co-ownership interest or the underlying property, and the manager’s effective par- ticipation in both profits (through the remarketing fee) and losses (through the advances).Bergford, 12 F.3d at 169–170. Accord Bussing v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 449 (1987),aff’donreh’g, 89 T.C. 1050 (1987);Alhouse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991–652. Under§1.761–1(a) and§§301. 7701–1 through 301.7701–3, a federal tax partnership does not include mere co-ownership of property where the own- ers’activities are limited to keeping the property maintained, in repair, rented or leased. However, as the above authorities demonstrate, a partnership for federal tax purposes is broader in scope than the common law meaning of partnership and may include groups not classified by state law as partnerships.Bergford, 12 F.3d at 169. Where the parties to a venture join together capital or services with the intent of conducting a business or enterprise and of sharing the profits and losses from the venture, a partnership (or other business entity) is created.Bussing, 88 T.C. at 460. Furthermore, where the economic ben- efits to the individual participants are not derivative of their co-ownership, but rather come from their joint relationship toward a common goal, the co-ownership arrangement will be characterized as a partnership (or other business entity) for federal tax purposes.Bergford, 12 F.3d at 169. SECTION 3. SCOPE This revenue procedure applies to co-ownership of rental real property (other than mineral interests) (the Prop- erty) in an arrangement classified under local law as a tenancy-in-common. This revenue procedure provides guidelines for requesting advance rulings solely to assist taxpayers in preparing rul- ing requests and the Service in issuing advance ruling letters as promptly as practicable. The guidelines set forth in this revenue procedure are not intended to be substantive rules and are not to be used for audit purposes. 2002–14 I.R.B.734April 8, 2002 SECTION 4. GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING RULING REQUESTS The Service ordinarily will not con- sider a request for a ruling under this rev- enue procedure unless the information described in section 5 of this revenue pro- cedure is included in the ruling request and the conditions described in section 6 of this revenue procedure are satisfied. Even if sections 5 and 6 of this revenue procedure are satisfied, however, the Ser- vice may decline to issue a ruling under this revenue procedure whenever war- ranted by the facts and circumstances of a particular case and whenever appropriate in the interest of sound tax administra- tion. Where multiple parcels of property owned by the co-owners are leased to a single tenant pursuant to a single lease agreement and any debt of one or more co-owners is secured by all of the parcels, the Service will generally treat all of the parcels as a single“Property.”In such a case, the Service will generally not con- sider a ruling request under this revenue procedure unless: (1) each co-owner’s percentage interest in each parcel is iden- tical to that co-owner’s percentage inter- est in every other parcel, (2) each co-owner’s percentage interests in the parcels cannot be separated and traded independently, and (3) the parcels of property are properly viewed as a single business unit. The Service will generally treat contiguous parcels as comprising a single business unit. Even if the parcels are not contiguous, however, the Service may treat multiple parcels as comprising a single business unit where there is a close connection between the business use of one parcel and the business use of another parcel. For example, an office building and a garage that services the tenants of the office building may be treated as a single business unit even if the office building and the garage are not contiguous. For purposes of this revenue proce- dure, the following definitions apply. The term“co-owner”means any person that owns an interest in the Property as a ten- ant in common. The term“sponsor” means any person who divides a single interest in the Property into multiple co-ownership interests for the purpose of offering those interests for sale. The term “related person”means a person bearing a relationship described in§267(b) or 707(b)(1),exceptthatinapplying §267(b) or 707(b)(1), the co-ownership will be treated as a partnership and each co-owner will be treated as a partner. The term“disregarded entity”means an entity that is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner for federal tax purposes. Examples of disregarded entities include qualified REIT subsidiaries (within the meaning of§856(i)(2)), qualified sub- chapter S subsidiaries (within the mean- ing of§1361(b)(3)(B)), and business entities that have only one owner and do not elect to be classified as corporations. The term“blanket lien”means any mort- gage or trust deed that is recorded against the Property as a whole. SECTION 5. INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED .01 Section 8 of Rev. Proc. 2002–1 outlines general requirements concerning the information to be submitted as part of a ruling request, including advance rul- ings under this revenue procedure. For example, any ruling request must contain a complete statement of all facts relating to the co-ownership, including those relating to promoting, financing, and managing the Property. Among the infor- mation to be included are the items of information specified in this revenue pro- cedure; therefore, the ruling request must provide all items of information and con- ditions specified below and in section 6 of this revenue procedure, or at least account for all of the items. For example, if a co-ownership arrangement has no brokerage agreement permitted in section 6.12 of this revenue procedure, the ruling request should so state. Furthermore, merely submitting documents and supple- mentary materials required by section 5.02 of this revenue procedure does not satisfy all of the information requirements contained in section 5.02 of this revenue procedure or in section 8 of Rev. Proc. 2002–1; all material facts in the docu- ments submitted must be explained in the ruling request and may not be merely incorporated by reference. All submitted documents and supplementary materials must contain applicable exhibits, attach- ments, and amendments. The ruling request must identify and explain any information or documents required in sec- tion 5 of this revenue procedure that are not included and any conditions in section 6 of this revenue procedure that are or are not satisfied. .02Required General Information and Copies of Documents and Supplementary Materials. Generally the following infor- mation and copies of documents and materials must be submitted with the rul- ing request: (1) The name, taxpayer identification number, and percentage fractional interest in Property of each co-owner; (2) The name, taxpayer identification number, ownership of, and any relation- ship among, all persons involved in the acquisition, sale, lease and other use of Property, including the sponsor, lessee, manager, and lender; (3) A full description of the Property; (4) A representation that each of the co-owners holds title to the Property (including each of multiple parcels of property treated as a single Property under this revenue procedure) as a tenant in common under local law; (5) All promotional documents relat- ing to the sale of fractional interests in the Property; (6) All lending agreements relating to the Property; (7) All agreements among the co-owners relating to the Property; (8) Any lease agreement relating to the Property; (9) Any purchase and sale agreement relating to the Property; (10) Any property management or brokerage agreement relating to the Prop- erty; and (11) Any other agreement relating to the Property not specified in this section, including agreements relating to any debt secured by the Property (such as guaran- tees or indemnity agreements) and any call and put options relating to the Prop- erty. SECTION 6. CONDITIONS FOR OBTAINING RULINGS The Service ordinarily will not con- sider a request for a ruling under this rev- enue procedure unless the conditions described below are satisfied. Neverthe- less, where the conditions described below are not satisfied, the Service may consider a request for a ruling under this revenue procedure where the facts and April 8, 20027352002–14 I.R.B. circumstances clearly establish that such a ruling is appropriate. .01Tenancy in Common Ownership. Each of the co-owners must hold title to the Property (either directly or through a disregarded entity) as a tenant in common under local law. Thus, title to the Property as a whole may not be held by an entity recognized under local law. .02Number of Co-Owners. The num- ber of co-owners must be limited to no more than 35 persons. For this purpose, “person”is defined as in§7701(a)(1), except that a husband and wife are treated as a single person and all persons who acquire interests from a co-owner by inheritance are treated as a single person. .03No Treatment of Co-Ownership as an Entity. The co-ownership may not file a partnership or corporate tax return, con- duct business under a common name, execute an agreement identifying any or all of the co-owners as partners, share- holders, or members of a business entity, or otherwise hold itself out as a partner- ship or other form of business entity (nor may the co-owners hold themselves out as partners, shareholders, or members of a business entity). The Service generally will not issue a ruling under this revenue procedure if the co-owners held interests in the Property through a partnership or corporation immediately prior to the for- mation of the co-ownership. .04Co-Ownership Agreement. The co-owners may enter into a limited co-ownership agreement that may run with the land. For example, a co-ownership agreement may provide that a co-owner must offer the co-ownership interest for sale to the other co-owners, the sponsor, or the lessee at fair market value (determined as of the time the par- tition right is exercised) before exercising any right to partition (see section 6.06 of this revenue procedure for conditions relating to restrictions on alienation); or that certain actions on behalf of the co-ownership require the vote of co-owners holding more than 50 percent of the undivided interests in the Property (see section 6.05 of this revenue proce- dure for conditions relating to voting). .05Voting. The co-owners must retain the right to approve the hiring of any manager, the sale or other disposition of the Property, any leases of a portion or all of the Property, or the creation or modifi- cation of a blanket lien. Any sale, lease, or re-lease of a portion or all of the Prop- erty, any negotiation or renegotiation of indebtedness secured by a blanket lien, the hiring of any manager, or the negotia- tion of any management contract (or any extension or renewal of such contract) must be by unanimous approval of the co-owners. For all other actions on behalf of the co-ownership, the co-owners may agree to be bound by the vote of those holding more than 50 percent of the undi- vided interests in the Property. A co-owner who has consented to an action in conformance with this section 6.05 may provide the manager or other person a power of attorney to execute a specific document with respect to that action, but may not provide the manager or other person with a global power of attorney. .06Restrictions on Alienation. In gen- eral, each co-owner must have the rights to transfer, partition, and encumber the co-owner’s undivided interest in the Prop- erty without the agreement or approval of any person. However, restrictions on the right to transfer, partition, or encumber interests in the Property that are required by a lender and that are consistent with customary commercial lending practices are not prohibited. See section 6.14 of this revenue procedure for restrictions on who may be a lender. Moreover, the co-owners, the sponsor, or the lessee may have a right of first offer (the right to have the first opportunity to offer to pur- chase the co-ownership interest) with respect to any co-owner’s exercise of the right to transfer the co-ownership interest in the Property. In addition, a co-owner may agree to offer the co-ownership interest for sale to the other co-owners, the sponsor, or the lessee at fair market value (determined as of the time the par- tition right is exercised) before exercising any right to partition. .07Sharing Proceeds and Liabilities upon Sale of Property. If the Property is sold, any debt secured by a blanket lien must be satisfied and the remaining sales proceeds must be distributed to the co-owners. .08Proportionate Sharing of Profits and Losses. Each co-owner must share in all revenues generated by the Property and all costs associated with the Property in proportion to the co-owner’s undivided interest in the Property. Neither the other co-owners, nor the sponsor, nor the man- ager may advance funds to a co-owner to meet expenses associated with the co-ownership interest, unless the advance is recourse to the co-owner (and, where the co-owner is a disregarded entity, the owner of the co-owner) and is not for a period exceeding 31 days. .09Proportionate Sharing of Debt. The co-owners must share in any indebt- edness secured by a blanket lien in pro- portion to their undivided interests. .10Options. A co-owner may issue an option to purchase the co-owner’s undi- vided interest (call option), provided that the exercise price for the call option reflects the fair market value of the Prop- erty determined as of the time the option is exercised. For this purpose, the fair market value of an undivided interest in the Property is equal to the co-owner’s percentage interest in the Property multi- plied by the fair market value of the Prop- erty as a whole. A co-owner may not acquire an option to sell the co-owner’s undivided interest (put option) to the sponsor, the lessee, another co-owner, or the lender, or any person related to the sponsor, the lessee, another co-owner, or the lender. .11No Business Activities. The co-owners’activities must be limited to those customarily performed in connec- tion with the maintenance and repair of rental real property (customary activities). See Rev. Rul. 75–374 (1975–2 C.B. 261). Activities will be treated as customary activities for this purpose if the activities would not prevent an amount received by an organization described in§511(a)(2) fromqualifyingasrentunder §512(b)(3)(A) and the regulations there- under. In determining the co-owners’ activities, all activities of the co-owners, their agents, and any persons related to the co-owners with respect to the Prop- erty will be taken into account, whether or not those activities are performed by the co-owners in their capacities as co-owners. For example, if the sponsor or a lessee is a co-owner, then all of the activities of the sponsor or lessee (or any person related to the sponsor or lessee) with respect to the Property will be taken into account in determining whether the co-owners’activities are customary activities. However, activities of a co-owner or a related person with respect 2002–14 I.R.B.736April 8, 2002 to the Property (other than in the co-owner’s capacity as a co-owner) will not be taken into account if the co-owner owns an undivided interest in the Prop- erty for less than 6 months. .12ManagementandBrokerage Agreements. The co-owners may enter into management or brokerage agree- ments, which must be renewable no less frequently than annually, with an agent, who may be the sponsor or a co-owner (or any person related to the sponsor or a co-owner), but who may not be a lessee. The management agreement may autho- rize the manager to maintain a common bank account for the collection and deposit of rents and to offset expenses associated with the Property against any revenues before disbursing each co-owner’s share of net revenues. In all events, however, the manager must dis- burse to the co-owners their shares of net revenues within 3 months from the date of receipt of those revenues. The manage- ment agreement may also authorize the manager to prepare statements for the co-owners showing their shares of rev- enue and costs from the Property. In addi- tion, the management agreement may authorize the manager to obtain or modify insurance on the Property, and to negoti- ate modifications of the terms of any lease or any indebtedness encumbering the Property, subject to the approval of the co-owners. (See section 6.05 of this revenue procedure for conditions relating to the approval of lease and debt modifi- cations.) The determination of any fees paid by the co-ownership to the manager must not depend in whole or in part on the income or profits derived by any per- son from the Property and may not exceed the fair market value of the man- ager’s services. Any fee paid by the co-ownership to a broker must be compa- rable to fees paid by unrelated parties to brokers for similar services. .13Leasing Agreements. All leasing arrangements must bebona fideleases for federal tax purposes. Rents paid by a les- see must reflect the fair market value for the use of the Property. The determination of the amount of the rent must not depend, in whole or in part, on the income or profits derived by any person from the Property leased (other than an amount based on a fixed percentage or percentages of receipts or sales). See sec- tion 856(d)(2)(A) and the regulations thereunder. Thus, for example, the amount of rent paid by a lessee may not be based on a percentage of net income from the Property, cash flow, increases in equity, or similar arrangements. .14Loan Agreements. The lender with respect to any debt that encumbers the Property or with respect to any debt incurred to acquire an undivided interest in the Property may not be a related per- son to any co-owner, the sponsor, the manager, or any lessee of the Property. .15Payments to Sponsor. Except as otherwise provided in this revenue proce- dure, the amount of any payment to the sponsor for the acquisition of the co-ownership interest (and the amount of any fees paid to the sponsor for services) must reflect the fair market value of the acquired co-ownership interest (or the services rendered) and may not depend, in whole or in part, on the income or profits derived by any person from the Property. SECTION 6. EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS Rev. Proc. 2000–46 is superseded. Rev. Proc. 2002–3 is modified by remov- ing sections 5.03 and 5.06. SECTION 7. DRAFTING INFORMATION The principal authors of this revenue procedure are Jeanne Sullivan and Deane Burke of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Indus- tries). For further information regarding this revenue procedure, contact Ms. Sulli- van or Mr. Burke at (202) 622–3070 (not a toll-free call). April 8, 20027372002–14 I.R.B. Part IV. Items of General Interest Credit for Increasing Research Activities; Correction Announcement 2002–38 AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. ACTION: Correction to notice of pro- posed rulemaking and notice of public hearing. SUMMARY: This document contains corrections to a notice of proposed rule- making (REG–112991–01, 2002–4 I.R.B. 404) and notice of public hearing relating to the computation of the research credit. This document was published in theFed- eral Registeron December 26, 2001 (66 FR 66362). FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa J. Shuman (202) 622– 3120 (not a toll-free number). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The proposed regulations that are the subject of these corrections are under sec- tions 41(c) and and 41(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. Need for Correction As published, the proposed regulations REG–112991–01, contains errors that may prove to be misleading and are in need of clarification. Correction of Publication Accordingly, the publication of the proposed regulations REG–112991–01, which is the subject of FR. Doc. 01–31007, is corrected as follows: § 1.41–3 [Corrected] 1. On page 66368, column 1,§1.41–3, paragraph (e), line 3, the language“end- ing on or after the date December 21”is corrected to read“ending on or after December 26”. § 1.41–4 [Corrected] 2. On page 66369, column 1,§1.41–4, paragraph(a)(8),paragraph(i)of Example 2., line 3 from the bottom of paragraph, the language“tests the nozzles to ensure that to ensure that”is corrected to read“tests the nozzles to ensure that”. 3. On page 66369, column 1,§1.41–4, paragraph(a)(8),paragraph(ii)of Example 2., line 2 the language“painting process is a separate business”is cor- rected to read“painting process relate to a separate business”. 4. On page 66369, column 3,§1.41–4, paragraph(a)(8),paragraph(i)of Example 6., lines 5 through 8 from the bottom of the paragraph, the language“X conducts extensive and complex scientific or laboratory testing to determine if the current model vehicle meets X’s require- ments.”is removed. 5. On page 66370, column 3,§1.41–4, paragraph (c)(6), line 2 of the paragraph heading, the language“years beginning on or after the”is corrected to read“years beginning on or after”. 6. On page 66371, column 2,§1.41–4, paragraph (c)(6)(iv)(C), line 1 of the col- umn, the language“leased, licensed or otherwise marketed”is corrected to read “leased, licensed, or otherwise marketed”. 7. On page 66371, column 2,§1.41–4, paragraph (c)(6)(vi)(C), line 2 from the bottom of the paragraph, the language “paragraphs (c)(6)(v)(A) and (B) of this” is corrected to read“paragraphs (c)(6)(vi)(A) and (B) of this”. 8. On page 66371, column 3,§1.41–4, paragraph (c)(6)(viii), paragraph (i) of Example 2., line 3, the language“order to create an improved reserve valuation”is corrected to read“order to create the improved reserve valuation”. 9. On page 66372, column 3,§1.41–4, paragraph(c)(6),paragraph(ii)of Example 7., line 1, the language“(ii) Conclusion.X’s software is software”is corrected to read“(ii)Conclusion.X’s software is”. 10. On page 66375, column 1, §1.41–4, paragraph (c)(10), paragraph (i) ofExample 6., line 1, the language “Example 6. (i)Facts. X manufacturer and”is corrected to read“Example 6. (i) Facts. X manufacturers and”. 11. On page 66375, column 2, §1.41–4, paragraph (c)(10), paragraph (1) ofExample 7. is correctly designated §1.41–4, paragraph (c)(10), paragraph (i) ofExample 7. 12. On page 66375, column 2, §1.41–4, paragraph (c)(10), paragraph (i) ofExample 7., line 9, the language“pur- chases the existing robotic equipment for”is corrected to read“purchases exist- ing robotic equipment for”. 13. On page 66375, column 3, §1.41–4, paragraph (e), line 4, the lan- guage“December 26, 2002.”is corrected to read“December 26, 2001.”. § 1.41–8 [Corrected] 14. On page 66375, column 3, §1.41–8, paragraph (b)(4), line 4, the lan- guage“December 26, 2002.”is corrected to read“December 26, 2001.”. Cynthia E. Grigsby, Chief, Regulations Unit, Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting). (Filed by the Office of the Federal Register on March 18, 2002, 8:45 a.m., and published in the issue of the Federal Register for March 19, 2002, 67 F.R. 12494) Excise Taxes on Excess Benefit Transactions; Correction Announcement 2002–39 AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury. ACTION: Correction to final regulations. SUMMARY: This document contains corrections to final regulations (T.D. 8978, 2002–7 I.R.B. 500) that were pub- lished in theFederal Registeron Wednesday, January 23, 2002 (67 FR 3076) relating to the excise taxes on excess benefit transactions. DATES: This correction is effective Janu- ary 23, 2002. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CON- TACT: Phyllis D. Haney, (202) 622–4290 (not a toll-free number). 2002–14 I.R.B.738April 8, 2002 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The final regulations that are the sub- ject of these corrections are under section 4958 of the Internal Revenue Code. Need for Correction As published, the final regulations contain errors that may prove to be mis- leading and are in need of clarification. Correction of Publication Accordingly, the publication of the final regulations (T.D. 8978), that were the subject of FR Doc. 02–985, is cor- rected as follows: 1. On page 3078, column 1, in the pre- amble under the paragraph heading“Defi- nition of Applicable Tax-Exempt Organi- zation”, line 6 from the top of the column, the language“to the efficient administration of the”is corrected to read “for the efficient administration of the”. 2. On page 3082, column 3, in the pre- amble under the paragraph heading “Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis”, first paragraph, line 13, the language “REP. 104–506 at 56–7, March 28, 1996)”is corrected to read“REP. 506, 104th Congress, 2d SESS. (1996), 53, 56–7)”. 3. On page 3083, column 1, in the pre- amble under the paragraph heading “Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis”, first full paragraph, line 1, the language “The objective for the rebuttable”is cor- rected to read“The objective of the rebut- table”. §53.4958–4 [Corrected] 4.Onpage3091,column3, §53.4958–4(a)(3)(vii),Example 1, line 12, the language“T (see§53.4958–3(a)). Under the initial”is corrected to read“T (see§53.4958–3(c)(3)). Under the ini- tial”. 5.Onpage3095,column2, §53.4958–4(c)(4),Example 2, line 10, the language“D fails to report the bonus on his individual”is corrected to read“D fails to report the bonus on D’s indi- vidual”. §301.7611–1 [Corrected] 6. On page 3099, column 2, in A–19, line1,thelanguage“A–19:See §53.4958–7(b) of this”is corrected to read“A–19: See§53.4958–8(b) of this”. Cynthia E. Grigsby, Chief, Regulations Unit, Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax and Accounting). (Filed by the Office of the Federal Register on March 18, 2002, 8:45 a.m., and published in the issue of the Federal Register for March 19, 2002, 67 F.R. 12471) Renewal of Enrolled Agent Status Announcement 2002–41 Enrolled agent cards will expire on March 31, 2002. However, all cards for the upcoming three year cycle will not be mailed out by that date. Therefore, the Director of Practice has extended all cur- rent enrollment cards until April 30, 2002. Anyone not receiving their enrollment card by that date should call (313) 234– 1280 or e-mail the Enrolled Practitioner Unit atepp@irs.gov. Enrolled agents may continue to use their existing enrollment card until April 30, 2002. Renewal of Sponsor Agreements for Enrolled Agent Continuing Professional Education Announcement 2002–42 Sponsor agreements for sponsors of qualifying continuing professional educa- tion expire on March 31, 2002. The Director of Practice will not mail out their approval or disapproval of sponsor agree- ments for the upcoming three year cycle by that date. Therefore, the Director of Practice has extended all existing sponsor agreements through August 31, 2002. Sponsors will be notified by August 31, 2002, of their renewal status. Sponsors seeking renewal will continue to be approved until that date. April 8, 20027392002–14 I.R.B. Definition of Terms Revenue rulings and revenue procedures (hereinafter referred to as“rulings”) that have an effect on previous rulings use the following defined terms to describe the effect: Amplifieddescribes a situation where no change is being made in a prior pub- lished position, but the prior position is being extended to apply to a variation of the fact situation set forth therein. Thus, if an earlier ruling held that a principle applied to A, and the new ruling holds that the same principle also applies to B, the earlier ruling is amplified. (Compare withmodified, below). Clarifiedis used in those instances where the language in a prior ruling is being made clear because the language has caused, or may cause, some confu- sion. It is not used where a position in a prior ruling is being changed. Distinguisheddescribes a situation where a ruling mentions a previously published ruling and points out an essen- tial difference between them. Modifiedis used where the substance of a previously published position is being changed. Thus, if a prior ruling held that a principle applied to A but not to B, and the new ruling holds that it applies to both A and B, the prior ruling is modified because it corrects a pub- lished position. (Compare withamplified andclarified, above). Obsoleteddescribes a previously pub- lished ruling that is not considered deter- minative with respect to future transac- tions. This term is most commonly used in a ruling that lists previously published rulings that are obsoleted because of changes in law or regulations. A ruling may also be obsoleted because the sub- stance has been included in regulations subsequently adopted. Revokeddescribes situations where the position in the previously published rul- ing is not correct and the correct position is being stated in the new ruling. Supersededdescribes a situation where the new ruling does nothing more than restate the substance and situation of a previously published ruling (or rulings). Thus, the term is used to republish under the 1986 Code and regulations the same position published under the 1939 Code and regulations. The term is also used when it is desired to republish in a single ruling a series of situations, names, etc., that were previously published over a period of time in separate rulings. If the new ruling does more than restate the substance of a prior ruling, a combination of terms is used. For example,modified andsupersededdescribes a situation where the substance of a previously pub- lished ruling is being changed in part and is continued without change in part and it is desired to restate the valid portion of the previously published ruling in a new ruling that is self contained. In this case, the previously published ruling is first modified and then, as modified, is super- seded. Supplementedis used in situations in which a list, such as a list of the names of countries, is published in a ruling and that list is expanded by adding further names in subsequent rulings. After the original ruling has been supplemented several times, a new ruling may be published that includes the list in the original ruling and the additions, and supersedes all prior rul- ings in the series. Suspendedis used in rare situations to show that the previous published rulings will not be applied pending some future action such as the issuance of new or amended regulations, the outcome of cases in litigation, or the outcome of a Service study. Abbreviations The following abbreviations in current use and formerly used will appear in material published in the Bulletin. A—Individual. Acq.—Acquiescence. B—Individual. BE—Beneficiary. BK—Bank. B.T.A.—Board of Tax Appeals. C—Individual. C.B.—Cumulative Bulletin. CFR—Code of Federal Regulations. CI—City. COOP—Cooperative. Ct.D.—Court Decision. CY—County. D—Decedent. DC—Dummy Corporation. DE—Donee. Del. Order—Delegation Order. DISC—Domestic International Sales Corporation. DR—Donor. E—Estate. EE—Employee. E.O.—Executive Order. ER—Employer. ERISA—Employee Retirement Income Security Act. EX—Executor. F—Fiduciary. FC—Foreign Country. FICA—Federal Insurance Contributions Act. FISC—Foreign International Sales Company. FPH—Foreign Personal Holding Company. F.R.—Federal Register. FUTA—Federal Unemployment Tax Act. FX—Foreign Corporation. G.C.M.—Chief Counsel’s Memorandum. GE—Grantee. GP—General Partner. GR—Grantor. IC—Insurance Company. I.R.B.—Intemal Revenue Bulletin. LE—Lessee. LP—Limited Partner. LR—Lessor. M—Minor. Nonacq.—Nonacquiescence. O—Organization. P—Parent Corporation. PHC—Personal Holding Company. PO—Possession of the U.S. PR—Partner. PRS—Partnership. PTE—Prohibited Transaction Exemption. Pub. L.—Public Law. REIT—Real Estate Investment Trust. Rev. Proc—Revenue Procedure. Rev. Rul.—Revenue Ruling. S—Subsidiary. S.P.R.—Statements of Procedural Rules. Stat.—Statutes at Large. T—Target Corporation. T.C.—Tax Court. T.D.—Treasury Decision. TFE—Transferee. TFR—Transferor. T.I.R.—Technical Information Release. TP—Taxpayer. TR—Trust. TT—Trustee. U.S.C.—United States Code. X—Corporation. Y—Corporation. Z—Corporation. 2002–14 I.R.B.iApril 8, 2002 Numerical Finding List 1 Bulletins 2002–1 through 2002–13 Announcements: 2002–1, 2002–2 I.R.B.304 2002–2, 2002–2 I.R.B.304 2002–3, 2002–2 I.R.B.305 2002–4, 2002–2 I.R.B.306 2002–5, 2002–4 I.R.B.420 2002–6, 2002–5 I.R.B.458 2002–7, 2002–5 I.R.B.459 2002–8, 2002–6 I.R.B.494 2002–9, 2002–7 I.R.B.536 2002–10, 2002–7 I.R.B.539 2002–11, 2002–6 I.R.B.494 2002–12, 2002–8 I.R.B.553 2002–13, 2002–7 I.R.B.540 2002–14, 2002–7 I.R.B.540 2002–15, 2002–7 I.R.B.540 2002–16, 2002–7 I.R.B.541 2002–17, 2002–8 I.R.B.561 2002–18, 2002–10 I.R.B.621 2002–19, 2002–8 I.R.B.561 2002–20, 2002–8 I.R.B.561 2002–21, 2002–8 I.R.B.562 2002–22, 2002–8 I.R.B.562 2002–23, 2002–8 I.R.B.563 2002–24, 2002–9 I.R.B.606 2002–25, 2002–10 I.R.B.621 2002–26, 2002–11 I.R.B.629 2002–27, 2002–11 I.R.B.629 2002–28, 2002–11 I.R.B.630 2002–29, 2002–11 I.R.B.631 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 2002–32, 2002–12 I.R.B.664 2002–33, 2002–12 I.R.B.666 2002–34, 2002–13 I.R.B.702 2002–35, 2002–12 I.R.B.667 2002–36, 2002–13 I.R.B.703 2002–37, 2002–13 I.R.B.703 Notices: 2002–1, 2002–2 I.R.B.283 2002–2, 2002–2 I.R.B.285 2002–3, 2002–2 I.R.B.289 2002–4, 2002–2 I.R.B.298 2002–5, 2002–3 I.R.B.320 2002–6, 2002–3 I.R.B.326 2002–7, 2002–6 I.R.B.489 2002–8, 2002–4 I.R.B.398 2002–9, 2002–5 I.R.B.450 2002–10, 2002–6 I.R.B.490 2002–11, 2002–7 I.R.B.526 2002–12, 2002–7 I.R.B.526 2002–13, 2002–8 I.R.B.547 2002–14, 2002–8 I.R.B.548 2002–15, 2002–8 I.R.B.548 2002–16, 2002–9 I.R.B.567 2002–17, 2002–9 I.R.B.567 2002–18, 2002–12 I.R.B.644 2002–19, 2002–10 I.R.B.619 Proposed Regulations: REG–209135–88, 2002–4 I.R.B.418 REG–209114–90, 2002–9 I.R.B.576 REG–107100–00, 2002–7 I.R.B.529 REG–107366–00, 2002–12 I.R.B.645 REG–118861–00, 2002–12 I.R.B.651 REG–105344–01, 2002–2 I.R.B.302 REG–112991–01, 2002–4 I.R.B.404 REG–115054–01, 2002–7 I.R.B.530 REG–119436–01, 2002–3 I.R.B.376 REG–120135–01, 2002–8 I.R.B.552 REG–125450–01, 2002–5 I.R.B.457 REG–125626–01, 2002–9 I.R.B.604 REG–142299–01, 2002–4 I.R.B.418 REG–159079–01, 2002–6 I.R.B.493 REG–102740–02, 2002–13 I.R.B.701 Revenue Procedures: 2002–1, 2002–1 I.R.B.1 2002–2, 2002–1 I.R.B.82 2002–3, 2002–1 I.R.B.117 2002–4, 2002–1 I.R.B.127 2002–5, 2002–1 I.R.B.173 2002–6, 2002–1 I.R.B.203 2002–7, 2002–1 I.R.B.249 2002–8, 2002–1 I.R.B.252 2002–9, 2002–3 I.R.B.327 2002–10, 2002–4 I.R.B.400 2002–11, 2002–7 I.R.B.526 2002–12, 2002–3 I.R.B.374 2002–13, 2002–8 I.R.B.549 2002–14, 2002–5 I.R.B.450 2002–15, 2002–6 I.R.B.490 2002–16, 2002–9 I.R.B.572 2002–17, 2002–13 I.R.B.676 2002–18, 2002–13 I.R.B.678 2002–19, 2002–13 I.R.B.696 Revenue Rulings: 2002–1, 2002–2 I.R.B.268 2002–2, 2002–2 I.R.B.271 2002–3, 2002–3 I.R.B.316 2002–4, 2002–4 I.R.B.389 2002–5, 2002–6 I.R.B.461 2002–6, 2002–6 I.R.B.460 2002–7, 2002–8 I.R.B.543 2002–8, 2002–9 I.R.B.564 2002–9, 2002–10 I.R.B.614 2002–10, 2002–10 I.R.B.616 2002–11, 2002–10 I.R.B.608 2002–12, 2002–11 I.R.B.624 2002–13, 2002–12 I.R.B.637 2002–14, 2002–12 I.R.B.636 2002–15, 2002–13 I.R.B.668 Treasury Decisions: 8968, 2002–2 I.R.B.274 8969, 2002–2 I.R.B.276 8970, 2002–2 I.R.B.281 8971, 2002–3 I.R.B.308 8972, 2002–5 I.R.B.443 8973, 2002–4 I.R.B.391 8974, 2002–3 I.R.B.318 8975, 2002–4 I.R.B.379 8976, 2002–5 I.R.B.421 8977, 2002–6 I.R.B.463 8978, 2002–7 I.R.B.500 8979, 2002–6 I.R.B.466 8980, 2002–6 I.R.B.477 8981, 2002–7 I.R.B.496 8982, 2002–8 I.R.B.544 8983, 2002–9 I.R.B.565 8984, 2002–13 I.R.B.668 1 A cumulative list of all revenue rulings, revenue procedures, Treasury decisions, etc., published in Internal Revenue Bulletins 2001–27 through 2001–53 is in Internal Revenue Bulletin 2002–1, dated January 7, 2002. April 8, 2002ii2002–14 I.R.B. Finding List of Current Actions on Previously Published Items 2 Bulletins 2002–1 through 2002–13 Announcements: 2001–83 Modified by Ann. 2002–36, 2002–13 I.R.B.703 2002–9 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 Ann. 2002–35, 2002–12 I.R.B.667 Notices: 98–31 Supplemented by Ann. 2002–37, 2002–13 I.R.B.703 98–43 Modified and superseded by Notice 2002–5, 2002–3 I.R.B.320 2000–11 Obsoleted by Notice 2002–3, 2002–2 I.R.B.289 2001–10 Revoked by Notice 2002–8, 2002–4 I.R.B.398 2001–61 Supplemented by Notice 2002–15, 2002–8 I.R.B.548 2001–68 Supplemented by Notice 2002–15, 2002–8 I.R.B.548 Proposed Regulations: REG–209135–88 Corrected by Ann. 2002–15, 2002–7 I.R.B.540 Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–251502–96 Withdrawn by Ann. 2002–33, 2002–12 I.R.B.666 REG–107100–00 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–105344–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–7, 2002–5 I.R.B.459 REG–112991–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 Proposed Regulations:—Continued REG–115054–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–119436–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–120135–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–125450–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–125626–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–126485–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–137519–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–142299–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–15, 2002–7 I.R.B.540 Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–142686–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 REG–159079–01 Corrected by Ann. 2002–30, 2002–11 I.R.B.632 Revenue Procedures: 84–37 Modified by Rev. Proc. 2002–1, 2002–1 I.R.B.1 84–57 Obsoleted by T.D. 8976, 2002–5 I.R.B.421 87–50 Modified by Rev. Proc. 2002–10, 2002–4 I.R.B.400 96–13 Modified by Rev. Proc. 2002–1, 2002–1 I.R.B.1 97–27 Modified and amplified by Rev. Proc. 2002–19, 2002–13 I.R.B.696 98–49 Obsoleted by T.D. 8976, 2002–5 I.R.B.421 Revenue Procedures:—Continued 99–49 Modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–9, 2002–3 I.R.B.327 2000–20 Modified by Rev. Proc. 2002–6, 2002–1 I.R.B.203 2001–1 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–1, 2002–1 I.R.B.1 2001–2 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–2, 2002–1 I.R.B.82 2001–3 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–3, 2002–1 I.R.B.117 2001–4 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–4, 2002–1 I.R.B.127 2001–5 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–5, 2002–1 I.R.B.173 2001–6 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–6, 2002–1 I.R.B.203 2001–7 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–7, 2002–1 I.R.B.249 2001–8 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–8, 2002–1 I.R.B.252 2001–13 Corrected by Ann. 2002–5, 2002–4 I.R.B.420 2001–16 Modified by Ann. 2002–26, 2002–11 I.R.B.629 2001–36 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–3, 2002–1 I.R.B.117 2001–41 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–2, 2002–1 I.R.B.82 2001–51 Superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002–3, 2002–1 I.R.B.117 2 A cumulative list of current actions on previously published items in Internal Revenue Bulletins 2001–27 through 2001–53 is in Internal Revenue Bulletin 2002–1, dated January 7, 2002. 2002–14 I.R.B.iiiApril 8, 2002 Revenue Procedures:—Continued 2002–6 Modified by Notice 2002–1, 2002–2 I.R.B.283 2002–8 Modified by Notice 2002–1, 2002–2 I.R.B.283 2002–9 Modified and clarified by Ann. 2002–17, 2002–8 I.R.B.561 Modified and amplified by Rev. Rul. 2002–9, 2002–10 I.R.B.614 Rev. Proc. 2002–17, 2002–13 I.R.B.676 Rev. Proc. 2002–19, 2002–13 I.R.B.696 Revenue Rulings: 55–747 Revoked by Notice 2002–8, 2002–4 I.R.B.398 61–146 Distinguished by Rev. Rul. 2002–3, 2002–3 I.R.B.316 64–328 Modified by Notice 2002–8, 2002–4 I.R.B.398 66–110 Modified by Notice 2002–8, 2002–4 I.R.B.398 89–29 Obsoleted by T.D. 8976, 2002–5 I.R.B.421 92–19 Supplemented in part by Rev. Rul. 2002–12, 2002–11 I.R.B.624 2002–7 Corrected by Ann. 2002–13, 2002–7 I.R.B.540 Treasury Decisions: 8971 Corrected by Ann. 2002–20, 2002–8 I.R.B.561 8972 Corrected by Ann. 2002–23, 2002–8 I.R.B.563 8973 Corrected by Ann. 2002–14, 2002–7 I.R.B.540 8975 Corrected by Ann. 2002–21, 2002–8 I.R.B.562 8976 Corrected by Ann. 2002–21, 2002–8 I.R.B.562 April 8, 2002iv2002–14 I.R.B.
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