Assistant Secretary Trainor Enforcement Guidance – Assessing Requests for the Use of an Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20410-2000
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
MEMORANDUM FOR: FHEO Headquarters Staff, FHEO Office of Enforcement
Staff, FHEO Regional Directors
FROM: Craig W. Trainor, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity
DATE: May 22, 2026
SUBJECT: Enforcement Guidance – Assessing Requests for the Use of
an Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair
Housing Act.
On February 19, 2025, President Trump instructed all federal agencies to review
their enforcement activities and practices to ensure that they are necessary to
“discharge their legal obligations, protect public safety, and advance the national
interest.”1 The President further instructed agencies to “preserve their limited
enforcement resources by generally de-prioritizing actions to enforce regulations that
are based on anything other than the best reading of a statute.”2
The President of the United States exercises supervisory control over the unitary
executive branch, including the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO).3 FHEO is
committed to vigorously enforcing the civil rights of all Americans, including with
respect to reasonable accommodations for disabilities under the Fair Housing Act. To
execute this commitment and comply with the President’s directive, FHEO must
prioritize its limited enforcement resources.
Effective immediately, for complaints related to animal-related reasonable
accommodations, FHEO will find reasonable cause and recommend charges only for
those cases involving animals trained to provide disability-related assistance. This
guidance does not address how the Department will process complaints against
1 Exec. Order No. 14219, 90 Fed. Reg. 10583 (2025).
2 Id.
3 See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197, 203-4, 213 (2020) (“Under our Constitution, the executive
Power—all of it—is vested in a President, who must take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
Because no single person could fulfill that responsibility alone, the Framers expected that the
President would rely on subordinate officers for assistance . . . . As Madison explained, if any power
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those
who execute the laws.”) (cleaned up).

2
housing providers under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).
Animal-related Reasonable Accommodations
The Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination “against any person . . . in the
provision of services or facilities in connection with [his or her] dwelling, because of a
handicap.”4 Unlawful discrimination can include “a refusal to make reasonable
accommodations in the rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodation may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and
enjoy a dwelling.”5 The Department’s accompanying regulation makes clear that
waiving a no-pets policy to allow a blind person to live in an apartment with his seeing
eye dog—a trained service animal—is a required reasonable accommodation.6
To help housing providers assess a person’s request to have an animal as a reasonable
accommodation, FHEO issued guidance on January 28, 2020. Citing to a regulation
of pet ownership in public housing, the guidance emphatically declared that animals
providing “emotional support”—as well as trained service animals—“are not pets.”7
Thus, the notice explained that pet fees could not be assessed for untrained emotional
support animals (ESAs).8 It further purported to delineate “the type and amount of
documentation” a housing provider “may ask” for to (1) show a disability, and (2)
support an accommodation request for an ESA.9
Six years after this guidance issued, it remains an immense challenge to determine
whether an animal-related reasonable accommodation should be granted or denied.
Though well intentioned, the guidance failed to provide “greater clarity” on the
supposed distinction between pets and emotional support animals.10 Instead, an
entire industry has emerged to convert pets into emotional support animals.11 And
housing providers that deny a request to waive pet policies for untrained ESAs or ask
4 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(2).
5 Id. at 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
6 24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b).
7 FHEO Notice: FHEO-2020-01, Assessing a Person’s Request to Have an Animal as a Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Fair Housing Act, 3 (Jan. 28, 2020). But see Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian
Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018) (The Act “requires that an accommodation be essential
to achieve equal housing opportunity, measured against any alternatives that were offered.”).
8 FHEO Notice: FHEO-2020-01, at 3.
9 Id. at 1.
10 See, e.g., Christian Britschgi, How the Fair Housing Act Gave Us Emotional Support Parrots,
REASON, Mar. 2025, https://reason.com/2025/02/02/you-cant-evict-polly/ (examining the absurdity and
confusion that has arisen by the lack of clear standards related to animal-related reasonable
accommodation requests).
11 E.g., @myemotionalsupportanimal, Get Approved for Free Today, Facebook (Apr. 18, 2026, 12:26
PM), https://www.facebook.com/myemotionalsupportanimal/videos/get-approved-for-free-today/
1120162697840187/ [https://perma.cc/WY3E-KACX]; Pettable, GET YOUR ESA LETTER IN 24 HOURS,
https://pettable.com/ [https://perma.cc/2SAH-NEX3] (last visited May 22, 2026).

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reasonable follow-up questions risk a fair housing complaint and a prolonged
investigation—despite compliance with HUD guidance. (Appendix A).12
Moreover, although framed as nonbinding best practices, the guidance had the effect
of imposing categorical fair housing obligations on housing providers without
comporting with the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.13 This is reason alone to rescind the guidance.
Prior Regulations, Guidance, and Case Law
As previously stated, the only example of an animal-related reasonable
accommodation provided in the Department’s regulations is permitting use of a dog
trained to provide a disability-related service.14 Over time, the requirement to waive
“no pets” policies for trained service animals expanded into a general injunction
against rules or conditions on untrained emotional support animals.
This evolution began in 2008, when the Department narrowed the definition of pets
within public housing to exclude assistance or support animals.15 The rule exempted
“animals that are used to assist, support, or provide service to persons with
disabilities” from limitations on pet ownership in HUD-assisted public housing.16 The
Department did not purport to impose its public housing pet rules on private owners
and operators nationwide.17
Nonetheless, some courts deferred to the Department’s public housing rule and
applied its reasoning to private housing providers.18 Relying on one such federal
district court opinion, the U.S. Department of Justice opined that “emotional support
animals that do not qualify as service animals under the [ADA] regulations may
12 Attached is an appendix with one federal district court opinion that found FHEO’s 2020 notice
unpersuasive and two examples of meritless cases involving multiple emotional support animals that
FHEO recently dismissed.
13 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 97 (2015) (explaining interpretive rules issued without
notice and comment lack the force of law in the adjudicatory process).
14 24 C.F.R. § 100.204. See also 24 C.F.R. § 8.11.
15 Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons With Disabilities, 73 Fed. Reg. 63834-01 (Oct. 27, 2008);
24 CFR § 5.303.
16 24 CFR § 5.303 (emphasis added).
17 The pet policy that the Department chooses to impose on public housing providers is not necessarily
appropriate for private landlords or property managers, especially those with small portfolios.
18 Warren v. Delvista Towers Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d. 1082, 1087 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“In light
of the HUD rule, it is of no moment whether Amir [an emotional support dog] is specially trained.”);
Overlook Mutual Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d 850, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (observing that
HUD’s rule applies “only to HUD-assisted public housing, as opposed [to] applying to housing
generally,” but finding that rationale of the rule supported extending it to all housing).

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nevertheless qualify as permitted reasonable accommodations for persons with
disabilities under the” Fair Housing Act.19
In 2013, the Department issued subregulatory guidance pronouncing that “any
assistance animal”—trained or untrained—must generally be admitted into
dwellings and their common use areas, without restrictions or pet fees, as a
reasonable accommodation.20 Other courts then deferred to this more robust guidance
when adjudicating “emotional support animal” reasonable accommodation claims.21
Although the most recent 2020 notice replaced the 2013 notice, it reinforced its
general rules.
Thus, through judicial deference to nonbinding agency interpretations, the legal
standards for animal-related “reasonable accommodations” under the Fair Housing
Act came to dramatically diverge from those required under the ADA. No housing
provider had an opportunity to provide comment.22 And now, over 20% of FHEO’s fair
housing complaints revolve around untrained ESAs. This cannot continue.
New Enforcement Standard and Prioritization
In a recent Fair Housing Act case, a federal court rejected a person’s reasonable
accommodation claim regarding her emotional support animal.23 When the plaintiff
invoked FHEO’s January 28, 2020, guidance in support for her position, the Court
found simply: “HUD’s Notice is unpersuasive.”24 Having carefully reviewed that
guidance, I agree. As a result, I am permanently rescinding FHEO’s 2020 notice
regarding assistance animals.25
19 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial
Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56236, 56240 (Sept. 15, 2010) (citing Overlook Mutual Homes, Inc. v. Spencer,
666 F. Supp. 2d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2009)).
20 FHEO-2013-01, Service Animals and Assistance Animals for People with Disabilities in Housing
and HUD-Funded Programs (Apr. 25, 2013).
21 E.g., Castellano v. Access Premier Realty, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 798, 807 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“The Court
grants HUD’s notice considerable and substantial deference.”); Bone v. Village Club, Inc., 223 F. Supp.
3d 1203, 1214 (M.D. Fla. 2016); Arnal v. Aspen View Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185-86
(D. Colo. 2016); Chavez v. Aber, 122 F. Supp. 3d 581, 597 n.7 (W.D. Tx. 2015); Comm’n on Human
Rights and Opportunities v. The Mansions, LLC, 231 Conn. App. 121, 144-46 (App. Ct. of Conn. 2025),
rev’d, SC 21111, 2026 WL 827929.
22 The Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment provision is designed “‘to ensure that
affected parties have an opportunity to participate in and influence agency decision making at an early
stage, when the agency is likely to give real consideration to alternative ideas.’” National Ass’n of Clean
Water Agencies v. EPA, 734 F.3d 1115, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting New Jersey, Dep’t of
Environmental Protection v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
23 Henderson v. Five Properties LLC, No. 24-750, 2025 WL 1951763, at *5 (E.D. La. July 16, 2025).
24 Id.
25 FHEO’s 2020 notice built upon the errors contained in the 2013 notice related to assistance animals.
Both notices were rescinded on September 17, 2025. This memorandum reconfirms those recissions
and provides further guidance on this topic.

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In the absence of HUD regulations defining animal-related reasonable
accommodations, the regulations for service animals under Titles II and III of the
ADA are instructive. Under the ADA, a service animal “is individually trained to do
work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a
physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.”26 To be a
service animal, the tasks performed by the animal “must be directly related” to the
disability.27 Common examples of disability-related tasks include “assisting
individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation,” “alerting individuals
who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds,” “assisting an
individual during a seizure,” “retrieving items,” “providing physical support and
assistance with balance and stability,” and “helping persons with psychiatric and
neurological disabilities.”28 But “the provision of emotional support, well-being,
comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this
definition.”29
Going forward, FHEO will use the training component of the ADA’s definition for
service animals to assess animal-related reasonable accommodation complaints
under the Fair Housing Act.30 Applying similar reasonable accommodation standards
between the Fair Housing Act and Titles II and III of the ADA will provide improved
clarity and predictability for tenants and housing providers alike. As a corollary,
defining an assistance animal as an animal trained to assist with a disability is the
best guarantee of evenhanded enforcement of the Fair Housing Act.
In light of these standards, FHEO will find reasonable cause for failure to provide a
reasonable accommodation involving the waiver of a pet policy only where the animal
has been individually trained to perform work or perform tasks directly related to the
complainant’s disability.
While requests to waive pet policies for animals trained to perform specific disability-
related services are presumptively reasonable, requests to waive pet policies for
untrained ESAs are not.31 FHEO no longer expects housing providers to categorically
extend accommodations for trained assistance animals to untrained ESAs. By
prioritizing the most meritorious cases involving trained assistance animals, FHEO
can responsibly utilize its enforcement discretion32 to deploy enforcement resources
26 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Unlike Titles II and III of the ADA, an animal-related reasonable accommodation under the Fair
Housing Act could involve a species other than a dog, provided the animal is trained to perform a
disability-related service.
31 See Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condo. Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 110 (3d Cir. 2017) (“In emotional support
animal cases, a housing provider may contest whether the accommodation is reasonable.”).
32 United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 685 (2023) (holding that Article III courts cannot “order the
Executive Branch to take enforcement actions against violators of federal law”); see Citizens for Resp.

6
consistent with the best reading of the law.33
Given this posture, Regional Directors must send all open emotional support animal
cases to Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement and Programs Robert A.
Doles for a case-by-case determination on the merits.
Notwithstanding the Department’s enforcement determination in a given case, the
Fair Housing Act provides that a complainant may file a civil action in an appropriate
federal district court or state court within two years after the occurrence or
termination of the alleged discriminatory housing practice.34 Nothing in this
enforcement guidance affects the rights of parties to seek redress through a private
action in court.
Future Rulemaking
The language and definitions in the ADA regulations have changed over time, but
HUD’s regulations for animal-related reasonable accommodations by private housing
providers have not been updated in 35 years.35 The Department intends to engage in
notice and comment rulemaking regarding animal-related reasonable
accommodations, with the aim of harmonizing our regulations, to the maximum
extent possible, with those of the ADA.
Whether a particular accommodation is reasonable under the circumstances is the
type of fact-intensive, case-specific determination that would benefit from notice and
comment rulemaking. With public input from private as well as public housing
providers, the Department will be better positioned to develop a sound approach to
case-by-case determinations.36 Although a “case-by-case determination” inherently
implies individual assessment, regulations can be designed and implemented to
streamline and simplify determinations while balancing the interests of housing
providers and disabled Americans.
& Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 993 F.3d 880, 887-88 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“The general principle that an
agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion is unreviewable follows from tradition, case law, and sound
reasoning as well as protection for a core executive power. The vesting of all executive power in the
President as well as his constitutional obligation ‘to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’
has been understood to leave enforcement and nonenforcement decisions exclusively with the
Executive Branch.”) (cleaned up).
33 Exec. Order No. 14219, 90 Fed. Reg. 10583 (2025).
34 42 U.S.C. 3613(a)(1)(A).
35 Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3289 (Jan. 23, 1989);
24 C.F.R. § 100.204(b).
36 See United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The primary purpose of Congress in
imposing notice and comment requirements for rulemaking is to get public input so as to get the wisest
rules.”) (cleaned up).

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Appendix
This appendix includes reference materials that either inform or reflect the
Department’s current approach to animal-related reasonable accommodation
requests under the Fair Housing Act.
Exhibit A is a recent federal district court decision, Henderson v. Five
Properties LLC, No. 24-750, 2025 WL 1951763, at *1 (E.D. La. July 16, 2025), that
declined to follow the rules announced in the now-rescinded FHEO notices on
emotional support animals. In July 2025, the court held that waiver of a generally-
applicable pet fee for an emotional support animal was neither reasonable nor
necessary, which are required elements of a reasonable accommodation claim.
Exhibit B is a no reasonable cause determination (NRC) that dismissed a
complaint involving three emotional support animals supported by an online form
letter. Filed in February 2024, the matter led to a preliminary conciliation agreement
that would have required the respondents to obtain fair housing training and amend
their pet policies. The investigative file, however, warranted an NRC, which FHEO
issued in April 2026.
Exhibit C is another NRC that dismissed a complaint involving dozens of
animals of different species that were claimed as emotional support animals. Filed in
March 2024, the case had not been resolved as of March 2026. FHEO issued the NRC
in April 2026.

Exhibit A

Henderson v. Five Properties LLC, Slip Copy (2025)
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2025 WL 1951763
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.
Michaela HENDERSON
v.
FIVE PROPERTIES LLC and Suzanne Tonti
CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-750
|
Signed July 16, 2025
Attorneys and Law Firms
Ameca Alexis Reali, M. Lucia Blacksher Ranier, Molly Gordon, Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center, New Orleans, LA,
Myles Drew Ranier, Broussard Injury Lawyers, Lake Charles, LA, for Michaela Henderson.
Elizabeth A. Roussel, Luke Gerard LaHaye, Adams and Reese, LLP, New Orleans, LA, for Five Properties LLC and Suzanne
Tonti.
SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
SARAH S. VANCE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Defendants Five Properties, LLC, Suzanne Tonti, and APMT Management Services, LLC move for summary judgment
dismissing plaintiff Michaela Henderson's reasonable accommodation claim under the Fair Housing Act and the Louisiana Equal
Housing Opportunity Act. 1 Defendants also move for summary judgment on their breach of contract claims against plaintiff. 2
Plaintiff opposes the motion. 3 For the following reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motions for summary judgment on
plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim, and dismisses the remaining state-law claims without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court has reviewed the record and determined the facts are as follows. In July 2022, plaintiff Michaela Henderson applied
to lease an apartment at AlmondTree Apartments in Harahan, Louisiana, which is owned by Five Properties and managed
by Suzanne Tonti and APMT Management Services, LLC. 4 In the application, Henderson stated that she had a dog named
Tydus. 5 Henderson entered a lease to live at Almondtree Apartments through November 30, 2023, and paid a nonrefundable
animal fee of $350. 6
In November 2023, Henderson inquired about moving into another one of Five Properties’ apartment complexes managed
by defendants, Sunlake Apartments. 7 As part of the application, Henderson requested that the nonrefundable $400 animal
fee be waived because of Tydus's emotional support animal (“ESA”) status. 8 In support of this request, Henderson noted in
her application that Tydus keeps her calm and stable, that he has documentation, and that she is getting more documentation
in December. 9 On December 26, 2023, Henderson submitted a letter from Steph Lee, an advance practice registered nurse
(“APRN”), who stated that Henderson meets the federal criteria to request a reasonable accommodation of being accompanied

Henderson v. Five Properties LLC, Slip Copy (2025)
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by her ESA. 10 Specifically, Lee found that Henderson has a mental/emotional condition recognized in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders that caused disability as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act, and that
Henderson needs to have her ESA accompany her to provide relief from symptoms from her mental/emotional disability. 11
Shortly after receiving the letter, Tonti notified Henderson that Tydus could live with her if she paid the nonrefundable animal
fee, but she had not provided sufficient information to demonstrate she could not enjoy the use of the apartment without a waiver
of the animal fee. 12 Tonti noted that the records Henderson provided indicated that she had sufficient income to pay the fee. 13
*2 An attorney for Tonti Management sent Henderson a letter on January 4, 2024, communicating Tonti Management's denial
of the $400 animal fee waiver. 14 He noted that the Lee letter did not provide sufficient reliable information that Henderson is
disabled or that there is a nexus between the supposed disability and the dog such that the animal is required. 15 Further, he
stated that there is no indication that Henderson cannot equally use and enjoy the apartment without waiver of the fee because
her financial information indicates she has adequate income to pay the $400 fee. 16 On January 9, 2024, Henderson canceled
her Sunlake Apartments application. 17 On March 25, 2024, Henderson filed suit under the Fair Housing Amendments Act
(“FHAA”), and the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act seeking a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and
general, specific, and punitive damages. 18 In defendants’ answer, they made a counterclaim against plaintiff for breach of
contract arising out of alleged unpaid rent and damages caused by plaintiff's dog. 19
Defendants now move for summary judgment on plaintiff's reasonable accommodations claims, asserted under 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(b) and La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2606(A)(6)(a)(ii). 20 Additionally, defendants move for summary judgment on their breach
of contract claim. 21
The Court considers the motion below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam). “When assessing whether a dispute to any
material fact exists, [the Court] consider[s] all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations
or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or
affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion
for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting 10A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 (2d ed. 1983)); see also Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (noting that
the moving party's “burden is not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’
by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence” (citations omitted)). “No genuine dispute of fact exists if
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd.,
767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must put forth
evidence that would “entitle it to a [judgment as a matter of law] if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int'l Shortstop,
Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo.
1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “[T]he nonmoving party can defeat the motion” by either countering with evidence
sufficient to demonstrate the “existence of a genuine dispute of material fact,” or by “showing that the moving party's evidence
is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.

Henderson v. Five Properties LLC, Slip Copy (2025)
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If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy
its burden by pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring
to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule
56 ‘mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Claims
*3 Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (“FHAA”) and the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act (“LEHOA”), it
is unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter
because of a” disability of “a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B); La. Rev.
Stat. § 51:2606(A)(6)(a)(ii). In both statutes, discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use
and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2606(A)(6)(c)(ii). When, as here, the applicable LEHOA
provisions mirror those in the FHAA, courts in the Fifth Circuit apply the same analysis to both claims. See Greater New Orleans
Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. Kelly, 364 F. Supp.3d 635, 648 n.90 (E.D. La. 2019) (“Because the language in the relevant sections
of the FHA and Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act are nearly identical, the Court's analysis of plaintiff's FHA claims
applies with equal force to its claims under the state statute.”); Pecan Acres Ltd. P'ship I v. City of Lake Charles, 54 F. App'x
592, *1 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that for the same reasons plaintiff failed to prove a violation of the FHAA, plaintiff also failed
to prove a violation of the LEHOA); Edwards v. St. John Baptist Par., 2010 WL 3720436, at *5 n.2 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2010)
(same); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. Kelly, 2019 WL 9903799, at *2 n.11 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2019) (applying
the same analysis when the plaintiff's “claims under the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act ... has provisions mirroring
the Fair Housing Act”); Osborne v. Belton, 2022 WL 3093765, at *6 (W.D. La. Aug. 3, 2022) (same).
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving a violation. Women's Elevated Sober Living L.L.C. v. City of Plano, Texas, 86 F.4th 1108,
1112 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996)). In a failure-to-accommodate
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the residents of the affected dwelling or home suffer from a disability, (2) they
requested an accommodation from the defendant, (3) the requested accommodation was reasonable, and (4) the requested
accommodation was necessary to afford the residents equal opportunity to use and enjoy the home. Id. (citing Providence Behav.
Health v. Grant Rd. Pub. Util. Dist., 902 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2018)).
A generally applicable fee, like the one at issue here, is not per se valid simply because it is generally applicable. “[T]o exempt
generally applicable fee rules from scrutiny under the FHAA would permit landlords to circumvent the Act's requirements
simply by imposing fees for certain matters, rather than by imposing flat bans or other types of restrictive rules.” United States
v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co. I”).
Generally applicable fees may, but do not automatically, unfairly burden disabled tenants. Id. (“There are, of course, many types
of residential fees that affect handicapped and non-handicapped residents equally; such fees are clearly proper. Fees that merit
closer scrutiny are those with unequal impact, imposed in return for permission to engage in conduct that, under the FHAA,
a landlord is required to permit.”). The inquiry to determine if the generally applicable fee does so is “highly fact-specific,
requiring case-by-case determination.” Id. at 1418. The analysis also requires the court to balance the needs of the parties.
Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002).
To prove that an accommodation is necessary, the fourth element, courts require that the plaintiff prove the requested
accommodation makes the home therapeutically meaningful or financially viable. Women's Elevated Sober Living L.L.C., 86

Henderson v. Five Properties LLC, Slip Copy (2025)
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F.4th at 1112 (citing Bryant Woods Inn v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1997)). Courts consider necessity “(1)
in light of the statutory provision's language; (2) in accord with the purpose of the FHA and ADA, to ameliorate the plaintiff's
particular disability; and (3) in the light of ‘proposed alternatives.’ ” Id. at 1112 (citing Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners
Ass'n, 903 F.3d 100, 105 (3d Cir. 2018)). But a preferable accommodation or alternative is not sufficient—it must be essential. To
be therapeutically necessary, an accommodation be “[i]ndispensable, requisite, essential, needful; that cannot be done without,
or absolutely required.” Id. (citing Vorchheimer, 903 F.3d at 105). The accommodation must be so necessary and so closely
linked to the individual's disability that “without the requested accommodation, the ameliorative benefit provided [would] be
so insignificant that it deprives persons with disabilities from the opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling of their choice as
compared to those without disabilities.” Id. “A requested accommodation is necessary only if the plaintiff shows that without
the requested accommodation, they will receive no ameliorative effect from their disability, thereby depriving them of the equal
opportunity to enjoy the dwelling.” Id. at 1113.
*4 Therefore, to succeed on this prong, plaintiff must show that her requested accommodation, the waiver of the animal fee,
is indispensable and essential to achieve ameliorative effects of her disability. Plaintiff fails to do so. Plaintiff puts forward
no evidence to demonstrate that waiving the fee would alleviate any effects of her disability. The letter from Lee adequately
establishes that Henderson has a recognized disability and that her pet provides relief from symptoms from that disability. But
her having the animal is not at issue; defendants allow animals in the apartment. The indispensable nature of the fee waiver is
at issue. The evidence in the record establishes that a proposed alternative, a payment plan for the animal fee, would have been
effective. Defendants offered twice to establish a payment plan so that plaintiff could afford the fee. 22 And plaintiff stated that
she could have paid the fee had it been broken out into installments. 23 Thus, plaintiff has not established that a waiver of the
fee is necessary to afford her equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling.
Regarding the third element, the reasonableness element, the burden is again on the plaintiff to show that the requested
accommodation is reasonable. See Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, Tex., 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
plaintiff, and not a defendant, bears the burden of proof on the question of reasonableness). When considering the reasonableness
of a generally applicable fee, a court should consider factors such as “the amount of fees imposed, the relationship between
the amount of fees and the overall housing cost, the proportion of other tenants paying such fees, the importance of the fees
to the landlord's overall revenues, and the importance of the fee waiver to the handicapped tenant.” California Mobile Home
Park Mgmt. Co. I, 29 F.3d at 1417; see also United States v. California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1381
(9th Cir. 1997) (“California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co. II”) (“Each of the factors we discussed [in California Mobile Home
Park Mgmt. Co. I] is relevant to the balancing of interests inherent in any ‘reasonableness’ determination.”).
The Court finds that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of reasonableness. Turning to the
factors outlined above, the animal fee imposed was a one-time payment of $400. 24 The overall housing cost was $910 a month
for a term of fifteen months. 25 That makes the fee a little under three percent of the total cost of housing. Though plaintiff
provided evidence of defendants’ current assets and how much defendants have collected in security deposits, 26 plaintiff did
not provide any information about the importance, or lack thereof, of the animal fee to the landlord's overall revenue. Plaintiff
provided no evidence on the number of other tenants paying the fee, and plaintiff submitted no evidence that the fee has an
unequal impact on or was designed to wrongly target handicapped individuals. Animal fees are relatively typical for leased
apartment buildings in which animals are allowed.
Additionally, plaintiff failed to establish the importance of the fee waiver to her. While being able to have an ESA may be a
reasonable accommodation, see, e.g., Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014),
permission to have an ESA is not at issue here, because defendants’ apartment complex allows for plaintiff to have an animal
with a fee. The requested accommodation is the waiver of the animal fee, and plaintiff must demonstrate the importance of the
fee waiver. While she maintains that she had some financial difficulties, plaintiff stated that she could have afforded the animal
fee. 27 Specifically, defendants offered plaintiff a payment plan, where she did not have to pay the entirety of the fee all at once.
Plaintiff stated that she could have made incremental payments and been able to afford the fee over time. 28

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*5 Based on a fact-specific inquiry of the generally applicable fee at issue and the highlighted factors, the Court holds that
plaintiff also failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of the animal fee waiver.
Plaintiff relies on agency interpretations of the FHAA to demonstrate that the request was necessary and reasonable, but
these agency interpretations do not change the Court's analysis. Plaintiff relies on the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development's (“HUD”) Notice on Assessing a Person's Request to Have an Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under
the Fair Housing Act. 29 The United States Supreme Court has clarified that it is the role of the courts, not agencies, to “interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions.” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706); Van Loon v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549, 562 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that the Supreme Court
overruled Chevron and “eliminated the ‘judicial invention’ of deference to administrative action and rulemaking”). Therefore,
plaintiff's cited agency interpretation—which was not derived from formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking—
are “ ‘entitled to respect,’ under [Skidmore] only to the extent that [they] have the ‘power to persuade.’ ” Christensen v. Harris
Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); see Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc.
v. Spencer, 415 F. App'x 617, 621 n.3 (6th Cir. 2011) (clarifying that the Joint Statement, discussed below, is a policy statement
that warrants Skidmore deference, not an authoritative interpretation of the statute). As a result, the weight of the agency's
interpretation “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944).
HUD's Notice is unpersuasive. The Notice provides that a housing provider may not charge a fee or deposit for service animals
or other assistance animals, even though it may do so for other pets in its discretion. U.S. Dep't Hous. & Urb. Dev., FHEO
Notice: FHEO-2020-01, Assessing a Person's Request to Have an Animal as a Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair
Housing Act 3, 3 n.8, 14 (Jan. 28, 2020) [hereinafter “Notice”]. This Notice suggests that fees are disfavored in every instance,
regardless of how reasonable or proportional the fee may be or of the circumstances of the person with a disability. The
authorities it cites to in support of this assertion are unconvincing. The first cited authority is the HUD and the U.S. Department
of Justice's (“DOJ”) Joint Statement on Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act. This Joint Statement provides
that “[h]ousing providers may not require persons with disabilities to pay extra fees or deposits as a condition of receiving a
reasonable accommodation,” and it provides two examples of such behavior. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev. & U.S. Dep't
of Just., Joint Statement on the Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act 9–10 (May 17, 2004) [hereinafter
“Joint Statement”]. Though the Joint Statement was issued fourteen years ago and is consistent with the Notice, which factor
positively under the Skidmore analysis, the Joint Statement does not provide thorough reasoning in its interpretation or offer
any explanation or authorities for its cursory statement regarding the payment of fees. Additionally, HUD stated that it “does
not intend to imply that the Joint Statement is independently binding statutory or regulatory authority. HUD understands it to be
subject to applicable limitations on the use of guidance.” Notice at 4 n.8. The Joint Statement is unpersuasive under Skidmore
because its consideration is not thorough, and it presents no reasoning to evaluate. Cf. Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners
Ass'n, 903 F.3d 100, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding the Joint Statement unpersuasive on a different point, because of its lack of
thorough reasoning).
*6 The Notice also cites two cases that quote the Joint Statement in their opinions, in support of the proposition that the Joint
Statement is persuasive to courts: Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, 765 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2014), and Sinisgallo v.
Town of Islip Hous. Auth., 865 F. Supp.2d 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Neither of these cases quotes the portions of the Joint Statement
relating to animal fees or even deals with an animal fee. See Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1286, 1287; see also Sinisgallo, 865 F. Supp.
2d at 315, 321, 336, 338. Both are unpersuasive in establishing the point at issue. Just because the Joint Statement or Notice
may be convincing on other topics does not make the entire document influential. The final case the Notice cites in support of
its animal fees assertion is Fair Hous. of the Dakotas, Inc. v. Goldmark Prop. Mgmt., 778 F. Supp.2d 1028 (D. N.D. 2011). This
case referred to the Joint Statement with no discussion of its persuasive authority and merely restated its brief conclusion. Id.
at 1040. The Joint Statement was not necessary to the matter before that court, which was whether a landlord must treat those
with assistance animals for mental disabilities (who were charged a fee) the same as those with assistance animals for physical

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disabilities (for whom the fee was waived). Id. at 1039, 1032 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the court found that there was an
outstanding “fact[ual] question regarding whether the requested accommodation [was] necessary to afford equal opportunity to
use and enjoy” the apartment. Id. at 1039. That case is distinguishable from this one because some disabled individuals were
treated differently from others, whereas all individuals are treated the same here under the generally applicable animal fee.
Plaintiff cites to another case for her case-in-chief and to demonstrate that courts regularly cite to the Joint Statement's guidance
related to animal fees, Intermountain Fair Hous. Council v. CVE Falls Park, L.L.C., No. 2:10-CV-00346-BLW, 2011 WL
2945824 (D. Idaho July 20, 2011). This case is similarly unpersuasive. That court likewise quoted the Joint Statement as if
it were binding, id. at *5, and then improperly cited to Chevron to describe the deference a court should give to the Joint
Statement, id. at *6. Interpretations like joint statements and notices are given Skidmore deference. See Christensen, 529 U.S.
at 587; see also Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1286 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Joint
Statement receives Skidmore deference, not Chevron-style deference). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Chevron
and “eliminated the ‘judicial invention’ of deference to administrative action and rulemaking” in Loper Bright v. Raimondo.
Van Loon v. Dep't of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549, 562 (5th Cir. 2024). Therefore, the deference afforded to the Joint Statement
in Intermountain Fair Housing Council is improper to afford today. The Court is not swayed by these two district court cases,
which contain no analysis of the Joint Statement's claims and no reasoning or determination as to its power to persuade.
Therefore, the Notice's interpretations do not contain the power to persuade and do not alter the Court's necessity or
reasonableness analysis. Accommodations related to generally applicable fees must be analyzed in a “fact-specific,...case-by-
case determination.” California Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d at 1418. To be clear, the Court is not holding that
animal fees can always be enforced against someone with an ESA, or even that this animal fee can be enforced against every
resident. The Court holds that plaintiff here failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the waiver of the fee
was necessary and reasonable. Because plaintiff's claims fail on the necessity and the reasonableness prongs, the Court grants
summary judgment on plaintiff's reasonable accommodations claims under the FHA and LEHOA.
B. Defendants’ Breach of Contract Claims
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), when federal-law claims that serve as the basis of subject matter jurisdiction are dismissed, and
only state-law claims based on supplemental jurisdiction remain, a district court has broad discretion to decline jurisdiction
over the remaining claims. See Brown v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen there is a subsequent
narrowing of the issues such that the federal claims are eliminated and only pendent state claims remain, federal jurisdiction
is not extinguished, [and] the decision as to whether to retain the pendent claims lies within the sound discretion of the district
court.”). In deciding whether to hear any remaining state-law claims, courts are to “analyze the statutory and common law
factors that are relevant to the question of its jurisdiction over pendent state law claims.” Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d
155, 158-59 (5th Cir. 2011). The relevant statutory factors are those found in Section 1367, including “(1) whether the state
claims raise novel or complex issues of state law; (2) whether the state claims substantially predominate over the federal claims;
(3) whether the federal claims have been dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional circumstances or other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). The common law factors include comity, convenience,
fairness, and judicial economy. See Parker & Parsley Petroleum v. Dresser Ind., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir.1992). The “general
rule” is for courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all federal claims have been dismissed
prior to trial. Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 446-47 (5th Cir. 2002).
*7 As to the first statutory factor, the state-law claims do not raise unresolved issues of Louisiana law—the primary dispute
is an issue of fact. Therefore, that factor disfavors dismissal. But the other three statutory factors favor dismissal because no
federal claims remain, and there are no exceptional circumstances here.
On balance, the common-law factors favor dismissal as well. The common-law factor of comity “demands that the ‘important
interests of federalism and comity’ be respected by federal courts, which are courts of limited jurisdiction and ‘not as well
equipped for determinations of state law as are state courts.’ ” Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160 (quoting Parker & Parsley Petroleum

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Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992)). Given that only a state-law claim remains in this case, the adjudication
of which would require grappling exclusively with Louisiana law, the factor of comity weighs in favor of dismissal.
The convenience factor also favors dismissal. The state court that would likely hear this matter would be the 24th Judicial
District Court in Jefferson Parish. It is a more convenient forum than the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana in Orleans Parish. The underlying events occurred in Jefferson Parish, and most of the witnesses are located there.
See Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160 (“[I]t is certainly more convenient for the case to have been heard in the Texas state court...where
all of the parties, witnesses, and evidence were located.”). Accordingly, the convenience factor favors declining jurisdiction.
As to fairness, the Court can identify no reason why a state court would be unlikely to fairly resolve the remaining claim. And,
although trial is scheduled for October, courts routinely remand cases nearer to the trial date when all federal claims have been
dismissed. See, e.g., Total Ben. Servs., Inc. v. Grp. Ins. Admin., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1228, 1242 (E.D. La. 1995) (dismissing state
law claims when trial was a couple weeks away).
The judicial economy factor is less straightforward. This case commenced over a year ago, with defendants filing the
counterclaim in June 2024. Requiring defendants to re-file their claim in state court when trial is scheduled in a few months
is certainly a hardship. But by the same token, only minimal adjudication of this matter has occurred. This is the first time
the Court considered case-dispositive motions, and the Court has not yet considered the merits of defendants’ state-law claim,
which can be readily handled by a state court. On balance, the Court finds that this factor is neutral.
Three of the four statutory factors weigh in favor of declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction, and, on balance, the common-
law factors favor declining jurisdiction. The Court thus finds no reason to depart from the “general rule” that federal courts
should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim when all federal claims have been dismissed prior
to trial. Smith, 298 F.3d at 446–47; cf. Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 941 F.2d 302, 307–08 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that a district court abused its discretion after it dismissed a case on the eve of trial after it had been litigated for four years,
consuming hundreds of court hours and producing twenty-three volumes and thousands of pages of record consisting of over
100 depositions, 200,000 pages of discovery, and a pretrial order exceeding 200 pages). The Court dismisses defendants’ state-
law claims without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
*8 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's Fair Housing
Act and the Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act claims and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §
3604(f)(3)(B) and La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2606(A)(6)(a)(ii) claims. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE defendants’
state-law claims.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2025 WL 1951763
Footnotes
1 R. Docs. 69 & 36.
2 R. Docs. 69.

Exhibit B

Exhibit C

Following is a summary of Complainant s allegations.

On March 31, 2025, Respondent Property Manager submitted the following responses to the
allegations.
Respondent admits to managing the Subject Property but denies all allegations of discrimination
and asks for dismissal of the complaint.
he claim(s) raised by 	in the instant complaint were
already settled and released as the result of civil litigation between the very same parties, same
Subject Property located at 	, and same discrimination and
reasonable accommodation claims.
Respondent charged pet rent because at most, if not all times, Complainant housed animals that
had not been approved as support animals. In her original lease, Complainant listed the Chihuahua
as a pet, which initiated the $25 pet rent. On July 27, 2023, the Chihuahua was approved as a
support animal. Subsequently, Complainant then housed 8 puppies and a cat 	none of which were
approved as support animals. Pet rent was justified for these additional animals.
Respondent Property Manager credited Complainant in the amount of $225 for pet fees despite
her 	housing 	several 	unauthorized 	pets 	during her 	tenancy. 	Complainant 	routinely 	housed
status when Respondent Property Manager notified her that they were considered unauthorized
pets.
rent.
Additionally, Respondent Owner provided the following responses to the allegations during the
course of the investigation. Respondent Owner admits to owning the Subject Property but denies
all allegations of discrimination.
Complainant lied about maintenance requests being ignored, as maintenance was performed on
the unit. After the repairs, the city inspector certified that the unit met city standards.
Complainant failed to pay rent for the Subject Property for multiple months, which triggered the
eviction action.

Respondent Owner spent approximately $20,000 over seven to eight months to repair and
rehabilitate the Subject Property for re-rental after Complainant vacated it. Complainant left
approximately 3,000 pounds of garbage throughout the Subject Property and caused substantial
damage.
Respondent Owner told Complainant that she loves animals. Respondent Owner, however,
Respondent Property Manager, and
Respondent Owner would be unable to provide particulars on the animals housed at the Subject
Property.