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chapter-702•Hawaii Revised Statutes, Chapter 702 — General Principles of Penal Liability
chapter-702Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 702CodeJan 1, 1972
Division 5. Crimes and Criminal Proceedings — Title 37. Hawaii Penal Code
Hawaii Revised Statutes as published by the Hawaii State Legislature (files updated 1/5/2026 7:15 PM).
(1) In any prosecution it is a defense that the conduct alleged does not include a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which the defendant is physically capable.
(2) Where the defense provided in subsection (1) is based on a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect which precludes or impairs a voluntary act or a voluntary omission, the defense shall be treated exclusively according to chapter 704, except that a defense based on intoxication which is pathological or not self-induced which precludes or impairs a voluntary act or a voluntary omission shall be treated exclusively according to this chapter.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 325, §1]
"Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously or habitually as the result of the effort or determination of the defendant.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
Possession is a voluntary act if the defendant knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or if the defendant was aware of the defendant's control of it for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate the defendant's possession.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
Penal liability may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless:
(1) The omission is expressly made a sufficient basis for penal liability by the law defining the offense; or
(2) A duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
Except as provided in section 702-212, a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense. When the state of mind required to establish an element of an offense is not specified by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
The elements of an offense are such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct, as:
(a) Are specified by the definition of the offense, and
(b) Negative a defense (other than a defense based on the statute of limitations, lack of venue, or lack of jurisdiction).
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
(1) "Intentionally."
(a) A person acts intentionally with respect to his conduct when it is his conscious object to engage in such conduct.
(b) A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.
(c) A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious object to cause such a result.
(2) "Knowingly."
(a) A person acts knowingly with respect to his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature.
(b) A person acts knowingly with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances exist.
(c) A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
(3) "Recklessly."
(a) A person acts recklessly with respect to his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is of the specified nature.
(b) A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances exist.
(c) A person acts recklessly with respect to a result of his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a result.
(d) A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this section if, considering the nature and purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances known to him, the disregard of the risk involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.
(4) "Negligently."
(a) A person acts negligently with respect to his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk taken that the person's conduct is of the specified nature.
(b) A person acts negligently with respect to attendant circumstances when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances exist.
(c) A person acts negligently with respect to a result of his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause such a result.
(d) A risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this subsection if the person's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a law- abiding person would observe in the same situation.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1983, c 132, §1; am L 1986, c 314, §4]
When the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
When the law provides that negligence is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. When the law provides that recklessness is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When the law provides that acting knowingly is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
When a particular intent is necessary to establish an element of an offense, it is immaterial that such intent was conditional unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law prohibiting the offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
When the grade or class of a particular offense depends on whether it is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, its grade or class shall be the lowest for which the determinative state of mind is established with respect to any element of the offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
The state of mind requirements prescribed by sections 702-204 and 702-207 through 702-211 do not apply to:
(1) An offense which constitutes a violation, unless the state of mind requirement involved is included in the definition of the violation or a legislative purpose to impose such a requirement plainly appears; or
(2) A crime defined by statute other than this Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offense or with respect to any element thereof plainly appears.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
Notwithstanding any other provisions of existing law and unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides:
(1) When absolute liability is imposed with respect to any element of an offense defined by a statute other than this Code and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation except as provided in section 702-212(2); and
(2) Although absolute liability is imposed by law with respect to one or more of the elements of an offense defined by a statute other than this Code, the culpable commission of the offense may be charged and proved, in which event negligence with respect to such elements constitutes a sufficient state of mind and the classification of the offense and the sentence that may be imposed therefor upon conviction are determined by section 701-107 and chapter 706.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
Conduct is the cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
In the following instances intentionally or knowingly causing a particular result shall be deemed to be established even though the actual result caused by the defendant may not have been within the defendant's intention or contemplation:
(1) The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm intended or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the intended or contemplated result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct to have a bearing on the defendant's liability or on the gravity of the defendant's offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1975, c 163, §1; gen ch 1993]
In the following instances, recklessly or negligently causing a particular result shall be deemed to be established even though the actual result caused by the defendant may not have been within the risk of which the defendant was or, in the case of negligence, should have been aware:
(1) The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct to have a bearing on the defendant's liability or on the gravity of the defendant's offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1973, c 136, §3(a); am L 1975, c 163, §2; gen ch 1993]
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
In any prosecution for an offense, it is a defense that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct under ignorance or mistake of fact if:
(1) The ignorance or mistake negatives the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense; or
(2) The law defining the offense or a law related thereto provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as the defendant supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and class of the offense of which the defendant may be convicted to those of the offense of which the defendant would be guilty had the situation been as the defendant supposed.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
In any prosecution, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the conduct or caused the result alleged under the belief that the conduct or result was not legally prohibited when the defendant acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in:
(1) A statute or other enactment;
(2) A judicial decision, opinion, or judgment;
(3) An administrative order or administrative grant of permission; or
(4) An official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration, or enforcement of the law defining the offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1973, c 136, §3(b); gen ch 1993]
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
(2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(a) Acting with the state of mind that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;
(b) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this Code or by the law defining the offense; or
(c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) With the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, the person:
(a) Solicits the other person to commit it;
(b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make reasonable effort so to do; or
(2) The person's conduct is expressly declared by law to establish the person's complicity.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing the result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if the accomplice acts, with respect to that result, with the state of mind that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
Unless otherwise provided by this Code or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(1) He is a victim of that offense;
(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and:
(a) Wholly deprives his complicity of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or
(b) Gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes reasonable effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
In any prosecution for an offense in which the liability of the defendant is based on conduct of another person, it is no defense that:
(1) The offense charged, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class of persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity, unless imposing liability on the defendant is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing the defendant's incapacity;
(2) The other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense, or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, based upon the conduct in question; or
(3) The other person has a legal immunity from prosecution based upon the conduct in question.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
When, pursuant to any section from section 702-221 through section 702-223, two or more persons are liable for an offense which is divided into degrees, each person is guilty of the degree of the offense which is consistent with the person's own state of mind and with the person's own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
A corporation or unincorporated association is guilty of an offense when:
(1) It omits to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations or unincorporated associations by law and the omission is prohibited by penal law;
(2) The conduct or result specified in the definition of the offense is engaged in, caused, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors of the corporation or by the executive board of the unincorporated association or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of the agent's office or employment and in behalf of the corporation or the unincorporated association; or
(3) The conduct or result specified in the definition of the offense is engaged in or caused by an agent of the corporation or the unincorporated association while acting within the scope of the agent's office or employment and in behalf of the corporation or the unincorporated association and:
(a) The offense is a misdemeanor, petty misdemeanor, or violation; or
(b) The offense is one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose such criminal liability on a corporation or unincorporated association.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
(1) A person is legally accountable for any conduct the person performs or causes to be performed in the name of a corporation or an unincorporated association or in its behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in the person's own name or behalf.
(2) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation or an unincorporated association, any agent of the corporation or the unincorporated association having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is legally accountable for a reckless omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon the agent.
(3) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of the person's legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the person is subject to the sentence authorized by law when a natural person is convicted of an offense of the grade and class involved.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
As used in sections 702-227 and 702-228:
"Agent" means any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or association and, in the case of an unincorporated association, a member of such association.
"Corporation" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.
"High managerial agent" means an officer of a corporation or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation or unincorporated association having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or the unincorporated association.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
[Repeal and reenactment on July 1, 2034. L 2024, c 243, §4.] (1) Self-induced intoxication is prohibited as a defense to any offense, except as specifically provided in this section.
(2) Evidence of the intoxication of the defendant that is not self-induced intoxication or that is pathological intoxication shall be admissible to prove or disprove the conduct alleged or the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is admissible to prove or disprove conduct or to prove the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of an offense. Evidence of self-induced intoxication of the defendant is not admissible to disprove the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense.
(3) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute a physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect within the meaning of section 704-400.
(4) Intoxication that is:
(a) Not self-induced intoxication; or
(b) Pathological intoxication,
is an affirmative defense if by reason of the intoxication, the defendant at the time of the defendant's conduct lacks substantial capacity to engage in the alleged conduct, to have the state of mind sufficient to establish an element of the offense, to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law.
(5) As used in this section:
"Intoxication" means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.
"Lacks substantial capacity" means capacity that has been impaired to such a degree that only an extremely limited amount remains.
"Pathological intoxication" means intoxication grossly excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the defendant does not know the defendant is susceptible and that results from a physical abnormality of the defendant.
"Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances that the defendant knowingly introduces into the defendant's body, the tendency of which to cause intoxication the defendant knows or ought to know, unless the defendant introduces the substances pursuant to medical advice or under circumstances that would afford a defense to a charge of a penal offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1986, c 325, §2; gen ch 1993; am L 2015, c 35, §21; am L 2024, c 243, §1]
(1) It is a defense to a penal charge that the defendant engaged in the conduct or caused the result alleged because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
(2) The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the defendant recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish the requisite state of mind for the offense charged.
(3) It is not a defense that a person acted on the command of his or her spouse, unless he or she acted under such coercion as would establish a defense under this section.
(4) When the conduct of the defendant would otherwise be justifiable under section 703-302, this section does not preclude the defense of justification.
(5) In prosecutions for any offense described in this Code, the defense asserted under this section shall constitute an affirmative defense. The defendant shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence to prove the facts constituting such defense, unless such facts are supplied by the testimony of the prosecuting witness or circumstance in such testimony, and of proving such facts by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to section 701-115.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1979, c 183, §1]
It is an affirmative defense to a penal charge that the defendant, in engaging in the conduct or causing the result alleged, which the defendant did not know to be unlawful, did no more than execute an order of the defendant's superior in the armed services.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
In any prosecution, the victim's consent to the conduct alleged, or to the result thereof, is a defense if the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
In any prosecution involving conduct which causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such injury is a defense if:
(1) The conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic event or competitive sport; or
(2) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under chapter 703.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
Unless otherwise provided by this Code or by the law defining the offense, consent does not constitute a defense if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct alleged;
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease, disorder, or defect, or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the defendant to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct alleged;
(3) It is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or
(4) It is induced by force, duress or deception.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
(1) The court may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct alleged and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct:
(a) Was within a customary license or tolerance, which was not expressly refused by the person whose interest was infringed and which is not inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense;
(b) Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
(c) Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense.
(2) The court shall not dismiss a prosecution under subsection (1)(c) of this section without filing a written statement of its reasons.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1]
(1) In any prosecution, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct or caused the prohibited result because the defendant was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement officer, or by a person acting in cooperation with a law enforcement officer, who, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, either:
(a) Knowingly made false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct or result was not prohibited; or
(b) Employed methods of persuasion or inducement which created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
(2) The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]
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