Federal Trade Commission’s Proposed Enforcement Policy Statement Regarding Personalized Pricing

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Federal Trade Commission’s Proposed Enforcement Policy Statement Regarding
Personalized Pricing
August 19, 2026
I. 	Summary
There is growing public concern that modern data collection and processing capabilities
can allow businesses to set personalized prices based on analysis of consumers’ personal data
and resulting conclusions, such as estimates of how much an individual consumer is willing to
pay for a product or whether that consumer is likely to engage in comparison shopping. Although
personalized pricing is a long-established norm in some markets, it is not in many others.
Personalized pricing in the latter markets would therefore run contrary to longstanding practice
and consumers’ reasonable expectations that the price they see for a product or service is the
same price that any other consumer at the same place and time would see.
Congress has not given the Commission the authority to prohibit personalized pricing in
all circumstances, but the Commission intends to enforce the law aggressively against any
deceptive or unfair personalized pricing practices that violate Section 5 of the FTC Act or any
other law enforced by the Commission. Where consumers reasonably expect that prices for a
product or service will not vary based on their personal data, businesses that engage in
personalized pricing should clearly and conspicuously disclose not just that the price is
personalized, but also the basis for that personalization and the types of data on which the
personalization is based. The failure to make these disclosures is likely to constitute an unfair or
deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5. The Commission intends to deploy
enforcement resources in a manner consistent with this conclusion.
II. 	Background
The Federal Trade Commission under President Trump’s leadership has been and remains
focused on ensuring that the price consumers see for a good or service is the price that
consumers will pay for that good or service without any surprises or hidden charges.1 These
1 Press Release, FTC, FTC Seeks Public Comment on Unfair and Deceptive Fee Practices in Online Food and
Grocery Delivery Services (Apr. 14, 2026), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/04/ftc-seeks-
public-comment-unfair-deceptive-fee-practices-online-food-grocery-delivery-services; Press Release, FTC, StubHub
Refunding $10 Million in Fees to Consumers After Deceptive Ticket Pricing (Apr. 9, 2026),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/04/stubhub-refunding-10-million-fees-consumers-after-
deceptive-ticket-pricing; Press Release, FTC, FTC, Maryland Attorney General Secure Full Refunds and Additional
Penalties Against Lindsay Auto Group for Deceptive Pricing Practices and Unwanted Add-ons (Apr. 2, 2026),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/04/ftc-maryland-attorney-general-secure-full-refunds-
additional-penalties-against-lindsay-auto-group; Press Release, FTC, Instacart to Pay $60 Million in Consumer
Refunds to Settle FTC Lawsuit Over Allegations it Engaged in Deceptive Tactics (Dec. 18, 2025),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/12/instacart-pay-60-million-consumer-refunds-settle-ftc-
lawsuit-over-allegations-it-engaged-deceptive; Press Release, FTC, Greystar Agrees to Pay $24 Million and Stop
Deceptive Advertising Practices as a Result of FTC and Colorado Lawsuit Alleging the Firm Deceived Consumers

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priorities have also been outlined in President Trump’s executive orders focusing on issues that
affect the cost of living for American families.2
The public, Congress, and state legislatures are increasingly concerned that the massive
amount of data collected and generated when consumers use modern technology is making it
possible for merchants to personalize prices for goods and services that traditionally did not vary
from person to person and which American consumers therefore reasonably expect will not be
any different for them than they will be for their friends or neighbors. When consumers walk
into a retail store, for example, they reasonably expect the price on the shelf to be the same price
offered to any other consumer shopping at the same store at the same time. Likewise, when they
browse to a product listing on a retailer’s website, they reasonably expect the price to be the
same price that anyone else browsing to that listing would see, not a price set based on the
retailer’s analysis of their personal data and conclusion as to how much they would be willing to
pay for that product as compared to some other consumer. These expectations of non-
personalized pricing, in turn, factor into consumers’ decisions regarding where to shop, whether
and where to comparison shop, and other important considerations impacting the purchase
process.
Consumers obviously do not expect that prices will never vary. Prices will vary based on
changes in supply and demand that affect everyone participating in the same market. Sometimes
those supply-demand variations will be intensely local—for example, the prices of rideshare
services can vary if the supply and demand in one neighborhood is different than in an adjoining
About Rent Prices (Dec. 2, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/12/greystar-agrees-
pay-24-million-stop-deceptive-advertising-practices-result-ftc-colorado-lawsuit; Press Release, FTC, FTC Rule on
Unfair or Deceptive Fees to Take Effect on May 12, 2025 (May 5, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/news/press-releases/2025/05/ftc-rule-unfair-or-deceptive-fees-take-effect-may-12-2025; see also Press
Release, FTC, FTC Seeks Public Comment on a Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Unfair or Deceptive Rental
Housing Fee Practices (Mar. 12, 2026), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2026/03/ftc-seeks-
public-comment-proposed-rulemaking-regarding-unfair-or-deceptive-rental-housing-fee.
2 Exec. Order No. 14395, Establishing the Task Force to Eliminate Fraud, 91 Fed. Reg, 13485 (Mar. 16, 2026),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/03/establishing-the-task-force-to-eliminate-fraud/;
Exec. Order No. 14364, Addressing Security Risks From Price Fixing And Anti-Competitive Behavior In The Food
Supply Chain, 90 Fed. Reg. 57349 (Dec. 6, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/2025/12/addressing-security-risks-from-price-fixing-and-anti-competitive-behavior-in-the-food-supply-
chain/; Exec. Order No. 14331, Guaranteeing Fair Banking For All Americans, 90 Fed. Reg. 38925 (Aug. 7. 2025),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/guaranteeing-fair-banking-for-all-americans/; Exec. Order
No. 14297, Delivering Most-Favored-Nation Prescription Drug Pricing to American Patients, 90 Fed. Reg. 20749
(May 12, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/05/delivering-most-favored-nation-
prescription-drug-pricing-to-american-patients/; Exec. Order No. 14273, Lowering Drug Prices by Once Again
Putting Americans First, 90 Fed. Reg. 16441 (Apr. 15, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/2025/04/lowering-drug-prices-by-once-again-putting-americans-first/; Exec. Order No. 14267, Reducing
Anti-Competitive Regulatory Barriers, 90 Fed. Reg. 15629 (Apr. 9, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/2025/04/reducing-anti-competitive-regulatory-barriers/; Exec. Order No. 14254, Combating Unfair Practices
in the Live Entertainment Market, 90 Fed. Reg. 14699 (Mar. 31, 2025),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/combating-unfair-practices-in-the-live-entertainment-
market/.

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neighborhood, as well as other factors intrinsic to the requested ride.3 Prices may vary based on
regional differences in taxes, regulations, and market conditions. And the prices of some
products necessarily vary from purchaser to purchaser because of the nature of the product—for
example, the prices of insurance policies or of credit necessarily turn on a consumer’s
individualized characteristics and details so that they properly reflect the risk of providing an
insurance policy or loaning money to the consumer.4
The rise of data-driven “personalized pricing” has the potential to transform our history
of relatively limited variation in pricing from one consumer to the next. The significant amount
of data collected and generated when consumers use modern technology may give merchants the
tools to personalize prices for goods and services that traditionally have not varied from person
to person.5 Because consumers generate, and countless firms collect and purchase, data
reflecting every facet of our lives, these data can reveal “some of our most intimate details—our
identities, interests, locations, credit histories, medical conditions, sexual interests, and religious
and political views.”6 Many Americans do not understand just how much data they generate
every second of their lives.7 Nor do they necessarily understand how those data are collected and
stored, to whom they may be sold, or how they may be used—including, potentially, to price
products and services uniquely for them on the basis of their intimate details.
The extent to which businesses currently use personalized pricing is not well understood,
and the effects of personalized pricing on consumers are unclear.8 As a theoretical matter, perfect
personalized pricing without business competition would allow a monopolist to capture the entire
consumer surplus by charging each consumer the highest amount he is willing to pay for a
3 See, e.g., Yanqiao Wang, Pricing at Lyft (Aug. 2, 2022), https://eng.lyft.com/pricing-at-lyft-8a4022065f8b; Yupeng
Chen et al., Uber vs. Lyft: How Do They Decide Their Price?, DataRes at UCLA, Medium (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://ucladatares.medium.com/uber-vs-lyft-how-do-they-decide-their-price-92222122f482.
4 Concurring Statement of Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson, Surveillance Pricing Intermediaries, Matter No.
P246202, at 1 (July 23, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/surveillance-pricing-6b-ferguson-
concurrence.pdf (“Ferguson Surveillance Pricing Statement”).
5 See Patrick J. Kehoe at al., Dynamic Competition in the Era of Big Data at 1 (Nov. 3. 2020).
6 Ferguson Surveillance Pricing Statement, supra note 4 at 1.
7 See, e.g., Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson, Social Media and Video
Streaming Services Report, Matter No. P205402, at 1 (Sept. 19, 2024),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/ferguson-statement-social-media-6b.pdf (“Most Americans do not
understand, however, how much of their private data these companies are collecting, nor what they are doing with
that information after collecting the data.”); Colleen McClain et al., How Americans View Data Privacy, Pew
Research (Oct. 18, 2023), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2023/10/18/how-americans-view-data-privacy/
(“Some 67% [of the American public] say they understand little to nothing about what companies are doing with
their personal data, up from 59%.”); Hailey Reissman, Americans Don’t Understand What Companies Can Do With
Their Personal Data — and That’s a Problem (Feb. 7, 2023), https://www.asc.upenn.edu/news-
events/news/americans-dont-understand-what-companies-can-do-their-personal-data-and-thats-problem.
8 See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Dubé & Sanjog Misra, Personalized Pricing and Consumer Welfare, 131 J. Pol. Econ. 131,
134 (2023) (noting that the study may be “the first to document both the feasibility and implications of scalable
personalized pricing”); Nicholas Buchholz at al., Personalized Pricing and the Value of Time: Evidence from
Auctioned Cab Rides, 93 Econometrica 929, 930 (2025) (“The welfare effect of price discrimination is known to be
ambiguous and thus a matter of empirical measurement.” (citation omitted)).

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product or service.9 But real-world personalized pricing would be less than perfect in its ability
to identify consumers and determine their willingness to pay and, in the vast majority of
circumstances, would have to contend with competitive pressures that limit pricing power.10 The
limited economic research on the question suggests that while personalized pricing is likely to
increase business profits,11 benefits to some consumers are accompanied by losses to other
consumers12 and that the more sophisticated personalized pricing practices become, the less
likely consumers are to benefit.13
III. 	Personalized Pricing Without Adequate Disclosures Likely Violates Section 5
Congress has not given the Commission the authority to prohibit personalized pricing
outright, but the Commission intends to enforce aggressively against any practices associated
with personalized pricing that violate Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,14 or any other law enforced by the
Commission.15
An act or practice is deceptive if it involves a representation, omission, or practice that is
material and likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
9 Dubé, supra note 8, at 141.
10 See, e.g., id. at 133, 140–41.
11 See, e.g., id. at 131, 135; Buchholz, supra note 8, at 929; B. R. Shiller, Approximating Purchase Propensities and
Reservation Prices From Broad Consumer Tracking, 61 Int’l Econ. Rev. 847 (2020).
12 See, e.g., Dubé, supra note 8, at 131–38; Buchholz, supra note 8, at 929–32.
13 Ginger Zhe Jin et al., Surveillance Pricing: A Cautionary Summary of Potential Harms and Solutions, CPI
Antitrust Chronicle at 4 (July 14, 2025); Andrew Rhodes & Jidong Zhou, Personalized Pricing and Competition,
114 Am. Econ. Rev. 2141–70 (2024) (finding that when only some companies in a market can personalize prices,
consumers can be worse off than when either all or no companies do so); Rosa-Branca Esteves & Francisco
Carballo-Cruz, Access to Data for Personalized Pricing: Can It Raise Entry Barriers and Abuse of Dominance
Concerns, NIPE Working Papers, NIPE, Universidade do Minho (May 2025); Buchholz, supra note 8, at 929; cf.
Dubé, supra note 8, at 141–43 (setting out theoretical examples involving databases with varying information
available to firms and explaining that “the example indicates that the consumer welfare implication of personalized
pricing is ultimately an empirical question that depends on the databases available to firms for marketing decision-
making”).
14 FTC Policy Statement on Deception (“Deception Policy Statement”), 103 F.T.C. 174, 176 (1984) (appended to In
re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984)),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf; FTC Policy
Statement on Unfairness (“Unfairness Policy Statement”), 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984) (appended to In re Int’l
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984)), https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
15 Other relevant laws or regulations enforced by the Commission include the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence
Act (“ROSCA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 8401–8405, and the Rule Against Unfair or Deceptive Fees (the “Fees Rule”), 16
C.F.R. Part 464. ROSCA prohibits charging consumers for subscriptions without their express informed consent as
well as failing to clearly and conspicuously disclose all material terms of the transaction before consumers provide
their payment information. The Fees Rule prohibits misleading consumers about fees in the live-event ticketing and
short-term lodging industries. In some cases, the potential Section 5 violations identified below may also violate
these other legal requirements.

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consumer’s detriment.16 An act or practice is unfair if it causes, or is likely to cause, substantial
injury to consumers that is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.17 These principles apply
with the same force to personalized pricing as to any other commercial conduct.
Retailers may deceive consumers in violation of Section 5 when they represent, expressly
or by implication, that a price is static or widely offered when in fact it is personalized.18 They
may similarly deceive consumers when a consumer reasonably believes that a price for a good or
service is static or widely offered, and the merchant fails to disclose that the price is in fact
personalized.19 Such misrepresentations or omissions are likely to be material: consumers who
are unaware of personalized pricing cannot take steps to avoid the higher prices that may result
from it, such as using a virtual private network or private browsing functionality, choosing a
different retailer whose prices are static or widely offered, rather than personalized, or simply
declining to complete the transaction.
Similarly, retailers may violate Section 5 when they mislead consumers as to the basis for
the personalization of a price or the effect of that personalization. Consumers who reasonably
believe that a personalized price is a discount based on their purchase history with that retailer
when it is in fact a higher price based on information about their disposable income or their
shopping habits with other firms, for example, may be deceived into not taking action to avoid
the personalized price. Tricked into forgoing alternative courses of action, misled consumers
might suffer the injury of paying a higher price that they could have otherwise avoided.
16 Deception Policy Statement, supra note 14, at 176. This test, which “undergird[s] all deception cases,” consists of
three elements. Id. at 175. “First, there must be a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer.” Ibid. “Second, we examine the practice from the perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances,” i.e., we ask whether the interpretation of the statement that renders it misleading is reasonable or
not. Ibid. And “[t]hird, the representation, omission or practice must be a material one” such that it is “likely to
affect the consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a product or service” and “injury is likely.” Ibid. The U.S.
courts of appeals have, by and large, adopted these three elements for deception cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Pukke, 53
F.4th 80, 104 (4th Cir. 2022); FTC v. Moses, 913 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2019); FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc., 767
F.3d 611, 630–31 (6th Cir. 2014); FTC v. Lalonde, 545 F. App’x 825, 837 (11th Cir. 2013); FTC v. LoanPointe, LLC,
525 F. App’x 696, 700 (10th Cir. 2013) (“a practice is deceptive if it entails a material misrepresentation or omission
that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances”); FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th
Cir. 2001); Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992).
17 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see also Unfairness Policy Statement, supra note 14; FTC v. Corpay, Inc., 164 F.4th 807, 839
(11th Cir. 2026); FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010), amended, No. 09-55093, 2010 WL
2365956 (9th Cir. June 15, 2010) (unfair creation and delivery of unverified checks); FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570
F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009).
18 Examples described herein are not a comprehensive list of potential legal violations related to personalized
pricing. Nor are they intended to be definitive statements of the Commission relating to the legality of the identified
practices. Instead, they are presented for discussion purposes only.
19 See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 387 (1965) (“It has long been considered a deceptive
practice to state falsely that a product ordinarily sells for an inflated price but that it is being offered at a special
reduced price, even if the offered price represents the actual value of the product and the purchaser is receiving his
money's worth.”).

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Some personalized pricing practices may also be unfair under Section 5. The higher price
paid by a consumer due to personalized pricing may be a substantial injury. Consumers may not
reasonably be able to avoid that higher price if the fact or nature of personalization of the price
has been concealed by the retailer. For example, consumers may not be able to avoid paying the
higher personalized price if they lack the information or tools necessary to, among other things,
modify their behavior to avoid triggering higher prices, dispute or correct inaccurate information
collected about them that is leading to higher prices, or avoid the collection of that data in the
first place. Any benefits to consumers or competition from personalized pricing may also be
realized without concealing the fact and nature of the personalized pricing.20
Existing regulations of industries where personalized pricing is a well-established
practice support the Commission’s approach to Section 5 enforcement.21 For example, the Fair
Credit Reporting Act requires that companies notify consumers not only when an adverse action
is based on a consumer report (for example, the charging of a higher price), but also of the
specific basis for that adverse action.22 And many state laws regulating the insurance industry
require disclosure of the basis for individualized adverse action including, in some cases, the
increase in premiums offered to consumers.23 In each case, disclosure improves consumers’
ability to avoid substantial injury from higher prices that may be founded on incorrect data or
behavior that consumers can change.
To be effective, personalized pricing disclosures should be clear and conspicuous and
include all relevant information, such as the fact that the price is personalized, the basis of that
personalization, and the type of data used.24 Telling a consumer only that he is being shown a
20 The Commission declines at this time to take any position on whether some personalized pricing practices are
unfair even when fully disclosed to consumers.
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (“In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider
established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations
may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.”).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (requiring that consumers receive an adverse action notice if their consumer reports are
used, in whole or in part, to make an adverse decision about eligibility for credit and are also entitled to get a free
copy of their consumer report so they can identify and dispute any inaccuracies).
23 E.g., CAL . I NS. CODE §§ 791.02, 791.10 (1981/2013); V A. CODE A NN. §§ 38.2-602, 38.2-602 (1986/2003); WASH.
A DMIN. CODE 284-30A (2024).
24 Cf. P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950) (“to tell less than the whole truth is a well-known
method of deception”); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 114 (1937) (holding that it was false, deceptive,
and misleading to falsely represent to purchasers that they had been “specially selected” to receive free books and
that the price of a “loose leaf extension service” was a “reduced price and that the usual price at which respondents’
publications are sold is higher than the price ‘at which they are offered to such purchasers’”); Anna Priester et al., A
Special Price Just for You: Effects of Personalized Dynamic Pricing on Consumer Fairness Perceptions, 19 J. Rev.
& Pricing Mgmt. 99, 100 (2020) (“[W]e show that a more granular price individualization level negatively affects
consumers’ fairness perceptions.”), at 108 (“We show that when sellers differentiate prices across individual
consumers depending on personal information, consumers deem this pricing practice as less fair than when sellers
set prices for different consumer segments based on less uniquely identifying information.”); Lan Xia et al., The
Price Is Unfair! A Conceptual Framework of Price Fairness Perceptions, 68 J. Mktg. 1, 7 (2004) (“When buyers
believe that an inequality in an exchange is unacceptable and are upset, disappointed, or regretful (if they believe
that there is a better option), they may choose to complain, ask for a refund, spread negative word of mouth, and/or

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“specially selected” price, for example, would likely be misleading because it omits important
information. Conversely, a clear and conspicuous disclosure that a personalized price is based on
a consumer’s estimated willingness to pay derived from data about that consumer’s previous
purchases from the same retailer through the same login account—if accurate and complete—
would likely be enough to dispel any reasonable expectation that the posted price is not
personalized and give the consumer the information he needs to identify potentially incorrect
information, take measures to avoid the personalized price, or avoid the future collection of data
for personalized pricing, as well as alert him that it might be in his interest to take such steps.
Data practices associated with personalized pricing may also implicate Section 5. The
Commission has long applied Section 5 to protect consumers’ data privacy.25 Businesses that
collect, use, or disclose consumers’ personal data for the purpose of personalized pricing without
adequate disclosures or without obtaining consent may violate Section 5.26 And businesses that
base personalized prices on personal data of consumers without sufficiently verifying that
consumers consented to the collection of those data for that purpose may violate Section 5.27
To illustrate, below are non-exhaustive examples of scenarios in which personalized
pricing without adequate disclosure would raise Section 5 concerns:
• 	A food delivery company quoting a higher price to consumers on the basis of data
personal to those consumers that lead the company to believe they are less likely or
unable to leave their homes to purchase food.
• 	A grocery chain charging a delivery customer a higher price for milk based on data
showing that several children live in the customer’s household.
leave the relationship, depending on their assessment of which action is most likely to restore equity with the least
cost.”).
25 See, e.g., Complaint, In re Lenovo, Inc., Docket No. C-4636 (Jan. 2, 2018) (alleging that preinstallation of ad-
injecting software that, without adequate notice or informed consent, acted as a man-in-the-middle between
consumers and all websites with which they communicated was unfair; and that failure to take reasonable measures
to assess and address security risks created by the preinstalled software was unfair),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1523134_c4636_lenovo_united_states_complaint.pdf; Complaint,
FTC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2017) (alleging that collection of sensitive television viewing
activity without consent and contrary to consumer expectations, and sharing of such information with third parties,
was an unfair practice); Complaint, In re Aaron’s, Inc., Docket No. C-4442 (Mar. 11, 2014) (alleging that allowing
franchisees to install software facilitating surreptitious collection of private information on rented computers was an
unfair practice, and noting that consumers were unable to avoid harm because collection was surreptitious),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140311aaronscmpt.pdf; Complaint, In re Showplace, Inc., Docket
No. C-4397, (Apr. 15, 2013) (alleging that rent-to-own store’s use of monitoring and tracking software installed on
rented computers was an unfair practice),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130415showplacecmpt.pdf.
26 See, e.g., Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson, In re Gravy Analytics, Inc.
& In re Mobilewalla, Inc., Matter Nos. 2123035 & 2023196 (Dec. 3, 2024).
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/gravy_-mobilewalla-ferguson-concurrence.pdf (concurring in holding
a company liable for “collecting, using, and selling precise location information without sufficiently verifying that
the consumers who generated the data consented to the collection of those data by the applications that collected it”).
27 Id.

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• 	A hotel charging a higher price to a consumer on the basis of data personal to that
consumer leading the hotel to believe that the consumer is traveling for a funeral or
some other can’t-miss personal business.
• 	A rideshare company charging a user more on the basis of data revealing that the user
has not installed any of the company’s competitors’ apps on the user’s phone.
• 	A rideshare company charging a user more for transport to a medical facility on the
basis of data suggesting that the user has a life-threatening medical emergency or
condition.
• 	A retailer charging more for a home-security camera system based on court filings
indicating a particular customer has recently been the victim of a crime.
• 	A retailer charging more for a product sold on its website on the basis of data
revealing that the consumer is inside one of the retailer’s physical locations or parking
lots at the time of browsing the retailer’s website.
This Policy Statement elaborates on principles adopted by the Commission in individual
cases and rules over the course of many years. This Policy Statement does not confer any rights
on any person and does not operate to bind the FTC or the public. In any enforcement action, the
Commission must prove the challenged act or practice violates at least one existing statutory or
regulatory requirement.
* * *
The Commission will use all tools at its disposal to protect consumers. It will continue to
monitor the deployment of personalized pricing and will not hesitate to bring enforcement
actions in the public interest when it has reason to believe the law is being violated.