FTC Prepared Statement Before the Ohio Privacy and Public Records Access Study Committee Concerning Public Entities, Personal Information, and Identity Theft

us-ftc-advocacy-filings-7f2ea33b02eb58ea9ae1469b27ae31efFTC Prepared Statement Before the Ohio Privacy and Public Records Access Study Committee Concerning Public Entities, Personal Information, and Identity TheftAdvocacy Filing

PREPARED STATEMENT OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Before the
OHIO PRIVACY and PUBLIC RECORDS ACCESS STUDY COMMITTEE
of the
OHIO SENATE and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
on
Public Entities, Personal Information, and Identity Theft
Columbus, Ohio
May 31, 2007
Complete printed PDF page 1
1 The views expressed in this statement represent the views of the Commission.
My oral presentation and responses to questions are my own and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Commission or any individual Commissioner.
2 See, e.g., www.consumer.gov/idtheft/pdf/synovate_report.pdf.
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I. Introduction
Senator Goodman, Representative Wolpert, and members of the Committee, I am Betsy
Broder, Assistant Director of the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection at the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”).1 Thank you for the opportunity to speak about identity
theft and the government’s obligations in protecting sensitive personal information in its
possession.
Identity theft is a pernicious crime, and controlling it is a critical component of the
Commission’s consumer protection mission. This testimony describes the nature and scope of
the identity theft problem, the work of the President’s Identity Theft Task Force, and specific
issues concerning the protection of personal information held by governmental entities.
II. The Identity Theft Problem
Identity theft has become a serious concern in our information-based economy. Millions
of consumers are victimized by this crime every year.2 Beyond its direct costs, concerns about
identity theft harm our economy by threatening consumers’ confidence in the marketplace
generally, and in electronic commerce specifically. A recent Wall Street Journal/Harris
Interactive survey, for example, found that, as a result of fears about protecting their identities,
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3 See Jennifer Cummings, Substantial Numbers of U.S. Adults Taking Steps to
Prevent Identity Theft, the Wall Street Journal Online, May 18, 2006,
www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/WSJfinance/HI_WSJ_PersFinPoll_2006_vol2_iss0
5.pdf.
4 Federal law limits consumers’ liability for unauthorized credit card charges to $50
per card as long as the credit card company is notified within 60 days of the unauthorized charge.
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b). Many credit card companies do not require consumers to pay the $50
and will not hold the consumers liable for the unauthorized charges, no matter how much time
has elapsed since the discovery of the loss or theft of the card. Consumers’ liability for
unauthorized debit card charges is limited to $50 in cases where the loss is reported within two
business days, and to $500 if reported thereafter. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a). In addition, if
consumers do not report unauthorized use when they see it on their bank statement within 60
days of receiving the notice, they may be subject to unlimited liability for losses that occurred
after that period. Id.
2
30 percent of consumers polled were limiting their online purchases, and 24 percent were cutting
back on their online banking. 3
Generally speaking, most cases of identity theft fall into one of two broad categories: the
takeover or misuse of existing credit card, debit card, or other accounts (“existing account
fraud”); and the use of stolen personal information to open new accounts in the consumer’s name
(“new account fraud”). New account fraud, although less prevalent, typically causes
considerably more harm to consumers in out-of-pocket expenses and time necessary to repair the
damage.4
Identity thieves obtain the information they use to commit identity theft from many
sources, both private and public. They may steal wallets, rifle through trash, bribe insiders, or
hack into databases. Government agencies can also be a source of consumer data that can be
used to commit identity theft. Public entities, including federal, state and local governments,
collect personal information about individuals for a variety of purposes, such as determining who
is eligible for government programs and delivering efficient and effective services. Accordingly,
Complete printed PDF page 3
5 Exec. Order No. 13, 71 FR 27945 (May 10, 2006), available at www.idtheft.gov.
6 The President’s Identity Theft Task Force, Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic
Plan, is available at www.idtheft.gov.
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public entities play a critical role in guarding against misuse and unauthorized disclosure of the
personal information they collect and maintain.
III. President’s Identity Theft Task Force
On May 10, 2006, the President established an Identity Theft Task Force. Comprised of
17 federal agencies, the Task Force is chaired by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and co-
chaired by FTC Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras. The mission of the Task Force is to develop a
comprehensive national strategy to combat identity theft.5 The President specifically directed the
Task Force to make recommendations on steps the federal government can take to reduce the
likelihood of identity theft.
In April 2007, the Task Force published a strategic plan for combating identity theft.6
Broadly, the plan is organized around the life cycle of identity theft – from the thieves’ attempts
to obtain sensitive information to its impact on victims – and identifies roles for consumers, the
private sector, government agencies, and law enforcement. 	The Strategic Plan includes
recommendations on how to prevent sensitive data from falling into the wrong hands, to make
such data less valuable to identity thieves by improving authentication, to ease victim recovery,
and to improve tools for effective criminal law enforcement. The Strategic Plan includes several
specific recommendations regarding the protection of sensitive personal information collected
and maintained by the Federal government.
IV. 	The Critical Role Of Social Security Numbers
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Many of the Task Force recommendations focus on the security for and use of Social
Security numbers (“SSNs”). The SSN is particularly valuable to identity thieves because in
many cases it is the key piece of information that can enable criminals to perpetrate new account
fraud. Creditors and other benefits providers often use SSNs to access information (such as a
credit report) that is necessary to open an account or provide other benefits.
SSNs play a vital role in our economy, enabling both business and government to match
information to the proper individual. Federal, state, and local governments rely extensively on
SSNs for identifying consumers when administering programs that deliver services and benefits
to the public. With 300 million Americans, many of whom share the same name, the SSN
presents significant advantages as a means of identification because of its uniqueness and
permanence. At the same time, however, the widespread use of SSNs makes them more readily
available to identity thieves. The challenge is to find the proper balance between keeping SSNs
out of the hands of thieves, while giving businesses and government sufficient means to identify
individuals. Excessive restrictions on the use of SSNs could have a deleterious impact on such
important purposes as public health, criminal law enforcement, and anti-fraud efforts by making
it unduly difficult for government agencies to identify individuals. In addition, changes to
government systems can be time-consuming and expensive, and it is important that any changes
not impair the transparency of public records.
SSNs are widely available in public records held by federal agencies, states, local
jurisdictions, and courts. As of 2004, 41 states and the District of Columbia, as well as 75
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7 Government Accounting Office, Social Security Numbers: Government Could Do
More to Reduce Display in Public Records and On Identity Cards (November 2004), at 2,
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d0559.pdf.
8 In the past, many states used SSNs as driver’s license identification numbers.
Many states voluntarily changed this practice to reduce the unnecessary use of SSNs. The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, now prohibits
the display of SSNs on driver’s licenses, vehicle registrations, or other identification documents
issued by state departments of motor vehicles. See 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2)(C)(vi).
9 See, e.g., Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1005.
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percent of U.S. counties, displayed SSNs in public records.7 Although the number and type of
records in which SSNs are displayed vary greatly across states and counties, SSNs are often
found in death records, voter registration records, property records, and court documents.8 In
addition, the increasing online availability of public records may make it easier for thieves to
obtain SSNs from those records. Although steps are being taken to reduce the widespread
availability of SSNs through publicly available documents -- such as the 2003 change in
Bankruptcy Court rules that requires that truncated versions of SSNs be used in most documents
filed with the court9 -- SSNs remain one of the most widely used individual identifiers.
Decisions and policies regarding public display of SSNs and other consumer data must rely on a
careful balancing of the need for public access to records with the concerns for privacy and
security, along with the costs of limiting access.
The Identity Theft Task Force made several recommendations with respect to the issue of
government use of SSNs. Based on an Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) review of the
use of SSNs by federal agencies for human resource purposes, the Task Force recommended that
OPM take steps to eliminate, restrict, or conceal the use of SSNs wherever possible (including
assigning employee identification numbers where practicable). The Task Force expressly
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10 See, e.g., The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; The E-Government Act of 2002, 44
U.S.C. § 3501 note.
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recognized that SSNs must continue to be used for certain purposes, such as income and tax
records, and recommended that OPM issue guidance to federal agencies on how to restrict,
conceal, or mask SSNs in those records. The Task Force also recommended that the Social
Security Administration develop a clearinghouse for agency practices that minimize use and
display of SSNs in order to facilitate the sharing of best practices.
In addition, the Task Force recommended that its agencies work with state and local
governments -- through organizations such as the National Governors Association, the National
Association of Attorneys General, the National League of Cities, and the National Association
for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems -- to discuss the use of SSNs and to explore
ways to eliminate unnecessary use and display of SSNs. Many of the recommendations to
federal agencies can be applied equally to government agencies at all levels.
V. 	Data Security in the Public Sector
Governments collect sensitive personal information that can be misused by identity
thieves, and must therefore take appropriate steps to ensure that the information is properly
protected. Just as private entities need to develop and strengthen their security programs,
government agencies need to carefully examine their methods of protecting the privacy of
individuals whose information they collect and store. Certain of these obligations are imposed
by law,10 while others are simply a function of proper oversight and management.
Federal agencies currently are taking steps to strengthen their information security. The
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), the primary governing statute for the
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11 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541, et seq.
12 See Protection of Sensitive Agency Information, Memorandum from Clay Johnson
III, Deputy Director for Management, OMB, to Heads of Departments and Agencies, M-06-16
(June 23, 2006).
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federal government’s information technology security program, establishes a comprehensive
framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information security controls over federal
information resources. It also provides for the development and maintenance of minimum
controls required to protect federal information and information systems.11 FISMA requires the
head of each federal agency to implement cost-effective policies and procedures to reduce
information technology security risks to an acceptable level. It also requires agency officials to
conduct annual reviews of agency information security programs and report the results to the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB issued several guidance memoranda last year
on how agencies should safeguard sensitive information. For example, OMB published a
checklist for protecting remotely accessed information, including a recommendation that
agencies encrypt all data on mobile devices and use a “time-out” function for remote access and
mobile devices.12
In addition, OMB and the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) lead an
interagency Information Systems Security Line of Business working group on government data
security practices. This working group has identified key steps for improving the government’s
security procedures. Employee training is one essential part of ensuring the effectiveness of such
procedures. Training programs must be reviewed continuously and updated to reflect the most
recent changes, issues, and trends in information security. This effort includes the development
of annual security training for all government employees, particularized security training
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13 The Commission has published a guide, entitled Protecting Personal Information,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/infosecurity/index.html, which includes
guidelines for improving information security. Although directed at businesses, it includes a
five-step process that applies equally well to government entities: (1) entities should take stock of
the information in their possession; (2) efforts should be made to collect only necessary
information; (3) information that is retained must be sufficiently protected and employees should
receive training in information security; (4) information that is not needed should be disposed of
properly; and (5) entities should make plans to respond to any security breaches that may occur.
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curricula for all employees with significant security responsibilities, a repository of training
programs, and conferences and seminars organized to share knowledge. Each of these
components contributes to greater security awareness within agencies, leading to enhanced
protection of sensitive data.13
The Task Force issued several recommendations aimed at ensuring that government
agencies take concrete steps to improve their data security measures. First, the Task Force
recommended that OMB and DHS outline best practices in the arena of automated tools, training
processes, and standards that would enable agencies to improve their security and privacy
programs. The Task Force also recommended the development of a list of the most common
mistakes to avoid in protecting personal information held by the government.
Because several highly-publicized government data breaches involved the loss of laptops,
the Task Force also recommended that Chief Information Officers of federal agencies remind the
agencies of their responsibilities to protect laptops and other portable data storage and
communication devices, such as PDAs and thumb drives.
For example, the FTC itself has instituted an extensive and active program to instill and
support a culture of privacy throughout the agency. The FTC maintains a Privacy Steering
Committee (“the Committee”) and created the position of Chief Privacy Officer. The Chief
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Privacy Officer is responsible for overseeing the FTC’s internal privacy policies and procedures
and reports directly to the agency’s Chief of Staff.
In 2006, the Committee undertook a comprehensive and systematic review of the FTC’s
collection, use, sharing, retention, storage, and disposal of personally identifiable information
and sensitive health information. The Committee then developed detailed FAQs that provide
practical advice regarding situations that staff is likely to encounter when handling personally
identifiable information during agency activities. Employees and contractors undergo mandatory
data security training, and electronic access to data is secured through multi-layered security.
The FTC also is developing a formal incident response plan setting forth how it should respond
in the event of a data breach. All of these efforts are directed at raising awareness throughout the
agency of each person’s responsibility to ensure the security of personal identifying information.
From processing employment records to collecting documents in litigation, agency employees are
charged with using appropriate care, forethought, and attention to the data within their control.
VI. Data Breach Responses in the Public Sector
Just as with private-sector breaches, the loss or compromise of personal data by the
government exposes individuals to identity theft. In addition to taking steps to avoid such
breaches, government agencies also should have response plans in place should a breach occur.
Government agencies should be prepared to determine (1) whether a particular breach warrants
notice to consumers, (2) the content of the notice, (3) which third parties, if any, should be
notified, and (4) whether to offer affected individuals credit monitoring or other prophylactic or
remedial services.
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14 See President’s Identity Theft Task Force, Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic
Plan, Appendix A, pages 73-82.
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The Task Force developed guidelines that set forth the factors that should be considered
in deciding how to respond to a breach, and recommended that OMB issue them as a guidance to
all federal agencies and departments.14 OMB issued the guidance on September 20, 2006. The
guidelines contain three core recommendations: (1) agencies should identify a core response
group that can be convened in the event of a breach; (2) if a breach occurs, the core response
group should engage in a risk analysis to determine whether the incident poses risks of identity
theft; and (3) if it is determined that an identity theft risk is present, the agency should tailor its
response to the nature and scope of the risk presented. This risk-based approach allows an
agency to assess a situation and take appropriate steps to minimize consumer harm.
In determining whether a breach creates a risk of identity theft, the guidelines suggest that
agencies consider: (1) how difficult it would be for an unauthorized person to access the personal
information; (2) whether the breach was likely the result of criminal activity; (3) the ability of the
agency to mitigate the identity theft; and (4) any evidence that the compromised information is
actually being used to commit identity theft.
The guidelines also provide recommendations for issuing notices to affected consumers,
when appropriate, including the timing, content, and methods of notification. In addition, the
guidelines discuss two other possible actions that agencies can take when the risk of identity theft
appears to be high. First, agencies can perform an analysis to determine whether the data breach
appears actually to be resulting in identity theft. This can allow agencies to evaluate the severity
of a breach and determine whether some action other than a notice to consumers is warranted.
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Second, agencies can provide credit monitoring to affected individuals, a service that advises
consumers of material changes to their credit report, thereby assisting them in early detection of
identity theft and allowing them to take steps to minimize the impact. Although credit
monitoring can be costly when it involves large numbers of consumers, it may be justified in
cases where, because of the nature of the breach, risk of identity theft is high.
While each security breach must be evaluated individually, establishing a set of
guidelines for assessing the situation can improve a government entity’s ability to respond to a
security incident in a timely and reasonable fashion.
VII. 	Conclusion
Identity theft remains a serious problem in our economy, causing enormous harm to
consumers and businesses and threatening consumer confidence in the marketplace and, at times,
in government agencies. To succeed in the battle against identity theft, governments, together
with the private sector, must make it more difficult for thieves to obtain the information they
need to steal identities and respond appropriately to data breaches if they occur. To prevent
thieves from obtaining sensitive information, government must consider what information it
collects and maintains from or about consumers and must better protect the data it does collect.
In this regard, eliminating unnecessary collection, use, and disclosure of Social Security numbers
-- an important tool of identity thieves -- can play a key role.
From county clerks and town halls to federal departments, public agencies play a key role
in reducing the incidence and impact of identity theft. Minimizing collection of data, restricting
its availability to those who have a legitimate need for it, and implementing appropriate response
systems for breaches all can contribute to the efforts to reduce identity theft.
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