FTC Staff Comment Before the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Concerning Relationships Between Suppliers and Retailers

CO"'1!'lISS ION 	AUTHORI ZED
V94C016
COMMENT OF THE STAFF OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
The staff of the Federal Trade Commissionl offers this comment to the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in its rulemaking to define "exclusion" as the term is used in
the federal statutes and regulations applicable to relationships between suppliers and retailers in
the alcoholic beverage industry. One proposal, that exclusion of a supplier should not be found
unless a threat to retailer independence is demonstrated, would be consistent with efforts to
promote a competitive marketplace if the reduction in retailer independence would be due to
another supplier's exercise of market power. We recommend that BATF not define exclusion
by reduction in purchases from the supplier's competitors, because that fact will always be
ambiguous.
The Federal Trade Commission is an independent administrative agency charged with
maintaining competition and safeguarding the interests of consumers. The FTC enforces the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which declares unlawful unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 2 The legal understanding of
"unfair methods of competition" and related principles under other antitrust laws that the
I These are the views of the staff of the Federal Trade Commission and are not necessarily
those of the Commission or of any Commissioner.
c 15 U. S. C. §§ 41 et seq.

Commission enforces, notably the Clayton Act,) are analogous to the "unfair trade practices"
provisions of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act that govern the present rulerr..aking. 4
I. 	Description of Proposal
This rulemaking 5 implements the provisions of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act 6
that prohibit certain practices - 	exclusive dealing, commercial bribery, 	and "tied house"
relationships - 	if they require or induce retailer purchases of the offending supplier's products
"to the exclusion in whole or in part" of the products of some other supplier. Relationships that
are considered to amount to a tied house include holding an interest in a retailer's license or
property, 	furnishing 	it 	equipment or 	fixtures, 	paying 	for 	its 	advertising 	or distribution,
guaranteeing its loans, extending it unusual credit, or setting sales quotas for it. BATF has
announced its intention to promulgate a framework for characterizing exclusion under the FAA
Act, to identify promotional practices that result in control of retailers and in exclusion, and to
identify practices that fall in safe harbors. 7
) 15 U .S.C. §§ 12 et seq.
4 The staff of the Commission has commented to the BATF previously about advertising and
labeling issues, including a comment in 1979 about comparative advertising, and comments in
1986, 	1987, and 	1988 about non-alcoholic and 	"light" beers. 	On those subjects, 	too, the
Commission's statutory authority concerning advertising and marketing parallels the provisions
of the FAA Act.
5 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 21698 (April 26, 1994).
627 U.S.c. §§ 203(a), (b), and (c) ("FAA Act").
7 The proposal also deals with consignment sales, which are also regulated by the FAA Act,
27 U.S.c. § 203(d), but which are not subject to the exclusion requirement.
2

BA TF proposes to add new rules about exclusion to the CFR sections dealing with tied
houses, exclusive dealing, and commercial bribery. 8 The same basic definition would be used
for each statutory category. Exclusion in whole or in part would occur when a practice by a
supplier places retailer independence9 at risk, by a tie or link between the supplier and the
retailer or by any other means of supplier control over the retailer, and the practice results in
the 	retailer 	purchasing 	less 	than 	it 	would 	have 	of 	a 	competitor's 	product. 	The 	rules
corresponding to each statutory category would also include criteria for determining whether a
practice places retailer independence at risk. 10 The criteria would include whether (a) the
practice restricts or hamper~ the retailer's free economic choice of products or quantities, (b)
the retailer is obligated to participate in a promotion as a condition of obtaining the supplier's
products, (c) the retailer has a continuing obligation to buy or promote the supplier's products,
(d) the retailer commits not to terminate its purchases of the supplier's products, (e) the practice
involves the industry member in the retailer's day-to-day operations, such as decisions about
purchases, prices, and display, or (f) the practice is not offered to all retailers in the local market
on the same terms without business reasons to justify differences in treatment. II
8 Proposed 27 C.F.R. §§ 6.151,8.51, and 10.51.
9 Or, in the case of commercial bribery, exclusion would occur when the independence of
a trade buyer is placed at risk.
10 Proposed 27 c.F.R. §§6.153, 8.54, and 10.54.
II In addition to these general rules, specific practices would be identified as placing retailer
or 	trade 	buyer 	independence 	at 	risk 	under each 	statutory 	category. 	For the 	tied 	house
prohibition, these practices would be resetting shelves for other suppliers' products, paying
slotting fees (if the result was to reduce space available for competitors' products), partial (but
not complete) ownership of a retailer, and tying. Proposed 27 C.F.R. § 6.152. (BATF also
proposes to treat slotting allowances as consignment sales.) For exclusive dealing, practices that
would result in exclusion would be threats (or acts) of physical or economic harm or contracts
3

II. 	Competition policy and the FAA Act
The Notice states that "the goal of regulating trade practices in the alcoholic beverage
industry has been identified as healthy competition in order to insure the best possible price,
quality and selection for the consumer and to prevent formation of a corrupt black market. "12
The Congress that passed the FAA Act in 1935 was concerned about preventing monopoly and
unfair competitive practices and promoting a competitive market, among other things. 13 Post-
Prohibition 	industry 	concentration seemed 	high14 and 	prices 	were 	high enough 	to 	make
bootlegging attractive and a threat to tax revenues. Thus, one goal was to bring prices down by
eliminating practices that were considered to be monopolistic. 15 The legislative history shows
that expressly restrict the retailer's purchases from others. Proposed 27 C.F.R. § 8.52. For
commercial bribery, the rules would bar promotional arrangements involving payments of money
or some other premium to retailer employees without the knowledge of the employer in exchange
for the employee's agreement to order from the supplier. Proposed 27 C.F.R. § 10.52. Except
as noted below, this comment does not address these specific proposed rules or the other aspects
of the BA TF proposal.
12 59 Fed. Reg. 21700.
13 See National Distributing Co. v. BATF, 626 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
14 The levels might not seem high by current antitrust standards. In 1934, the largest fIrm's
share of the whisky market was 23 percent, and the top nine totalled 81 percent. These fIgures
suggest that the HHI, the measure now used in merger analysis as a threshold screening for
competition concerns, might well have been about 1000, which is the level below which a
market is now considered unconcentrated. Moreover, concentration apparently fell the next year
as more finns began production; the top finn's share dropped to 16 percent. 	See National
Distributing Co., supra n. 13, 626 F.2d at 1006.
15 Congress was also concerned to prevent pre-Prohibition problems believed to be connected
with "tied houses," including political corruption and excessive consumption.
4

that the FAA Act's provisions about unfair competition and unlawful practices were understood
to be "analogous" to the prohibitions of the antitrust laws. 16
The analogous antitrust laws would have included the Shennan Act's prohibition of
contracts and combinations in restraint of trade and monopolization l7 and the Clayton Act's
provisions concerning exclusive dealing and tying. 18 The substance of these provisions is also
encompassed by the Federal Trade Commission Act's general prohibition of "unfair methods of
competition. "19 The FAA Act's unfair trade practice provisions, unlike those of the Clayton
Act, contain no express r~quirement that the practice at issue cause or threaten an adverse effect
on competition. Instead, the FAA Act's "effects" standard relates to interstate commerce: the
prohibited 	acts 	must 	occur 	in 	interstate 	commerce, 	"substantially" 	restrain 	or 	prevent
transactions 	in interstate commerce, 	or have the 	"direct effect" 	of preventing, 	deterring,
hindering, or restricting other persons' efforts to make sales in interstate commerce. Although
these tenns C" not explicitly ';,clude the concept of effect on competition, they are consistent
with an application intended to promote competitive markets.
16 Federal Alcohol Control Administration, Legislative History of the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act, Appendix II, p. 143 (report of the House Committee on Ways and Means)
(1935).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2.
18 15 U.S.C. § 14.
19 15 U.S.c. § 45. Some provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, concerning promotional
allowances and services and "dummy brokerage," are also analogous to FAA Act issues, but
the Robinson-Patman Act was passed a year later.
, 5

Recent court decisions have encouraged viewing the FAA Act's "unfair competition"
standards as ways to promote the kind of conduct normally encountered in competitive markets.
The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit has required that exclusion under the FAA Act result
from direct action by the supplier, not from the retailer's free economic choice, because to find
exclusion when the retailer has exercised a free choice could hinder legitimate competition.
Fedway Associates, Inc. v. BATF, 976 F.2d 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Thus, in language that is
echoed in the proposed rules, the court required that the forbidden conduct be associated with
some tie or link between supplier and retailer that threatened the retailer's independ~nce. The
court said that competition should lead to lower prices and would promote Congress's intentions
in regulating the alcoholic beverag~ industry, observing that free competition "helps deter the
formation of a corrupt black market. "20
III. 	Proposed policies about exclusion
One of the two basic concepts BA TF proposes for the definition of exclusion, impainnent
of retailer independence, could be responsive to the concern to promote free competition if it
20 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reached a similar conclusion, 	in
Foremost 	Sales 	Promotions, 	Inc. 	v. 	BATF, 	860 	F.2d 	229 	(7th 	Cir. 	1988), 	finding 	that
participation 	in a cooperative 	advertising 	program, 	with 	no 	requirement 	to 	refrain 	from
purchasing products of other suppliers, cannot by itself constitute a tied house violation.
6

is applied judiciously. 21 The other, diminution in the sales of the supplier's competitors, may
be irresolvably ambiguous and adds little to the first.
Without more, the fact that one supplier's action results in a retailer buying less of
another supplier's product implies nothing about whether competition has been hindered or even
about whether the first supplier's act has excluded the competing supplier from access to the
market. A reduction in a retailer's purchases from a supplier could be the result of the retailer's
free economic choice, in a competitive market, of more attractive combinations of price and
quality offered by other suppliers. Without knowing whether the purchase patterns result from
a competitive market process or an exercise of market power, the fact of reduced purchases is
fundamentally ambiguous. Without knowing more about the relative prevalence of competition
and of anticompetitive exclusion, it is impossible to say whether a reduction in purchases results
from one or the otht::r, and thus it is impossible to know whether the fact of reduced purchases
should be treated as economically significant.
It is unclear that the fact of reduced purchases is necessarily an element in the statutory
violation. The FAA Act speaks of "exclusion, in whole or in part. n This language may invite
focus on the nature of the offending action, as preventing others from a fair opportunity to
21 As the courts have recognized, in language that is repeated in the Notice, the definition
of exclusion should recognize "the value of pro-competitive wholesale promotions. This value
derives not only from the traditional benefits of competition in terms of lower prices a'1d
improved quality, but also ... from the fact that a competitive alcohol market helps deter the
formation of a corrupt black market." Fedway, supra, 976 F.2d at 1423. 	Assessment of market
power to determine whether a practice promotes competition is explained at p. 10 below.

co;npete, rather than on the retailer's purchases. The fact of reduced purchases might be taken
as some measure of actual effect, if there are other reasons to find that a supplier's actions
offend statutory policies. But in the absence of such other reasons, the fact of reduced purchases
may simply reflect healthy competition. To focus too much on this effect could discourage
competition without advancing other policy goals. Any reduction in purchases from competitors
should be considered relevant only as corroborating evidence that a practice already found, for
other reasons, to have violated the statute has actually had some effect. 22
The other part of the proposed definition, placing retailers' independence at risk, could
be understood as consistent with promoting competition if the risk were due to a supplier's
exercise of market power. Reduction in economic freedom through limitation of marketplace
choices and prevention of robust price and product competition are the harms of monopoly
power that antitrust enforcement seeks to correct and prevent. The focus on impairing economic
independence is also supported in the language of the FAA Act, whose exclusion requirement
can be construed to call for showing a particular means by which a supplier's actions override
the retailer's otherwise free choice among competitively determined options.
Even 	in 	a competitive 	market, 	though, 	buyers 	and 	sellers 	might 	freely 	agree 	to
arrangements that seem to constrain their freedom of action. Such arrangements can be efficient
n Decisions such as Fedway have emphasized that the central concern is supplier control.
If the reduced-purchases standard is retained, 	it should be construed to require showing a
specific link between how the offending practice tends toward supplier control and how that
control requires the retailer to reduce its purchase of other products.
8

and procompetitive. The FAA Act declares that a supplier cannot require that a retailer be its
exclusive outlet, to the exclusion in whole or in part of other suppliers' products. The FAA Act
thus speaks in terms of suppliers exerting power over retailers. But BATF proposes to extend
that prohibition, so that a retailer could not, by its own free choice, offer and agree to be an
exclusive outlet for a supplier, even in a competitive marketY Such a choice would presumably
show that the retailer believed the arrangement would be beneficial to it. Determining whether
it would be anticompetitive would require knowing more about the characteristics of the market.
Under the Clayton Act, an exclusive dealing arrangement is illegal only if the effect may
be to substantially lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly. The practices that are the
subject of this rulemaking would be not considered per se illegal in antitrust analysis. On the
contrary, 	in many circumstances they would be considered competitively neutral or even
procompetitive. Only if more complete analysis disclosed actual or threatened anticompetitive
effects in particular circumstances would antitrust law fi~ j 	them illegal. Thus, evaluating a
particular exclusive dealing agreement requires understanding the nature of competition in the
relevant product and geographic markets and the likely effect of the agreement in that context. 24
23 Notice, p. 21699; Proposed 27 C.F.R. § 8.52(b).
24 The proposal would also treat all forms of tying as violations of the FAA Act, without
regard to the tying product'::; market share or the practice's competitive effect. Although tying
has sometimes been described as a per se offense, thus requiring no showing of anticompetitive
effect, the Supreme Court has required a showing of economIc or market power in the tying
product before imposing liability.
9

Antitrust analysis of a vertical restraint such as an exclusive dealing contract is concerned
with whether the practice preserves or enhances the market power of existing firms and whether
it shelters or facilitates collusion or anticompetitive coordinated behavior. 25 "Market power"
can be defined as the ability to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period
of time. In examining vertical restraints, market power issues are usually assessed by identifying
relevant markets and market shares and by examining the conditions of competition among
different brands, that is, the ability of consumers to purchase the competing products of other
manufacturers at a competitive price. If this "interbrand" competition is healthy, so consumers
retain this ability, then antitrust analysis does not usually object to manufacturers' restrictions
on non-price aspects of product distribution that have procompetitive benefits. These restrictions
on "intrabrand" competition may lead to efficiencies and promote interbrand competition. For
example, nonprice vertical restrictions may discourage retailers from "free riding" by using one
supplier's promotional efforts to promote the products of others. Such restrictions can thus
benefit the ultimate consumer.
Some of the proposed criteria for identifying risk to retailer economic and competitive
independence 	raise 	the 	possibility 	that 	risks 	to 	independence 	would 	be 	inferred 	from
competitively neutral or even procompetitive behavior. The first criterion, that the practice
restricts or hampers the retailer's free economic choice of products or quantities, is a restatement
of the general principle. But the next three criteria might lead to objections to competitively
neutral contracts. The proposed rule would find that a retailer's obligation to participate in a
25 &e Beltone Electronics Corp. I 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982).
10

promotion as a condition of obtaining the supplier's products, its continuing obligation to buy
or promote the supplier's products, 	or its commitment not to terminate purchases of the
supplier's products, would be considered evidence that the retailer's economic independence was
threatened. 	Yet each feature 	could appear as an aspect of otherwise nonnal commercial
relationships through which parties undertake to buy, promote and sell quantities over a period
of time. 	Such transactions, 	which the BATF regulations apparently would prohibit,26 are
commonplace in other settings and in most circumstances are competitively benign and indeed
may often be efficiency enhancing. 27
Thus, even if the focus is on impainnent of retailer independence, rather than effect on
the sales of competing suppliers, achieving results that do not impair healthy competition may
require careful analysis. Moreover, the analysis may depend on factors that vary from market
to market. Because the alcoholic beverage industry is subject to many differing state and local
regulations of pricing and entry, both at wholesale and retail levels, market and competitive
conditions may vary greatly and the competitive significance of any general federal policy may
be muted 	Still, BATF may wish to consider incorporating some principles from competition
policy analysis and enforcement. The possibility of competitive entry into the relevant market
is always an important consideration. If entry is not too difficult, for example, if exclusive
territories are not mandated by law or contract, and if prices are not regulated, then BA TF might
26 27 C.F.R. § 8.22 prohibits agreements that have the effect of requiring purchases beyond
a single sales transaction.
27 A stringent rule might nonetheless be called for if there is reason to believe that such
arrangements in this industry were likely to represent relationships that offended other polic;es.
11

be more willing to find 	that arrangements reflect free choices rather than anticompetitive
conditions or loss of independence.
The FAA Act's prohibitions against exclusive outlets and tied houses may be intended
to promote goals other than or in addition to market competition. Stringent restrictions of these
practices, intended to promote those other goals, might well inhibit market competition. Under
the antitrust laws, the practices are not ones that would nonnally be thought to require such tight
regulation in order to protect competition in the m~rket for other kinds of products. If BATF
intends to use market competition as one means of accomplishing its statutory goals, we urge
that its definition of "exclusion" be no broader than the FAA Act requires.
IV. 	Conclusion
BA TF' s proposal that exclusion under the FAA Act should not be found unless there is
a showing of a threat to retailers' competitive independence could be consistent with promoting
a competitive market if the threat to independence resulted from an exercise of market power
by a supplier. A retailer could, consistently with healthy competition, choose an arrangement
that constrained some of its independence. We recommend that BA TF not define exclusion by
reference 	to 	reduction 	in 	purchases 	from 	competitors, 	because 	that 	fact 	will 	always 	be
ambiguous. Instead, the focus should be on acts by suppliers that exclude their competitors by
unreasonably restraining retailers' choices.
12