FTC Staff Comment Before the FCC In the Matter of Amendment of the Commissions Rules With Regard to the Establishment and Regulation of New Digital Audio Radio Services

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UNITED ~ATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
DALLAS REGIONAL OmCE
July 	29, 	1991
Rose 	Marie 	Alderete
Clerk 	of 	the 	Supreme Court
State of 	New Mexico
P.O. 	Box 	848
Supreme 	Court 	Building
Santa 	Fe, 	NM 	87504-0848
Dear Ms. 	Alderete:.
The 	staff 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	is 	pleased 	to
respond 	to 	the 	request 	from 	the 	New 	Mexico 	Supreme 	Court 	for
comments 	on 	the 	proposed 	amendments 	to 	the 	New 	Mexico 	Code 	of
Professional Conduct. 1 	These 	amendments would generally establish
more restrictive standards 	than now exist 	in the areas of 	attorney
advertising 	and 	client 	solicitation. 	We 	believe 	that 	several 	of
these 	proposals 	may 	restrict 	the 	flow 	of 	tru~hful 	and 	us~ful
information 	to 	consumers, 	and 	thus 	impede 	competition 	or 	increase
costs, 	to 	a 	greater 	extent 	than 	is 	necessary 	to 	achieve 	the
consumer 	benefits 	envisioned 	by 	the 	dra~tars of 	the 	amendments.
The 	discussion 	of 	these 	issues 	will 	be 	divided 	into 	a 	number
of sections. 	The first of these describes the FTC staff t s 	interest
and previous experience in this 	field. 	We then present a 	statement
of 	our 	general 	conclusions. 	The 	remaining 	sections 	then 	take 	up
the 	specific 	provisions 	of 	the 	proposed 	amendments 	that 	raise 	the
most serious concerns about adverse effects on consumers, 	including
the 	provisions 	governing: 	( 1) 	self-laudatory 	statements 	and
representations 	of 	quality; 	(2) 	claims 	that 	cannot 	be 	factually
substantiated; 	(3) 	solicitation 	in personal 	injury 	cases; 	and 	(4)
a 	caution 	to 	consumers 	against 	exclusive 	reliance 	on 	advertising.
This 	comment 	takes 	no 	position 	on other 	proposed 	amendments. 2
These 	comments 	are 	the 	views 	of 	the 	staff 	of 	the 	Dallas
Regional 	Office and the 	Bureau of Competition of 	the 	Federal 	Trade
Commission. 	They 	are 	not 	necessarily 	the 	views 	of 	the Commission
or any 	individual 	Commissioner.
2 	We 	recognize 	that 	the 	deadline 	for 	submitting comments 	was
July 	I, 	1991. 	However, 	it 	is 	my 	understanding 	based 	upon 	our
conversation 	that 	these 	FTC 	staff 	comments 	will 	be 	considered 	by
the 	Court 	if 	they 	are 	submitted 	before 	the 	Court 	takes 	final
action.

New Lexico 	Supreme Court 	-- 	Page 	2
The 	Interest 	and 	Experience 	of 	the 	Staff 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade
Commission
Congress has empowered the Federal Trade Commission to prevent
unfair 	methods 	of 	competition 	and 	unfair 	or 	deceptive 	acts 	or
practices 	in 	or 	affecting 	commerce. 3 Pursuant 	to 	this 	statutory
mandate, 	the Commission and its staff seek to encourage competition
among 	members 	of 	the 	licensed 	professions 	to 	the 	maximum 	extent
compatible 	with 	other 	legitimate 	goals. 4 For 	several 	years 	the
Commission 	and 	its 	staff, 	through 	law enforcement 	proceedings 	and
analysis, 	have 	been 	evaluating 	the 	competitive 	effects 	of 	public
and 	private 	restrictions 	on 	the 	business 	practices 	of 	lawyers,
dentists, 	optometrists, 	physicians, 	and 	other 	state-licensed
professionals. 	Our 	goal 	has 	been 	to 	identify 	restrictions 	that
impede 	competition 	or 	increase 	costs 	without 	providing
countervailing benefits 	to consumers. 	As 	part of 	this 	effort, 	the
Commission 	has 	examined 	the 	effects 	of 	public 	and 	private
restrictions 	limiting 	the 	ability 	of 	professionals 	to 	contact
prospective 	clients 	and 	to 	advertise 	truthfully.s
3 15 	U.S.C. 	Sec. 	41 	~ ~
4 	The Commission's 	staff has previously submitted comments 	to
state 	governments 	and 	professional 	associations 	on 	the 	regulation
of professional advertising, particularly advertising by attorneys.
See, 	e.g., 	Comments 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	Staff 	on 	the
Rules 	of 	Professional 	Conduct 	of 	the 	State 	Bar 	of 	Arizona,
submitted 	to 	Bruce 	Hamilton, 	Executive 	Director, 	State 	Bar 	of
Arizona 	(April 	17, 	1990); 	Comments 	of the 	Federal Trade'Commission
Staff 	on 	the 	Rules 	of 	Professional 	Conduct 	of 	the 	Florida 	Supreme
Court, 	submitted 	to 	William 	Blews, 	Member, 	Florida 	Bar 	Board 	of
Governors 	(July 17, 	1989); Comments of the Federal Trade Commission
Staff 	on 	the 	American 	Bar Association Model 	Rules 	of 	Professional
Conduct 	(NOvember 	22, 	1988); 	Comments 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade
Commission 	Staff 	on 	the 	Rules 	of 	the 	Idaho 	State 	Board 	of
Chiropractic Physicians 	(December 7,1987); 	Comments of the Federal
Trade Commission Staff on the Rules 	of Professional Conduct of 	the
New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court, 	submitted 	to 	the 	Committee 	on 	Attorney
Advertising 	of 	the 	New 	Jersey 	Supreme 	Court 	(November 	9, 	1987);
Comments 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	Staff 	on 	the 	Code 	of
Professional Responsibility of 	the Alabama State Bar, 	submitted to
the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	Alabama 	(March 	31, 	1987); 	Comments 	of 	the
Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	Staff 	on 	the 	rules 	of 	the 	South 	Carolina
Boards 	of 	Optometry 	and 	Opticianry, 	submitted 	to 	the 	Legislative
Audit 	Council 	of 	the 	State 	of 	South 	Carolina 	(February 	19, 	1987).
See, 	e.g., 	American 	Medical 	Association, 	94 	F.T.C. 	701
(1979), 	aff'd, 	638 	F.2d 	443 	(2d 	Cir. 	1980), 	aff'd 	memo 	by 	an
egually divided Court, 	455 	u.S. 	676 	(1982). 	The 	thrust of 	the AMA
decision 	-- 	"that 	broad 	bans 	on 	advertising 	and 	soliciting 	are
inconsistent 	with 	the 	nation's 	public 	policy" 	(94 	F.T.C. 	at 	1011)

New Mexico 	Supreme Court 	-- 	Page 	3
General 	Conclusions
Our experience in this 	area confirms 	that advertising informs
consumers 	of 	options 	available 	in 	the marketplace, 	and encourages
competi tion among firms seeking to meet consumer needs. 	And, 	while
these 	procompetitive 	functions 	of 	advertising 	can 	be 	significant
regardless 	of 	a 	firm's 	size 	or 	age, 	they 	may 	be 	especially
important 	in 	facilitating 	the entry of new firms, 	enabling them to
become 	known 	to 	potential 	clients 	and 	to 	reach 	an 	efficient
competitive 	size more quickly 	than 	they otherwise might. 	Studies
indicate 	that 	prices 	for 	professional 	services 	tend 	to 	be 	lower
where 	advertising 	exists 	than 	where 	it 	is 	restricted 	or
prohibited.' 	Empirical evidence also 	indicates 	that while certain
restrictions on professional advertising tend to raise prices, 	the
restrictions 	studied 	do 	not 	generally 	increase 	the 	quality 	of
available 	goods 	a~d 	services. 7 	These 	relationships 	among 	price,
-- 	accords 	with 	the 	reasoning 	of 	recent 	Supreme 	Court 	decisions
involving 	professional 	regulations. 	See, 	e.g., 	Peel 	v. 	Attorney
Registration 	and 	Disciplinary 	Commission 	of 	Illinois, 	110 	S.Ct.
2281 	(1990) 	(holding 	that 	state's 	total 	prohibition of 	attorney's
use on letterhead of statement of bona fide specialty certification
violates the First Amendment); 	Shapero v. 	Kentucky Bar Association,
108 	S. 	Ct. 	1916 	(1988) 	(holding 	that 	nondeceptive 	targeted 	mail
solici tation 	is 	protected 	by 	the 	First 	Amendment); 	Zauderer 	v.
Office 	of 	Disciplinary 	Counsel 	of 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	Ohio, 	471
U.S. 	626 	(1985) 	(holding 	that 	an 	attorney 	may 	not 	be 	disciplined
for 	seeking 	legal 	business 	through 	printed 	advertising 	containing
truthful 	and 	nondeceptive 	information 	and 	advice 	regarding 	the
legal 	rights 	of 	potential 	clients 	or 	for 	using 	nondeceptive
illustrations or pictures); 	Bates v. 	State Bar of Arizona, 	433 u.S.
350 	(1977) 	(holding 	a 	state 	prohibition 	on 	advertising 	invalid
under 	the 	First 	Amendment 	and 	according 	great 	importance 	to 	the
role of 	advertising in the 	efficient functioning of 	the market 	for
professional 	services); 	Virginia 	State 	Board 	of 	Pharmacy 	v.
Virginia 	Citizens 	Consumer 	Council, 	425 	u.S. 	748 	(1976) 	(holding
invalid a Virginia prohibition on price advertising by pharmacies) .
6 	Bond, 	Kwoka, 	Phelan 	& Whitten, 	Effects 	of 	Restrictions 	on
Advertising 	and 	Commercial 	Practice 	in 	the 	Professions: 	The 	Case
of 	Optometry 	(1980); 	Benham 	& 	Benham, 	Regulating 	Through 	the
Professions: 	A Perspective on 	Information Control, 	18 J.L. 	& Econ.
421 	(1975); 	Benham, 	The 	Effects 	of 	Advertising 	on 	the 	Price 	of
Eyeglasses, 	15 	J.L. 	& Econ. 	337 	(1972).
7 	Bond 	et 	al., 	Effects 	of 	Restrictions 	on 	Advertising 	and
Commercial 	Practice 	in 	the 	Professions: 	The 	Case 	of 	Optometry
(1980) . 	See 	also 	Benham, 	Licensure 	and 	Competition 	in 	Medical
Markets, 	in 	Frech, 	ed., 	Regulating 	Doctors' 	Fees 	(1990); 	Cady,
Restricted 	Advertising 	and 	Competition: 	The 	Case 	of 	Retail 	Drugs
(1976).

New Mexico 	Supreme Court 	-- 	Page 	4
quality, 	and advertising have been found 	to exist 	in the provLsLon
of 	certain 	legal 	services 	as 	well 	as 	in 	the 	provision 	of 	other
professiona~ services.'
This 	is 	not, 	of course, 	to say that advertising is 	invariably
benign. 	As 	noted 	by 	the 	State 	Bar 	Task 	Force 	that 	drafted 	the
proposed 	rules, 	advertising may 	sometimes 	be 	unfair or deceptive,
or 	may 	violate 	other 	legitimate 	goals 	of 	public 	policy. 	We
believe, 	however, 	that 	truthful 	advertising 	is 	generally
beneficial. 	Therefore, 	we 	suggest 	that 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	the
State of New Mexico should impose restrictions 	on advertising only
if those rules are narrowly tailored to prevent unfair or deceptive
acts 	or 	practices, 	or 	otherwise 	to 	serve 	consumers. 9
The 	remaining sections 	of 	the 	letter will 	apply these 	general
principles 	to 	the.proposed 	Rules 	of 	Professional 	Conduct.
Restrictions 	on 	Advertising 	Content: 	Rule 	16-701 	B.(4). 	(9). 	and
.Llli
The proposed rules would prohibit "self-laudatory" statements,
claims 	concerning 	"the 	quality 	of 	legal 	services," 	and 	any 	claims
that cannot be 	factually 	substantiated. 	As 	discussed below, 	while
these 	categories 	of 	advertising 	could 	be 	employed 	to 	deceive
consumers, 	each 	of 	the 	prohibitions 	could 	also 	inhibit 	the
provision 	of 	truthful 	and 	useful 	information. 	They 	may 	thus 	be
unnecessarily 	broad.
, 	~ 	Jacobs 	et 	al., 	Improving 	Consumer 	Access 	to 	Legal
Services: 	The 	Case 	for 	Removing 	Restrictions 	on 	Truthful
Advertising 	(1984); 	Calvani, 	Langenfeld 	& 	Shuford, 	Attorney
Advertising 	and 	Competition 	at 	the 	Bar, 	41 	Vand. 	L. 	Rev. 	761
(1988); 	Schroeter, 	Smith 	& 	Cox, 	Advertising 	and 	Competition 	in
Routine 	Legal 	Service 	Markets: 	An 	Empirical 	Investigation, 	35 	J.
Indus. 	Econ. 	49 	(1987); 	Muris 	& McChesney, 	Advertising 	and 	the
Price 	and 	Quality 	of 	Legal 	Services: 	The 	Case 	for 	Legal 	Clinics,
1979 	Am. 	B. 	Found. 	Research 	J. 	179 	(1979).
9 	The 	published 	comments 	of 	the 	State 	Bar 	Task 	Force 	that
drafted the proposed amendments themselves recognize the importance
of 	not 	"impeding 	the 	flow 	of 	useful, 	meaningful, 	and 	relevant
information 	to 	the 	public," 	while 	also 	noting 	the 	State's 	concern
with 	"protecting 	the 	public 	from 	false, 	deceptive, 	or 	misleading
advertisements 	by 	lawyers." 	The 	reservations 	we 	note 	concerning
the 	Bar's 	proposals 	do 	not 	arise 	from 	disagreement 	with 	these
stated 	concerns, 	but 	rather 	as 	different 	judgments 	as 	to 	how 	best
to 	balance 	these 	principles.

New Mexico 	Supreme Court 	-- 	Page 	5
A. 	Representations 	of 	Quality 	and 	Self-Laudation: 	Rule 	16-701
B. ( 4) 	and 	(10)
Qn 	their 	face, 	these 	proposed rules 	would 	apparently ban 	all
assertions 	relating 	to 	the 	quality of 	services 	offered other 	than
those 	expressly 	permitted 	by 	other, 	narrower 	rule 	provisions .10
Many 	instances 	of 	ordinary, 	non-deceptive, 	and 	useful 	advertising
could 	thereby 	be 	prohibited. 	Notably, 	most 	advertisements 	are
self-laudatory to some extent, 	explicitly or implicitly. 	And even
subjective, 	self-laudatory 	assertions 	of 	the 	quality 	of 	services
offered, 	though understood by consumers 	as 	"puffery" 	in some part,
can also convey information of some value 	-- 	if 	only that 	the 	firm
believes 	that, 	for 	example, 	courtesy 	and 	attentiveness 	are
particularly 	important 	aspects 	of 	the 	delivery 	of 	legal 	services
to 	the 	public. 	A ban 	of 	this 	nature 	may 	also 	harm 	consumers 	by
affecting 	the 	incentives 	that 	shape 	lawyers' 	conduct 	of 	their
practices. 	Without 	the 	ability 	to 	call 	attention 	to 	subjective
features 	as desirable aspects of his or her practice, 	the incentive
to 	provide 	them 	is 	likely 	to 	be 	reduced.
We 	recognize 	that 	these 	rules 	may 	actually 	be 	intended 	to
prohibit 	only 	a 	limited 	class 	of 	overreaching 	and 	potentially
misleading 	claims 	on 	which 	consumers 	could 	be 	expected 	to 	place
serious 	reliance, 	such 	as 	claims 	concerning 	an 	attorney's 	ability
to 	secure 	relief 	for 	clients 	or 	other 	indicia 	of 	the 	relative
quality 	of 	a 	lawyer'S 	work 	product. ll 	If 	so, 	the Court 	might 	wish
to 	rely 	instead 	on 	a 	prohibition 	of 	quality 	claims 	whose 	content
would suggest that they are supported by nbjective substantiation,
when in fact 	they are not. 	Thus, 	the Court might consider deleting
Rules 	16-701 	B.(4) 	and 	(10) 	entirely 	and 	recasting 	Rule 	16-701
B.(9) 's 	substantiation 	provision 	(as 	discussed 	below) 	to 	secure
this 	objective. 	This 	approach 	could 	alleviate 	the 	chilling 	of
potentially 	useful 	communications 	that 	the 	present 	language 	may
entail.
10 	See,~, 	Rule 	16-701 	A.(3) 	through 	(5), 	and 	Rule 	16-702
D 	generally. 	We 	assume 	that 	these 	specific 	enumerations 	of
permissible quality-related claims 	take precedence, 	as 	a 	matter of
rule 	interpretation, 	over the 	broad prohibitions 	found 	in Rule 	16-
701 	B. 	I f 	so, 	a 	firm 	could 	advertise, 	for 	example, 	that 	it
accepted 	credit 	card 	payment 	and 	offered 	fixed 	fees 	for 	specific
services 	(as 	long as 	it included the seemingly redundant disclosure
that 	the 	fees 	were 	for 	those 	specific 	services); 	but 	it 	is 	not
clear 	that 	the 	firm 	could 	characterize 	the 	credit-card 	option 	as
"convenient," 	or 	the 	fees 	as 	"low" 	or 	otherwise 	advantageous
without 	running 	afoul 	of 	the 	16-701 	B prohibitions.
11 	This 	intent 	also 	seems 	apparent 	in, 	for 	example, 	Rule 	16-
701 	A. ( 3) 	and 	(4).

New Mexico 	Supreme Court 	-- 	Page 	6
B. 	Claims 	that 	Cannot 	be 	Factually 	Substantiated: 	Rule 	16-701
B. (9)
The proposed rules would also preclude advertising claims that
"cannot be 	factually substantiated." 	As suggested above, 	however,
some claims, 	such as that the firm provides 	"friendly," 	"diligent,"
"prompt," 	or 	"convenient" 	service, 	while 	probably not 	susceptible
to 	objective 	substantiation, 	may 	nonetheless 	communicate 	useful
information, 	indicating qualities that 	the 	firm seeks to emphasize
in its practice. 	In this regard, 	the Court may wish to distinguish
between 	those 	claims 	that 	imply, 	by 	their 	content, 	the 	existence
of 	objective 	substantiation, 	and 	those 	that 	do 	not. 	Only 	the
former 	should be 	subjected 	to 	the 	requirement 	that 	the 	advertiser
actually possess the implied substantiation, 	or refrain from making
the 	claim.
Solicitation 	in 	Personal 	Injury Cases: 	Rule 	16-701 	C.(3)
The 	proposed 	rule 	would 	prohibit 	all 	solicitations 	(written,
telephonic, 	or 	in-person) 	directed 	to 	an 	injured 	person 	or 	a
relative of an injured person when that solicitation relates 	to 	an
action 	for personal 	injury or wrongful death. 	Direct solicitation
by lawyers, 	like advertising, 	can be a 	useful source of information
about a 	consumer's 	legal 	rights 	and remedies, 	and also can provide
information 	about 	the 	terms 	and 	availability 	of 	legal 	services.
On the other hand, 	as 	the Supreme Court reasoned in Ohralik v. 	Ohio
State Bar Association, 	436 	U.S. 	447 	\1978), 	in-person solicitation
in particular may disserve 	the 	individual's 	and society's 	interest
in 	informed 	and 	reliable 	decisionmaking 	where 	it 	discourages
persons 	needing 	counsel 	from 	engaging 	in 	a 	critical 	and 	unhurried
comparison of available legal services. 	1.Q..:.. at 457. 	The potential
for 	overreaching 	is 	significant 	when 	a 	lawyer, 	"a 	professional
trained 	in 	the 	art 	of 	persuasion," 	personally 	solicits 	a
prospective client who may be physically or emotionally overwhelmed
by 	the 	circumstances 	giving 	rise 	to 	the 	need 	for 	legal 	services.
~ 	at 	465.
At 	least 	one 	jurisdiction 	has 	adopted 	a 	rule 	more 	narrowly
tailored to address the concerns expressed in Ohralik than the rUle
proposed 	here. 12 Nevertheless, 	a 	broad 	ban 	on 	at 	least 	in-person
12 	The 	District 	of 	Columbia's 	Rules 	of 	Professional 	Conduct
permit 	uninvited 	in-person 	solicitation 	so 	long 	as: 	(1) 	the
solicitation 	does 	not 	involve 	false 	or 	misleading 	statements 	or
claims; 	(2) 	the 	solicitation 	does 	not 	involve 	the 	use 	of 	undue
influence; 	and 	(3) 	the 	potential 	client's 	apparent 	physical 	or
mental 	condition 	would 	not 	prevent 	him 	or 	her 	from 	exercising
"reasonable, 	considered 	judgment" 	when 	selecting 	a 	lawyer. 	Rule
7.l(b), 	Rules 	of 	Professional 	Conduct, 	District 	of 	Columbia 	Court
of 	Appeals, 	adopted March 	1, 	1990 	(effective 	January 	1, 	1991).

14
·'
New Mexico 	Supreme Court 	-- 	Page 	7
solicitation 	of 	personal 	injury 	victims 	might 	be 	justified 	if 	a
narrower restriction of this 	sort would be 	ineffective -- because,
for example, 	direct solicitation 	"is not visible or otherwise open
to 	public 	scrutiny" 	and, 	as 	a 	result, 	may be 	"virtually 	immune 	to
effective oversight." 	~ at 	466. 13 	As 	to written 	solicitations,
however, 	the 	concerns 	expressed 	by 	the 	Ohralik 	Court 	seem 	less
salient, 	since 	the 	communication 	may 	normally 	be 	considered 	at
leisure 	by 	its 	target. 	Thus, 	the 	Court 	may 	wish 	to 	evaluate 	the
sufficiency 	of 	a 	prohibition 	more 	narrowly 	targeted 	than 	that
presently proposed 	to 	address 	this 	problem.
Cautioning Consumers 	Against 	Exclusive 	Reliance 	on 	Advertising:
Rule 	17-701 	F.
. 	.Another provision of the new rules would require attorneys who
advertise 	to 	caution 	consumers 	against 	exclusive 	reliance 	on
advertising. 	Proposed 	Rule 	17-701 	F. 	would 	require 	that 	all
advertisements 	contain 	the 	following 	disclaimer: 	"This 	is 	a 	paid
advertisement. 	The choice of a 	lawyer should not 	be based upon an
advertisement 	alone ... 14
Any disclosure obligation tends to increase advertising costs,
both because 	it may 	increase the 	length of 	the message and because
it 	may 	force 	advertisers 	to 	forego 	some 	other 	portion 	of 	the
message 	that 	would 	have 	been 	delivered 	had 	the 	space 	not 	been
occupied 	by 	the 	disclosure. 	Unnecessary 	disclosure 	requirements
can 	thus 	result 	in 	a 	decrease 	in 	useful 	information 	available 	to
consumers. 	Moreover, 	some 	disclosures 	may 	further 	discourage
advertising 	if 	consumers 	are 	thought 	likely 	to 	understand 	the
disclosure 	to reflect negatively on the advertiser, 	even when such
an 	inference 	is 	unjustified. 	Accordingly, 	it 	is 	important 	in
evaluating disclosure requirements 	to weigh such costs 	against any
benefits 	that 	can be 	clearly 	identified.
Conclusion
In 	short, 	we 	believe 	that 	some 	of 	the 	proposed 	rules 	under
consideration for regulating attorney advertising and solicitation
may 	not 	give 	sufficient 	weight 	to 	the 	value 	of 	informed 	consumer
cholce. 	We therefore suggest that you consider modifying the rules
to 	permit 	a 	wider 	range 	of 	truthful 	communications, 	and 	to 	narrow
13 	We 	lack 	information 	concerning 	the 	prevalence 	within 	the
Court's 	jurisdiction of 	such 	abusive 	direct 	solicitation.
However, 	proposed 	Rule 	16-701 	F.(2) 	allows 	attorneys 	to
use 	print 	advertisements 	in 	the 	strictly 	limited 	business
card/legal 	directory 	format 	without 	the 	disclosure.

New Mexico Supreme Court 	-- 	Page 	8
their 	prohibitions 	to 	target 	only those 	representations 	that 	pose
a 	clear 	likelihood of 	consumer 	injury 	through material 	unfairness
or deception, 	or 	that 	otherwise violate 	significant public 	policy
objectives 	in 	a 	way 	that 	threatens 	to 	cause 	net 	injury 	to
consumers.
We 	appreciate 	this 	opportuni~y to 	provide 	our views. 	Please
feel 	free 	to 	contact 	me 	if 	you 	have 	any 	questions, 	or 	if 	we 	can
help 	in 	any 	other way.
~~_._---
~s B. 	ar=-·· 	>
Director
Dallas 	Regional 	Office