FTC Staff Comment Before the Hon. Burton Natarus Concerning Ordinances Regulating Chicago Taxis

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FEDERAL TRADE CO~f~tISSIO:'\
Chicago Regional Office
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January 	12, 	1987
Honorable 	Burton 	Natarus
Chairman, 	Transportation 	Committee
Chicago 	City Council
City Hall
121 North 	LaSalle 	Street
Chicago, 	IL 	60602
Dear 	Alderman 	Natarus:
The 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission's 	Chicago 	Regional 	Office
and 	Bureaus 	of 	Competition, 	Consumer 	Protection, 	and 	Economics
are 	taking 	this 	opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	an 	invitation 	to
provide 	comments 	on 	a 	series 	of 	proposed 	ordinance~ involving
the 	regulation 	of 	taxicabs 	in 	the 	City of 	Chicago. 	The
invitation, 	dated 	last 	August, 	originally 	requested 	that 	we
provide 	oral 	testimony. 	However, 	due 	to 	the 	passage 	of 	time
without 	a 	reconvening 	of 	the 	hearings, 	we 	are 	instead 	filing
written 	comments. 	We 	hope 	that 	our 	views 	will 	be 	of
assistance 	to 	you 	and 	fhe 	Chicago 	City Council 	in 	its
consideration 	of 	this 	proposed 	legislation.
The 	principal 	provision 	in 	the 	proposed 	reform of
Chicago's 	taxi 	ordinance 	provides 	for 	the 	gradual 	elimination
of 	the 	ceiling 	on 	the 	number 	of 	taxicab 	licenses 	in 	Chicago.
As 	discussed 	below, 	we 	strongly 	support 	the 	passage 	of 	this
ordinance. 	Freer 	entry 	into 	the 	taxicab 	market 	will 	benefit
Chicago 	residents 	and 	visitors 	by 	increasing 	the 	number 	of
taxicabs, 	thus 	reducing 	waiting 	times 	for 	taxis, 	providing
service 	to 	more 	neighborhoods, 	creating 	employment 	opportun-
ities, 	and 	keeping 	fares 	at 	levels 	lower 	than 	they would 	be 	in
a 	non-competitive 	market. 	The 	proposal 	further 	calls 	for 	the
elimination 'of 	minimum 	fares, 	the 	legalization 	of 	jitney
services/and 	package 	deliveries, 	and 	an 	easing 	of 	restrictions
on 	shared 	rides. 	We 	also 	believe 	that 	adoption of 	these
provisions 	will 	benefit 	consumers 	in 	many of 	the 	same 	ways.
1 	The 	views 	presented 	in 	this 	letter 	are 	not 	necessarily 	those
of 	the 	Commission 	itself 	nor 	any 	individual 	Commissioner,
although 	the 	Commission has 	authorized 	the 	presentation 	of
these 	comments.

Honorable 	Burton Natarus
Page 	2
The 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	is 	charged 	by 	the 	United
Sta~es Congress 	with 	maintaining 	competition 	and 	protecting
consumers 	from 	restraints 	of 	trade. 2 	In 	accordance 	with 	this
role, 	the 	Commission 	and 	its 	staff 	submit 	comments 	upon
request 	to 	federal, 	state, 	and 	local 	governmental 	bodies 	to
advocate 	competition-based 	approaches 	to 	various 	policy 	issues
to 	the 	maximum 	extent 	compatible 	with 	other 	legitimate
goals. 	Our 	goal 	is 	to 	assist 	decision-makers 	by 	identifying
how 	various 	legislative 	proposals 	may 	affect 	competition 	and
consumers.
Taxicab 	regulation 	is 	often 	viewed 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	only
state 	or 	local 	concern. 	However, 	taxi 	services 	are 	frequently
used 	by 	travelers 	from 	out 	of 	state, 	whether 	traveling 	for
business 	or 	pleasure, 	and 	the 	operation 	of 	the 	industry 	is
therefore 	a 	proper 	matter 	.for 	federal 	concern 	as 	well. 	As 	you
may know, 	the 	Chicago 	Regional 	Office 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade
Commission 	has 	been 	interested 	in 	the 	reform 	of 	taxicab
regulation 	in 	Chicago 	for 	some 	time. 	In 	1984, 	when 	there 	was
another 	proposal 	before 	this 	Council 	to 	lift 	gradually 	the
limit 	on 	taxicab 	licenses, 	we 	filed 	written 	comments
supporting 	open 	entry.
In 	addition, 	the 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission 	staff 	has 	been
interested 	in 	issues 	affecting 	taxicab 	regulation 	in 	other
cities. 	The 	Commission's 	staff 	has 	submitted 	comments
relating 	to 	taxicab 	regulation 	to 	the 	city governments 	of
New 	York, 	Seattle, 	San 	Francisco, 	and 	the 	District 	of 	Columbia
as 	well 	as 	to 	the 	Alaska 	and 	Colorado 	state 	legislatures: 	and
the 	Commission 	issued 	administrative 	complaints 	against 	the
cities 	of 	New Orleans 	and 	Minneapolis, 	challenging 	entry
restrictions 	and 	price 	restraints. 3
2
3
See 	lS'U.S.C. 	§ 41 	et 	seq.
The 	complaints 	indicated 	that 	the 	Commission 	had 	reason 	to
believe 	that 	each 	city, 	acting 	in 	concert 	with 	local 	cab
companies, 	had 	violated 	the 	antitrust 	laws 	by 	restricting
entry 	into 	taxicab 	markets 	and 	adopting 	uniform 	fares 	with-
out 	authorization 	by 	the 	state 	legislature 	to 	so 	restrain
competition. 	The 	New Orleans 	complaint 	was 	withdrawn
following 	the 	State 	of 	Louisiana's 	enactment 	of 	a 	law
permitting 	its 	cities 	to 	regulate 	taxicabs 	in 	the 	manner 	the
Commission 	had 	challenged. 	The 	Minneapolis 	complaint 	was
withdrawn. following 	the 	city's 	amendment 	of 	its 	City Code 	to
permit 	more 	competition 	among 	taxicabs.

Honorable 	Burton 	Natarus
Page 	3
In 	1984, 	the 	Commission's 	Bureau 	of 	Economics 	completed 	a
stu9Y of 	taxicab 	regulations. 4 	Based 	on 	a 	careful 	analysis 	of
taxicab 	regulation 	in 	cities 	throughout 	the 	country, 	the
authors 	found 	no 	persuasive 	economic 	rationale 	for 	restric-
tions 	on 	the 	total 	number 	of 	taxicabs, 	for 	absolute
prohibitions 	on 	fare 	competition, 	or 	for 	restrictions 	on
shared 	ride 	or 	jitney 	service. 	The 	study 	concluded 	that 	such
restrictions 	harm 	consumers 	and 	impose 	a 	disproportionate
burden 	on 	low 	income 	people, 	including 	the 	elderly 	and
handicapped, 	many of 	whom 	are 	more 	reliant 	on 	and 	expend 	a
greater 	share 	of 	their 	income 	for 	taxi 	service 	than 	do 	members
of 	other 	segments 	of 	the 	population. 	As 	a 	consequence 	of
these 	restrictions, 	these 	consumers 	either 	pay 	more 	for
taxicab 	service 	than 	they 	would 	in 	a 	competitive 	environment
or 	go 	without 	service 	or 	are 	forced 	to 	use 	unregulated 	"gypsy"
cabs. 	Thus, 	low 	income 	riders, 	often 	unknowingly, 	are 	exposed
to 	the 	dangers 	of 	riding 	uninsured, 	unlicensed 	vehicles
operated 	by 	drivers 	of 	questionable 	ability, 	training, 	or
credentials.
Another 	study, 	commissioned 	by 	the 	U.S. 	Department 	of
Transportation,5 	confirm? 	the 	principal 	findings 	of 	the 	Bureau
of 	Economics 	report. 	This 	study 	concluded 	that 	regulations
restricting 	entry of 	new 	cabs 	and 	preventing 	discounting 	of
fares 	cost 	consumers 	nearly 	$800 	million 	annually. 	Moreover,
the 	study 	predicts 	that 	the 	removal 	of 	these 	restrictions
would 	create 	38,000 	new 	jobs 	in 	the 	taxi 	industry.
An 	example 	of 	the 	success 	of 	open 	entry 	is 	provided 	by
the 	District 	of 	Columbia, 	where 	ease 	of 	entry has 	expanded
employment 	and 	entrepreneurial 	opportunities 	-- 	a 	matter 	of
particular 	importance 	to 	urban 	minority communities. 	As
Professor 	Walter 	E. 	Williams 	has 	noted: 	"While 	blacks 	own 	few
taxis 	in 	most 	major 	cities 	with 	large 	black 	populations, 	they
own 	more 	than, 70 	percent 	of 	the 	taxis 	in Washington. 	This 	is
no 	accident_ 	• 	•• 	[I]n 	Washington 	there 	is 	virtually 	no
u,l 	t ' 	,,6entry 	reg 	a 	Ion. 	• 	• 	•
4
5
6
Frankena, 	M., 	and 	Pautler, 	P., 	"An 	Economic Analysis 	of
Taxicab Regulation," 	FTC 	Bureau 	of 	Economics, 	May 	1984.
Webster, 	A., 	Weiner, 	E'., 	and 	Wells, 	J. 	"The 	Role 	of 	Taxicabs
in 	Urban 	Transportation," 	Department 	of 	Transportation,
December 	1974.
The 	Wall 	Street 	Journal, 	June 	11, 	1984, 	p. 	24.

Honorable 	Burton 	Natarus
Page 	4
These 	general 	conclusions 	are 	applicable 	to 	the 	Chicago
taxicab 	market 	according 	to 	several 	economic 	studies. 	In
1958, 	the 	Transportation 	Center 	of 	Northwestern 	University
prepared 	an 	independent 	research 	report 	on 	the 	operation 	and
regulation 	of 	taxicabs 	in 	Chicago. 7 	That 	report, 	which 	was
introduced 	in 	City 	Council 	hearings 	at 	that 	time, 	concluded
that 	the 	best 	interests 	of 	the 	pUblic 	would 	be 	served 	by
unrestricted 	entry 	into 	the 	taxicab 	business 	in 	Chicago 	and
the 	elimination 	of 	mandatory 	fares. 	Thirteen 	years 	later,
Professor 	Edmund 	Kitch 	and 	his 	colleagues 	at 	the 	University 	of
Chicago Law 	School 	wrote 	a 	study 	about 	the 	regulation 	of
taxicabs 	in 	Chicago 	and 	concluded 	that 	the 	introductign 	of
competition 	would 	reduce 	fares 	and 	increase 	services. 	A 1984
study of 	taxicab 	regulation 	in 	Chicago 	concluded 	that 	the
granting 	of 	monopoly 	status, 	as 	under 	the 	current 	ordinance,
to 	taxicab 	companies 	hurts 	service 	to 	low 	income 	neighbor-
hoods, 	raises 	fares, 	reduces 	the 	supply 	of 	taxis, 	and
undermines 	the 	health 	of 	the 	entire 	taxicab 	industry.9 	The
arguments 	for 	open 	entry 	that 	have 	been 	voiced 	for 	nearly 	four
decades 	have 	even 	stronger 	support 	today.
Who 	gains 	from 	restricted 	taxicab 	entry 	such 	as 	that
endorsed 	by 	Chicago's 	present 	taxi 	ordinance? 	Not 	the
drivers, 	not 	the 	poor, 	not 	minorities, 	and 	not 	the 	general
pUblic, 	all 	of 	whom 	suffer 	the 	economic 	effects 	of 	these 	entry
restrictions. 	The 	primary 	beneficiaries 	of 	the 	current 	system
are 	the 	long-time 	holders 	of 	the 	licenses.
It 	is 	clear 	from 	reports 	about 	the 	history of 	Chicago
taxi 	regulation 	that 	the 	Chicago 	taxicab 	companies 	have 	been
strong 	advocates 	of 	entry 	restrictions. 	Beginning 	in 	the 	late
1920's, 	Checker 	Taxi 	Co. 	and 	Yellow 	Cab Co. 	representatives
argued 	for 	entry 	limitations 	to 	curb 	competition 	caused 	by 	the
cabs 	then 	licensed. 	In 	the 	1930's, 	Checker 	and 	Yellow 	jointly
sought 	a 	reduction 	in 	the 	number 	of 	licenses 	then 	outstanding,
and 	the 	City acquiesced 	-- 	under 	the 	threat 	of 	a 	taxi 	strike.
7
8
9
The 	Transportation 	Center 	at 	Northwestern 	University, 	"The
Operation 	and 	Regulation 	of 	Taxicabs 	in 	the 	City of
Chicago," 	(March 	27, 	1958).
Kitch, 	E., 	Isaacson, 	M., 	and 	Kasper, 	D., 	liThe 	Regulation 	of
Taxicabs 	in 	Chicago," 	14 	J. 	Law 	& Econ. 	285 	(1971).
J. 	Bast, 	"The 	Fight 	Over 	Cab 	Deregulation 	in 	Chicago" 	(1984)
(availab1~ from 	The 	Heartland 	Institute).

Honorable 	Burton 	Natarus
Page 	5
In 	the 	1940's, 	Yellow 	and 	Checker 	vigorously 	objected 	to 	an
ordinance 	authorizing 	an 	increase 	from 	3,000 	to 	5,500
taxicabs. 	They 	sued 	the 	City 	for 	its 	attempt 	to 	increase
competition, 	while 	in 	another 	court 	they 	were 	defending 	United
States 	Justice 	Department 	charges 	that 	they had 	conspired 	to
monopolize 	the 	taxicab 	business 	in 	Chicago. 	The 	United 	States
lost 	its 	case, 	primarily on 	a 	jurisdictional 	issue. 	Chicago
remained 	in 	court 	defending 	itself 	from 	Yellow 	and 	Checker's
lawsuits 	until 	1963, 	when 	the 	city 	enacted 	the 	current
ordinance 	which 	reaffirmed 	a 	license 	limit 	of 	4,600 	and
granted 	Checker 	and 	Yellow 	80 	percent 	of 	the 	market.
Economists 	see 	Chicago 	as 	a 	city 	where 	the 	ceiling 	on 	the
number 	of 	licenses 	has 	given 	the 	major 	taxicab 	companies
market 	power. 	Like 	a 	typical 	cartel, 	the 	companies 	reportedly
have 	been 	able 	to 	cut 	back 	the 	number 	of 	cabs 	and 	collect
monopoly 	profits. 	In 	the 	past, 	Checker 	and 	Yellow 	have
acknowledged 	that 	20 	percent 	of 	their 	cars 	typically are 	out
of 	service 	-- 	for 	maintenance. 	In his 	article, 	Professor
Kitch 	estimated 	that 	there 	were 	more 	idle 	cabs 	than 	those 	in
repair 	shops. 	Even 	today, 	we 	continue 	to 	hear 	reports 	ot 	cabs
sitting 	empty 	in 	company 	lots. lO
Chicago 	taxicab 	licenses 	have 	sold 	for 	as 	much 	as 	$28,500
each. ll 	These 	high 	license 	prices 	are 	evidence 	that 	entry
restrictions 	have 	raised 	the 	rate 	of 	return 	in 	the 	taxi
industry 	significantly 	above 	the 	competitive 	rate 	in 	the 	rest
of 	the 	economy. 	The high 	license 	prices 	are 	also 	evidence
that 	entry 	restrictions 	have 	led 	to 	some 	combination 	of 	higher
fares, 	longer 	waiting 	times, 	shortages 	of 	service, 	and 	reduced
consumption 	of 	taxi 	rides, 	and 	therefore 	have 	caused 	a 	waste
of 	resources. 	Further 	evidence 	of 	the 	above-normal 	rate 	of
return 	and 	social 	waste 	resulting 	from 	restrictions 	on 	the
number 	of 	licenses 	is 	that 	in 	one 	year 	a 	single 	license 	can
bring 	in 	more 	than 	$6,000 	rent. 	The 	weekly 	lease 	price 	of 	the
license 	alone' has 	been 	reported 	to 	be 	approximately 	$120,
excluding 	insurance. 	On 	a 	daily 	basis, 	these 	figures 	mean
that 	cab 	drivers 	have 	to 	collect 	approximately 	$20 	on 	top 	of
all 	other 	expenses 	before 	they 	can 	make 	any 	profit. 	This
assessment 	against 	the 	taxi 	riders 	of 	the 	city 	is 	simply
monopoly 	profit 	for 	the 	owner 	of 	the 	license. 	Opening 	entry
would 	eliminate 	this 	monopoly 	profit.
10
11
Chicago Tribune, 	May 	25, 	1986, 	at 	Sec. 	1, 	p. 	18.
Crain's 	Chicago 	Business, 	June 	30, 	1986, 	p. 	2.

Honorable 	Burton 	Natarus
Page 	6
One 	of 	the 	arguments 	most 	frequently 	advanced 	in
opposition 	to 	open 	entry 	is 	that 	traffic 	congestion 	and 	chaos
in 	the 	streets 	will 	inevitably 	result. 	Lifting 	the 	license
limit, 	however, 	could 	actually help 	alleviate 	congestion
problems. 	More 	cabs 	can 	mean 	fewer 	private 	automobiles.
Taxis, 	by 	serving 	as 	a 	link-up, 	have 	the 	potential 	to 	increase
the 	use 	of 	pUblic 	transportation 	and 	decrease 	the 	number 	of
those 	who 	drive 	to 	work. 	For 	example, 	many people 	in 	Chicago
may 	bring 	their 	own 	cars 	downtown 	-- 	crowding 	expressways 	and
filling 	parking 	lots 	-- 	simply because 	they have 	a 	midday 	trip
and 	cannot 	count 	on 	finding 	a 	cab 	at 	that 	time. 	Thus, 	one
taxicab 	in 	the 	Loop 	can 	do 	the 	work 	of 	many 	private 	cars. 	The
Commission's 	1984 	Bureau 	of 	Economics' 	study 	concluded 	that
the 	downtown 	congestion 	argument 	is 	refuted 	by 	the 	experience
of 	cities 	such 	as 	Washington, 	D.C. 	and 	London, 	which 	have 	not
restricted 	entry, 	as 	well 	as 	the 	other 	cities 	that 	recently
opened 	entry.
Some 	cities 	that 	have 	eliminated 	restrictions 	on 	entry
into 	the 	taxicab 	market 	have 	experienced 	taxi-related
congestion 	at 	airports. 	These 	congestion 	problAIDs 	have
generally 	occurred 	when 	both 	maximum 	fares 	and 	entry have 	been
deregulated 	simultaneously. 	Yet 	the 	solution 	to 	congestion
problems 	lies 	not 	in 	restricting 	the 	number 	of 	taxis 	or
maintaining 	fixed 	fare 	restrictions. 	Rather, 	as 	the 	FTC's
Bureau 	of 	Economics' 	study 	concluded, 	revisions 	in 	the 	first-
in-first-out 	queue 	system, 	improvements 	in 	fare 	posting
requirements, 	increased 	cab 	line 	user 	fees, 	or 	lower 	fare
ceilings 	provide 	workable 	solutions 	to 	congestion 	problems
without 	simultaneously 	depriving 	consumers 	of 	the 	benefits 	of
a 	competitive 	taxicab 	market.
There 	are 	approximately 	1,000,000 	cars, 	buses, 	and 	trucks
registered 	in 	Chicago, 	but 	only 	4,600 	cabs. 	Only 	the 	number
of 	cabs 	is 	restricted 	by 	law. 	There 	is 	no 	sound 	reason 	why
the 	number 	ot' taxicabs 	on 	the 	street 	should 	be 	limited 	in 	a
manner 	di~ferent from 	private 	cars, 	trucks, 	and 	other
commercial 	vehicles. 	Taxicabs 	can 	be 	required 	to 	pay 	their
fair 	share 	of 	the 	costs 	of 	using 	the 	streets 	by 	paying 	license
fees, 	gasoline 	taxes, 	and 	the 	other 	traditional 	charges.
Limiting 	the 	number 	of 	taxicabs 	does 	not 	serve 	the 	purpose 	of
minimizing 	congestion.
Will 	open 	entry diminish 	quality of 	service? 	The 	FTC's
Bureau 	of 	Economics' 	study 	found 	no 	systematic 	evidence 	of
quality deterioration 	following 	the 	lifting 	of 	entry
restrictions 	in 	other 	cities. 	While 	data 	to 	measure 	the
effects 	on 	wafting 	time 	is 	often 	not 	available, 	following

Honorable 	Burton Natarus
Page 	7
deregulation 	in 	San 	Diego, 	the 	average 	waiting 	time 	in 	the
radio-dispatched 	market 	declined 	20 	percent 	and 	the 	average
waiting 	times 	at 	major 	cab 	stands 	became 	negligible. 	Further,
other 	regulations, 	such 	as 	those 	dealing 	with 	driver
qualifications 	and 	vehicle 	safety, 	are 	specifically aimed 	at
ensuring 	quality of 	service.
While 	our 	comments 	have 	focused 	on 	the 	more 	controversial
open 	entry provisions 	of 	the 	proposed 	ordinance, 	we 	also
support 	the 	elimination 	of 	minimum 	fares, 	as 	well 	as 	the
proposals 	to 	allow 	regulated 	jitney 	service, 	package 	delivery
and 	shared 	rides. 	Our 	economists' 	report 	found 	no 	economic
justification 	for 	such 	restrictions. 	By 	contrast, 	the 	report
found 	potential 	justifications 	for 	fare 	ceilings 	under 	certain
circumstances 	and 	for 	regulations 	dealing 	with 	matters 	such 	as
vehicle 	safety and 	liability 	insurance 	coverage.
We 	have 	also 	noted 	recent 	news 	reports 	stating 	that
negotiations 	have 	taken 	place 	that 	may 	result 	in 	a
recommendation 	for 	a 	slightly higher 	ceiling 	of 	5,000
licenses, 	wi th 	Checker 	and 	Yellovl 	relinquishing 	a 	number 	e)f
their 	existing 	licenses. 12 	While 	this 	would 	constitute 	a
modest 	improvement, 	we 	strongly 	believe 	that 	the 	total 	removal
of 	taxicab 	entry 	restrictions, 	as 	well 	as 	of 	the 	other 	anti-
competitive 	provisions, 	will 	provide 	the 	greatest 	benefits 	to
Chicago 	residents 	and 	visitors. 	Any 	limit 	on 	the 	number 	of
taxicab 	licenses 	merely 	serves 	to 	protect 	taxicab 	companies 	at
the 	expense 	of 	consumers, 	particularly low 	income 	groups. 	We
do 	not 	object, 	however, 	to 	regulations 	appropriately designed
and 	directly 	related 	to 	quality 	and 	safety 	standards, 	such 	as
mandatory driver 	training 	classes 	or 	increased 	penalties 	for
ordinance 	violations.
In 	conclusion, 	we 	strongly 	support 	the 	efforts 	to
eliminate 	antJcompetitive 	effects 	of 	the 	current 	ordinance.
Very 	truly 	YOJls,
1",~Ii{.~~
J 	hn 	M. 	Peterson
cting 	Director
CHICAGO 	REGIONAL OFFICE
12 	Chicago Tribune, 	December 	7, 	1986, 	at 	Sec. 	2, 	p. 	1.

I
f 	City's 	n~"" 	consumer chief
sets 	taxi 	dereg 	as, No. 	1 job /
"
caneJudtd thM "&hen are lood r....- f.m. (deNpla-.
don) pOI&una...
The admlniaration .....ier pt'OpOIId """-d......y Ri..
IIaI &he num_ oltaAlc:ab meda1lion1lO 5.000 (rom 4,600
and orrerina unUmi&ed llc:eMtftC by 1918,
The bUl 11 e:ucrendy balora Ute C1&y CoundJ', Local
TranaportaUon Commlu". chaired by admlDIllratAon
ally Alderm,n BurtOn Nacarus (12.D4). It facet Ilronl op-
pition from ulwns meciailion ownen. ..,.etall., JetTy
~1dman. wno contro1a about ~ of lM city', cab n..
Wouch tua y.llow Cab and Checker Taai comptlni-.
Ordinance pt.M11t1 Vlue that deresuJation will en-
Ible new -ntrepflne\It'I co enter a Ileld pte-empttld ainee
li64 by the near·monopoty aranted to Mr. Feldman by
Mayor Richard J. D&ley. An Important .ide benefit. propo-
Bema araUl, will be lmpmved "nice in poot and minor-
Ity ne1ahbo1-hooda, Boch pia add up to a pt"Obab!e ",pan·
"on of minorit, buelnesa enterprlaa In the CUy,
While Ma. 8&JTeU poe.... I,mi~ knowledp about
...ui&&lnC ~.. Ueena«I\I-oM of &he thief responti·
bUill .. of the department abe', about to head.-he ia
t.nowl~le.ble about minority buainlll ~L
.fore,takinc &he S60.000·per·yeat ... wl&h &he city,
.... luren ... 'rice·presldaot 01 C1obetronen Enli-
Deerina Corp, For roW' ynta,1he ran &he firm', man__..
QIeDl conaul&ln& croup. wboM prlm&rJ canula wa, nan·
S. Hew""" Im~...~
lo.when ,be
taUt ~ the reint
of the city', main
~ re&WaIort
..enc., thtl -.ek.
hi&h on Mr aaend.a
wtll be eanyinC out
Mayor Harold
Waahinlt0n's pro-
,ram to deNIUlaIe
&he wJcab Inciua,
in &he cit.,.
. -rhe ~bor·
dlnlnce will lit
priority att.ntlon
lfOG'l 1M:' .,. the
f.4-,..r~ -oman·
_ator. AclmiUinc
&hal &he', j\&Il now
lesminl al:Ioul dM
tad Induatry••he-
• •••rth.I... ha.
• " llOal7J. GOOZNQ
InMUa Howell Barnu doesn't know much abou& &he
dey', D.panmena of Conavmv Sen6ca. but abe knows
• 	oileopoly wbeD ........OM.
.
COftaunw..,....· 8armt: ....
..,bu....~e......	
,.~ - _._... 	..... 	.
• • ••• _ ••••_ 	.••••• ' _ ..... ·0 •
CRAIN'S 	CHICAGO 	BUSINESS 	Monday, 	September 1, 	19
Attachment 	1
,," .. ,-,.T
ahesays. 	,
......_- p. wwoe 	fI','
Jndft4. aJd.frMn all&Md wtth ch.
"Iyor are p\&Shlne lor ..p.nded
po-.n lor the depattJnent. For In-
"11l:e. ""'-rman Dobby RuM (2nd).
Nt:eNly ll'lltllled II chairman of ,he
E.nern. En.lronmer\taf Protection
and PubHc: UtIlities Commiet", ,..
...k introduced a p.c:ule of ordl·
nancet Nlula.unc tollie aubManc-..
Inc:ludine a requlr.ment that bu•••
DI:Mft I'ePOn Lbeir UIIIQ thecl'.,.•
.......
•
""d.. bUlIM'" Ilcanlln.. the
qeney-wl&h an annual budpt of
IG.2 mWlon and 2SO ,",pla,.. 	•.. f'CCllOnaible 1M &he city', unitary
and ~and musulU I~
and Ila Iimit~ role in 8IMn:Inmen&aI
INS alnIum« proteCtion.
In thou atft\oU, bulln_ can ...
peel a mol'. acai.ill appro.ch from a
clepartlMnt under Ma. B.urctfslud.
enhlp. '-Wo ahould uk, • peature of
"....mtl~ Aituatlon. th.at will be ct.
trimenul to citizen. 01 Chlc'IO.".
New chief • ••
C."'.,,1IId frowc" 3
nt~ the b~inea, de-te&opmctnC een.
1M I" Cary, lnet .. 1M the U.S. Oe~n.
mcmt of COmlM~e'l Minority nusl.
lIeU ~~elopment Aleney (MBOA).
The campOl", pr'O¥lded a Icmilu .. ,.
• lcc rOt \180"" ptOJrOim in illinois, '
fttluoun and wlaconsin.
...u.. Oft.tty .
Qobcotrotters. with 15 emplo,...., in
0icaJ0. Cat'y .Iftd MiJwatlket!. ~ift
Oft the city of C\iaso lot ~ 0( itt
~neD, Ilt~ It &ell none lrom
the OrpanrMnl ot ~Scnicel.
-she w••..., "ron( In our mar,
bttnC "'ort." ..ys Nlr.",.,,, Shah,
_hatrman of CloOflroUera. "II', a
.... lOt the finn,"
Me. Barrlftf. Inillal eapoauN to the
nelcl ., mc,""",y buaC,,", 4eYdop.
.... came at t~ 'not-for-prollt CU.
. ~ Economic ,ecr.e1opmcn& Corp,.
wheN the "tan work 1ft 1065 and
...10 .-Iate dll"lCtOr in 1013.
1M thon joined the cabinet ot IOf'
_eo., Dan WalkM _ head of the
orne. of Ii,,",*" Rewvreft, an um·
~Ia OIpncy ""ponatble for , nvm·
Mt 01 pro,tam., 'ncludlnlt the
..... minority ~neM emerpnJO
anon. .'or. joHti", CJobetrollC:ra.
lheran U.s, Rep,CUlS4.ace·a~h
Side office.
Her rim tontac:u with the mapor
canw when he WII in the S4~te Lcci.-
"ture ."4 '"PQnllbl. lor 'ppro- I
,riali~)r" lor the depArtment she· .
twtded. "He C~ayor WutllnXlon)
thoulthl , couW ~ my npaf'.nce
sainccl It the ..te 1e•• 1 with a ~ty
.rw:y o"nina many aerricft....
• ,. of thl! ,ppotntmem. ,
..