FTC Staff Submission to the Tennessee Department of Health Regarding the Certificate of Public Advantage Application of Mountain States Health Alliance and Wellmont Health System

Federal Trade Commission Staff Submission
to the Tennessee Department of Health
Regarding the Certificate of Public Advantage Application of
Mountain States Health Alliance
and Wellmont Health System
Pursuant to Tennessee Code § 68-11-1301 et seq.
and the rules implemented thereunder at Chapter 1200-38-01
November 21, 2016
Bureau of Competition
Bureau of Economics
Office of Policy Planning

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
i
Table of Contents
I. 	Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1
II. 	The FTC’s Interest and Experience .................................................................................... 5
III. 	The FTC Evaluates Healthcare Mergers Similarly to the Approach Outlined in the
Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act .............................................................................................. 6
IV. 	Statutory Factor Analysis: Benefits of the COPA Are Unlikely to Clearly and
Convincingly Outweigh the Disadvantages Resulting from a Reduction in Competition ............. 8
A. 	The COPA Is Likely to Result in Significant Disadvantages Due to a Reduction in
Competition Between Mountain States and Wellmont ............................................................... 9
1. 	The Merger Will Eliminate the Close and Vigorous Competition Between Mountain
States and Wellmont and Will Result in Extraordinarily High Market Shares and
Concentration......................................................................................................................... 11
2. 	The COPA Would Make It More Difficult for Health Insurers to Negotiate Appropriate
Payment and Service Arrangements with Mountain States and Wellmont, Which Likely
Would Result in Higher Prices for Employers and Patients .................................................. 18
3. 	The COPA Is Likely to Substantially Reduce Competition for Physician Services and
Ancillary Healthcare Services ............................................................................................... 21
4. 	The COPA Is Likely to Have a Substantial Adverse Impact on the Quality, Availability,
and Price of Healthcare Services for Patients in Northeast Tennessee ................................. 22
5. 	The COPA Is Unnecessary Because Less Restrictive Arrangements Are Available That
Would Achieve Similar Benefits While Posing Fewer Competitive Disadvantages Than the
Merger ................................................................................................................................... 25
B. 	The Claimed Benefits of the COPA Are Largely Speculative, Achievable Without the
Merger, and Unlikely to Outweigh the Merger’s Likely Disadvantages .................................. 28
1. 	The COPA Is Unlikely to Significantly Enhance Quality of Hospital and Hospital-
Related Care .......................................................................................................................... 31
2. 	Mountain States and Wellmont Offer Only a Limited Commitment to Preserve Hospital
Facilities to Ensure Access to Care ....................................................................................... 42
3. 	Purported Gains in the Cost-Efficiency of Services Provided by Mountain States and
Wellmont Are Unsubstantiated, Not Merger-Specific, and Insufficient to Overcome the
Likely Competitive Harm ...................................................................................................... 44
4. 	The Merger is Unlikely to Significantly Improve Utilization of Hospital Resources and
Equipment or Avoid Duplicative Hospital Resources in a Manner That Benefits Patients .. 46
5. 	Mountain States and Wellmont Have Not Shown That the COPA is Necessary for
Population Health Improvement of the Region ..................................................................... 47
6. 	The COPA is Unnecessary to Ensure Access to Medically Underserved Populations.. 50
V. 	Entry Would Not Be Timely, Likely, or Sufficient to Overcome the Likelihood of
Substantial Harm to Competition.................................................................................................. 51

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
ii
VI. 	Proposed Commitments Will Not Mitigate the Harm Resulting From Loss of
Competition................................................................................................................................... 52
A. 	Price Commitments Proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont Will Be Difficult to
Administer and Unlikely to Address Consumer Harms ............................................................ 56
B. 	Proposed Accountability and Enforcement Mechanisms for Quality Benefits Are
Insufficient ................................................................................................................................ 59
C. 	Proposal to Enhance Transparency for Quality Measures Will Be of Limited Value to
Consumers in the Absence of Provider Competition ................................................................ 61
D. 	Commitments Regarding Contractual Provisions Do Not Mitigate Merger Harms ...... 62
E. 	COPA Protections May Expire in Ten Years ................................................................ 62
VII. 	Proposed Plan of Separation Would Not Be An Effective Remedy ................................. 63
VIII. 	Practical Problems Encountered with Certificates of Public Advantage in
Other States ................................................................................................................................... 67
IX. 	Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 70

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
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I. 	Executive Summary
The staffs of the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Bureau of Competition, Bureau of
Economics, and Office of Policy Planning (collectively, “FTC staff”)1 respectfully submit this
public comment regarding the certificate of public advantage (“COPA”) application submitted
by Mountain States Health Alliance (“Mountain States”) and Wellmont Health System
(“Wellmont”) (collectively, the “parties” or “applicants”) in Tennessee.2 We appreciate the
opportunity to present our views on the proposed merger of Mountain States and Wellmont (the
“merger” or “COPA”) in connection with the review of the COPA application by the Tennessee
Department of Health (“Department”) pursuant to Section 68-11-1301 et seq. of the Code of
Tennessee (“Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act”).3
FTC staff recognizes the challenges confronting many states regarding unmet needs in
healthcare, particularly in rural areas with vulnerable patient populations, inadequate access to
providers, and struggling local economies. We also understand that healthcare providers face
regulatory and financial pressure to better coordinate the delivery of healthcare services. The
FTC appreciates the Department’s efforts to establish goals for improving healthcare outcomes
and access to quality healthcare for patients in Tennessee, particularly the development of the
State Health Plan.4 The FTC has a similar mission: to preserve competition that will benefit
consumers and enhance innovation in healthcare markets. The antitrust laws, which the FTC
enforces, are consistent with the “triple aim” of healthcare reform to improve quality, enhance
patient experience and access to care, and reduce costs.5
1 These comments express the views of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, Bureau of Economics, and Office of
Policy Planning. These comments do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or of any individual
Commissioner. The Commission has, however, voted to authorize staff to submit these comments.
2 Mountain States Health Alliance & Wellmont Health System, Application for a Certificate of Public Advantage for
State of Tennessee (Feb. 16, 2016), http://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/COPA_application.pdf
[hereinafter Tennessee COPA Application].
3 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act of 1993, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1301 et seq. [hereinafter Tennessee
Hospital Cooperation Act]. See id. § 68-11-1303 (f) (“The department shall consult with the attorney general and
reporter regarding its evaluation of any potential reduction in competition resulting from a cooperative agreement.
The attorney general and reporter may consult with the United States department of justice or the federal trade
commission regarding its evaluation of any potential reduction in competition resulting from a cooperative
agreement”). See also Tennessee Rules Implementing Laws Relative to Cooperative Agreements and the Granting
of Certificates of Public Advantage Pursuant to the Hospital Cooperation Act of 1993, T.C.A §§ 68-11-1301 through
68-11-1309, Chapter 1200-38-01 (filed Jul. 14, 2015), http://share.tn.gov/sos/rules_filings/07-13-15.pdf [hereinafter
Tennessee COPA Rules]; Comment from FTC Staff to Malaka Watson, Tn. Dep’t of Health (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-tennessee-department-health-
regarding-implementation-laws-relative-cooperative/151015tennesseedoh.pdf.
4 See D IVISION OF H EALTH P LANNING, T ENNESSEE D EP’T OF H EALTH, 2015 EDITION OF THE STATE H EALTH P LAN ,
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/2015_Edition_of_the_State_Health_Plan.pdf [hereinafter
STATE H EALTH P LAN].
5 See, e.g., Edith Ramirez, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care – Controlling Costs, Improving Quality, 371 N EW
E NG. J. M ED. 2245, 2247 (2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1408009 (“The FTC supports the
key aims of health care reform, and we recognize that collaborative and innovative arrangements among providers
can reduce costs, improve quality, and benefit consumers. But these goals are best achieved when there is healthy
competition in provider markets fostering the sort of dynamic, high-quality, and innovative health care that

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
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We are submitting this comment to express our concern that the proposed merger of
Mountain States and Wellmont would undermine, rather than advance, the Department’s goals.
The proposed merger presents substantial risk of serious competitive and consumer harm in the
form of higher healthcare costs, lower quality, reduced innovation, and reduced access to care.
Evidence shows that this harm would not be outweighed by any potential benefits of the merger,
nor would it be eliminated or effectively mitigated by regulating the combined entity’s post-
merger conduct. Competition is the most reliable and effective mechanism for controlling
healthcare costs while preserving quality of care, including in rural areas facing economic
challenges.
FTC staff’s concerns detailed in this submission are based on a year-long assessment of
the proposed merger. During this time, we applied the analytical framework described in the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Merger Guidelines”), which antitrust agencies, state courts, and
federal courts use to evaluate mergers.6 We have evaluated both the potential harm to consumers
from the loss of competition as well as the potential benefits, including clinical quality benefits
and cost savings, that Mountain States and Wellmont claim they will be able to achieve through
the proposed merger. Under Tennessee law, the Department must weigh these same factors when
reviewing COPA applications. Thus, our analysis is closely aligned with the analysis that the
Department will undertake. Indeed, we present our analysis using the specific factors contained
in the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act.
Mountain States and Wellmont are the two largest hospital systems in the border area of
Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. In fact, Mountain States and Wellmont own and
operate the only hospitals in 12 of the counties in that area. As such, Mountain States and
Wellmont are currently the only two full-service hospital systems serving the vast majority of
patients living in this area.7 Indeed, Mountain States and Wellmont are each other’s closest,
most-intense competitor and together they would hold a near-monopoly over inpatient services in
the area and have significant shares in several outpatient services and physician specialty service
lines.
Competition between Mountain States and Wellmont greatly benefits area employers and
residents. It enables health insurers to negotiate lower hospital reimbursement rates (i.e., prices)
practitioners seek and patients deserve.”); Deborah L. Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, FTC, Remarks at
the Fifth National Accountable Care Organization Summit: Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Proscription, not
Prescription 16 (Jun. 19, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/409481/140619_aco_speech.pdf (“We continue to
hear claims that antitrust principles are at odds with the mandates of the Affordable Care Act. I believe these
arguments misunderstand the focus and intent of federal antitrust enforcement. . . . In the final analysis, our actions
make clear the important role of antitrust in health care policy. Ultimately, we believe that the imperatives of
developing lower cost, higher quality health care can coexist with continued enforcement of the antitrust laws.”).
6 U.S. D EP’T OF J USTICE & FED . T RADE COMM ’N, H ORIZONTAL M ERGER G UIDELINES (2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
7 See infra note 51 and accompanying text for further discussion of the geographic area served by Mountain States
and Wellmont.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
3
on behalf of their customers, which reduces the prices that area employers and residents must
pay in premiums, copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket expenses. That competition
also improves healthcare quality, availability of services and new healthcare technologies, and
other non-price factors as the two compete to attract patients to their respective systems. As a
result, area employers and residents – commercially insured, those covered by Medicare and
Medicaid, and the uninsured – have benefited from this competition. The proposed merger would
eliminate that competition to the detriment of the residents of Northeast Tennessee and
Southwest Virginia. Many consumers, health insurers, and community stakeholders have
expressed similar concerns.8
As described in greater detail in Section IV.A.1, FTC staff’s quantitative economic
analyses confirm that Mountain States and Wellmont are extremely close competitors, and that
the merger will result in extraordinarily high market shares and concentration. To measure the
degree of lost competition likely to result from the proposed merger, we calculated diversion
ratios, which estimate the proportion of Mountain States patients that view Wellmont hospitals as
their next-best choice, and vice-versa. The diversion ratios show that 85% of Mountain States
patients view Wellmont hospitals as their next-best choice and that 90% of Wellmont patients
view Mountain States hospitals as their next-best choice. Diversion ratios of this large magnitude
indicate that Mountain States and Wellmont are extremely close substitutes and competitors, and
that the merger would likely lead to significant price increases, as well as reduced incentives to
maintain or improve quality.
Additionally, we calculated market shares and concentration levels, which can be very
informative when evaluating the likely competitive impact of a proposed hospital merger. High
market shares and concentration among healthcare providers often indicate that merging hospital
systems will be able to raise prices, without offering corresponding improvements to care that
would justify the higher prices. FTC staff estimates that the combined Mountain States-
Wellmont hospital system would control approximately 71% of inpatient hospital services, as
well as a significant share of several outpatient services and physician specialties, in the
8 See, e.g., Comments from America’s Health Insurance Plans to the Tenn. Dep’t of Health-COPA Index Advisory
Group (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/AHIP_COPA_Comments_041819.pdf;
Declaration of Colin Drozdowski, Vice President for National Provider Solutions, Anthem, Inc. (Attachment A)
[hereinafter Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A)]; Comments from Virginia Association of Health Plans to
Southwest Virginia Health Authority (May 25, 2016) (regarding proposed certificate of public advantage for
Wellmont and Mountain States), https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/8-vahp-comments-to-
swva-health-authority-members-5-25-16.pdf; Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, Exhibit 10.2 at 12
(Record of Community Stakeholder and Consumer Views of the Proposed Cooperative Agreement) (“Patients have
confessed to me that they are scared about the potential merger.”); id. at 44 (“I am concerned that the merger will
bring a lack of competition and ‘choice’ for patients in their health care”); id. at 46 (“I do not believe that lack of
competition is a good thing….”); id. (“What you are doing is called a MONOPOLY and, by definition, reduces the
choices for the consumer.”); Brian Krumm, Time for a Conversation on Hospital Consolidation, BRISTOL H ERALD
COURIER (June 21, 2015), http://www.heraldcourier.com/news/opinion_columns/time-for-a-conversation-on-
hospital-consolidation/article_f47bce42-17c1-11e5-8a6d-c35f320b8ac2.html (“the result could be the same as so
many other communities across America – less competition and higher prices”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
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geographic area that it plans to serve.9 Further, the proposed merger would increase market
concentration to a level that far exceeds the legal threshold for a presumption of significant
anticompetitive effects. The combined market share and increase in concentration would also
exceed those of past hospital mergers that the FTC and federal courts have found to be
anticompetitive.10
Although there is overwhelming evidence that the merger will likely lead to higher prices
and reduced quality for healthcare services, Mountain States and Wellmont assert that their
merger would also result in clinical quality benefits and cost savings, and is necessary to ensure
continued access to healthcare facilities and services throughout the region. The Department
should carefully evaluate these claimed quality benefits and cost savings. Most studies have
shown that competition among health systems – not consolidation – results in the greatest price
constraint and quality benefits for consumers.11 FTC staff has assessed the parties’ claims, with a
particular focus on potential clinical quality efficiencies. Importantly, Mountain States and
Wellmont have not provided sufficient information to substantiate many of them, nor have they
demonstrated that the claimed benefits and cost savings would offset the merger’s substantial
harm to competition.
Moreover, the proposed merger does not appear necessary to achieve many of these
claimed benefits, which could be realized either independently or through another collaboration
or merger that would not be as harmful to competition as the proposed merger. The Tennessee
Hospital Cooperation Act requires consideration of whether these benefits can be achieved
through alternative arrangements that are less restrictive to competition.12 Despite the parties’
claims to the contrary, an alternative merger with an out-of-market hospital system is unlikely to
result in greater price increases, facility closures, job losses, and other negative economic
consequences as compared to the proposed COPA.13
Mountain States and Wellmont recognize that the merger is likely to raise significant
antitrust concerns.14 They attempt to mitigate potential adverse effects on prices and quality by
proposing several commitments that they assert would restrict their post-merger pricing and
contracting behavior, and ensure quality improvements. However, their proposed commitments
would prove difficult to implement, monitor, and enforce, and would not replicate the benefits of
9 This is a conservative market share estimate, based on inpatient admissions from commercially insured patients in
the 21-county area that the New Health System plans to serve. This area may be broader than a properly defined
relevant geographic market under the Merger Guidelines and case law. See infra Section IV.A.1.b). In narrower
geographic areas, the combined system’s market share is likely to be substantially higher.
10 See Market Shares and HHIs in Prior Healthcare Merger Cases (Attachment B).
11 For surveys of the research literature, see, e.g., M ARTIN G AYNOR & ROBERT T OWN, T HE IMPACT OF H OSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION – U PDATE (Robert Wood Johnson Found., The Synthesis Project, Policy Brief No. 9, 2012),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261 (Attachment C); Martin Gaynor, Kate
Ho & Robert Town, The Industrial Organization of Health-Care Markets, 53 J. E CON. L ITERATURE 235 (2015),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278676719_The_Industrial_Organization_of_Health-Care_Markets.
12 See Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(3)(D).
13 See infra Section IV.A.5 for further discussion.
14 See infra note 216.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
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competition. The price commitments could even result in higher prices than might otherwise
occur in a competitive market. Moreover, the merged hospitals would have strong financial
incentives to circumvent regulatory commitments, which could further undermine the
effectiveness of the proposed commitments in mitigating the likely competitive harm of the
proposed merger. For these reasons, such commitments, commonly referred to as “conduct
remedies,” are generally disfavored by antitrust agencies and courts.15 Finally, if Mountain
States and Wellmont are allowed to merge, there should be no expectation that a subsequent
antitrust enforcement action or any required plan of separation could effectively unwind the
merger if either state decides that the benefits of the COPA (cooperative agreement in Virginia)
no longer outweigh the harms and terminates the COPA. Experience shows that unwinding
healthcare provider mergers and successfully restoring the lost competition is difficult, if not
impossible.
Practical impediments also exist. The COPAs implemented in other states illustrate the
challenges with regulating a hospital monopoly in perpetuity. These challenges may be
exacerbated under this proposed COPA, which would involve regulation by two different states.
Moreover, if either the Tennessee or Virginia state legislature were to repeal or revise the
underlying COPA statutes, the regulatory oversight intended to mitigate the anticompetitive
effects of the merger could be eliminated entirely, leaving the combined system free to exercise
its significant market power with no regulatory oversight or antitrust enforcement.
If the COPA is approved, the harm resulting from the reduction in competition is likely to
far outweigh any potential benefits. In our view, the evidence put forward by the parties in their
COPA application falls far short of the “clear and convincing” standard they must meet pursuant
to the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act.16 Consequently, we urge the Department not to
approve the COPA.
II. 	The FTC’s Interest and Experience
The FTC is an independent, bipartisan agency with a unique dual mission of promoting
competition and protecting consumers. To carry out this mission, Congress has charged the FTC
with enforcing the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. In addition, the FTC enforces the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.17 Competition is at the core of the American economy,
particularly in the healthcare sector.18 Vigorous competition among healthcare providers in an
15 In merger challenges, the FTC prefers “structural remedies” (i.e., an injunction preventing consummation of a
merger or a divestiture of assets) rather than “conduct remedies” (i.e., restrictions intended to regulate the conduct of
a merged firm).
16 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(1).
17 See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18; Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
18 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Fed Trade Comm’n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic
policy long has been faith in the value of competition.”); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2015) (“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation’s free market

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
6
open marketplace provides consumers with the benefits of lower prices, higher quality goods and
services, greater access to goods and services, and innovation.19 Pursuant to its statutory
mandate, the FTC seeks to identify mergers and acquisitions, business practices, laws, and
regulations that may impede competition without providing countervailing benefits to
consumers.
Anticompetitive mergers and conduct in healthcare markets have long been a focus of
FTC law enforcement, research, and advocacy.20 A critical part of the FTC’s role in protecting
consumers is reviewing proposed mergers and acquisitions in the healthcare industry. The FTC
has considerable experience in evaluating proposed hospital, outpatient facility, and physician
group mergers, including those in rural areas, to determine whether they are, on balance, likely to
benefit or harm consumers.21
III. 	The FTC Evaluates Healthcare Mergers Similarly to the Approach Outlined in the
Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act
The FTC’s mission to protect competition and consumers in healthcare markets is similar
to the Department’s mandate to help improve the health and lives of the residents of Tennessee.
When reviewing a proposed hospital merger, FTC staff devotes significant resources to
understand the transaction’s likely efficiencies and benefits (e.g., lower costs and improved
structures. In this regard, it is ‘as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.’”).
19 See Nat’l Soc. of Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (The antitrust laws reflect “a legislative
judgment that, ultimately, competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. . . .
The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all
elements of a bargain – quality, service, safety, and durability – and not just the immediate cost, are favorably
affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”).
20 See, e.g., Competition in the Health Care Marketplace, FED. T RADE COMM ’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/competition-guidance/industry-guidance/health-care; FED. T RADE COMM ’N, O VERVIEW OF FTC ACTIONS IN
H EALTH C ARE SERVICES AND P RODUCTS (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-
guidance/hcupdaterev3.pdf; Joseph Farrell, Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Economics at
the FTC: Retrospective Merger Analysis with a Focus on Hospitals, 35 REV. I NDUS. O RG. 369 (2009),
http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11151-009-9231-2.pdf; Examining Health Care Competition,
FED. T RADE COMM ’N (Mar. 20-21, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/03/examining-
health-care-competition [hereinafter FTC Healthcare Workshop 2014]; Examining Health Care Competition, FED.
T RADE COMM ’N & U.S. D EP’ T OF J USTICE (Feb. 24-25, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-
calendar/2015/02/examining-health-care-competition [hereinafter FTC-DOJ Healthcare Workshop 2015]. These
workshops focused on the competition implications of various issues that are central to healthcare reform, including
the challenges of measuring healthcare quality, as well as evolving healthcare provider and payment models. The
workshop record suggests that neither a transition to value-based payment models nor improved population health
management require anticompetitive levels of provider consolidation. See also FED. T RADE COMM ’N & U.S. D EP’T
OF J USTICE , I MPROVING H EALTH C ARE : A D OSE OF C OMPETITION (2004),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-
trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [hereinafter D OSE OF COMPETITION REPORT].
The report was based on, among other things, 27 days of formal hearings on competitive issues in healthcare, an
FTC-sponsored workshop, independent research, and the Agencies’ enforcement experience.
21 See FED. T RADE COMM ’N, O VERVIEW OF FTC ACTIONS IN H EALTH C ARE SERVICES AND P RODUCTS, supra note
20, at Section III.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
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quality), as well as its likely competitive harm (e.g., higher prices, reduced quality and access to
care). Most hospital mergers do not raise competitive concerns and are allowed to proceed
without any challenge from the FTC.
The FTC and U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have jointly issued Merger Guidelines
that outline the analytical framework used by the antitrust agencies to evaluate the competitive
impact of a proposed merger. These guidelines reflect experience in analyzing a wide variety of
mergers – including many hospital and other healthcare-related mergers, both proposed and
consummated – as well as economic and other relevant research. Federal and state courts
routinely rely on the Merger Guidelines framework to analyze the likely competitive effects of a
proposed hospital merger. Ultimately, as stated in the Merger Guidelines, the “Agencies seek to
identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary interference
with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral.”22
This approach is similar to that which the Department will take when reviewing COPA
applications. The Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act directs the Department to review
applications for a COPA between merging hospitals and to issue a COPA if the Department
“determines that the applicants have demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the
likely benefits resulting from the agreement outweigh any disadvantages attributable to a
reduction in competition that may result from the agreement.”23 If the COPA is granted, the
Department would be responsible for actively supervising the parties to ensure compliance with
the approved provisions.24 Notably, the types of benefits and disadvantages that the Department
must consider, as discussed in greater detail below, are similar to those that FTC staff considers
when reviewing hospital mergers.
Some hospital mergers, including those that raise competitive concerns, may yield
meaningful clinical quality improvements and cost savings that might not be possible without the
merger. Taking this into account, our analysis of a proposed merger includes a thorough
assessment of the potential benefits and efficiencies, as well as the disadvantages and harms
resulting from a reduction in competition. Those benefits are then weighed against the likely
adverse effects. The FTC declines to challenge transactions that might raise competitive
concerns when there is compelling evidence that the likely benefits of the transaction would be
of sufficient magnitude to offset the potential harm from lost competition. It should be noted,
however, that the greater the likelihood of harm from a proposed merger, the more substantial
any claimed benefits must be to conclude that the benefits outweigh the harms. Indeed,
“[e]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”25
FTC staff has conducted a thorough investigation of the proposed merger between
Mountain States and Wellmont. As is customary in our investigations of hospital mergers, a team
22 Merger Guidelines § 1.
23 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(1) (emphasis added). See also Tennessee COPA Rules,
1200-38-01.
24 Tennessee COPA Rules, 1200-38-01.
25 Merger Guidelines § 10.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
8
of attorneys and economists interviewed many market participants, including hospitals, health
insurers, and employers. We examined a significant amount of public and non-public
information, including business documents and data obtained from Mountain States, Wellmont,
and other market participants. We also performed an economic analysis of hospital discharge
data collected by Tennessee and Virginia, as well as a financial analysis of the merging parties’
hospitals. Although the FTC is typically prohibited from disclosing confidential information
obtained during an investigation, we are nonetheless able to provide an extensive assessment of
the proposed merger based on public sources. Our analysis is also supported by the non-public
data and information that we have reviewed. We carefully considered the potential clinical
quality benefits and cost savings that Mountain States and Wellmont claim they will be able to
achieve through the proposed merger.
To assist in our evaluation of quality of care and health improvement claims, we retained
an outside quality of care expert, Dr. Kenneth Kizer, Director of the Institute for Population
Health Improvement at the University of California Davis Health System and a Distinguished
Professor in the UC Davis School of Medicine (Department of Emergency Medicine) and the
Betty Irene Moore School of Nursing.26 At our request, Dr. Kizer independently analyzed the
applicants’ quality claims and prepared an independent assessment that will be submitted to the
Department as a separate public comment.
IV. 	Statutory Factor Analysis: Benefits of the COPA Are Unlikely to Clearly and
Convincingly Outweigh the Disadvantages Resulting from a Reduction in
Competition
In conjunction with our standard analysis under the Merger Guidelines, FTC staff
evaluated the proposed merger applying the statutory factors that the Department must consider
when reviewing the COPA application. As set forth below, we present our assessment of the
disadvantages and benefits that must be considered under the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation
Act. In Section IV.A.1, we describe the evidence and economic analyses supporting our
conclusion that Mountain States and Wellmont are each other’s closest competitor and that the
post-merger market structure indicates a high likelihood of significant harm to consumers
resulting from the elimination of vigorous competition between the two systems. We include this
foundation because it is relevant to assessing the disadvantages listed in the statute. In Section
IV.A.2 through A.5, we provide our assessment of each statutory disadvantage factor. In Section
IV.B.1 through B.6, we provide our assessment of each statutory benefit factor. Ultimately, we
conclude that the claimed benefits of the COPA are unlikely to outweigh the significant
disadvantages that would result from a reduction in competition between Mountain States and
Wellmont, and the applicants have failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the likely benefits will outweigh any disadvantages.
26 See Kenneth W. Kizer Biography, UC Davis Health System,
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/iphi/Staff/kizer_bio.html.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
9
A. 	The COPA Is Likely to Result in Significant Disadvantages Due to a
Reduction in Competition Between Mountain States and Wellmont
Today, Mountain States and Wellmont compete vigorously to be included in health plan
networks and to attract patients. The proposed merger would eliminate this competition and
would likely lead to increased prices and reduced quality and availability of healthcare services
in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia.
The FTC and healthcare economists use the following framework for analyzing
competition in hospital markets. Hospital systems generally compete in two interrelated stages:
first, they compete for inclusion in a health insurer’s network; and, second, they compete to
attract patients and physician referrals to their respective systems. In the first stage, health
insurers – on behalf of their customers (employer and individual) – use competition between
hospitals as leverage to negotiate better reimbursement rates (i.e., prices). This, in turn, results in
lower premiums, copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket expenses for employers who
purchase health insurance for their employees, consumers who receive health insurance as an
employee benefit, and consumers who purchase their own health insurance.27 In the second
stage, competition between hospitals to attract patients typically leads to increased quality and
availability of healthcare services. Thus, hospital systems compete on both price and quality, and
mergers between close rivals eliminate that beneficial competition. Therefore, when competing
hospitals merge, two different kinds of adverse effects may occur: higher prices charged to
insurance companies (which are then passed on to employers and consumers) and non-price
effects such as reduced quality and availability of services.28 These anticompetitive effects are
larger when the merging hospitals are closer (i.e., more intense) competitors, and when non-
merging hospitals are less significant competitors.
This framework is consistent with a large and growing body of empirical research finding
that mergers between close competitors in concentrated healthcare provider markets are likely to
result in substantial consumer harm, without offsetting improvements in quality.29 For example,
one article discussing several recent studies of hospital mergers concludes that “the magnitude of
price increases when hospitals merge in concentrated markets is typically quite large, most
exceeding 20 percent.”30 Notably, this empirical finding is true regardless of whether the
merging hospitals have for-profit or not-for-profit status.31 In other words, non-profit hospitals
have the propensity to exercise market power and raise prices, similar to for-profit hospitals.32
27 See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶¶ 20, 26.
28 Merger Guidelines §§ 1, 6. See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶ 55 (“In health care, . . . competition plays a
key role in driving quality and performance improvement.”), ¶ 32 (“If a provider perceives that it has few or no
alternatives, it often will seek to extract rates from insurers that are above competitive levels.”).
29 See, e.g., G AYNOR & T OWN (Att. C), supra note 11; Gaynor, Ho & Town, supra note 11.
30 G AYNOR & T OWN (Att. C), supra note 11, at 2.
31 See, e.g., Robert Town, The Economists’ Supreme Court Amicus Brief in the Phoebe Putney Hospital Acquisition
Case, 1 H EALTH M GMT. P OL’ Y & I NNOVATION 60 (2012), http://www.hmpi.org/pdf/HMPI-
%20Town,%20Phoebe%20Putney.pdf; Gaynor, Ho & Town, supra note 11.
32 See, e.g., Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-For-Profit Hospital Mergers: A Case
Study, 49 J. I NDUS. ECON. 63 (2001), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-6451.00138/epdf (finding

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
10
Thus, as most courts generally recognize, the non-profit status of merging hospitals does not
mitigate the potential for anticompetitive harm.33
As discussed more fully below, Mountain States and Wellmont are unquestionably each
other’s closest competitor, and no realistic alternatives exist for the vast majority of patients in
Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia.34 This indicates that the anticompetitive effects of
this merger are likely to be significant. The two systems routinely compete for inclusion in health
insurer networks and to attract patients to their respective systems. By eliminating this
competition, the proposed merger would substantially increase the combined system’s ability to
exercise its market power, enabling it to extract higher prices in negotiations with health
insurers,35 which in turn would likely lead to higher healthcare costs for employers and
consumers. The proposed merger also would reduce the combined system’s incentives to
maintain or improve the quality or availability of healthcare services.36
In their COPA application and other public statements, Mountain States and Wellmont
emphasize the challenges that they face in providing healthcare services in Northeast Tennessee
and Southwest Virginia.37 In doing so, however, they undervalue the critical importance of
competition in addressing these challenges. Competition is no less important in rural and
economically-stressed communities than it is in urban and more prosperous ones. Competition
between Mountain States and Wellmont has long benefitted area patients and employers in the
form of lower prices and enhanced quality and availability of healthcare services. Contrary to
substantial price increases resulting from a merger of non-profit, community-based hospitals, and determining that
mergers involving non-profit hospitals are a legitimate focus of antitrust concern); Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of
Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter–Summit Transaction, 18 I NT’ L J. E CON. B US. 65, 79 (2011),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13571516.2011.542956 (finding evidence of post-merger price
increases ranging from 28%-44%, and concluding that “[o]ur results demonstrate that nonprofit hospitals may still
raise price quite substantially after they merge. This suggests that mergers involving nonprofit hospitals should
perhaps attract as much antitrust scrutiny as other hospital mergers.”).
33 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[T]he
evidence in this case reflects that nonprofit hospitals do seek to maximize the reimbursement rates they receive.”);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. ProMedica, No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *22 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (finding
that a nonprofit hospital entity “exercises its bargaining leverage to obtain the most favorable reimbursement rates
possible from commercial health plans.”); United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1284-87 (7th Cir.
1990) (rejecting the contention that nonprofit hospitals would not seek to maximize profits by exercising their
market power); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he district
court’s assumption that University Health, as a nonprofit entity, would not act anticompetitively was improper.”);
Hospital Corp. of America v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390-91 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the contention
that nonprofit hospitals would not engage in anticompetitive behavior). See also D OSE OF C OMPETITION REPORT,
supra note 20, ch. 4, at 29-33 (discussing the significance of nonprofit status in hospital merger cases, and
concluding that the best available empirical evidence indicates that nonprofit hospitals exploit market power when
given the opportunity and that “the profit/nonprofit status of the merging hospitals should not be considered a factor
in predicting whether a hospital merger is likely to be anticompetitive.”).
34 See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶¶ 9, 35, 48.
35 See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶¶ 20, 32.
36 See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶¶ 11, 52.
37 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 2 (“The challenges are intensified in the Parties’ service area
of Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia, a rural area with extremely low Medicare payment rates, high
volumes of Medicaid and uninsured populations, and significant health care challenges.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
11
assertions by the parties, we have seen no evidence that would suggest that this region cannot
support competition between Mountain States and Wellmont, or that such competition inhibits
their ability to serve the region effectively. Both of these hospital systems are financially sound
and have the resources to continue operating independently,38 and there is no indication that
either system operates at a loss or is at risk of failing and ceasing operations.
1. 	The Merger Will Eliminate the Close and Vigorous Competition
Between Mountain States and Wellmont and Will Result in
Extraordinarily High Market Shares and Concentration
Mountain States and Wellmont are each other’s closest competitor due to their similar
facility locations, service offerings, and quality of care.39 Each system operates large acute care
hospitals that provide advanced inpatient services, as well as several smaller community
hospitals, in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. Mountain States and Wellmont also
operate outpatient facilities and employ physicians across a number of specialties. As shown on
the attached map of general acute care hospitals located in the 21-county area identified by the
parties (Attachment D), there is significant geographic overlap between Mountain States’s and
Wellmont’s facilities. Notably, Mountain States and Wellmont operate the only two acute care
hospitals in Norton, Virginia (located 2 miles apart), as well as the only two hospitals in
Kingsport, Tennessee (located roughly 3 miles apart). Consistent with our economic analyses,
empirical research indicates that mergers among hospitals in close proximity are likely to result
in particularly significant price increases.40
Mountain States and Wellmont compete on price, quality, innovation, and patient
experience in order to be included in health insurers’ networks and to attract patients to their
respective hospital system for inpatient, outpatient, and physician services. Mountain States and
38 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 1 (acknowledging Wellmont’s current “position of clinical
strength and relative financial stability”); Tammy Childress, Mountain States Health Alliance Posts Audited Year-
End Results, B RISTOL H ERALD COURIER (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.heraldcourier.com/workittricities/business_news/mountain-states-health-alliance-posts-audited-year-
end-results/article_e1a9b05c-8316-11e5-a8d4-5f3b2b601935.html (reporting that for fiscal year 2015, Mountain
States substantially reduced its debt as a result of strong volume growth and cost discipline); Nate Morobito,
Wellmont Health System, Executives Benefit from Good Financial Year, WJHL (May 18, 2016),
http://wjhl.com/2016/05/18/wellmont-health-system-executives-benefit-from-good-financial-year/ (“Overall,
Wellmont Health System is coming off a solid year financially.”); Hank Hayes, Wellmont's Filing Discloses
Compensation, Shows Better Operating Margins, K INGSPORT T IMES-N EWS (May 17, 2016),
http://www.timesnews.net/Business/2016/05/17/Wellmont-s-filing-discloses-old-salaries-and-shows-better-
operating-margins.
39 See, e.g., Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 11-14 (describing the similarity of services offered by
Mountain States and Wellmont and a brief history of competition between the two systems).
40 See, e.g., W ILLIAM B. V OGT & ROBERT T OWN, ROBERT WOOD J OHNSON FOUND., RESEARCH SYNTHESIS REPORT
N O. 9: H OW H AS H OSPITAL C ONSOLIDATION A FFECTED THE PRICE AND Q UALITY OF H OSPITAL C ARE ? 7 (2006),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf12056/subassets/rwjf12056_1 (“Mergers
among hospitals that are close together geographically generate greater price increases than do mergers among
distant hospitals.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
12
Wellmont themselves acknowledge publicly that they have a history of vigorous competition.41
Barbara Allen, the Chairwoman of Mountain States’s board, said, “for years [MSHA and
Wellmont have] been very fierce competitors.”42 Similarly, Dale Sargent, the Medical Director
of Hospitalist Programs for Wellmont, acknowledged that “MSHA and [Wellmont] have been
battling one another since the two health systems formed.”43
a) 	Diversion Ratio Analysis Confirms That Mountain States and
Wellmont Are Each Other’s Closest Competitor and That the
Merger Is Likely to Result in Significant Disadvantages
To measure the degree of competition between the merging hospitals, FTC staff
performed a diversion ratio analysis. This analysis calculates what would happen if,
hypothetically, one of the merging systems were removed from an insurer’s network and was no
longer an option for that insurer’s patient members. The patients who would have used their
preferred hospital must now use a hospital outside of that system. If a significant fraction of
those “diverted” patients would choose a hospital in the other merging system, then that system
can be said to be a close competitor to the first system. This fraction of diverted patients is
known as the diversion ratio, and it is a standard economic metric often used to measure
closeness of competition in hospital merger cases.44
In this matter, FTC staff’s diversion ratio analysis confirms what already makes sense
intuitively: that Mountain States and Wellmont are each other’s closest competitor and next-best
alternative to the other for inpatient services.45 FTC staff calculates that if Mountain States’s
hospitals were no longer an option for area residents, 85% of the patients who currently use a
Mountain States hospital would seek care at a Wellmont hospital. Conversely, if Wellmont’s
hospitals were no longer an option for area residents, 90% of the patients who currently use a
41 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 2 (“Wellmont and Mountain States have a history of
competition dating back to the formation of the two health systems in the late 1990s . . . .”). See also id. at 12-13.
42 David McGee, Wellmont, Mountain States Health Alliance Officials Make Deal Public, BRISTOL H ERALD
COURIER (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.heraldcourier.com/news/wellmont-mountain-states-health-alliance-officials-
make-deal-public/article_3a4f3bee-d9af-11e4-9516-974cd93d1907.html (emphasis added).
43 Dale Sargent, Editorial, It’s Up to Us: We Alone Can Seize Opportunities for Region’s Health Care, B RISTOL
H ERALD COURIER (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.heraldcourier.com/opinion/editorials/we-alone-can-seize-
opportunities-for-region-s-health-care/article_c8679895-b573-55c8-a998-882c4267413c.html.
44 See Merger Guidelines § 6.1 (“Diversion ratios between products sold by one merging firm and products sold by
the other merging firm can be very informative for assessing unilateral price effects, with higher diversion ratios
indicating a greater likelihood of such effects.”). Unilateral price effects refers to the ability of a merged firm to raise
prices on its own, without colluding with other competitors.
45 To calculate diversion ratios, we estimate a patient choice model using the Tennessee and Virginia state hospital
discharge data for commercially insured patients. See Tenn. Dep’t of Health, Hospital Discharge Data System
(HDDS) Inpatient Data (2014); Va. Health Info., Patient Level Data (2014), http://www.vhi.org/pld.asp. For a
discussion of the underlying methodology, see Joseph Farrell, David J. Balan, Keith Brand & Brett W. Wendling,
Economics at the FTC: Hospital Mergers, Authorized Generic Drugs, and Consumer Credit Markets, 39 REV.
I NDUS. O RG. 271 (2011), http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11151-011-9320-x.pdf.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
13
Wellmont hospital would seek care at a Mountain States hospital.46 Diversion ratios of this
magnitude indicate that Mountain States and Wellmont are extremely close substitutes and that a
merger between them would likely lead to significant price increases, as well as reduced
incentives to maintain or improve quality. Indeed, Competition Economics LLC, an economic
consultant hired by America’s Health Insurance Plans to analyze the proposed merger, estimated
that the price increase could be as high as 130%.47 Moreover, these diversion ratios are higher
than those in recent hospital mergers that the FTC has litigated and that courts have found
anticompetitive, indicating that the competition between Mountain States and Wellmont that
would be eliminated by the proposed merger is stronger than in other hospital mergers
determined to be anticompetitive.
b) 	High Market Shares and Concentration Levels in the Proposed
Geographic Service Area Confirm That the COPA Is Likely to
Result in Significant Disadvantages
General principles of antitrust law and economics indicate that mergers between close
competitors in highly concentrated hospital markets are likely to result in significant consumer
harm because the merged hospital system will be able to raise prices without offering sufficient
quality improvements to justify the higher price.48 For this reason, market shares and
concentration are important tools for assessing the potential for adverse competitive effects
resulting from a merger. The proposed merger between Mountain States and Wellmont would
create a system with high market shares in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia, lead to
a highly concentrated provider market, and result in substantial harm to consumers due to lost
competition.
46 America’s Health Insurance Plans hired Competition Economics LLC to perform an independent analysis of the
proposed merger between Mountain States and Wellmont, based on data for patients insured by Anthem Virginia
and BCBS Tennessee. That analysis also estimated very high diversion ratios between Mountain States and
Wellmont. The specific estimates (approximately 70% at the system level) differ from our estimates because the
FTC analyses are based on all commercially insured patients while Competition Economics LLC analyses are
limited to data for patients covered by Anthem Virginia and BCBS Tennessee. See Michael Doane & Luke Froeb,
Competition Economics LLC, An Economic Analysis of the Proposed Merger Between Wellmont Health System and
Mountain States Health Alliance, Tables 10, 12 & 13 (Oct. 29, 2015) (economic analysis funded by America’s
Health Insurance Plans), https://ahip.org//wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Wellmont-Mountain-States-Merger-
Report.pdf [hereinafter Competition Economics Report]. See also Press Release, America’s Health Insurance Plans,
New Report: Wellmont/Mountain States Merger Predicted to Increase Health Care Costs, Limit Choices for
Consumers (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.ahip.org/new-report-wellmontmountain-states-merger-predicted-to-
increase-health-care-costs-limit-choices-for-consumers/.
47 Competition Economics Report, supra note 46, at 18, Table 14.
48 See, e.g., Merger Guidelines §§ 5-6; United States v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363-66 (1963)
(“Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger
is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
14
Courts and antitrust agencies use a standard measure of market concentration, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”), to gauge a merger’s effect on concentration in the area.49
Under the Merger Guidelines and relevant case law, mergers resulting in a post-merger HHI
above 2,500 and an increase in HHI of more than 200 points are presumed likely to enhance the
merged firm’s market power and to be anticompetitive.50
Using state hospital discharge data, FTC staff calculated market shares and HHI
measures for the proposed merger between Mountain States and Wellmont using the 21-county
area that the parties define as the area the New Health System plans to serve.51 Based on that
analysis, the New Health System would have a market share of approximately 71% for inpatient
hospital services (based on discharges of commercially insured patients) and the post-merger
HHI would be 5,161, reflecting an HHI increase of 2,441 points.52 These market share and
concentration numbers approach monopoly levels and far exceed those that would create a
presumption of illegality under the Merger Guidelines and the relevant case law.53 The combined
market share and HHI calculations also exceed the levels in past hospital mergers that courts
49 HHI measures are calculated by summing the squares of the individual firms’ market shares. For hospital mergers,
they are based on the market shares of all hospitals (or systems) deemed to be in the market.
50 Merger Guidelines § 5.3. Courts accept this presumption of illegality when evaluating hospital mergers. See, e.g.,
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559, 570 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Commission is
entitled to take seriously the alarm sounded by a merger’s HHI data.”); id. (“These two aspects of this case – the
strong correlation between market share and price, and the degree to which this merger would further concentrate
markets that are already highly concentrated – converge in a manner that fully supports the Commission’s
application of a presumption of illegality.”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069,
1079 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“High levels of concentration raise anticompetitive concerns, and the HHI calculation
provides one way to identify mergers that are likely to invoke these concerns.”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ.
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The most prominent method of measuring market
concentration is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).”); id. at 1218 n.24 (“Significant market concentration
makes it easier for firms in the market to collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above or farther above
the competitive level.”) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285
(7th Cir. 1990) (“The defendants’ immense shares in a reasonably defined market create a presumption of
illegality.”).
51 See Tenn. Dep’t of Health, supra note 45; Va. Health Info., supra note 45. The market shares and HHI
calculations are based on inpatient admissions of commercially insured patients residing in the 21 counties that the
New Health System plans to serve, as identified by Mountain States and Wellmont in their COPA application. See
Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 15. The 21-county area includes 10 counties in Tennessee (Carter,
Cocke, Greene, Hamblen, Hancock, Hawkins, Johnson, Sullivan, Unicoi, and Washington) and 11 counties in
Virginia (Buchanan, Dickenson, Grayson, Lee, Russell, Scott, Smyth, Tazewell, Washington, Wise, and Wythe), as
well as the independent cities of Norton and Bristol, Virginia. See id. at 15 n.8. The shares are “patient-based
shares” calculated based on where patients who reside in the 21-county area received inpatient hospital services,
regardless of whether the hospital is located inside or outside the 21-county area, as opposed to “supplier-based
shares,” which are calculated based on the inpatient admissions for only the hospitals located within the 21-county
area, regardless of where the patients reside. For consistency of presentation, we followed the parties’ patient-based
formulation of market shares. See id. Exhibit 5.2 (Shares for New Health System), at 2-3. However, neither the
Merger Guidelines nor relevant case law dictate the use of patient-based shares in an antitrust context.
52 See also Competition Economics Report, supra note 46, at 10, Table 3. That analysis estimated a similarly large
post-merger market share for the New Health System of 77%, a post-merger HHI of 5,987, and an HHI increase of
2,551.
53 See supra note 50.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
15
have found to be anticompetitive and blocked.54 As shown in Table 1 below, no other hospital
system’s market share even remotely comes close to that of Mountain States and Wellmont.
Notably, Mountain States and Wellmont do not dispute that they would have a dominant post-
merger market share. Moreover, the applicants’ combined share is likely to increase further – to
nearly 77% – if two additional proposed transactions, the merger of Mountain States and
Laughlin Memorial Hospital and Wellmont’s acquisition of Takoma Regional Hospital, proceed
as planned.55
54 See Market Shares and HHIs in Prior Healthcare Merger Cases (Attachment B).
55 Laughlin Memorial Hospital recently announced plans to merge with Mountain States in early 2017. See News
Channel 11 Staff, Greeneville Hospital, Laughlin Memorial, Joins Mountain States, N EWS CHANNEL 11 (Nov. 1,
2016), http://wjhl.com/2016/11/01/greeneville-hospital-laughlin-memorial-hospital-joins-mountain-states/.
Wellmont plans to purchase Takoma Regional Hospital by the end of 2016. See Ken Little, Wellmont: Takoma
Purchase Could Be Finalized By Year’s End, T HE G REENEVILLE S UN (Nov. 3, 2016),
http://www.greenevillesun.com/news/local_news/wellmont-takoma-purchase-could-be-finalized-by-year-s-
end/article_ead467af-e1ab-594c-ae38-726cb2d6f0bc.html.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
16
FTC staff has assessed market conditions using the 21-county area that the merging
hospitals have identified as their service area, to be consistent with the information submitted by
Mountain States and Wellmont. However, we do not concede that it necessarily represents a
“relevant geographic market” under the Merger Guidelines or antitrust case law. This 21-county
Table 1: Inpatient Market Shares for 21-County Area
(Based on 2014 Commercial Discharges)
Hospital Systems Pre-Merger
Market Share
Post-Merger
Market Share
Mountain States Health Alliance (TN, VA) 	42.23% 	71.13%
Wellmont Health System (TN, VA) 	28.90%
LifePoint Health
• 	Clinch Valley Medical Center (VA)
• 	Wythe County Community Hospital (VA)
5.42% 	5.42%
Covenant Health
• 	Morristown-Hamblen Healthcare System (TN)
• 	Claiborne Medical Center (TN)
• 	Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (TN)
• 	Parkwest Medical Center (TN)
• 	LeConte Medical Center (TN)
• 	Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge (TN)
4.68% 	4.68%
Laughlin Memorial Hospital (TN) 	4.19% 	4.19%
Community Health Systems
• 	Tennova – Newport Medical Center (TN)
• 	Tennova – Lakeway Regional Hospital (TN)
• 	Tennova – Jefferson Memorial Hospital (TN)
• 	Tennova Healthcare – Clarksville (TN)
• 	Tennova Healthcare – Lebanon (TN)
• 	Southern Virginia Regional Medical Center (VA)
1.86% 	1.86%
Carilion Clinic
• 	Carilion Tazewell Community Hospital (VA)
• 	Carilion Giles Community Hospital (VA)
• 	Carilion New River Valley Medical Center (VA)
• 	Carilion Clinic Saint Albans Hospital (VA)
1.74% 	1.74%
University of Tennessee Medical Center (TN) 	1.73% 	1.73%
Adventist Health System
• 	Takoma Regional Hospital (TN) 1.55% 	1.55%
Duke LifePoint Healthcare
• 	Twin County Regional Hospital (VA) 1.30% 	1.30%
Vanderbilt University Medical Center (TN) 	1.22% 	1.22%
Buchanan General Hospital (VA) 	1.20% 	1.20%
Other Hospitals (less than 1% share each) 	3.97% 	3.97%
HHI 	Pre-Merger 	Post-Merger
2,720 	5,161
Change in HHI = 2,441

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
17
area is potentially broader than a market defined for antitrust purposes, meaning the shares listed
above are conservative and likely to understate the competitive impact. But adjusting the area in
which to assess market shares does not change the conclusion that the merger results in a high
combined share. In fact, Mountain States and Wellmont admit that they would have an 88.4%
share of total discharges in their 90% service area (i.e., the zip codes that comprise the area
where 90% of their patients reside) and a 93.6% share of total discharges in their 75% service
area (i.e., the zip codes that comprise the area where 75% of their patients reside).56 Neither of
these areas necessarily represent a relevant market for antitrust purposes, but they illustrate the
overwhelming share of inpatient services controlled by Mountain States and Wellmont in
Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. As demonstrated in the attached maps showing
inpatient admission market shares in each county (Attachment E), Mountain States and
Wellmont are by far the two largest providers of general acute care services in most of the
counties in the region.
The proposed COPA also would result in high market shares for several outpatient and
physician specialty services in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia, based on facility or
physician counts. For example, shares calculated by Mountain States and Wellmont indicate that
they would control a high share of outpatient facilities for imaging services (60% of CT scans
and 53% of MRI), hospital-based surgeries (58%), surgeries at ambulatory surgery centers
(“ASCs”) (68%), and cancer treatment services (60% or more).57 With respect to physician
services, according to information contained in the COPA application, post-merger Mountain
States and Wellmont would control 86% of cardiology services, 85% of hematology and
oncology services, 80% of occupational medicine services, and 62% of pulmonary services.58
Mountain States and Wellmont have since submitted a revised table showing lower combined
shares in these and other physician specialties, but they did not provide any underlying data that
might explain the discrepancy between the two sets of shares.59 The revised table may understate
56 Mountain States Health Alliance & Wellmont Health System, Responses to Questions Submitted May 27, 2016
by Southwest Virginia Health Authority in Connection with Application for Letter Authorizing Cooperative
Agreement, 000096 (Exhibit 12A: Inpatient Shares Based on New Health System’s 75% Service Area) (July 13,
2016), https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/msha-responses-to-questions-bates.pdf [hereinafter
Responses to Authority Questions]; id. at 000097 (Exhibit 12B: Inpatient Shares Based on New Health System’s
90% Service Area).
57 Mountain States Health Alliance & Wellmont Health System, Responses to Questions Submitted April 22, 2016
by Tennessee Department of Health in Connection with Application for A Certificate of Public Advantage, Exhibit 2
(Revised Classification of Facilities to Reflect Substitutable Services or Products) (July 13, 2016),
http://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/WHS-MSHA_April_22,_2016_DOH_Response_1.pdf [hereinafter
Responses to Department Questions].
58 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 63. The above market shares include physicians employed by
Mountain States and Wellmont, as well as physicians affiliated with Mountain States. See id. at 63 n.50. Even under
a conservative approach that limits the hospital systems’ share to employed physicians, they would still command a
dominant share of these physician specialty services post-merger: 85% for cardiology, 79% for
hematology/oncology, 80% for occupational medicine, and 57% for pulmonology. See id. at 63.
59 Mountain States Health Alliance & Wellmont Health System, Supplement to Responses to Questions Submitted
April 22, 2016, by Tennessee Department of Health in Connection with Application for A Certificate of Public
Advantage, Updated Exhibit 6.1E (Physician Status by Specialty/Employment as of July 1, 2016) (July 25, 2016),
http://tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/WHS-MSHA_April_22,_2016_Response_2.pdf [hereinafter
Supplemental Responses to Department Questions].

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
18
the applicants’ combined physician shares by including mid-level healthcare practitioners, such
as physician assistants and nurse practitioners, as well as by consolidating physician specialty
categories that were reported separately in the initial application.60 Nevertheless, even according
to the revised table, Mountain States and Wellmont will employ or have an affiliation with more
than 60% of physicians and mid-level practitioners who perform cardiovascular services and
urgent care services, nearly 60% of those who perform pulmonology services, and roughly 50%
of those who perform oncology and hematology services.61
Furthermore, shares based on the broad 21-county area likely understate the competitive
implications of the COPA for physician services. Because patients likely stay relatively close to
home when seeking care for most physician services, the relevant geographic markets for these
services are likely to be much narrower than the 21-county area. Shares based on 21 counties
may mask concentration in more local markets. For example, FTC staff analysis of Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) data indicates that county-level shares for Mountain
States and Wellmont physicians exceed 50% in a number of specialties, including primary care
and family medicine physicians, and exceed 70% in cardiology, pulmonology,
oncology/hematology, and occupational medicine in some counties.
Below, we present FTC staff’s assessment of each potential disadvantage that the
Department must consider under the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act.
2. 	The COPA Would Make It More Difficult for Health Insurers to
Negotiate Appropriate Payment and Service Arrangements with
Mountain States and Wellmont, Which Likely Would Result in
Higher Prices for Employers and Patients
COPA DISADVANTAGE FACTOR A: The extent of any likely adverse impact
on 	the 	ability 	of 	health 	maintenance 	organizations, 	preferred 	provider
organizations, managed healthcare organizations, or other healthcare payors to
negotiate 	appropriate 	payment 	and 	service 	arrangements 	with 	hospitals,
physicians, allied healthcare professionals, or other healthcare providers62
ASSESSMENT: The Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act requires the Department to
consider whether the proposed merger would have an adverse impact on the ability of health
insurers “to negotiate appropriate payment and service arrangements” with healthcare
60 The applicants submitted an identical physician shares table to the Southwest Virginia Health Authority, which
indicates that the physician shares do in fact include mid-level healthcare practitioners. See Mountain States Health
Alliance & Wellmont Health System, Supplement to Responses to Questions Submitted May 27, 2016 by Southwest
Virginia Health Authority in Connection with Application for Letter Authorizing Cooperative Agreement,
Replacement Application Exhibit 14.1 (Section E) (Physician Status by Specialty/Employment), at 000132 n.1 (July
25, 2016), https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/supplement_to_msha-
wellmont_swvha_responses.pdf.
61 See Supplemental Responses to Department Questions, supra note 59, Updated Exhibit 6.1E (Physician Status by
Specialty/Employment as of July 1, 2016).
62 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(3)(A).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
19
providers.63 Ultimately, this is an important indicator of how the merger is likely to impact
consumers because health insurers negotiate on behalf of their customers – area residents and
employers.64 When hospitals obtain greater bargaining leverage, they are able to negotiate higher
reimbursement rates (i.e., prices) with insurers. Insurers typically pass on these higher prices to
consumers in the form of higher premiums, copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket
expenses. This affects fully insured employers who offer coverage to their employees, self-
insured employers who pay their employees’ healthcare claims, employees who pay some
portion of their health insurance benefits, and individuals who purchase health insurance
directly.65 Furthermore, employers facing higher costs may reduce insurance coverage for their
employees or eliminate insurance coverage altogether. Higher healthcare costs can also be
passed through to employees in the form of lower wages and total compensation.66 Because the
FTC is concerned about the impact that healthcare mergers will have on consumers, we take
seriously the impact that a hospital merger will have on the ability of insurers to negotiate
competitive prices and other contractual terms on consumers’ behalf.
Currently, prices for inpatient, outpatient, and physician services provided by Mountain
States and Wellmont are set via separate negotiations between each hospital system and insurers.
We focus our discussion below on inpatient hospital services, but the same analysis applies to
outpatient and physician services. Each side in these negotiations has some bargaining power.
The insurer’s bargaining power stems from the fact that the hospital wants access to the insurer’s
patient members, and the hospital’s bargaining power stems from the fact that its inclusion in the
insurer’s network will make that network more attractive to potential patient members. The
prices that result from these negotiations are a function of the relative bargaining leverage of the
two sides in the negotiations, which will depend on how each side would fare if no agreement
63 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(3)(A).
64 See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶ 26 (“To offer lower premium rates to existing and potential customers,
Anthem Virginia and Amerigroup attempt to negotiate competitive rates for hospital and other medical services.”).
65 See Erin E. Trish & Bradley J. Herring, How Do Health Insurer Market Concentration and Bargaining Power
With Hospitals Affect Health Insurance Premiums?, 42 J. H EALTH E CON. 104 (2015),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629615000375.
66 See, e.g., Gaynor, Ho & Town, supra note 11, at 236 (stating that employers pass through higher health care costs
dollar for dollar to workers, either by reducing wages or fringe benefits, or even dropping health insurance coverage
entirely); G AYNOR & T OWN (Att. C), supra note 11, at 1 (“Ultimately, increases in health care costs (which are
generally paid directly by insurers or self-insured employers) are passed on to health care consumers in the form of
higher premiums, lower benefits and lower wages[.]”); Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity
Benefits, 84 AM . E CON. REV. 622 (1994), http://economics.mit.edu/files/6484 (finding that increased health
insurance costs can be passed to employees in the form of lower wages); Jay Bhattacharya & M. Kate Bundorf, The
Incidence of the Healthcare Costs of Obesity, 28 J. HEALTH E CON. 649 (2009),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629609000113 (finding that increased health insurance costs
can be passed to employees in the form of lower wages); Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Labor Market
Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums, 24 J. LAB . E CON. 609 (2006),
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/achandr/JLE_LaborMktEffectsRisingHealthInsurancePremiums_2006.pdf (finding
that increased health insurance costs lead to reduced wages and employment); Priyanka Anand, The Effect of Rising
Health Insurance Costs on Compensation and Employment, (Mar. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://docplayer.net/1978184-The-effect-of-rising-health-insurance-costs-on-compensation-and-employment.html
(finding that as health insurance costs increase, employers that offer health insurance reduce total employee
compensation).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
20
were reached. Generally, the less one side has to lose from failure to reach an agreement, relative
to the other side, the more favorable prices and other contractual terms it will be able to
negotiate. Mergers of competing hospitals give hospitals more relative bargaining leverage
because, after the merger, insurers now have more to lose from failing to reach agreement with
the merged system.
Today, Mountain States and Wellmont each already has substantial bargaining leverage
in negotiations with health insurers. An insurer network that lacks the hospitals of either system
is less attractive to employers and consumers than a network that includes the hospitals of both
systems, and this gives each system significant bargaining power today relative to insurers.
However, the bargaining leverage of each hospital system is limited by the availability of the
other system as an alternative. That is, an insurer could still offer a fairly attractive network if it
included only one of the two hospital systems, especially because that more limited network
would likely be offered at a discount.67 Indeed, this has happened before in Northeast Tennessee
and Southwest Virginia. For example, in 2012, one health insurer dropped Mountain States from
its network and relied on Wellmont to meet its patient members’ healthcare needs after Mountain
States demanded higher prices than the insurer was willing to pay and that insurer could not
reach an agreement with Mountain States during contract negotiations.68
The proposed merger of Mountain States and Wellmont would give the merged hospital
system even greater bargaining leverage over insurers and eliminate the leverage for insurers that
competition between Mountain States and Wellmont provides. Failure to reach an agreement
with the merged hospital system would now mean the loss of both hospital systems from the
insurer’s network, making it very unattractive to consumers. It would be virtually impossible for
an insurer to assemble a viable local provider network without contracting with the merged
hospital system.69 This would give the merged hospital system the ability to extract substantially
higher reimbursement rates from health insurers during contract negotiations.70 Competition
from other hospitals would not prevent this, as the other hospitals are either too far away from
most of the patients who currently use Mountain States and Wellmont, or their service offerings
are too limited to constitute a provider network that would be attractive.71 Thus, the proposed
67 See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶ 26. It is important to note that, even in this case, both the hospital
system and the insurer still benefit from reaching an agreement, and so agreement is usually reached. But the terms
on which agreement is reached depend on the relative bargaining power of the hospital system and the insurer,
which in turn will depend on the degree of hospital competition.
68 See George Jackson, MSHA Splits with CIGNA, Commits to New Health Care Model, B RISTOL H ERALD COURIER
(Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.heraldcourier.com/news/msha-splits-with-cigna-commits-to-new-health-care-
model/article_b18fc80e-0198-57da-8134-c9c8e7320b9b.html. See also Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶ 38
(indicating that in 2002 Anthem dropped Mountain States from its provider network).
69 Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶ 77.
70 Id. ¶ 32; Comment from Virginia Association of Health Plans to the Southwest Virginia Health Authority (May
25, 2016).
71 Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶ 48.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
21
merger between Mountain States and Wellmont would greatly enhance the hospitals’ bargaining
power, which would lead to substantially higher prices for consumers.72
Mountain States and Wellmont have suggested that consolidation occurring at all levels
of the healthcare industry necessitates the proposed merger. In particular, they have highlighted
consolidation among health insurers as a motivating factor for the proposed merger.73 FTC staff
routinely hears concerns from healthcare providers about insurer consolidation and leverage,
along with claims that providers must counter this insurer consolidation and leverage by
enhancing their own in response. However, as discussed above, mergers that increase healthcare
providers’ bargaining power are likely to result in higher prices for hospital services, regardless
of the degree of competition between insurers. A merger between close hospital competitors
increases the bargaining leverage of the hospitals, and leaves the bargaining leverage of the
insurer unchanged, which means that the hospitals’ relative bargaining leverage has increased,
even if the insurer’s leverage is already high.74
Hence, the proposed merger between Mountain States and Wellmont is likely to increase
the prices of healthcare services for residents in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. As
discussed in Section VI.A, the price commitments proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont
are unlikely to mitigate this harm.
3. 	The COPA Is Likely to Substantially Reduce Competition for
Physician Services and Ancillary Healthcare Services
COPA 	DISADVANTAGE 	FACTOR 	B: 	The 	extent 	of 	any 	reduction 	in
competition among physicians, allied health professionals, other healthcare
providers, or other persons furnishing goods or services to, or in competition
with, hospitals that is likely to result directly or indirectly from the cooperative
agreement [COPA]75
ASSESSMENT: The framework to evaluate mergers that combine outpatient providers
and physician services is essentially the same as that described above for inpatient hospitals.
72 The above analysis assumes that the merged hospital system will bargain with insurers on an all-or-nothing basis
(i.e., contract with all hospitals in the system or none). If instead each hospital continued to negotiate separately, the
merger would still lead to a price increase, though the mechanism would be slightly different.
73 See Wellmont & Mountain States, Better Together: Community & Stakeholder Certificate of Public
Advantage/Cooperative Agreement Pre-Submission Report,
http://becomingbettertogether.org/report/#sthash.MRGC9LZ1.dpuf, at 7 [hereinafter Pre-Submission Report]; David
McGee, Health Systems’ Proposed Merger ‘Relatively’ On Schedule, Leaders Say, BRISTOL H ERALD COURIER (Oct.
19, 2015), http://www.heraldcourier.com/news/local/health-systems-proposed-merger-relatively-on-schedule-
leaders-say/article_eefd6803-0568-55ed-b237-d5dc262c6025.html.
74 We also note that the Department of Justice has sued to block the Aetna-Humana and Anthem-Cigna mergers. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and State Attorneys General Sue to Block Anthem’s
Acquisition of Cigna, Aetna’s Acquisition of Humana (July 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-and-state-attorneys-general-sue-block-anthem-s-acquisition-cigna-aetna-s.
75 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(3)(B).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
22
Like hospitals, providers of outpatient services and physician services compete for inclusion in
health plan networks and to attract patients. These providers negotiate reimbursement rates with
insurers, and the rates negotiated depend on their relative bargaining leverage. When there are
adequate alternatives to a particular provider, an insurer has a greater ability to resist demands
for higher rates by a particular outpatient provider and physician-services provider.
Mountain States and Wellmont are close competitors for outpatient and physician
services. The systems operate competing outpatient centers that serve Northeast Tennessee and
Southwest Virginia, and each system employs physicians in the area across numerous specialties.
Mountain States and Wellmont compete for inclusion in insurer networks and negotiate with
insurers to establish rates for outpatient and physician services. The merger will eliminate the
competition between Mountain States and Wellmont for outpatient and physician services and
will further consolidate those markets.
As previously stated, the proposed merger would result in the merged system
commanding high, even dominant, market shares for several physician specialty services,
including cardiology, hematology and oncology, occupational medicine, and pulmonology –
ranging from 50% to 86%.76 In addition, the merged system would have shares greater than 50%
for several outpatient services.77 Market shares of this magnitude indicate that the COPA is
likely to enhance Mountain States’s and Wellmont’s market power. Post-merger, the combined
system’s negotiating leverage is likely to increase substantially, which is likely to lead to higher
prices and reduced quality and availability of physician and outpatient services to the serious
detriment of employers and area residents. As discussed in Section VI.A, the price commitments
proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont will be unlikely to mitigate this harm.
4. 	The COPA Is Likely to Have a Substantial Adverse Impact on the
Quality, Availability, and Price of Healthcare Services for Patients in
Northeast Tennessee
COPA DISADVANTAGE FACTOR C: The extent of any likely adverse impact
on patients in the quality, availability, and price of healthcare services78
ASSESSMENT: As described above, the COPA would give Mountain States and
Wellmont tremendous bargaining leverage with insurers to negotiate significantly higher
reimbursement rates, which are passed through to consumers in the form of higher premiums,
copayments, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket expenses.79 This would have a substantial
adverse impact on patients with respect to the price of healthcare services.
Additionally, Mountain States and Wellmont compete on quality and service, including
patient experience, access to healthcare services and innovative technology, and other quality
76 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
77 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
78 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(3)(C).
79 See supra Section IV.A.2.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
23
and service metrics.80 These non-price dimensions of competition greatly benefit patients and are
among the factors by which employers and consumers evaluate the desirability of a provider
network. Today, Mountain States and Wellmont know that patients can choose to seek care at,
and physicians can send their referrals to, the other system if they are not satisfied with the
quality, patient experience, or services offered by either hospital system. That threat of losing
patients and physician referrals to a rival system incentivizes each system to provide the best
possible quality and patient experience, to add new services and technology, and to enhance the
availability and convenience of care.81 Not surprisingly, Mountain States and Wellmont compare
themselves to each other on a number of quality and patient experience dimensions, to attract
patients in the local area.82
The competition between Mountain States and Wellmont for patients also incentivizes
each system to provide innovative medical technology and to enhance their service lines.83 For
example, competition between Wellmont and Mountain States spurred the adoption and
expansion of upgrades to robotic surgery technology at both hospital systems.84 Similarly,
competition between the systems has led to increased rehabilitation services for patients
80 See Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶¶ 11, 52, 55-61.
81 Alan Levine, President and CEO of Mountain States, emphasized this point to the Mountain States community in
a 2014 newsletter article:
So when we talk about growth, the most important word I want you to keep in mind is CHOICE.
Let me explain what I mean by that. Our patients do not have to use our services. They have a
choice. They can choose a different doctor, a different hospital, a different outpatient clinic. And
if we don’t deliver the quality they deserve or the patient experience they want, they will choose
someone else. Our goal, and the way we will achieve success in the Growth pillar, is by giving
our patients such outstanding care and such a positive patient experience that they will want to
choose us. If we do our jobs well, they’ll not only choose us, but they’ll tell their family and
friends that they ought to choose us too, if they want the very best that health care has to offer. . . .
That is how we grow -- by earning our patients’ trust and loyalty and respecting the fact that they
always have a choice.
Alan Levine, Mountain States, A Look at Our New Growth Pillar: Earning Our Patients’ Trust, M OUNTAIN S TAR
(Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.mshanews.org/news/article.aspx?id=1958.
82 See id.; Mountain States, Survey Shows MSHA Is No. 1 Health Care Provider in the Region, M OUNTAIN S TAR
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.mshanews.org/news/article.aspx?id=368 (discussing results of the National Research
Corporation survey that compared Mountain States to Wellmont along a number of quality and patient experience
dimensions).
83 Nathan Baker, The Battle Must End: Health Care Officials Say Merger Is Best Route to Serve Community,
J OHNSON C ITY P RESS (Apr. 26, 2015), http://www.johnsoncitypress.com/Local/2015/04/25/The-battle-must-end-
Health-care-officials-say-merger-is-best-route-to-serve-community.html (“When one [system] purchased a new
piece of equipment, the other [system], by competitive necessity, bought one too.”). See infra Section IV.B.4.
84 See, e.g., Press Release, Wellmont, Holston Valley Begins Using da Vinci Surgical System Reinforcing
Wellmont’s Leadership in Robotics (May 8, 2012), http://wellmont.newsroom.meltwaterpress.com/news/holston-
valley-begins-using-da-vinci-surgical-system-reinforcing-wellmont-s-leadership-in-robotics; Mountain States,
JCMC Upgraded to Newest da Vinci Robotic Surgical System, M OUNTAIN STAR (July 11, 2012),
http://www.mshanews.org/news/article.aspx?id=190. Robotic surgery allows for minimally invasive surgery, by
translating surgeon hand movements into smaller, more precise movements of tiny instruments inside a patient’s
body. See da Vinci Surgery, http://www.davincisurgery.com/.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
24
recovering from stroke, brain and spinal cord injury, cardiac and pulmonary conditions, and
orthopedic conditions.85 In addition, in response to community demand, Wellmont expanded
urgent care services into Johnson City, Tennessee, and Abingdon, Virginia, two areas that at the
time were predominantly served by Mountain States’s hospitals.86
The elimination of competition between Mountain States and Wellmont will significantly
diminish the hospitals’ incentives to maintain or improve current levels of quality, patient
experience, and access to services and innovative technology, because the New Health System
would no longer risk losing patients to its pre-merger rival. Importantly, a reduction in quality of
care can have an adverse effect on patient outcomes such as mortality, readmissions, and length
of stay. Reduced availability of services may result in decreased patient access, increased travel
time to receive services, increased emergency room wait times, and other negative consequences.
Indeed, the empirical economic evidence indicates that increased competition is associated with
better quality.87
Notably, the benefits of competition among healthcare providers are not confined to those
patients covered by commercial insurance plans. Competition benefits all patients, including
those who are covered by government insurance programs (i.e., Medicare and Medicaid) or are
uninsured. By far, the most important such benefit is improved quality of care. As noted above,
competition-reducing mergers often reduce quality. Those quality reductions will harm all of the
hospitals’ patients, not just those with commercial insurance. Competition may also indirectly
restrain the prices or premiums paid by patients covered by a government insurance program or
who are uninsured.88
85 See, e.g., Press Release, HealthSouth Corp., Wellmont, HealthSouth Form Joint Venture to Open a New
Rehabilitation Hospital in Southwest Virginia (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://s2.q4cdn.com/500379385/files/doc_news/2009/HLS_News_2009_9_8_General_Releases.pdf;
Press Release, HealthSouth Corp., HealthSouth and Mountain States Health Alliance Finalize Joint Venture to
Operate Quillen Rehabilitation Hospital in Johnson City, Tennessee (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://s2.q4cdn.com/500379385/files/doc_news/HealthSouth-And-Mountain-States-Health-Alliance-Finalize-Joint-
Venture-To-Operate-Quillen-Rehabilitation-Hospital-In-Johnson-City-Tennessee.pdf.
86 W ELLMONT, W ELLMONT D EFINED: F ISCAL 2011 REPORT TO O UR COMMUNITIES 28 (2011),
http://www.wellmont.org/uploadedFiles/About_Us/Wellmont-Defined-Fiscal-2011-Report.pdf (“Not so long ago,
area yards displayed signs reading ‘We Need Wellmont,’ as residents expressed their desire for Wellmont services
in their communities.”).
87 See Gaynor, Ho & Town, supra note 11, at 249 (“[T]he evidence indicates that increases in competition improve
hospital quality.”); G AYNOR & T OWN (Att. C), supra note 11, at 3 (“While it is not possible to draw direct
conclusions about the United States based on evidence from the United Kingdom, these studies add to the growing
evidence base that competition leads to enhanced quality under administered prices.”).
88 Many Medicare patients are covered by Medicare Advantage (MA) plans rather than by traditional Medicare. MA
hospital prices are negotiated rather than fixed and, as such, vary from traditional Medicare hospital prices. See
Robert A. Berenson, Jonathan H. Sunshine, David Helms & Emily Lawton, Why Medicare Advantage Plans Pay
Hospitals Traditional Medicare Prices, 34 H EALTH A FFAIRS 1289 (Aug. 2015),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/34/8/1289.abstract; Laurence Baker, M. Kate Bundorf, Aileen Devlin &
Daniel Kessler, Medicare Advantage Plans Pay Hospitals Less Than Traditional Medicare Pays, 35 H EALTH
A FFAIRS 1444 (Aug. 2016), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/35/8/1444.abstract. A competition-reducing
merger may to some extent increase MA prices, and those increases will be passed through to Medicare
beneficiaries in the form of higher MA premiums or reduced benefits. In addition, under the Patient Protection and

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
25
Therefore, the proposed COPA is likely to have a substantial negative impact on patients
with respect to the quality, availability, and price of healthcare services. As discussed in Section
VI, the commitments proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont are unlikely to mitigate this
harm.
5. 	The COPA Is Unnecessary Because Less Restrictive Arrangements
Are Available That Would Achieve Similar Benefits While Posing
Fewer Competitive Disadvantages Than the Merger
COPA DISADVANTAGE FACTOR D: The availability of arrangements that
are less restrictive to competition and achieve the same benefits or a more
favorable balance of benefits over disadvantages attributable to any reduction in
competition likely to result from the agreement89
ASSESSMENT: The Department must consider whether there are alternative
arrangements that would be less restrictive to competition and would achieve the same benefits,
or a more favorable balance of benefits over disadvantages. This statutory factor is similar to the
Merger Guidelines requirement that any cost saving or quality benefit must be “merger-specific”
to be recognized as an efficiency – meaning the cost saving or quality benefit likely would only
be achieved through the proposed merger rather than through practical alternatives that would
raise fewer competitive concerns.90 Practical alternatives may include actions undertaken by the
hospital systems independently, joint ventures and other forms of collaboration between the
merging parties, or a merger or affiliation with a different partner. In this section, we explain
generally why most of the benefits from the merger could be achieved through alternatives that
are less restrictive to competition and achieve comparable benefits or a more favorable balance
of benefits over disadvantages.91 Throughout the next section, in which we assess the claimed
benefits of the merger, we identify specific instances where practical alternatives that are less
restrictive to competition may be available.
Both Mountain States and Wellmont are integrated health systems with sufficient scale,
capability, and resources to achieve the claimed benefits independently. For example, both
Affordable Care Act, prices that non-profit hospitals charge to uninsured, self-pay patients eligible for financial
assistance can be no more than “amounts generally billed to insured patients.” See Sara Rosenblum, Additional
Requirements For Charitable Hospitals: Final Rules On Community Health Needs Assessments And Financial
Assistance, H EALTH A FFAIRS B LOG (Jan. 23, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/23/additional-
requirements-for-charitable-hospitals-final-rules-on-community-health-needs-assessments-and-financial-assistance/.
The calculation of these “amounts generally billed” includes commercial insurance prices, which means that
increases in commercial prices also increase the prices that hospitals are permitted to charge to uninsured patients.
89 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(3)(D).
90 Merger Guidelines § 10.
91 This assumes that benefits would be achieved as a result of the merger. FTC staff believes that any benefits
resulting from the merger that are substantiated and merger-specific are likely to be modest.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
26
hospital systems already have fully-functioning electronic health records systems and engage in
population health management initiatives and value-based payment models.92
There are also many ways that Mountain States and Wellmont could collaborate with
each other to achieve the benefits they claim will result from the merger without actually having
to merge, including, but not limited to, joint ventures and other contractual agreements to
coordinate and standardize clinical healthcare services. Indeed, they already engage in many
such collaborative efforts to improve healthcare services in this region, as identified in their
COPA application.93
The merging parties contend that the COPA will allow them to provide new and
enhanced services that they cannot otherwise provide due to antitrust concerns.94 However, as
the antitrust agencies have consistently made clear, the antitrust laws are not an impediment to
legitimate, procompetitive collaboration that would benefit consumers. Indeed, the FTC has
issued extensive guidance to healthcare providers about ways that they can collaborate without
running afoul of the antitrust laws.95
Another option the parties could consider if they believe they could not independently
achieve these benefits would be to merge or affiliate with alternative hospital systems that raise
fewer antitrust concerns. Wellmont received eight alternative proposals from other hospital
systems, suggesting there may well be viable, less competitively harmful alternatives to the
proposed merger to near-monopoly.96
Mountain States and Wellmont counter that alternative mergers with out-of-market health
systems would result in greater price increases, facility closures, job losses, and other negative
economic consequences as compared to a local merger.97 However, FTC staff is unaware of
evidence supporting this broad statement. Indeed, the only evidence that Mountain States and
Wellmont offer in support of their claim is inapplicable to the circumstances presented here.
They cite an economic study showing that average price increases of 17% may occur when out-
of-market health systems acquire stand-alone independent hospitals, even though they do not
92 See infra Sections IV.B.1.c), IV.B.1.f), and IV.B.5.
93 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 13-14.
94 See id. at 48 (suggesting that collaborative efforts between independent hospital systems cannot be undertaken due
to antitrust concerns).
95 See, e.g., U.S. D EP’T OF J USTICE & FED. T RADE COMM ’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST E NFORCEMENT P OLICY IN
H EALTH C ARE (1996), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/revised-federal-trade-commission-
justice-department-policy-statements-health-care-antritrust/hlth3s.pdf (see specifically Statement 6 regarding
provider participation in exchanges of price and cost information, Statement 7 regarding joint purchasing
arrangements among providers of health care services, and Statement 8 regarding physician network joint ventures);
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare
Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice Oct. 28, 2011),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-10-28/pdf/2011-27944.pdf.
96 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing Wellmont’s strategic alignment options).
97 Pre-Submission Report, supra note 73, at 7-8; Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 48 (stating that an
out-of-market merger “would not come close to achieving the same level of efficiencies, cost-savings and quality
enhancement opportunities” as the COPA between Mountain States and Wellmont).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
27
compete in the same local healthcare market.98 However, both Mountain States and Wellmont
are already large, integrated hospital systems, not stand-alone independent hospitals. Moreover,
this study does not show that acquisitions by out-of-market health systems result in the same or
greater price effects than a merger to near-monopoly in a local healthcare market. To the
contrary, this study suggests that the price effects of mergers between hospitals located within
close proximity of one another are likely to be far more significant than those involving distant
ones.99
Moreover, the merging parties’ claims that an acquisition by an out-of-market system
would result in facility closures, job losses, and other negative economic consequences must be
considered in light of the parties’ limited commitment to maintain their existing facilities post-
merger. For example, they have only committed to continue operating existing facilities for five
years and to maintain three tertiary hospitals and Johnston Memorial for an unspecified period of
time; for most hospitals, they have made no commitment to continue operating hospitals at
current service levels or even as hospitals at all.100 The parties also admit that there will be job
losses and facility consolidation as a result of the merger.101 Mountain States and Wellmont have
not shown that alternative arrangements having less of an anticompetitive effect would result in
more facility closures, job losses, and negative economic consequences.
98 See Responses to Authority Questions, supra note 56, at 000005 (citing Lewis & Pflum 2016, infra note 99) (“At
least one study has shown this type of merger ‘allowed hospitals to increase average prices by around 17 percent,
with some specifications suggesting even larger increases.’”); Nate Morabito, Report: Proposed Merger Will
Increase Healthcare Costs, News Channel 11 (Nov. 16, 2015), http://wjhl.com/2015/11/16/report-proposed-merger-
will-increase-healthcare-costs/ (“MSHA CEO Alan Levine says there is another study that suggests a local merger is
a good thing. The report is titled Hospital Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market
Acquisitions and was completed in part by an economics researcher at Clemson University.”).
99 See, e.g., Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Hospital Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Out-of-
Market Acquisitions, RAND J. E CON. at 18 (Aug. 2016 - forthcoming),
http://www.clemson.edu/economics/faculty/lewis/Research/Lewis_Pflum_hosp_bp.pdf (“When hospitals within two
miles of each other merge, prices increase by roughly 50% more on average than for mergers involving hospitals
more than five miles away.”). There are a few other empirical studies suggesting that large hospital systems may be
able to command higher prices simply by virtue of their size or breadth, regardless of the impact to competition in
local healthcare markets. See Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power
in Managed Care Networks, 7 AM . E CON. J.: ECON. P OL’Y 243 (2015),
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20130009; Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price
Effects of Cross-Market Hospital Mergers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22106.pdf. See also FTC-DOJ Healthcare Workshop 2015, supra note 20 (panel on
“Trends in Provider Consolidation”). However, these studies do not suggest that the Mountain States-Wellmont
merger would not result in a significant price increase, nor do they suggest that a merger between Wellmont (or
Mountain States) and another hospital system would result in as large of a price increase as the proposed merger
between Mountain States and Wellmont. There are two reasons for this. First, to the extent that large systems may
be able to obtain higher prices, a combined Mountain States-Wellmont hospital system would be large enough to
obtain higher prices. Second, and more important, in contrast to the Mountain States-Wellmont merger, none of the
alternative mergers would result in the elimination of such extensive head-to-head competition between hospitals.
As discussed throughout this comment, the loss of this competition is likely to have highly negative effects.
100 See infra Section IV.B.2.
101 See infra note 182 and accompanying text.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
28
In sum, the proposed merger eliminates substantial competition and will likely lead to
significantly higher prices and a reduced incentive to maintain or improve quality and access to
care. Moreover, there are likely to be several alternatives to the merger – remaining independent,
joint ventures and other collaborations, or alternative mergers – that are likely to achieve
comparable benefits identified in the COPA, but without the substantial lessening of competition.
B. 	The Claimed Benefits of the COPA Are Largely Speculative, Achievable
Without the Merger, and Unlikely to Outweigh the Merger’s Likely
Disadvantages
Under Tennessee law, the Department must consider whether the proposed COPA is
likely to generate sufficient public benefits to offset the likely harm to consumers.102 This is
similar to the analysis that courts and antitrust agencies perform when assessing the competitive
impact of mergers.103 As noted above, the Merger Guidelines reflect the combined experience of
the antitrust agencies when assessing mergers. In addition to considering competitive harm, that
assessment includes consideration of the potential benefits resulting from the transaction.
Mountain States and Wellmont claim that the proposed merger is necessary to generate
cost savings and improve the quality and availability of healthcare services in Northeast
Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. They estimate that the merger will eventually generate
approximately $121 million in annual cost savings after the first five years.104 They have also
committed to invest $450 million over a ten-year period in various initiatives that they claim will
improve healthcare in the region.105 Based on FTC staff’s assessment, the claimed benefits of
this merger – even assuming they were realized – would be unlikely to outweigh the
transaction’s substantial adverse impact on competition and consumers. The applicants have not
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the likely benefits would outweigh any
disadvantages, which are likely to be significant.
For cost savings and quality benefits to be recognized as cognizable efficiencies under
the Merger Guidelines, they must be sufficiently substantiated by the merging hospitals so that
courts and antitrust agencies “can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of
each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how
each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be
merger-specific.”106 Rigorous substantiation of efficiency claims is critical because efficiencies
are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the information is in the hands of the
102 See Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(1).
103 See Merger Guidelines § 10; Fed. Trade Comm’n v. ProMedica, No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *57
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (finding that the defendant’s efficiencies claims did not rebut a presumption of
anticompetitive effects); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1088-89 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (recognizing the Merger Guidelines approach for evaluating efficiencies); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ.
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that efficiencies are an important consideration in
predicting whether a transaction would substantially lessen competition).
104 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 81-85.
105 Id. at 3.
106 Merger Guidelines § 10.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
29
merging parties, and because efficiencies may not be realized. Indeed, legal cases indicate that
efficiency claims based on “speculation and promises about post-merger behavior” are not
sufficient.107 Efficiency claims also must be “merger-specific” – meaning they can only be
achieved by this particular merger and not through other means having the same or lesser
anticompetitive effects – a similar requirement to the Tennessee COPA statutory factor discussed
in Section IV.A.5.
Any cost savings and quality benefits that are substantiated and merger-specific must
then be balanced against the likely competitive harm. Under the Merger Guidelines, the greater
the potential anticompetitive effects from a merger, the greater the efficiencies need to be to
outweigh the harm from the merger, and the more they must be passed through to consumers.
Where the proposed merger is likely to result in substantial harm to competition, the Merger
Guidelines require a showing of extraordinary efficiencies to overcome that harm.108 Experience
has shown that “[e]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-monopoly.”109
Mountain States and Wellmont have failed to meet that standard.
First, many of Mountain States and Wellmont’s claimed benefits are not adequately
substantiated, and therefore cannot be verified. The parties present little more than speculative
and aspirational goals and promises about their post-merger behavior, without offering clear
commitments regarding specific benefits to be achieved, how those benefits will be achieved,
and how much it will cost to achieve those benefits.
Second, the proposed commitments to invest in community health are entirely contingent
on the applicants achieving their cost-savings targets.110 Experience and evidence demonstrates
that many hospital mergers fail to achieve their projected efficiencies.111 If the applicants do not
achieve the full $121 million in projected annual cost savings, that puts in doubt whether they
could fulfill all of their commitments and deliver the level of services that they have promised to
107 United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J.
Heinz, 246 F.3d 708, 720-721 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
108 Merger Guidelines § 10. See also ProMedica, 2011 WL 1219281, at *57 (“Efficiencies must be ‘extraordinary’
to overcome high concentration levels”) (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir.
2001)); OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (“‘[h]igh market concentration levels require proof of
extraordinary efficiencies’”) (quoting H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 89).
109 Merger Guidelines § 10.
110 Response by Applicants to Federal Trade Commission Staff Submission on September 30, 2016 and Supporting
Memorandum to the Southwest Virginia Health Authority and Virginia Dep’t of Health Regarding Cooperative
Agreement Application (Oct. 14, 2016), available at
https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/response-to-ftc-comments-submitted-to-swvha.pdf
[hereinafter Applicants’ Response to FTC Comment], at 33 (“The monetary commitments are possible solely based
on savings to be realized from merger efficiencies[.]”).
111 See Noah Smith, Mergers Raise Prices, Not Efficiency, B LOOMBERGV IEW (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-10-24/mergers-raise-prices-not-efficiency; Scott A. Christofferson,
Robert S. McNish, and Diane L. Sias, Where mergers go wrong, 10 MC K INSEY ON F INANCE 1(Winter 2004),
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/corporate_finance/latest_thinking/mckinsey_on_finance/~/media/mckinse
y/dotcom/client_service/corporate%20finance/mof/pdf%20issues/mof_issue_10_winter%2004.ashx (“Most
companies routinely overestimate the value of synergies they can capture from acquisitions.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
30
the community. If that is the case, the Department does not appear to have a mechanism to
remedy the failure to achieve the claimed cost savings or to ensure that the parties make their
committed investments in the event that they do not achieve some of their projected cost savings.
Third, the merging parties have not shown that all of their claimed benefits are both
merger-specific and incremental to the benefits the parties would have achieved without the
merger. Mountain States and Wellmont pledge to use cost savings derived from the merger to
invest $450 million over a 10-year period on quality and healthcare initiatives, including
population health management initiatives, behavioral health services, and academic and research
opportunities.112 However, it is unclear what portion of the $450 million is truly incremental
compared to the current or future investments that Mountain States and Wellmont would have
made independently, absent the merger. Mountain States and Wellmont already make significant
investments in quality and healthcare initiatives,113 and likely would continue to do so without
the merger. Moreover, as discussed below, many of the claimed cost savings, quality benefits,
and healthcare initiatives are not merger-specific because they could be achieved without
incurring the substantial harm to consumers likely to result from the proposed merger.
Fourth, to the extent that there are efficiencies and benefits that are verifiable and merger-
specific, they appear to be modest in magnitude and unlikely to offset the significant
disadvantages of the merger. Furthermore, even assuming they could achieve all of the claimed
cost savings, Mountain States and Wellmont have not specified how much of these anticipated
efficiencies would be passed through to customers in the form of lower prices. The hospital
systems estimate $121 million in annual cost savings (phased in over five years), yet their COPA
application only commits them to reinvesting an average of $45 million annually in quality and
healthcare initiatives in the community. Thus, it is unclear how much, if any, of the remaining
$76 million in purported annual cost savings would be passed through to customers rather than
retained by the hospital systems.
Below, we present FTC staff’s assessment of each potential benefit that the Department
must consider under the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act.
112 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 3.
113 See, e.g., M OUNTAIN S TATES, B UILDING H EALTHY COMMUNITIES: 2014 COMMUNITY REPORT (2014),
https://www.mountainstateshealth.com/sites/default/files/documents/MTN-
150141_050815_2015%20Community%20Report_WEB.pdf; W ELLMONT, REPORT TO O UR COMMUNITIES (FY
2014), http://www.wellmont.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Our_Mission/Community_Benefit/Wellmont-Report-to-
Our-Communities-fy14.pdf.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
31
1. 	The COPA Is Unlikely to Significantly Enhance Quality of Hospital
and Hospital-Related Care
COPA BENEFIT FACTOR A: Enhancement of the quality of hospital and
hospital-related care provided to Tennessee Citizens114
ASSESSMENT: In their COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont argue that
the merger generally would lead to improved quality of care and enhanced clinical coordination
throughout the merged entity.115 Assessing potential quality improvements has long been a
central element of FTC hospital merger investigations because we recognize that a hospital
merger could improve patient health outcomes under certain circumstances. We often analyze
the clinical quality effects likely to occur as a result of consolidation with guidance from leading
academic and policy experts in healthcare quality. We also evaluate how the merger affects the
hospitals’ incentives to deliver higher quality care, and whether changes brought about by the
merger would enable the combined hospitals to provide higher quality care more cheaply or
efficiently than they could achieve individually.
The elimination of substantial competition between merging hospitals tends to weaken a
hospital’s incentives to deliver higher quality care. There exists a substantial empirical literature
that has evaluated the relationship between competition and various measures of hospital quality
of care. The literature does not support the conclusion that hospital consolidation generally
improves clinical quality of healthcare services.116 To the contrary, the literature demonstrates
that the net effect of mergers of competing hospitals on quality is often negative. Thus, the
available evidence provides no reason to presume that any given hospital merger is likely to
improve quality or reduce costs by enough to offset a price increase.
We have evaluated the specific quality claims asserted by Mountain States and
Wellmont. As detailed below, many of the claims Mountain States and Wellmont make about the
likely quality benefits from the merger are unsubstantiated or the benefits are modest in scope.
Most of the remaining claimed quality enhancements can be achieved through less restrictive
alternatives – either by the parties independently, through another form of collaboration between
the parties, or through an alternative merger or affiliation with a different partner that would not
meaningfully reduce competition. In sum, we believe that the information and data in this case
indicate that the net effect on quality from this COPA is likely to be negative.
114 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(2)(A).
115 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 72.
116 See Patrick Romano & David Balan, A Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical Quality Effects of the Acquisition of
Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Hospital, 18 I NT’ L J. E CON. B US. 45 (2011),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13571516.2011.542955; Gaynor, Ho & Town, supra note 11; G AYNOR
& T OWN (Att. C), supra note 11.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
32
a) 	Consolidation of Clinical Services Is Uncertain and Could
Reduce Patient Access
Mountain States and Wellmont claim that the merger will improve patient outcomes
through the consolidation of certain clinical services, including consolidation of the area’s two
Level I Trauma Centers, consolidation of unidentified specialty pediatric services, repurposing of
acute care beds, and consolidation of “certain co-located facilities.”117 The consolidation of
clinical services likely would require considerable effort, money, and time. Mountain States and
Wellmont have not provided this information in their COPA application, so it remains unclear
whether they could successfully consolidate clinical services in such a way as to improve patient
outcomes, or when the merging hospitals expect to realize any purported quality benefits.
Moreover, consolidation could also reduce the availability of, and patient access to, healthcare
services, for example, due to the closure of hospital facilities or a reduction in hospital staff. If
this occurs, then the consolidation of clinical services may be more harmful to patients than
beneficial.
Mountain States and Wellmont have suggested that a post-merger consolidation of
clinical services would increase the volume of trauma procedures performed within a single
hospital system, leading to improved quality outcomes because the higher volumes would allow
hospital staff to better develop their skills.118 The research literature shows that a
“volume/outcome” relationship only exists for certain procedures and services, including trauma
and certain other complex procedures.119 Any benefits from clinical consolidation would be
confined to those services for which there is a demonstrated volume/outcome relationship.
Moreover, for such procedures, consolidation may improve clinical quality outcomes only if it
enables the New Health System to surpass certain volume thresholds that Mountain States and
Wellmont could not meet independently. In their COPA application, Mountain States and
Wellmont rely on an article indicating that the general trauma volume/outcome threshold is
about 650 trauma admissions per facility per year.120 In other words, at a volume/outcome
threshold of 650, quality improves until annual trauma admissions reach 650, but after that point,
there is no meaningful quality improvement with additional trauma admission volume. Assuming
this threshold of 650 trauma admissions is correct, it appears that both Mountain States and
Wellmont already independently meet this 650-admission volume/outcome threshold for trauma
services.121 Notably, the parties did not dispute this claim in their response to the FTC’s
117 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 45.
118 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 44-5.
119 Romano & Balan, supra note 116. There is a distinction between volume/outcome relationships for physicians
and volume/outcome relationships for facilities. Because the parties claim the volume/outcome benefit will occur
from consolidating trauma facilities, the correct focus is on the facilities’ volume/outcome relationship.
120 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 45 (citing Avery B. Nathens et. al., Relationship Between Trauma
Center Volume and Outcomes, 285 J. AM . MED. ASS’N 1164 (2001),
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=193615).
121 See T RAUMA C ARE ADVISORY COUNCIL, T ENN. D EP’T OF H EALTH, T RAUMA C ARE IN T ENNESSEE : A REPORT TO
THE 2010 107 TH G ENERAL ASSEMBLY 16 (2010),
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/2010_Trauma_Care_in_TN_Report.pdf. We included trauma
admissions from the two facilities with Level I trauma centers, Mountain States’s Johnson City Medical Center and

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
33
comment to the Southwest Virginia Health Authority.122 Thus, the planned consolidation of the
Level I trauma centers is unlikely to result in meaningful improvements to clinical outcomes.
Further, even if the merging hospital systems were able to obtain volume/outcome related
improvements in clinical outcomes by consolidating their trauma services, those benefits must be
weighed against any potential disadvantages that could result from the consolidation. If closing
some trauma centers is necessary to consolidate volume at a more limited number of facilities,
the increased travel time to these facilities could have an adverse impact on some patients. For
example, if the merging hospitals were to consolidate their trauma centers into Johnson City
Medical Center, some patients in Tennessee and Virginia would have to travel as much as 25
additional miles to reach the nearest trauma center, thereby delaying care and potentially
increasing the risk of mortality or other complications.123
Because the merging hospital systems have failed to identify in their COPA application
the specific pediatric service lines they are likely to consolidate, we cannot comment on whether
they will likely have a volume/outcome relationship. Other consolidations, such as repurposing
acute care beds and consolidating co-located facilities, are unlikely to have a volume/outcome
relationship. As a result, although this consolidation could result in some cost savings, it is
unlikely to significantly improve quality.
Finally, to consolidate clinical services, the parties must be able to integrate successfully
and this involves achieving sufficient cultural compatibility. But in describing the long-time
competition that exists between Mountain States and Wellmont, Dale Sargent, the Medical
Director of Hospitalist Programs for Wellmont, acknowledged that “Our cultures are
incompatible. We could never bury the hatchet.”124 This raises doubts about whether Mountain
States and Wellmont can adequately reconcile their different cultures and achieve the efficiencies
and benefits that they have projected.
b) 	The COPA Is Unnecessary to Expand Behavioral Health
Services in the Region
In their COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont indicate that behavioral health
problems and substance abuse are prevalent in the region and that “[t]he largest diagnosis related
to regional inpatient admissions is psychoses. . . .”125 Although the parties state that they will
invest in programs and partnerships to help address behavioral health and substance abuse issues
Wellmont’s Holston Valley Medical Center. We excluded 1090 patient admissions to Wellmont’s Bristol Regional
Medical Center, the location of Wellmont’s level II trauma center.
122 See Applicants’ Response to FTC Comment, supra note 110, at 25.
123 See generally Nathan Baker, Health System Merger: Trauma Center Consolidation Hinges On Need, J OHNSON
C ITY P RESS (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.johnsoncitypress.com/Health-Care/2016/02/19/Trauma-center-
consolidation-hinges-on-need (describing the parties’ potential plans to consolidate trauma centers).
124 Sargent, supra note 43.
125 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 7. See also id. at 4, 49-50, 53-4, 86-7, 90-98.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
34
in the region, they do not substantiate their plans. Moreover, the parties’ COPA plans should be
viewed skeptically for two reasons.
First, their COPA plans regarding behavioral health services should be viewed skeptically
in light of their efforts to prevent other providers from offering such services. For example,
Mountain States opposed the Certificate of Need (“CON”) application by Strategic Behavioral
Health (“SBH”) to open a new psychiatric facility in Kingsport, Tennessee.126 Its proposed
facility in Kingsport would add 72 inpatient beds to the region, including ten adult chemical
dependency beds.127 SBH expects the facility to attract additional specialists to the area, who
likely would provide additional outpatient treatment capacity.128 SBH initially filed its CON
application in 2013.129 Despite opposition from Mountain States,130 an administrative law judge
granted the certificate of need on February 8, 2016.131 Mountain States appealed this grant of the
CON to SBH.132 Thus, the merging parties should not be rewarded for proposed plans in their
COPA application to fill a need for services when either (1) Mountain States’s statements in the
CON proceeding cast doubt about the public need for additional inpatient behavioral health
capacity or (2) assuming there is a need, Mountain States actively opposed other providers’
efforts to offer services to fill the public’s health needs.
Second, the merging parties’ plans regarding behavioral health services should be viewed
skeptically because Mountain States and other organizations are already willing to develop new
facilities and provide new services in the area. For example, Mountain States and Frontier Health
126 See Hank Hayes, Proposed Kingsport Hospital Gets State Approval, KINGSPORT T IMES-N EWS (June 23, 2016),
http://www.timesnews.net/Business/2016/06/23/Proposed-new-hospital-gets-state-approval (“Mountain States
Health Alliance (MSHA) opposed the CON and indicated the planned SBH facility would undermine its behavioral
facility, Woodridge Hospital, based in Johnson City.”). SBH operates ten facilities dedicated to behavioral health,
including three facilities in neighboring North Carolina. See Facilities, Strategic Behavioral Health, LLC,
http://www.strategicbh.com/facilities/.
127 SBH-Kingsport, LLC, No. 25.00-126908J, SBH-KINGSPORT 000458, at 000459, ¶¶ 1, 4 (Tenn. Health Servs.
& Dev. Agency, Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/hsda/attachments/SBH-KINGSPORT_000001.pdf
(initial order). The facility planned to become “an integral part of the healthcare delivery system within its service
area by reaching out to community based organizations” and providers of outpatient services. Id. at 000476-77, ¶ 53.
128 Id. at 000477, ¶ 54 (“[SBH] feels that the project will attract additional healthcare professionals, specialized
psychiatrists and other staff to the area.”); id. at 000481, ¶ 64 (“SBH asks its physicians to participate in outpatient
therapy and shares its therapists with the community.”).
129 See Hayes, supra note 126.
130 See Nathan Baker, Kingsport Psychiatric Hospital Headed for State Review; Officials Expect Appeal, J OHNSON
C ITY P RESS (June 19, 2016), http://www.johnsoncitypress.com/Business/2016/06/19/Kingsport-psychiatric-hospital-
headed-for-state-review-officials-expect-appeal.
131 SBH-Kingsport, LLC, supra note 127, SBH-KINGSPORT 000458 (initial order).
132 Despite Mountain States’s appeal, the initial order granting the CON became a final agency decision in June
2016. See Hank Hayes, Proposed Kingsport Hospital Gets State Approval, K INGSPORT T IMES-N EWS (June 23,
2016), http://www.timesnews.net/Business/2016/06/23/Proposed-new-hospital-gets-state-approval (stating that SBH
has received “final approval from the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency (HSDA) to build a 72-
bed hospital facility . . . in Kingsport”); Baker, supra note 130 (indicating that Mountain States had appealed the
judge’s February 2016 decision to grant the CON). Mountain States appealed the agency decision to the Tennessee
chancery court. See Case Summary, Mountain States Health Alliance v. Tennessee Health Services & Development
Agency, No. 16-950-IV (Tenn. Chancery Court, 20th Judicial District, Davidson County, Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.nashvillechanceryinfo.org/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=70555.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
35
are jointly developing a 12-bed adolescent crisis stabilization unit to be located in Gray,
Tennessee.133 Mountain States also has entered into a partnership with East Tennessee State
University to bring a methadone clinic into the region, which will add substance abuse treatment
to the region.134 Thus, it is not clear that the COPA is necessary to provide additional mental
healthcare services in the region.
c) 	Mountain States and Wellmont Have Not Shown That
Consolidating Electronic Health Records Systems and
Creating a New Health Information Exchange Are Necessary
for Sharing Patient Data to Achieve Quality Improvements
In their COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont commit to invest
approximately $150 million over ten years to establish an electronic health record (“EHR”)
system that ensures a common platform and interoperability among its 19 hospitals, employed
physicians, and related services.135 They claim that these efforts “will allow providers in the New
Health System the ability to quickly obtain full access to patient records at the point of care,”136
and that these efforts will “facilitate the increased adoption of best practices and evidence based
medicine,” “provide immediate, system-wide alerts and new protocols to improve quality of
care,” and “reduce the risk of clinical variation and lower the cost of care by decreasing
duplication of health care services.”137 These claimed benefits do not justify approving the
COPA, for several reasons.
With regard to the first category – full access to patient records at the point of care – both
Mountain States and Wellmont already have well-functioning EHR systems that are fully
integrated across their respective hospitals.138 These systems allow complete sharing of patient
133 SBH-Kingsport, LLC, supra note 127, SBH-KINGSPORT 000239 at 000241, ¶ 8 (Jul. 7, 2015) (affidavit of
Teresa M. Kidd, Ph.D).
134 See, e.g., News Channel 11 Staff, MSHA, ETSU Postpone Methadone Clinic Vote “Out of Deference”, WJHL
(July 12, 2016), http://wjhl.com/2016/07/12/msha-and-etsu-postpone-methadone-clinic-vote-out-of-deference (“If
we cannot agree on the location [of the methadone clinic], or if we do not have their public support for their
proposed new location, we plan to move forward with the Gray Commons location.”).
135 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 34-36, 89. Mountain States and Wellmont have proposed
building a comprehensive Epic platform or using a completely new platform for supporting connectivity at the New
Health System. Id. Exhibit 11.1 at 63 (Signed Copy of the Cooperative Agreement).
136 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 36.
137 Id.
138 Wellmont launched its Epic system in 2014. See Hank Hayes, Wellmont Launches Epic Electronic Health Record
System, K INGSPORT T IMES-N EWS (Mar. 20, 2014), http://e-edition.timesnews.net/article/9074700/wellmont-
launches-epic-electronic-health-record-system. Mountain States uses Siemens Soarian in its hospitals and Allscripts
for its practitioners, and these systems are interoperable. See, e.g., Press Release, Allscripts, Mountain States Health
Alliance Selects Allscripts Electronic Health Record and Practice Management for Physicians Across Four-State
Area (Jan. 6, 2010), http://investor.allscripts.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112727&p=irol-
newsArticle_print&ID=1371346. Mountain States has met federal requirements for at least one year of Stage 1
Meaningful Use of its EHR system. See Alan Levine, Mountain States, A Message from Our CEO: Let's Talk
'Meaningful Use', M OUNTAIN STAR (May 26, 2014), http://www.mshanews.org/news/article.aspx?id=1858.
Additionally, Mountain States has been named a “Most Wired” healthcare system by Hospitals and Health Networks
Magazine for several years in a row. “The honor acknowledges a high level of sophistication throughout the system

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
36
records. This is true today, and will remain the case even if the COPA is not approved. The
potential benefit from the COPA is therefore only the incremental benefit of allowing both
Mountain States and Wellmont hospitals to share patient records within a single EHR system.
Mountain States and Wellmont have not demonstrated that this incremental benefit would
be of sufficient magnitude to significantly improve patient health outcomes. Patients who will
only use facilities in one of the current hospital systems (i.e., Mountain States or Wellmont) are
not likely to benefit from the combination of the EHR. Mountain States and Wellmont already
have effective means of sharing information with each other, even with their separate EHR
systems, further limiting the benefits of a common system. Moreover, it is possible that recent
federal legislation regarding EHR interoperability may reduce or obviate the need for a common
EHR platform between the parties.139
With regard to the second category – system-level improvements and cost-savings – the
proposed merger is not necessary to achieve these benefits. Once again, the relevant question is
the size of the increment by which this specific merger will generate these benefits beyond what
would happen without it. Mountain States and Wellmont are already large and sophisticated
hospital systems that are capable of realizing many of these benefits on their own. Moreover, to
the extent that they would be better able to realize these benefits in cooperation with a partner,
each could do so through a merger or affiliation with a partner other than its primary competitor.
Finally, any benefit of a common EHR system would have to be compared to its costs.
Converting to a common EHR system can be extremely expensive and time consuming,140 and
the conversion process can delay access to critical patient information. All told, the time,
difficulties, and expense of converting to a common EHR system may outweigh the potential
benefit.
in creating and using electronic medical records.” Press Release, Mountain States, Mountain States Health Alliance
Again Named a ‘Most Wired’ Health System (July 30, 2014), https://www.mountainstateshealth.com/news/msha-
again-named-most-wired-health-system. See also Press Release, OnePartner, Mountain States Health Alliance
Announces Participation in the OnePartner Health Information Exchange (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.onepartner.com/news/mountain-states-health-alliance-announces-participation-with-onepartner-hie;
Press Release, Mountain States, MSHA Named 2012 Most Wired Health System (Aug. 10, 2012),
https://www.mountainstateshealth.com/news/MSHA-named-2012%20Most%20Wired%20Health%20System.
139 See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA). Our understanding is that MACRA, as
it currently stands, would require widespread exchange of health information through interoperable certified EHR
technology among healthcare providers by the end of 2018. Thus, absent the merger, the parties may already be
required to achieve EHR interoperability by 2018. Although we recognize that the MACRA provisions regarding
interoperability may be subject to future modifications, the current provisions would seem to undermine the parties’
argument that a merger is necessary to achieve a common EHR platform, so that they can exchange health
information.
140 See Akanksha Jayanthi & Ayla Ellison, 8 Hospitals’ Finances Hurt by EHR Costs, B ECKER ’S H OSPITAL CFO
(May 23, 2016), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/8-hospitals-finances-hurt-by-ehr-costs.html;
Akanksha Jayanthi, 8 Epic EHR Implementations with the Biggest Price Tags in 2015, BECKER ’S H EALTH IT & CIO
REVIEW (July 1, 2015), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-technology/8-epic-ehr-
implementations-with-the-biggest-price-tags-in-2015.html.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
37
Mountain States and Wellmont also “commit to participate meaningfully in a health
information exchange [(“HIE”) that is] open to community providers.”141 In addition, they
indicate that their support will enable an HIE to achieve a higher level of function.142 A well-
functioning regional HIE already exists, operated by OnePartner.143 This HIE is able to
“harmonize and normalize the [patient] data to deliver it in a meaningful format, easily viewable
within the provider’s existing workflow.”144 This enables secure access to patient information
across the continuum of care, thereby improving patient health outcomes.145
Local physicians developed the OnePartner HIE,146 demonstrating that the merger is
unnecessary to have a successful regional HIE system. In fact, Mountain States and Wellmont
already participate by providing clinical patient information to OnePartner,147 and executives at
Mountain States and Wellmont recently touted the value of the OnePartner HIE.148 Today,
providers, including Mountain States and Wellmont, have the option of utilizing the OnePartner
HIE to access a significant amount of clinical patient information available on the existing
HIE.149
More importantly, MSHA and Wellmont have not sufficiently articulated any mechanism
by which the COPA would improve the OnePartner HIE, nor have they sufficiently described the
incremental benefit that any new HIE system they might create would have over the current
OnePartner product. Furthermore, the parties have not adequately explained the incremental
benefit of the information accessible on a combined EHR system versus that available on the
current HIE.
141 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 55.
142 Id. at 36.
143 See About OnePartner, OnePartner, http://www.onepartner.com/about; OnePartner HIE, OnePartner,
http://www.onepartner.com/hie; Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, Exhibit 19 (Current
Commitment and Timeframe for Participation of both MSHA and Wellmont in OnePartner).
144 OnePartner HIE, OnePartner, http://www.onepartner.com/hie.
145 See id.; About OnePartner, OnePartner, http://www.onepartner.com/about.
146 See About OnePartner, OnePartner, http://www.onepartner.com/about; Press Release, Performance Clinical Sys.,
Holston Medical Group Partners with Performance Clinical Systems for Care Coordination and Workflow Solutions
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121024006580/en/Holston-Medical-Group-Partners-
Performance-Clinical-Systems.
147 See OnePartner News, OnePartner, http://www.onepartner.com/news (MSHA and Wellmont agreed to
participate in OnePartner HIE in 2014); Press Release, OnePartner, Mountain States Health Alliance and Wellmont
Health System Go Live with OnePartner Health Information Exchange (Aug. 1, 2016),
http://www.onepartner.com/news/go-live-with-onepartner-hie (MSHA and Wellmont began sharing data through
OnePartner HIE in August 2016).
148 See Press Release, OnePartner, supra note 147 (quoting Alan Levine, President and CEO of MSHA, “Ensuring
physicians have all the information they need is very important, and we are pleased OnePartner provides a vehicle
for this effort. We congratulate the OnePartner team for their hard work and diligence in building this model.”)
(quoting Bart Hove, President and CEO of Wellmont, “Wellmont has experienced the benefits of having a common
platform for electronic medical records in our facilities, so we appreciate the value of participating in OnePartner.”).
149 See Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, Exhibit 19 (Current Commitment and Timeframe for
Participation of both MSHA and Wellmont in OnePartner); Responses to Authority Questions, supra note 56, at
000117-18 (Exhibit 22C: Description of Parties’ Use of Health Information Exchange).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
38
In their revised commitments, the applicants indicate that they intend to make access to
the new clinical IT platform “available on reasonable terms to all physicians in the service
area.”150 Additionally, the applicants indicate that they intend to “grant reasonable access to the
data collected in [the New Health System’s] Common Clinical IT Platform to researchers with
credible credentials who have entered Business Associate Agreements for the purpose of
conducting research in partnership with the New Health System.”151 The parties have not shown
that these commitments provide a meaningful benefit to the region over the existing HIE or over
what the applicants could offer absent the merger. Indeed, the parties have shown no reason why
they could not offer access to their clinical IT platforms to physicians and researchers without
the merger, or their reason for not doing so already. To determine whether these commitments
provide a significant benefit, we believe it is important to clearly understand the functionality of
the current HIE, as well as the ability of the individual hospital systems to share clinical
information with physicians and researchers. Moreover, as discussed above, to the extent that
MACRA legislation and regulations will create an imperative for increased interoperability
across EHR systems, the parties’ commitment to offer a new IT platform to all physicians in the
service area may be redundant.152
d) 	Mountain States and Wellmont Have Not Shown Why They
Cannot Pursue Clinical Standardization Without the COPA
Mountain States and Wellmont claim that they are committed to standardizing
management and clinical practice policies and procedures to promote efficiency and higher
standards of care.153 Although standardizing clinical policies and procedures may lead to quality
improvements, the parties can achieve these either on their own, through some collaboration
short of a merger, or through mergers or affiliations with alternative partners that raise fewer
competitive concerns.
A hospital merger may generate overall quality improvements when the merging
hospitals have very different clinical quality levels, and the merger will allow the clinically
inferior hospital to come under the management, and adopt the practices, of the clinically
superior hospital, thereby improving quality at the inferior hospital. Because Mountain States
and Wellmont have similar levels of quality, this potential source of quality improvement is
limited in this case.154 Moreover, if Mountain States and Wellmont want to engage in greater
efforts to coordinate care with one another and improve health outcomes for patients, there are
150 Mountain States and Wellmont, Commitments Chart Submitted to Southwest Virginia Health Authority (Oct. 12,
2016), Commitment No. 19, https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/committments-validated-by-
msha-and-whs.docx [hereinafter Updated Commitments Chart].
151 Id.
152 See supra note 139.
153 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 77-78.
154 For example, Mountain States and Wellmont’s three flagship hospitals have similar Hospital Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (“HCAHPS”) scores. See Medicare Hospital Comparison,
M EDICARE . GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/compare.html#cmprTab=1&cmprID=440017%2C440012%2C440063&
cmprDist=0.7%2C21.4%2C24.2&dist=50&loc=KINGSPORT%2C%20TN&lat=36.548434&lng=-82.5618186.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
39
numerous ways that they could do this. Indeed, despite their claims, Mountain States and
Wellmont already successfully collaborate with each other to improve healthcare services in this
region.155
Mountain States’s and Wellmont’s post-merger plan is to establish a physician-led
clinical council to identify best practices and develop standardized clinical protocols and models
of care. Yet, they provide no compelling reason why they could not convene this council absent
the merger. Providers serving on the council need not be integrated into a single organization, as
evidenced by the fact that the parties plan to include independent, privately practicing
physicians.156 Additionally, the parties already have opportunities to participate in alliances that
allow them to share best practices with other hospitals, including each other, that do not require
the loss of either competition or local control. For example, in 2013, Mountain States joined the
Vanderbilt University Medical Center network, which allows its members to share best practices
and collaborate clinically with a large number of other hospital systems.157
Finally, according to Dr. Kizer, both Mountain States and Wellmont are integrated
delivery systems in their own right; each is well-positioned to standardize clinical practices
among its facilities and providers even if it chose not to cooperate with the other system or
independent providers.
e) 	Mountain States and Wellmont Already Pursue Significant
Academic and Research Opportunities Independently
Mountain States and Wellmont claim that they will invest at least $85 million over the
next ten years (an average of $8.5 million per year) to “develop and grow academic and research
opportunities, support post-graduate healthcare training, and strengthen the pipeline and
preparation of nurses and allied health professionals.”158 They plan to invest funds derived from
merger efficiencies towards this effort. Mountain States and Wellmont claim that this investment
in research and training infrastructure will “enable research-based and academic approaches to
the provision of the services the New Health System intends to invest to improve overall
population health”159 and will attract additional outside investment by the state and federal
155 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 14 (In cooperation with East Tennessee State University, “the
parties have jointly sponsored and funded the region’s most substantial community health improvement assessment
effort to date.”); id. at 13-14 (listing several other examples of collaboration between Mountain States and Wellmont
to improve quality in this region).
156 Id. at 77.
157 See Kevin Castle, Mountain States Health Alliance Announces Affiliation with Vanderbilt University Medical
Center, B RISTOL H ERALD COURIER (May 3, 2013), http://www.heraldcourier.com/news/local/article_b4c48e72-
b3ed-11e2-a6f1-0019bb30f31a.html (“In putting this affiliation together, we have gained all of the advantages of a
large health system but we have not given up any local control.”); Patricia Kirk, Vanderbilt University Medical
Center Forms Nation’s Largest Clinically Integrated Network That Includes Its Own Health Insurance Offering,
D ARK D AILY (June 8, 2013), http://www.darkdaily.com/vanderbilt-university-medical-center-forms-nations-largest-
clinically-integrated-network-that-includes-its-own-health-insurance-offering#axzz43dyuOI1e (describing
collaboration and sharing of best practices).
158 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 3.
159 Id. at 89.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
40
government, as well as grant-making organizations.160 Other than general statements, and a
vague commitment to develop a research plan after the merger is consummated, the hospitals
have not explained how or when they expect to achieve these benefits, how or why they would
be better able to compete for research dollars if the merger were completed, or why they could
not better compete for research dollars with an alternative merger partner.
Furthermore, the parties have not shown that the committed amount is higher than what
the hospital systems would have spent absent the merger. It is important to understand what the
parties would have spent without the merger to establish a baseline and determine whether the
commitments are truly incremental investments.161 Currently, Mountain States and Wellmont
both invest significantly in healthcare education in the region and already partner with East
Tennessee State University (“ETSU”) and most area colleges and universities to provide
residencies, internships, and clinical education for medical, nursing, and pharmacy programs. In
fiscal year 2013, Mountain States and Wellmont reported spending more than $18 million
combined on health professions education, which covers spending on residencies, internships,
and continuing education programs for practicing professionals.162 More specific information on
the parties’ future spending on research and education is necessary to make a direct comparison.
In addition, Mountain States and Wellmont claim that the merger will allow them to
develop an enhanced academic medical center with their academic partners, but they have not
demonstrated how this will be achieved. The merging hospitals already serve as teaching
hospitals in partnership with regional medical and nursing schools, offering residency and
internship programs.163 Mountain States and Wellmont assert that cost savings from the merger
will allow them to fund additional residency slots and attract additional funding, but they have
not provided a clear plan addressing how they will allocate these funds or how many additional
positions they expect to fund.
f) 	The Applicants Have Not Shown That the COPA Is Necessary
to Adopt Value-Based Initiatives
The applicants assert that the merger will give them sufficient scale to enter into value-
based arrangements and risk-based contracts with health insurers. They claim this would enable
them to enhance quality of care and reduce costs within the merged hospital system, as well as
160 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 69.
161 The parties note that their commitment is incremental to current spending but, while that may serve as a
reference point, the relevant comparison is how the commitment to invest in education and research in the future as
a merged entity compares to the investment they would have made in the future independently (or with an
alternative merger partner).
162 See M OUNTAIN S TATES, supra note 113, at 14 ($12 million); W ELLMONT, O NE : F ISCAL 2013 REPORT TO O UR
COMMUNITIES 52 (2013),
http://www.wellmont.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Our_Mission/Community_Benefit/Wellmont-Health-System-
FY13-Community-Benefit-Report.pdf ($6.8 million). Reported benefits are net of Medicare reimbursement.
163 See, e.g., Affiliations, ETSU: Quillen College of Medicine, https://www.etsu.edu/com/surgery/affiliations/
(indicating that Mountain States and Wellmont both have affiliations with East Tennessee State University’s Quillen
College of Medicine).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
41
better manage the care for high-cost, high-utilization patients.164 But the applicants present no
support for their assertion that increased scale will make the New Health System more likely to
engage in or be more successful at value-based contracting, and recent research literature
suggests otherwise.165 In fact, Mountain States and Wellmont already independently engage in
various forms of value-based contracting today, suggesting their current scale and sophistication
likely is sufficient for them to participate in these types of arrangements.166 Furthermore, as
Mountain States and Wellmont have acknowledged, the shift to value-based initiatives is already
occurring among many hospital systems and insurers nationwide, and is mandated by CMS in
some circumstances.167 In keeping with this trend, Mountain States and Wellmont likely would
continue to transition to value-based initiatives independently. To the extent Mountain States and
Wellmont have already transitioned to value-based initiatives and would have continued to
engage in value-based initiatives independently, this cannot be considered a merger-specific
benefit.168
164 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 72-73, 80-81.
165 See, e.g., Anil Kaul, K.R. Prabha & Suman Katragadda, Size Should Matter: Five Ways to Help Healthcare
Systems Realize the Benefits of Scale, P WC S TRATEGY & (2016), http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/size-
should-matter (finding that greater size has not led to lower costs or better quality outcomes for consolidated health
systems); David Muhlestein, Robert Saunders & Mark McClellan, Medical Accountable Care Organization Results
for 2015: The Journey to Better Quality and Lower Costs Continues, H EALTH A FFAIRS B LOG (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/09/09/medicare-accountable-care-organization-results-for-2015-the-journey-to-
better-quality-and-lower-costs-continues/ (“Also consistent with last year, large, consolidated ACOs did not
necessarily achieve the best performance. In fact, we found that the opposite was often true, as smaller, physician-
led ACOs were more likely to improve quality and lower cost enough to earn shared savings. This result is a
cautionary note given the trend toward mergers and consolidations among health systems; consolidation and
larger size do not necessarily lead to the functional integration and efficiency needed to succeed under
alternative payment models.”) (emphasis added).
166 See Responses to Authority Questions, supra note 56, at 000020; Drozdowski (Anthem) Decl. (Att. A) ¶¶ 42-44,
57-59 (Anthem included pay-for-performance measures in both Wellmont and Mountain States contracts); Press
Release, Wellmont, Wellmont, UnitedHealthcare Issue Joint Statement About New Three Year Agreement,
Effective June 18 (undated), http://www.wellmont.org/Patients-And-Visitors/Billing-And-Insurance/Attention-
UnitedHealthcare-Insurance-Customers/ (United included pay-for-performance initiatives in contract with
Wellmont); Press Release, Wellmont, Wellmont Medical Associates Collaborates With Cigna in Initiative That
Advances Quality of Patient Care (undated), https://www.wellmont.org/News/Our-Providers/Wellmont-
Physicians/Wellmont-Medical-Associates/2014/Wellmont-Medical-Associates-Collaborates-With-Cigna-In-
Initiative-That-Advances-Quality-Of-Patient-Care.aspx (Cigna’s contract with Wellmont’s physician practice group
included pay-for-performance measures); Climbing the Mountain: Implementing Innovative Leadership, Population
Health and Disease Management, G ROUP PRACTICE J., July/Aug. 2015, at 11,
http://www.amga.org/wcm/PI/Acclaim/2014/wellmont.pdf (indicating that Wellmont “obtained and succeeded with
risk-based contracting.”).
167 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 80 (“The Affordable Care Act is moving providers away from
the fee-for-service reimbursement system toward a risk-based model that rewards improved patient outcomes and
incentivizes the provision of higher-value care at a lower cost. CMS has stated that its goal is to have 85% of all
Medicare fee-for-service payments tied to quality or value by 2016, thus providing incentive for improved quality
and service.”). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Better, Smarter, Healthier: In Historic
Announcement, HHS Sets Clear Goals and Timeline for Shifting Medicare Reimbursements From Volume to Value
(Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2015pres/01/20150126a.html.
168 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 350-51 (3d Cir. 2016) (suggesting that
the ability to engage in risk-based contracting cannot be considered a cognizable, merger-specific benefit when both
of the merging hospitals are already capable of doing this independently).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
42
In addition, the parties claim that “[m]any of the initiatives to reduce variation and
improve quality will be derived from new contracting practices designed to ensure collaboration
between the New Health System and the payers.”169 It remains unclear exactly how the merger
would affect incentives to enter into value-based and risk-based contracting models. However, it
is possible that the COPA, by increasing the parties’ bargaining leverage, could diminish the
New Health System’s willingness to cooperate with payers’ attempts to lower costs through
value-based and risk-based contracting models, if adopting such an approach would prove less
profitable than traditional fee-for-service models. Thus, the New Health System with substantial
market power may be able to resist certain efforts to negotiate beneficial value-based or risk-
based contracts that make them worse off than fee-for-service contracts because insurers will
have no viable alternatives than to contract with the New Health System.
2. 	Mountain States and Wellmont Offer Only a Limited Commitment to
Preserve Hospital Facilities to Ensure Access to Care
COPA 	BENEFIT 	FACTOR 	B: 	Preservation 	of 	hospital 	facilities 	in
geographical 	proximity 	to 	the 	communities 	traditionally 	served 	by 	those
facilities170
ASSESSMENT: In their COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont offer only a
limited commitment to preserve hospital facilities to ensure access to care. They commit to
maintain their three full-service tertiary referral hospitals in Johnson City, Kingsport, and Bristol,
Tennessee, for unspecified periods of time.171 There is no indication that this commitment is a
benefit, however, because there is no evidence that Mountain States and Wellmont planned to
close any of these hospitals absent the COPA.
Beyond these commitments, Mountain States and Wellmont commit that all other
hospitals “will remain operational as clinical and health care institutions for at least five years,”
but reserve the flexibility to “adjust scope of services or repurpose hospital facilities” during that
time.172 Thus, there is no guarantee that all, or even most, of the parties’ other hospitals,
including those located in Tennessee, will be maintained in their current form. Notably,
Mountain States and Wellmont do not provide details about which facilities would be altered or
closed. Instead, they defer such decisions until after the merger receives approval, referencing an
Alignment Policy that gives no assurances of keeping facilities open and services accessible.173
169 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 78.
170 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(2)(B).
171 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 29.
172 Id. at 43.
173 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 77 (“The Alignment Policy will apply to the consolidation of any
clinical facilities and clinical services where the consolidation results in a discontinuation of a major service line or
facility such that any such discontinuation would render the service unavailable in that community.”); id. Exhibit
11.13 (New Health System Alignment Policy), at 3 (providing a mechanism for hospital management to “establish
an inventory of current facilities and services and request recommendations for where potential overlap exists and/or
synergies could be realized.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
43
Recently, after FTC staff submitted its public comment to the Southwest Virginia Health
Authority, the parties revised their commitments to agree to maintain a limited number of basic
services (e.g., “emergency room stabilization for patients, emergent obstetrical care, primary care
services) at these other hospitals for five years.174 None of these terms (e.g., “primary care
services”) are defined, however, so there is no clear indication of what level of services the
community can actually expect to be maintained. More importantly, the parties do not commit to
keep any other services available to the local community – e.g., non-emergent obstetrical
services, secondary care services, hospital-based outpatient services (other than “outpatient
diagnostics needed to support emergency stabilization”). Further, this commitment only applies
to hospital services. The parties make no commitment to keep open, or maintain the same
services at, their freestanding outpatient facilities. Nor do they commit to maintain any specific
level of physician employment at any of their hospitals or freestanding outpatient facilities.
Mountain States and Wellmont claim that their rural hospitals operate at low or negative
margins, and that without the merger, it would become increasingly difficult to maintain these
facilities and preserve access to healthcare services in rural communities.175 The parties have not
indicated in their application materials, however, that they planned to close any of these hospitals
or eliminate these service lines at the hospitals absent the merger. As such, they have not shown
that the commitments provide a meaningful benefit.
One factor to consider is whether the health systems independently derive any benefits
from having a network of rural hospitals in the outlying communities that surround their tertiary
hospitals, such as increased referrals or efficiencies that may contribute to the profitability of the
overall health system. Thus, while an individual hospital could appear unprofitable – which itself
could be a function of how the healthcare system allocates costs to each system hospital for
accounting purposes – the hospital may, on balance, still be profitable to the system as a whole
and therefore, likely to remain operational even in the absence of the COPA.
Mountain States and Wellmont also cite concerns about low reimbursement rates and
future reductions in reimbursement that may occur as a result of declining admissions and
healthcare reform efforts, and have suggested that they cannot continue to operate independently
in this changing environment.176 However, both of these hospital systems have the financial
resources to continue operating independently,177 and there is no indication that either system
operates at a corporate loss or would qualify as a failing firm. Moreover, any challenges that
Mountain States and Wellmont face in response to the changing delivery and payment landscape
can be addressed in less restrictive ways than the proposed merger, without substantially
reducing competition in this region.
174 See Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 20.
175 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 6, 43, 90.
176 See id. at 1, 34, 43, 80; Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, Exhibit 10 (Benefits and Potential
Disadvantages), at 3.
177 See supra note 38.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
44
Finally, an alternative merger partner could make similar commitments to continue to
operate specific hospitals and to maintain particular services, so these purported benefits have
not been shown to be achievable only through this particular merger. Indeed, acquirers of
hospitals often make commitments to keep open the acquired hospital(s) for a certain number of
years (and to make a significant financial investment in the acquired hospital).178 As such, FTC
staff respectfully submits that the Department should understand if any of the alternative bidders
for Wellmont, or any other alternative merger partner, made or would be willing to make a
similar commitment. Only then can the benefit of this commitment be assessed.
3. 	Purported Gains in the Cost-Efficiency of Services Provided by
Mountain States and Wellmont Are Unsubstantiated, Not Merger-
Specific, and Insufficient to Overcome the Likely Competitive Harm
COPA BENEFIT FACTOR C: Gains in the cost-efficiency of services provided
by the hospitals involved179
ASSESSMENT: Mountain States and Wellmont claim that the merger will generate
approximately $121 million in annual cost savings through consolidation of clinical services,
reductions in labor expenses, and reductions in purchasing and other non-labor expenses, but
they provide little detail about these claims in their COPA application.180 For example, they do
not adequately explain how they plan to achieve these savings, the steps they plan to take, and
the costs to achieve them. Without this information, the likelihood and magnitude of their cost-
savings claims cannot be verified. In addition, many of their claimed savings appear to be
achievable without the merger. Thus, the purported gains in cost-savings are likely overstated
and would not clearly and convincingly outweigh the substantial loss in competition.
a) 	The Benefits of Clinical Consolidation Are Speculative and
Must Be Weighed Against Reduced Patient Access
Mountain States and Wellmont claim that they will be able to achieve approximately $26
million in annual cost savings through the consolidation of certain clinical services, such as
178 See, e.g., State of Rhode Island Department of Attorney General, Decision in Re: Expedited Review Hospital
Conversion Initial Application of Yale-New Haven Health Services Corporation, Lawrence + Memorial Corporation
and LMW Healthcare, Inc. d/b/a Westerly Hospital (Sept. 1, 2016), at 4, available at
http://www.riag.ri.gov/documents/LMYNHFinal.pdf (Yale-New Haven Health Services Corporation committed $44
million to support clinical programs and physician recruitment and an additional $300 million over a period of five
years, with $215 million of the commitment being generated by Lawrence + Memorial affiliates.); M ODERN
H EALTHCARE , Regional News/South: Catholic Health Initiatives buys six hospital health system in Houston, and
other news (Apr. 27, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130427/MAGAZINE/304279960 (The
definitive agreement included a $1 billion investment and a commitment to spend an additional $1 billion to help the
community’s underserved.); Detroit Medical Center, A New Partnership For Detroit (Dec. 10, 2010),
https://www.dmc.org/NewPartnership (Vanguard committed to keep all hospitals open for at least ten years and to
invest approximately $350 million for routine improvements and $500 million for capital spending in the first five
years.).
179 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(2)(C).
180 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 81-84.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
45
trauma and specialty pediatric services.181 Importantly, Mountain States and Wellmont have not
provided sufficient details on these consolidation plans, and they have not provided the analysis
necessary to determine whether they could successfully consolidate these clinical services or the
magnitude of the investments that may be required to achieve them. Even if Mountain States and
Wellmont were able to reduce their costs by eliminating competing clinical services, that is not
an unqualified benefit. Those cost savings may be derived from a reduction in staff or closure of
facilities, thereby reducing patient access to healthcare services and forcing some patients to
travel further to receive care or wait longer for appointments, which may reduce quality of care
and patient satisfaction. Indeed, contrary to statements of Mountain States and Wellmont that the
merger is the best way to preserve local jobs and hospital facilities, they acknowledge that some
jobs, facilities, and services will have to be eliminated or consolidated in order to achieve their
projected cost savings.182 Any detrimental impact that this consolidation would have on the
quality of patient care should receive appropriate consideration.
b) 	Other Claimed Savings Are Unsubstantiated and May Be
Achievable Without the Merger
Mountain States and Wellmont estimate that the merger will enable them to save
approximately $70 million annually on purchasing and other non-labor expenses and
approximately $25 million annually on labor expenses. We recognize that mergers have the
potential to achieve cost savings by eliminating duplicative corporate and administrative staff or
through purchasing synergies, and we consider this as part of our analysis. Here, however, the
merging hospitals have not provided sufficient detail to evaluate the credibility, magnitude, and
merger-specificity of their claims. For example, Mountain States and Wellmont have not
identified the specific steps necessary to achieve these savings, the expenditures involved, and
how any potential cost savings will be passed through to consumers, and they have not provided
a sufficient breakdown of the estimated annual cost savings for each subcategory of labor and
non-labor efficiencies in their COPA application.
Furthermore, some portion of these claimed cost savings may be achievable by the
systems independently or through an alternative merger. Purchasing synergies and reductions in
corporate overhead from eliminating duplicative administrative services often do not require
geographic proximity and are categories of efficiencies that could be achieved through a merger
or affiliation with an out-of-market health system. Indeed, Mountain States and Wellmont have
indicated that they would seek a deal with an out-of-market health system if the proposed merger
does not proceed as planned.183 Many hospital systems have also achieved synergies through the
use of group purchasing agreements.
181 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 84.
182 See id. at 59 (“As a result of the Cooperative Agreement, some positions will be eliminated.”); id. at 45 (“Other
cost-saving and efficiency opportunities include consolidation of specialty pediatric services, repurposing acute care
beds and consolidation of certain co-located facilities.”).
183 See Luanne Rife, Insurers Say Hospital Merger in Far Southwest Virginia Would Drive Up Costs, ROANOKE
T IMES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.roanoke.com/...nd_blogs/blogs/med_beat/insurers-say-hospital-merger-in-far-

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
46
Finally, it is possible that some of the claimed savings may not even be achievable. For
example, the hospital systems list “physician clinical preference items” as an area where their
purchasing needs are similar,184 yet they have not provided information to evaluate the extent to
which the physicians at each system are currently standardized or purchasing the same items.
This savings claim may require physicians to change their preferences for the type of equipment
or supplies they use, and Mountain States and Wellmont have not explained how they plan to
ensure uniformity. Such standardization can be difficult to achieve because physicians have
strong preferences and often resist change. Moreover, such standardization may incur training
costs and could result in a shift to higher cost or lower quality equipment.
4. 	The Merger is Unlikely to Significantly Improve Utilization of
Hospital Resources and Equipment or Avoid Duplicative Hospital
Resources in a Manner That Benefits Patients
COPA BENEFIT FACTORS D and E: Improvements in the utilization of
hospital 	resources 	and 	equipment; 	Avoidance 	of 	duplication 	of 	hospital
resources185
ASSESSMENT: Mountain States and Wellmont characterize the competition that exists
between them as leading to “expensive, unnecessary duplicative healthcare resources that are
allocated inefficiently” and assert that the proposed merger will allow them to eliminate this
duplication “to capture large cost savings and realign resources to improve access and
quality.”186 At the outset, we note that Tennessee is a certificate of need state, meaning that
Mountain States and Wellmont have made various investments only after demonstrating to the
Tennessee Department of Health that there was a “public need” for those investments. Moreover,
as large, sophisticated healthcare systems, Mountain States and Wellmont presumably have
made careful medical and business judgments about how to utilize precious tax-exempt resources
to best serve the community’s needs, and have not made unnecessary expenditures. In any case,
Mountain States and Wellmont have yet to identify the specific expenditures that they believe to
have been wasteful or duplicative. Mountain States and Wellmont also fail to articulate any
significant capital avoidance claims in their COPA application.
In addition, economic research indicates that hospital competition leads to lower costs,
more effective resource utilization, and improved patient health outcomes, as compared to highly
concentrated markets with less competition.187 As previously discussed, competition between
southwest-virginia-would-drive/article_e0a94a73-72ad-5995-9be3-7c2a4d54ae51.html (“Executives of both health
systems have said they would seek out-of-market partners if the merger fails.”).
184 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 82.
185 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(2)(D)-(E).
186 Pre-Submission Report, supra note 73, at 7; Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 5-6.
187 See Dan P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?, 115 Q. J. E CON. 577
(2000), http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/115/2/577.full.pdf+html (finding that hospital competition
unambiguously improves social welfare: competition leads to substantially lower costs and lower levels of resource
use, as well as lower rates of adverse patient health outcomes); Martin Gaynor, Rodrigo Moreno-Serra & Carol

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
47
Mountain States and Wellmont has led to investments that have improved patient care and access
to healthcare services. Indeed, the Chairman of Wellmont’s Board of Directors denied the
premise that competition between Mountain States and Wellmont has been counterproductive,
and instead stated that it has produced high-quality healthcare in the region.188 Thus, to the
extent that competition between Mountain States and Wellmont results in facility expansions and
new equipment purchases that improve access and quality, competition is good for consumers,
not wasteful. Eliminating this competition could lead to a less productive allocation of resources
and thereby deny consumers these benefits. For example, although new equipment can be costly,
the quality benefits associated with technology advances may justify these expenditures.189
Investments in facilities, technology, and equipment can result in shorter wait times, more
convenient service options for physicians and patients, and the continued availability of services
when a piece of equipment fails, all of which are far from wasteful, but quite beneficial. In
contrast, to the extent that the combined system’s future plans include the consolidation of
clinical services, including reduced facility and equipment investments, this could result in
reduced patient choice and access to healthcare services.
5. 	Mountain States and Wellmont Have Not Shown That the COPA is
Necessary for Population Health Improvement of the Region
COPA BENEFIT FACTOR F: Demonstration of population health improvement
of the region served according to criteria set forth in the agreement and approved
by the department190
ASSESSMENT: In their COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont claim that
they will create an integrated delivery system designed to enhance community health through
population health improvement initiatives.191 However, it is unclear why this consolidation is
necessary to achieve these goals. Mountain States and Wellmont already independently invest in
population health initiatives. Additionally, both parties note that the causes of poor health in the
region are varied and that no single organization can reverse these trends.192 Moreover, the
parties admit that the “commitments made by the New Health System alone will not solve the
Propper, Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service, 5 AM .
E CON. J.: E CON. P OL’ Y 134 (2013), https://www.aeaweb.org/atypon.php?doi=10.1257/pol.5.4.134 (finding that
hospital competition leads to improved quality and resource utilization).
188 Nathan Baker, Wellmont Leaders Look to Leave Limelight to Mull Merger Options, J OHNSON C ITY P RESS (Oct.
17, 2014), http://www.johnsoncitypress.com/frontpage/2014/10/17/Wellmont-leaders-look-to-leave-limelight-to-
mull-merger-options.html (describing Chairman Roger Leonard’s reaction to statements suggesting that competition
between Mountain States and Wellmont has been unhealthy).
189 See David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological Change in Medicine Worth It?, 20 H EALTH A FFAIRS
11 (Sept. 2001), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/20/5/11.full.pdf+html (“When costs and benefits are
weighed together, technological advances have proved to be worth far more than their costs.”).
190 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303(e)(2)(F).
191 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 7. See also Pre-Submission Report, supra note 73, at 9-14.
192 See Responses to Authority Questions, supra note 56, at 000072; Pre-Submission Report, supra note 73, at 11
(“All of these efforts recognize that income, education, family and community support, personal choices, genetics
and the environment are key drivers of individual and community health and well-being. As the 2014 Tennessee
Health Plan states, ‘We know that healthcare alone cannot make major improvements in population health.’”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
48
complex problems contributing to the poor health of the region.”193 Thus, the relevant question is
whether they will be more likely to participate in such initiatives, or participate more effectively,
with this merger than they would without it. There is no evidence that this is the case.
Mountain States and Wellmont have committed to developing a population health
improvement process and community health improvement plan in conjunction with the public
health resources at ETSU. They state that they would invest at least $75 million over ten years
towards various initiatives as determined by this action plan.194 However, the parties have
provided limited information about the specifics of their plans and state they will not identify the
specifics of this plan until after they consummate the merger. As a result, these claims cannot be
verified with the limited information Mountain States and Wellmont have provided. Moreover,
where the parties provide information about how they will improve population health in the
region,195 many of the initiatives (such as increasing third-grade reading level) are not in the
applicants’ control, and cannot be fully assessed or credited as much more than aspirational.
Additionally, as identified in the COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont have
already engaged in numerous population health initiatives that benefit the region without the
need for a merger. For example, Mountain States already operates drop-by health resource
centers that support chronic disease management, and Wellmont operates mobile health buses
that offer immunizations, cardiovascular screenings, cancer screenings, and physical
examinations.196 Both organizations also independently operate nurse call centers that enable
wellness coaching and disease management programs.197 Mountain States, Wellmont, and ETSU
have already organized four Community Health Work Groups to identify area needs, and those
groups started work in the fall of 2015.198 ETSU already spearheads this effort with a goal of
creating a ten-year action plan for the region.199 Thus, it appears that the region can continue to
benefit from these initiatives without incurring the disadvantages associated with a merger to
near-monopoly. Furthermore, Mountain States and Wellmont overstate the extent to which
antitrust laws prevent them from pursuing population health initiatives in the absence of the
merger.
Mountain States and Wellmont also assert that the merger would allow them to improve
access to high quality healthcare in underserved rural areas through enhanced telemedicine
capabilities, which they claim would help them achieve their population health goals.200
193 Responses to Authority Questions, supra note 56, at 000074. See also Tennessee COPA Application, supra note
2, at 49 (admitting that “ultimately, individual and community health and well-being are not primarily driven by
health care services”).
194 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 4; Pre-Submission Report, supra note 73, at 13; see generally
Better Together, Wellmont & Mountain States, http://becomingbettertogether.org.
195 See Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, Exhibit 21 (Template Community Health Improvement
Plan).
196 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 87.
197 See id. at 88.
198 See id. at 50-51.
199 See id. at 51.
200 See id. at 87-88.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
49
However, it does not appear that the merger is necessary to accomplish this goal, as both hospital
systems have independently pursued telemedicine initiatives in recent years.201 Furthermore, the
technology needed for these initiatives is relatively inexpensive and commonly used by many
providers; therefore, Mountain States and Wellmont should be capable of implementing them
independently.
In another effort to improve population health, the merging hospitals indicate they will
commit $27 million over ten years to develop pediatric specialty centers and pediatric emergency
rooms in Kingsport and Bristol, and will add rotating pediatric specialty clinics in rural
hospitals.202 However, Mountain States and Wellmont already offer pediatric programs.
Wellmont provides extensive pediatric services, including a partnership with East Tennessee
Children’s Hospital in Knoxville that brings regional sub-specialists directly into the Tri-
Cities.203 It is unclear whether this partnership will continue if the proposed merger is allowed to
proceed. In addition, Wellmont’s Holston Valley Regional Medical Center in Kingsport
currently offers pediatric emergency services, along with a Level III neonatology center.204
Wellmont also offers pediatric services at two of its rural hospitals in Virginia – Mountain View
Regional Medical Center in Norton and Lonesome Pine Hospital in Big Stone Gap.205 Mountain
States provides pediatric sub-specialty services at its Niswonger Children’s Hospital in Johnson
City, Tennessee, and all Mountain States facilities, including its rural hospitals, have access to
pediatric specialists through its telemedicine program.206 Given that Mountain States and
Wellmont already offer these pediatric services and are capable of enhancing them
independently, the merger may not be necessary to achieve these purported quality
improvements to population health.
201 See, e.g., Press Release, Mountain States, Collaboration with Vanderbilt Bringing Teleneurology Services to Two
Mountain States Hospitals (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.mountainstateshealth.com/news/teleneurology-
collaboration (Mountain States already employs telemedicine in rural areas to give patients access to specialty care
and to connect with Vanderbilt University neurologists); Mountain States, Mountain States Looks to the Future with
Use of Telehealth, M OUNTAIN STAR (June 9, 2015), http://www.mshanews.org/news/article.aspx?id=2245
(“‘Mountain States is very committed to implementing telehealth solutions whenever and wherever it makes
sense’”); Stroke Care, Wellmont, http://www.wellmont.org/Medical-Services/Stroke-Care/Stroke-Care/ (Wellmont
utilizes neurology telemedicine tools for stroke diagnosis and evaluation); Mac McLean, Governor Signs Bill
Requiring Insurance Companies to Cover Long-Distance Doctor Visits, N EWS & ADVANCE (Apr. 6, 2010),
http://www.newsadvance.com/lifestyles/governor-signs-bill-requiring-insurance-companies-to-cover-long-
distance/article_e592cf04-b504-50e9-9069-0653cf142fd1.html (Wellmont is expanding its use of telemedicine to
improve patient outcomes at Bristol Regional Medical Center’s stroke clinic and Holston Valley Medical Center’s
cardiology program); Mac Mclean, Wellmont Launches New Telemedicine Program, B RISTOL H ERALD COURIER
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.heraldcourier.com/news/wellmont-launches-new-telemedicine-
program/article_f2b91ddb-8d2b-51ad-9d9d-4ca8b1208414.html (In 2011, Wellmont received a nearly $500,000
grant to launch a telemedicine program for patients in rural areas with chronic diseases).
202 See Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, at 12; id. Exhibit 10, at 19; id. Exhibit 20, at 1.
203 See Children, Wellmont, http://www.wellmont.org/Our-Services/Children/.
204 See id.
205See Mountain View Regional Medical Center, Wellmont, http://www.wellmont.org/Our-Facilities/Hospitals-And-
Medical-Centers/Mountain-View-Regional-Medical-Center/; Lonesome Pine Hospital, Wellmont,
http://www.wellmont.org/Our-Facilities/Hospitals-And-Medical-Centers/Lonesome-Pine-Hospital/.
206 See Mountain States, Mountain States Looks to the Future with Use of Telehealth, supra note 201.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
50
6. 	The COPA is Unnecessary to Ensure Access to Medically
Underserved Populations
COPA BENEFIT FACTOR G: The extent to which medically underserved
populations have access to and are projected to utilize the proposed services207
The applicants claim that the COPA will allow them to “improve access to medically
underserved populations through charitable care programs as well as continue to offer programs
and services that are now unprofitable and risk curtailment or elimination due to lack of
funding.”208 They commit to taking the following steps to benefit the medically underserved:
• 	Lower the income limit from 200% to 225% of the Federal Poverty Level for charity care
that provides 100% discount;
• 	Design a case management model to manage “super-utilizers” of health care resources;
• 	Partner with Federally Qualified Health Centers (“FQHCs”) to expand access to care; and
• 	Encourage uninsured individuals to seek insurance in the federal health marketplaces.209
However, the applicants do not discuss why these benefits could not be achieved by the
parties individually, with an alternative merger partner, or why they need the merger to
accomplish them. In fact, the parties have already partnered with ETSU to create working groups
that focus on the underserved.210 Additionally, both applicants can partner with existing FQHCs
now if they so choose. The parties even claim there are already “many effective charity care
clinics and programs already operating in the region, and [they] believe[] that partnering with or
supporting these established programs will be the best use of community resources.”211 It is not
clear why the parties need this merger to partner with existing community-based clinics. Finally,
the merger is not needed to encourage uninsured individuals to seek insurance in the federal
health marketplaces.
In sum, assessing the COPA under the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act factors, we
conclude that the COPA is likely to result in serious disadvantages resulting from the loss of
competition, while any benefits are likely to be modest and largely achievable by other means
that are less restrictive to competition. In the following sections, we assess whether entry by a
new competitor or the applicants’ proposed commitments could mitigate the significant
disadvantages of the COPA.
207 Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act § 68-11-1303 (e)(2)(G).
208 Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, Exhibit 10 at 16.
209 Id. at 15-18.
210 Id. at 18-19.
211 Id. at 18.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
51
V. 	Entry Would Not Be Timely, Likely, or Sufficient to Overcome the Likelihood of
Substantial Harm to Competition
Under the Merger Guidelines framework, the FTC considers whether entry by a new
competitor would be timely, likely, and sufficient to alleviate the harm to competition caused by
a merger.212 Although this is not a factor under the Tennessee Hospital Cooperation Act or
regulations, FTC staff believes that such entry – if it would be timely, likely, and sufficient –
could offset or reduce concerns from the elimination of competition between Mountain States
and Wellmont.
The evidence shows, however, that new entry would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to
offset the competitive harm of the proposed merger. Construction and operation of new acute
care hospitals involve significant capital investment and take many years from the initial
planning stage to opening. The Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia region is unlikely to
attract investment in new hospitals because there are already 19 Mountain States and Wellmont
hospitals in the 21-county area with sufficient capacity to handle existing health needs.
Moreover, because the merger combines two large hospital systems, entry by a single hospital –
or even a few hospitals – would not be sufficient to replicate the current scope and strength of
competition between Mountain States and Wellmont. Of course, the time, cost, and challenges of
building multiple new hospitals would be significantly greater than building a single hospital.
Furthermore, both Tennessee and Virginia have certificate of need (“CON”) regulations
that pose an additional barrier to entry.213 Both the Tennessee and Virginia CON statutes
regulate hospital entry, the addition of acute care hospital beds, and expansion of services at
existing hospitals.214 In fact, two of Wellmont’s recent CON applications to expand its presence
in Johnson City, Tennessee, were denied following opposition by Mountain States,215
212 Merger Guidelines § 9.
213 See Tennessee Health Services and Planning Act of 2002, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-11-1607,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/tncode/; Virginia Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need Rules and
Regulations, 12VAC5-220,
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/OLC/Laws/documents/2011/pdfs/COPN%20regs%202011.pdf. FTC staff is aware that
Virginia is considering repealing its CON laws, which have been in place since 1993, and have submitted public
comments on this issue. See Comment from Fed. Trade Comm’n & Antitrust Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to the
Virginia Certificate of Public Need Work Group (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/joint-statement-federal-trade-commission-
antitrust-division-u.s.department-justice-virginia-certificate-public-need-work-group/151026ftc-dojstmtva_copn-
1.pdf. Even if changes to these laws encouraged future entry or expansion by other firms in this geographic region,
any such entry is unlikely to occur in the near future or be on a sufficient scale to replace the competition eliminated
by the COPA.
214 Tennessee Health Services and Planning Act of 2002, T ENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1607; Virginia Medical Care
Facilities Certificate of Public Need Law, V A. CODE ANN. §32.1-102.1 et seq.
215 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 13; Wellmont Health Sys. v. Tenn. Health Facilities Comm’n,
No. M2002-03074-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 193074 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2004),
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1056005/wellmont-health-system-v-tennessee-health-facilities-commission/?
(denying Wellmont’s application to build a new hospital in Johnson City, Tennessee); Mac McLean, Wellmont
Denied Certificate to Build Boones Creek, Tenn. Facility, BRISTOL H ERALD COURIER (Mar. 26, 2008),
http://www.heraldcourier.com/news/welmont-denied-certificate-to-build-boones-creek-tenn-

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
52
demonstrating how CON regulations can be a barrier to expansion. Going forward, a combined
Mountain States-Wellmont system would have every incentive to oppose potential entrants’
CON applications, making entry even less likely.
In short, it is unlikely that any firm could overcome the entry barriers necessary to build a
new acute care hospital in the area, much less a new hospital system, in the foreseeable future.
Indeed, our investigation reveals no such plans for new entry by acute care hospitals.
VI. 	Proposed Commitments Will Not Mitigate the Harm Resulting From Loss of
Competition
In an effort to address the significant antitrust concerns with the merger, Mountain States
and Wellmont have proposed commitments that they claim would limit the prices the New
Health System could charge, as well as control other aspects of the New Health System’s
contracting behavior and delivery of services.216 Such commitments are often referred to as
“conduct remedies” because they attempt to ameliorate the harm to competition and consumers
resulting from a merger by imposing restrictions on the merged entity’s conduct.217 Among the
commitments being considered are rate regulation, mechanisms for sharing cost savings and
efficiencies with local residents, public reporting of quality metrics, and commitments regarding
certain contractual provisions between the hospitals and commercial health insurers. Mountain
States and Wellmont assert that these restrictions on their post-merger conduct would shield
consumers from the anticompetitive effects of the merger.218 However, these conduct remedies
are not adequate substitutes for actual competition and are unlikely to be successful in protecting
consumers from higher prices and reduced quality.
facility/article_99316bb6-9e46-59bf-8e3c-6be08930bbb5.html (“The Tennessee Health Services and Development
Agency rejected an application for a certificate of need Wellmont required to built[sic] the proposed $43 million
Boones Creek emergency facility.”); Preston Ayres, Long Road to MSHA-Wellmont Merger, WCYB (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.wcyb.com/news/long-road-to-msha-wellmont-merger/32138724. See also supra notes 126-132 and
accompanying text (describing Mountain States’s opposition to a CON application submitted by SBH-Kingsport for
a new behavioral health facility).
216 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 2 (“Without the State Agreements, the proposed consolidation
of Wellmont and Mountain States would likely be challenged under state and federal antitrust laws.”). See also
Comment from Wellmont & Mountain States to Tenn. Dep’t of Health 7 (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/WHS_MSHA-COPA_Written_Comments.pdf
(acknowledging the “significant antitrust concerns that exist in this particular merger”).
217 In contrast to conduct remedies, “structural remedies,” which include divestitures and injunctions preventing
mergers, restore or maintain competition at the pre-merger level, thereby remedying the source of the
anticompetitive harm – the elimination of competition between the merging hospitals. Under a conduct remedy,
competition at the pre-merger level is not maintained. Designing a conduct remedy that would counteract the effects
of an anticompetitive merger is nearly impossible because the source of the harm is not prevented.
218 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 56 (“The Parties do not foresee any adverse impacts on
population health, quality, access, availability or cost of health care to patients and/or payers as a result of the
Cooperative Agreement. The projects and commitments identified in this Application will clearly improve health
care in the region.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
53
It is doubtful that the COPA commitments can drive meaningful cost savings and quality
improvements with as much force as the current competitive environment. Conduct remedies
that purport to restrain price increases, like those proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont,
are unlikely to replicate the pricing that would have prevailed absent the merger because such a
remedy cannot replace the competitive conditions that otherwise would have existed. A price cap
or price growth cap cannot simulate the nuanced, iterative responses that competitors make in
response to each other during the negotiation process.219 In addition, a conduct remedy designed
to mitigate one type of harm may inadvertently create another type of harm as an unintended
consequence. For example, a conduct remedy limiting price increases may result in the
unintended reduction in quality of care.
Conduct remedies designed to prevent price increases have several serious
deficiencies. First, they are typically temporary. After the conduct remedy expires, the less
competitive market structure remains, but any constraint imposed by the remedy will be
eliminated, and prices are likely to increase as a result.220 Second, designing and enforcing price
restrictions is a complicated and highly resource-intensive endeavor, in part because such
restrictions would need to constrain prices for all current and future services provided by the
merged entity during the relevant timeframe, and account for different (or changes in)
reimbursement methodologies.221 In the healthcare industry, in particular, where prices, quality,
and costs are difficult to measure, these kinds of regulatory mechanisms often do not achieve
their intended purpose, no matter how well-intentioned.222
219 See Commonwealth v. Partners Healthcare Sys., No. SUCV2014–02033–BLS2, at 42 (Sup. Ct. of Mass. Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2015/partners-memo-of-decision-and-order.pdf (“A conduct remedy,
which typically involves regulation of specific conduct over a limited period of time, is more difficult to craft and
easier to circumvent. It also does not directly address the problem, which is a loss of competition: indeed, it permits
consolidation and then attempts to limit the consequences that flow from that by imposing certain restrictions on the
defendant's behavior. . . . [C]onduct remedies ‘seek to thwart the natural incentives of the merged entity to behave as
a single firm’ and thus require constant and costly monitoring.”).
220 See id. at 3 (stating that the temporary conduct remedies would be “like putting a band-aid on a gaping wound
that will only continue to bleed (perhaps even more profusely) once the band-aid is taken off.”).
221 The purpose of imposing a conduct remedy is to constrain the exercise of market power following the merger.
The constraint would not be effective if market power could be exercised by increasing the price of bundles of
services containing a mix of constrained and unconstrained services.
222 See Letter from 21 Health Care Economists to The Honorable Janet L. Sanders in the Matter of Commonwealth
of Massachusetts v. Partners Healthcare Sys. (July 21, 2014) (Attachment F) [hereinafter Partners Economist Letter
(Att. F)]; Gregory S. Vistnes, An Economic Analysis of the Certificate of Public Advantage (COPA) Agreement
Between the State of North Carolina and Mission Health 11 (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.mountainx.com/files/copareport.pdf [hereinafter Vistnes COPA Analysis] (“Economists have long
recognized the difficulties of regulating monopolists and how regulation, no matter how carefully crafted and
implemented, can inadvertently create undesirable incentive problems.”); Cory S. Capps, Revisiting the Certificate
of Public Advantage Agreement Between the State of North Carolina and Mission Health System 32 (May 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Capps COPA Analysis] (“Economists generally agree that, with rare exceptions, competition produces
better outcomes than regulation.”); Comment from Amerigroup Corp. to the Tenn. Dep’t of Health 4 (Sept. 21,
2015), https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/Amerigroup-COPA_Written_Comments.pdf
(“regardless of the obligations and restrictions placed on recipients of a COPA, regulations are never an effective
substitute for competition”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
54
Even assuming that price restrictions could effectively replicate pricing that would
prevail were the parties to continue to compete, the proposed merger between Mountain States
and Wellmont would still likely cause a reduction in the incentives to improve or maintain
quality. Economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that adverse quality effects of mergers
are particularly likely in markets where prices are regulated.223 For example, studies of the
United Kingdom healthcare market, where rate regulation has long been the norm, demonstrate
that highly concentrated provider markets have worse patient health outcomes than competitive
provider markets.224 This evidence is relevant because the proposed price commitments are
tantamount to price regulation. Thus, if the COPA is approved and rates become regulated in the
highly concentrated provider market in the 21-county area, there will be a serious risk of reduced
quality of healthcare services.
Designing a conduct remedy to mitigate the harms of lost quality competition would be
extremely difficult and resource intensive. Any meaningful remedy would need to both establish
an explicit quantitative measure of the level of quality that competition would have produced and
require the merged entity to produce at least that level of quality. This is nearly impossible, for
several reasons. While objective quality measures exist for specific inpatient hospital services
(and may be incorporated into commercial insurance contracts), these measures are not
comprehensive and are difficult to establish; moreover, it would be even more difficult to
establish those measures for non-inpatient services (e.g., outpatient services) because those
quality measures are generally much less developed.
It would be equally challenging to design a compliance mechanism to ensure that the
New Health System achieved defined quality targets. Due to the complexities of assessing
quality, no mechanism exists to impose a conduct remedy sufficient to offset a loss of quality
competition. It is difficult to envision how a supervisor of the COPA would be able to effectively
force the New Health System to achieve a particular quality metric. Indeed, the parties’
application specifies no penalty for failure to meet quality objectives, short of terminating the
entire COPA. Even if it were possible to establish a lesser penalty for failure to perform, the New
Health System still may be less likely to reach the quality levels that Mountain States and
Wellmont would have achieved independently in a competitive environment.
The federal antitrust agencies have long contended that conduct remedies are inadequate
for addressing competitive harms that result from horizontal mergers. Instead, we strongly prefer
“structural remedies,” which seek to restore pre-merger competitive conditions through an
injunction preventing consummation of a merger or a divestiture of assets.225 Courts generally
223 See, e.g., Gaynor, Ho & Town, supra note 11.
224 See, e.g., Gaynor, Moreno-Serra & Propper, supra note 187.
225 See ANTITRUST D IV., U.S. D EP’ T OF J USTICE , ANTITRUST D IVISION P OLICY G UIDE TO M ERGER REMEDIES (2011),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf; Feinstein, supra note 5. See also Fed. Trade Comm’n,
Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment: In the Matter of Phoebe
Putney Health System, Inc., et al., Docket No. 9348, at 1 (Aug. 22, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/08/130822phoebeputneyanal.pdf (“The Commission
has declined to seek price cap or other nonstructural relief, as such remedies are typically insufficient to replicate

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
55
agree with this position.226 For example, a Massachusetts court recently rejected a consent
agreement that would have allowed multiple hospital systems to merge, provided they agreed to
certain conduct remedies. The court found that the proposed conduct remedies – which included
price caps, component contracting, a prohibition on joint contracting, and physician and network
growth restrictions – would have done little to restore the lost competition or to address the
anticompetitive harms.227 Furthermore, the court expressed serious concerns about its ability to
enforce the conduct remedies, which would have required substantial technical expertise and
resources to resolve complicated issues relating to healthcare pricing during a time in which
healthcare contracting practices were changing enormously.228 While every geographic area has
unique aspects, these challenges would apply equally in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest
Virginia.
In addition to being unable to replicate the lost competition resulting from the merger,
rate regulation and other conduct remedies are challenging and costly to implement, and require
constant supervision to ensure compliance. Adding to this complexity, hospitals subject to
conduct remedies often have strong financial incentives to circumvent the required regulatory
commitments.229 All of these factors would strain the state’s ability to determine whether the
public policy goals of the COPA are being met and to hold the New Health System accountable.
pre-merger competition, often involve monitoring costs, are unlikely to address significant harms from lost quality
competition, and may even dampen incentives to maintain and improve healthcare quality.”).
226 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-31 (1961) (Supreme Court held that
structural remedies to preserve competition are the preferred form of relief for mergers that violate Section 7 of the
Clayton Act because they are “simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure.”).
227 See Partners Healthcare Sys., supra note 219, at 2. Indeed, several prominent health economists urged the
Massachusetts court not to accept the consent agreement, arguing that it would not offset the consumer harm likely
to result from the acquisitions. Responding to arguments offered by Partners that the mergers would yield economic
and operational efficiencies, as well as quality improvements, that would help to slow the growth rate of healthcare
expenditures and benefit consumers, the economists stated that “systematic evidence from hundreds of hospital
mergers around the nation provides little empirical support for these assertions.” Partners Economist Letter (Att. F),
supra note 222, at 2.
228 See Partners Healthcare Sys., supra note 219, at 19 (stating that the methodology for regulating prices “remains
a mystery” to the court, and expressing concerns that any monitor would be able to handle the complex task of
administering the price caps) (“Even with some expertise in the field, the monitor will have to take into account
complex contractual arrangements between Partners and the major payers, each of which have their own unique
features and tradeoffs. The prices at issue are not for a homogenous good or a single product but for a complex set of
services which can be bundled and redefined from one year to the next.”).
229 See id. at 42 (“A conduct remedy, which typically involves regulation of specific conduct over a limited period of
time, is more difficult to craft and easier to circumvent. It also does not directly address the problem, which is a loss
of competition: indeed, it permits consolidation and then attempts to limit the consequences that flow from that by
imposing certain restrictions on the defendant's behavior. . . . [C]onduct remedies ‘seek to thwart the natural
incentives of the merged entity to behave as a single firm’ and thus require constant and costly monitoring.”); id. at
32 (“Particularly where the product or transaction is complex and enforcement of the remedies is over a long period
of time, there are many opportunities for the entity, in pursuit of its own self-interest, to ‘crowd’ the border of stated
rules and create ways to evade them.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
56
A. 	Price Commitments Proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont Will Be
Difficult to Administer and Unlikely to Address Consumer Harms
After FTC staff submitted its public comment on the parties’ cooperative agreement
application to the Southwest Virginia Health Authority, the parties revised their proposed price
commitments.230 First, they revised the definition of “Principal Payers” to partially address a gap
pointed out by FTC staff regarding the exclusion of government payers with negotiated contract
rates.231 According to the parties’ most recent description of the commitments, it appears that,
for Principal Payers, the New Health System would not adjust negotiated hospital rates by more
than the hospital Consumer Price Index (“CPI”) minus 0.25%, or negotiated rates for physician
and non-hospital outpatient services by more than the medical care CPI minus 0.25%.232 This
price growth cap commitment would purportedly become effective on the closing date of the
merger.233 The parties also commit to “reduce existing commercial contracting for fixed rate
increases by 50% for the second full fiscal year commencing after the closing date” of the
merger for Principal Payers.234 Mountain States and Wellmont claim that the reduction in price
increases resulting from these commitments will benefit insurers in the form of a lower cost
trend, and that the associated cost savings will be passed through to consumers.235 Despite the
parties’ claims and these revisions, the proposed price commitments are still unlikely to protect
consumers from the anticompetitive price increases that likely will result from the lost
competition between Mountain States and Wellmont. Additionally, the proposed price
commitments may only apply to a small portion of the New Health System’s contracts.236
Even with the recent revisions, the price commitment language included in the parties’
COPA application is ambiguous, appears to still have gaps, and is subject to interpretation.
Consequently, the timing and scope of the price commitments remain unclear, which would give
the New Health System wide discretion when calculating complex price and benchmark metrics.
230 See Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitments Nos. 1 and 2; Commitments Chart with
Redlines to Initial Commitments, Commitments Nos. 1 and 2,
https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/list-of-commitments-10-12-16-compared-with-
swvha_commitments-chart_final-10-12-16.pdf.
231 In their revised commitments, the parties define “Principal Payer” as “those commercial payers and governmental
payers with negotiated rates who provide more than two percent (2%) of the New Health System’s total net
revenue.” Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 1 n.1.
232 See Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 2. See also Applicants’ Response to FTC
Comment, supra note 110, at 15. In the parties’ initial COPA application, it appeared as though this price growth
cap would not take effect until a full year after the closing date of the merger, which may have resulted in artificially
high baseline rates. See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 72.
233 See Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 2; Applicants’ Response to FTC Comment,
supra note 110, at 15.
234 Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 1. See also Applicants’ Response to FTC
Comment, supra note 110, at 15 (committing to reduce “any inflator increase for Principal Payers by 50% in the first
contract year following the first fiscal year after the formation of the New Health System”).
235 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 71.
236 See Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, at 6 (“Less than six percent of Mountain States’ current
insurance contracts have fixed rate increases as written. Sixteen percent of Wellmont’s current insurance contracts
have fixed rate increases as written.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
57
For example, it appears that the New Health System would continue to have wide discretion to
renegotiate the price growth cap formula or use alternative methods for calculating rate increases
after the COPA has been approved.237 All of this leaves open the potential for these metrics and
formulas to be manipulated, especially because the New Health System would control the
underlying data, such that the intent of the price commitment may appear to be achieved when,
in fact, it is not.238 For these and other reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to foresee all of
the ways that these price commitments could fall short of their intended purpose, be
circumvented, or result in unintended consequences.
Several specific, practical issues arise from the price commitments proposed by Mountain
States and Wellmont, including:
• 	Inappropriate to Use Consumer Price Index as Benchmark for Future Price Increases: The
use of the hospital and medical care CPIs as benchmarks is intended to allow prices to
increase commensurate with costs, where the benchmarks serve as proxies for costs.
However, these benchmarks do not take into account differences in cost structures, case
mix, or service offerings between the merging hospitals and the other hospitals that make
up the benchmark. Thus, CPI benchmarks could overstate cost changes in Tennessee and
Virginia if, for example, costs in these states were to grow slower than the national
average. In addition, the medical care CPI is calculated based on a basket of goods and
services that includes expenditures for medical devices and drugs as well as provider
services.239 Thus, using the medical care CPI could overstate price (and cost) growth of
physician services if the rate of growth in drug prices, for example, exceeds that of
physician prices. If either of these scenarios were to occur, relying on the proposed price
growth cap in combination with the hospital and medical care CPIs as benchmarks may
allow the New Health System’s prices to rise by more than its costs.
• 	Timing for Implementation of Pricing Commitments: It is still not clear when the pricing
commitments take effect. Although the Applicants’ Response to FTC Comment says that
the 50% rate reduction commitment will take effect in the “first contract year following
the first fiscal year after the formation of the New Health System” and that the rate cap
237 See Responses to Department Questions, supra note 57, at 7 (“For comparison with the relevant index, new
contract provisions governing specified annual rate increases or set rates of change or formulas based on annual
inflation indices may also be used as an alternative to calculated changes.”).
238 This concern has been raised in other cases involving price commitments proposed by hospitals. See Partners
Healthcare Sys., supra note 219, at 2 (“Significantly, the monitor must rely on [the hospital system] for the critical
information to make these calculations – so that the fox is literally guarding the proverbial chicken coop.”). See also
supra note 228; RANDALL R. B OVBJERG & R OBERT A. B ERENSON, U RBAN I NSTITUTE , CERTIFICATES OF P UBLIC
ADVANTAGE : C AN T HEY ADDRESS P ROVIDER M ARKET P OWER? 22 (2015),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000111-Certificates-of-Public-Advantage.pdf,
[hereinafter U RBAN I NSTITUTE COPA REPORT] (describing the challenges of obtaining “objective information not
controlled by the supplier of data” and how “[c]ontrol over data could allow a regulatee to cherry pick its public
documentation and possibly even metrics of oversight”).
239 Measuring Price Change for Medical Care in the CPI, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpifact4.htm (last updated Apr. 12, 2010).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
58
commitment will take effect immediately upon consummation,240 other statements create
ambiguity about the timing for these commitments. The applicants’ revised commitments
chart states that rates will be reduced “by 50% for the second full fiscal year commencing
after the closing date of the New Health System.”241 The “Timing” section of the same
chart says the 50% rate reduction commitment will take effect the “[f]irst full fiscal year
following the first contract year after the formation of the New Health System.”242 For
the rate cap commitment, the “Timing” section says it will take effect in “[s]ubsequent
contract years.”243 As such, the timing for the commitments is not clear.
• 	Price Growth Cap Unlikely to Reduce Prices Borne by Insurers and Consumers:
Mountain States and Wellmont suggest that the price growth cap commitment will reduce
the prices borne by patients, employers, and insurers.244 However, the price-capping
formula proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont may actually function as a price
floor, guaranteeing price levels that would be higher than they might otherwise be in a
competitive market. Absent the merger, prices could have decreased in the future, or
increased at a slower rate, due to vigorous competition between Mountain States and
Wellmont. Under the COPA, the two systems will no longer serve as competitive
constraints on each other, and there will be nothing to prevent the New Health System
from negotiating for the maximum rate increases allowable per the pricing commitments.
Because insurers will have few alternative providers to contract with to serve local
residents, insurers will be forced to pay that maximum rate. Although this commitment
may guarantee the insurers a rate no higher than the cap, it also effectively guarantees a
rate no lower than the cap. For these reasons, FTC staff believes it is unlikely that the
price growth cap will reduce prices borne by insurers and consumers.
• 	Price Commitments Leave Many Patients Unprotected: The revised price commitments
only apply to patients enrolled in health plans operated by commercial payers and
government payers with negotiated rates who provide more than 2% of the New Health
System’s total net revenue.245 The price commitments do not limit how much the New
Health System can increases prices to payers who represent 2% or less of New Health
System’s total net revenue. Thus, the price commitments likely still leaves some patients
in the region unprotected against potentially significant price increases.
240 Applicants’ Response to FTC Comment, supra note 110, at 15 (emphasis added).
241 Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 1 (emphasis added).
242 Id.
243 Id. at Commitment No. 2 (emphasis added).
244 See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 85.
245 Id. at 72. In the parties’ initial COPA application, the price commitments did not apply to Medicaid managed
care, TRICARE, Medicare Advantage, or any other governmental plans offered by payers where prices are
negotiated. See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 72. The applicants have since expanded the scope of
their price commitments so that they would apply to governmental payers with negotiated rates. See Updated
Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 1 n.1 (defining “Principal Payer”); Applicants’ Response to
FTC Comment, supra note 110, at 16.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
59
• 	Price Commitments Do Not Apply to Evolving Delivery and Payment Models: The
proposed price commitments attempt to limit the New Health System’s ability to raise
prices under the applicants’ existing fixed-rate contracts. But the commitments do not
appear to prevent price increases if the New Health System’s contracts with payers are
structured as value-based contracts or risk-based contracts. As delivery and payment
models for healthcare services continue to evolve, we question how the proposed price
commitments would be applicable in particular to new value-based contracting models,
which do not rely on fee-for-service reimbursement rates.246 The terms of these value-
based contracts are negotiated, however, so if the price caps do not apply to these
contracts the New Health System could exercise its enhanced bargaining leverage to
demand significantly higher prices. Competitive environments naturally allow for
healthcare providers to adjust their output and quality in response to changes in
reimbursement structures. Regulatory environments, such as what is being proposed by
this COPA, do not allow for such adjustments.
• 	Estimated Annual Savings Are Questionable: Another issue to consider is the parties’
estimated $10 million in annual savings to consumers that they claim would result from
the price commitments.247 It is unclear to FTC staff how the parties calculated this figure,
particularly if they are relying on payers to pass along any savings to consumers.
Significantly, the parties state that this estimate is “nonbinding.”248
• 	Department Would Lack Control Over Ultimate Prices: There does not appear to be a
way for the Department to oppose or rectify rate increases that exceed the price growth
cap (short of ending the COPA and ordering a separation of the New Health System,
which has its own disadvantages, as discussed below). Although the COPA calls for
mediation between the New Health System and Principal Payers if they are unable to
reach agreement on a negotiated rate, it is unclear what happens if the mediation is
unsuccessful in resolving the dispute.
B. 	Proposed Accountability and Enforcement Mechanisms for Quality Benefits
Are Insufficient
The mechanisms proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont for evaluating the quality
benefits of the COPA do not appear sufficient or meaningful. The parties claim to offer an
“Index of Public Advantage and Community Health Improvement” as an accountability
mechanism to track compliance with their commitments under the COPA.249 Yet, most of the
246 Rates based on different types of reimbursement models are not directly comparable because they depend on
different definitions of a “unit of service.” For example, risk-based contracts rates that involve per-member-per-
month payments are not comparable to contract rates that involve fixed payments for particular diagnoses. In such
an environment, where there is no uniform definition of what constitutes a reimbursable unit of service, prices are
particularly challenging and resource-intensive to measure.
247 See Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment Nos. 1 and 2 (“Amount” section).
248 Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, Commitment No. 1 n.3.
249 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 91-92.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
60
Index factors appear to be qualitative and vague, consisting of little more than some yet to be
identified tracking measures and an annual report to the Department in which the parties will
attest to any progress they are making towards compliance.250
Measuring healthcare quality can be quite difficult and the method proposed by the
parties does not address those challenges. The parties’ proposed assessment does not constitute
objective, quantitative quality of care benchmarks by which the claimed benefits can be
evaluated, much less weighed against the disadvantages likely to result from the COPA.251
Moreover, in the event that there is a problem with the information submitted in the annual
report, adjustments could only be made every five years while the COPA remains in effect.252 It
is unclear how the Tennessee Department of Health could objectively determine whether the
hospital attestations regarding quality benefits are accurate, and thus whether the New Health
System is complying with the requirements of the COPA.
Likewise, the “Overall Achievement Score” parameters described in the COPA
application appear insufficient to facilitate an assessment of compliance, and the formula
proposed for evaluating evidence of “Continuing Public Advantage” does not appear to require a
sufficient magnitude of benefits to offset the significant disadvantages likely to occur as a result
of this merger.253 Indeed, this formula appears to allow almost any outcome to be considered
evidence of continuing benefit (i.e., that the benefits of the COPA are demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence to outweigh any disadvantages attributable to any reduction in
competition).254 Critically, the COPA appears to contain no enforcement mechanism if the New
Health System fails to meet its quality commitments, other than revoking the COPA and
unwinding the merger.
In Virginia, the parties proposed a different scoring system, which they claim is a
modification of the Overall Achievement Score initially proposed in their
application.255 According to the parties, the new scoring system addresses “criticism regarding
the relative weights of the commitments and the necessary performance threshold.”256 This new
250 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 95, 105.
251 Id. at 95, 105-118 (describing the proposed measures contained in the Index).
252 Id. at 104.
253 Id. at 110, 115-16 (describing the “Overall Achievement Score” parameters and the formula for determining
“Continuing Public Advantage”).
254 According to the formula in the COPA application, an Overall Achievement Score of 70% or higher would be
definitive evidence of Continuing Public Advantage, but an Overall Achievement Score that is below 50% may still
be considered definitive evidence of a Continuing Public Advantage, depending on the circumstances. Furthermore,
the Tennessee Department of Health Commissioner would have discretion to determine that there is Continuing
Public Advantage, even if the Overall Achievement Score falls anywhere below these thresholds. See id. at 115-16.
255 Mountain States and Wellmont, Proposed Achievement Scoring Mechanism Submitted to Southwest Virginia
Health Authority, https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/scoring-proposal-swva_final.pdf
[hereinafter Proposed Achievement Scoring Mechanism], at 1.
256 Mountain States and Wellmont, Response by Applicants to Submissions of Anthem Health Plans of Virginia,
Inc., Virginia Association of Health Plans, and America’s Health Insurance Plans and Supporting Memorandum to
the Southwest Virginia Health Authority Regarding Cooperative Agreement Application,

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
61
scoring system, however, still contains no enforcement mechanism other than revocation of the
COPA. Under the parties’ proposed scoring system, if the parties are unable to fulfill their
commitments, the Commissioner may “compel immediate resolution” or “require a corrective
action plan to ensure compliance.”257 However, the parties have yet to articulate a process to
ensure compliance with their commitments. Moreover, if Tennessee finds that the New Health
System has failed to meet its quality commitments and decides to dissolve the COPA but
Virginia reaches a different conclusion, it is not clear what would happen in that circumstance,
including whether Tennessee could unwind the merger in both Tennessee and Virginia.
C. 	Proposal to Enhance Transparency for Quality Measures Will Be of Limited
Value to Consumers in the Absence of Provider Competition
In their COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont affirm the importance of
transparency for healthcare quality measures to provide consumers with the information they
need to make better healthcare decisions.258 Generally, if consumers have access to meaningful
price and quality information regarding the various healthcare providers in their local area, they
can make better choices when selecting providers.259 To achieve greater transparency, Mountain
States and Wellmont have committed to publicly report CMS core quality measures on the New
Health System’s website within 30 days of reporting the data to CMS.260 They have also agreed
to provide benchmarking data against the most recently available CMS data in a faster manner
than they currently do to allow the public to compare the merging hospitals to other hospitals.261
However, nothing prevents either hospital system from taking these steps now while they remain
independent. More importantly, while this greater transparency might be useful to patients, it
does not address the root of the problem with the COPA, which is the loss of competition
between Mountain States and Wellmont.
Finally, whatever benefit might be realized from increased transparency would offer
limited value to consumers after the merger because they will have no meaningful alternatives to
the New Health System. The proposed merger will eliminate the only real choice that patients in
this area currently have. Thus, improving transparency for quality measures after the merger to
near-monopoly will not enable consumers to evaluate competing hospital systems and select the
most suitable providers for their needs.
https://swvahealthauthority.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/response-to-anthem-ahip-and-vahp-comments-submitted-
to-swvha.pdf, at 9.
257 Proposed Achievement Scoring Mechanism, supra note 255, at 1.
258 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 37.
259 See FTC Healthcare Workshop 2014, supra note 20 (panels on “Measuring and Assessing Quality of Health
Care,” “Price Transparency of Health Care Services,” and “Interplay Between Quality and Price Transparency”).
260 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 38.
261 Id.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
62
D. 	Commitments Regarding Contractual Provisions Do Not Mitigate Merger
Harms
In their COPA application, Mountain States and Wellmont have committed not to engage
in “most favored nation” pricing with any health plans, and they have agreed not to become the
exclusive network provider to any commercial, Medicare Advantage, or managed Medicaid
insurer.262 Furthermore, they have committed not to engage in exclusive contracting for
physician services (except for certain hospital-based physicians) and not to prohibit independent
physicians from participating in health plans and networks of their choice.263
The antitrust agencies have noted that, depending on the circumstances, some of these
contracting practices can be anticompetitive when imposed by a dominant hospital system.264
However, these practices are not the primary source of harm from this merger – lost competition
is the source of the harm – and prohibiting these practices will therefore not solve the problem.
In addition, prohibiting most of these practices would not be meaningful in a market where
competition among the most significant healthcare providers has been eliminated.265
E. 	COPA Protections May Expire in Ten Years
The applicants provided updated commitments to the Southwest Virginia Health
Authority stating that those commitments are intended to remain in place for ten years,266 after
which they provide for a review of the cooperative agreement in Virginia.267 If an amended or
262 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, at 28.
263 See id. at 28-29.
264 See, e.g., Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in
the Medicare Shared Savings Program, supra note 95, at 67029-30, Section IV.B.1.b. (identifying several
contracting practices that may raise competitive concerns if imposed by a provider with high market shares or other
possible indicia of market power, including: “[p]reventing or discouraging private payers from directing or
incentivizing patients to choose certain providers . . . through ‘anti-steering,’ ‘anti-tiering,’ ‘guaranteed inclusion,’
‘most-favored-nation,’ or similar contractual clauses or provisions”; “[t]ying sales (either explicitly or implicitly
through pricing policies) of [some of the provider’s] services to the private payer’s purchase of other services from
[other] providers”; “contracting on an exclusive basis”; and “[r]estricting a private payer’s ability to make available
to its health plan enrollees cost, quality, efficiency, and performance information to aid enrollees in evaluating and
selecting providers in the health plan”).
265 For example, payers may attempt to control costs by steering patients to high-quality, low-cost providers or
making price and quality information more transparent to patients. However, such strategies are unlikely to be
successful in markets that lack sufficient competition among providers. Thus, if a COPA results in substantial
provider consolidation, imposing prohibitions on contractual provisions that would undermine these strategies would
be meaningless. Indeed, Mountain States and Wellmont imply as much in their COPA application, when they
reserve the right to enter into exclusive network and most-favored nation agreements for non-inpatient services in
the event of repeal or material modification to the CON law in Tennessee or the certificate of public need law in
Virginia, which could ease entry barriers for potential competitors. See Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2,
at 48.
266 See Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, at Provision A (Revision of Commitments –
Recommendations by the Authority to the Commissioner).
267 See Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, at Provision B (Ten-Year Review of Cooperative Agreement –
Recommendations by the Authority to the Commissioner).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
63
extended cooperative agreement cannot be reached with the New Health System, however, the
updated commitments state that the Commonwealth of Virginia should withdraw its support for
the cooperative agreement.268 Therefore, in Virginia, if the New Health System refuses to extend
or amend the cooperative agreement—which appears to be in its sole discretion—the only
recourse Virginia would appear to have are either to (1) let the New Health System remain a
near-monopolist, unconstrained by any meaningful competition or state regulation of potentially
anticompetitive conduct, or (2) try to effectuate a plan of separation (the challenges of which we
address below). If the Tennessee COPA agreement were to include such a weak provision,
results could be similar in Tennessee.269 Indeed, as we discuss in Section VII below, we have
significant concerns about the difficulty and feasibility of separating a hospital system several
years after integration.
VII. 	Proposed Plan of Separation Would Not Be An Effective Remedy
The Tennessee COPA Rules require that the merging hospitals submit a Plan of
Separation describing how they would unwind the merger if deemed necessary by the
Department.270 In other words, if the Department determines that the underlying public policy
goals of the COPA are not being achieved, the Plan of Separation is intended to be a mechanism
for the Department to terminate the COPA and restore pre-merger competition. Hence, it is
important to seriously consider how the termination provisions might play out in practice and
what options the Department would have if the COPA is approved and the Mountain States and
Wellmont systems are integrated.
As discussed below, even with an aspirational Plan of Separation in place, it would be
unrealistic to expect that terminating a COPA following a merger’s consummation would return
the hospital systems to their pre-merger status and, therefore, fully restore the lost competition. A
transaction of this scale and scope, as evidenced by Mountain States and Wellmont’s stated
plans, would involve a significant degree of integration. For example, the combined entity would
be likely to: consolidate or close hospitals; consolidate and transfer service lines; reorganize
physician and other staffing at hospitals (with some physicians potentially leaving the area);
negotiate new, consolidated contracts with health insurers; integrate EHR and other IT systems;
integrate accounting and other financial systems; eliminate management and other staff;
consolidate administrative services and vendors; and change many aspects of daily operations at
these hospitals. These changes likely would alter patient travel patterns and facility preferences,
as well. Reversing all of this integration and these changes through a Plan of Separation would
be highly disruptive at best, and quite likely impossible.
268 Updated Commitments Chart, supra note 150, at Provision B.
269 If Tennessee tried to implement the Plan of Separation, we do not know whether it would be able to unwind the
entire transaction, including the New Health System’s hospitals and assets located in Virginia.
270 Tennessee COPA Rules, 1200-3801-.02.17 (“The Department shall require a Plan of Separation be submitted
with the Application. The Plan of Separation shall be updated annually by the parties to the Cooperative Agreement.
The parties shall provide an independent opinion from a qualified organization verifying the Plan of Separation can
be operationally implemented without undue disruption to essential health services provided by the parties”). See
also id. 1200-38-01-.01.14 (Definition of “Plan of Separation”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
64
For that reason, antitrust agencies typically seek to prevent or remedy problematic
mergers before they are consummated because it is inherently challenging, and rarely feasible, to
“unscramble the eggs” and unwind the assets of companies after they have been integrated.271
Historically, the FTC has faced difficulties in obtaining effective remedial relief after assets have
been combined through a merger, including hospital and other healthcare provider mergers.
Indeed, even in certain cases where the FTC has proven that such a merger was anticompetitive
and resulted in higher prices without offsetting quality improvements or enhanced patient
experience, the FTC has been unable to obtain a viable divestiture remedy for these harms.272
Similarly, if the proposed COPA between Mountain States and Wellmont is approved, and they
merge their operations, the remedies available if the merger does not yield its promised benefits
would be severely limited, despite having a Plan of Separation. Indeed, given the scale of the
merged system, separating Mountain States and Wellmont would likely be vastly more difficult
than any consummated healthcare provider merger that the FTC has ever sought to unwind.
Notably, Mountain States and Wellmont opposed efforts by the Department and
Virginia’s Department of Health to include a Plan of Separation provision in their respective
regulations.273 They stated that the feasibility of any Plan of Separation would depend on the
circumstances at the time of implementation and “that a plan as implemented may differ
significantly from the proposed plan.”274 This raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of
such a remedy. In addition, and contrary to assertions made by hospital executives that they
would be subject to antitrust scrutiny if a Plan of Separation were ever put into effect,275 there
can be no guarantee that the merger would be unwound by any federal or state antitrust
enforcement.
271 See Feinstein, supra note 5. See generally Comment from FTC Staff to John J. Dreyzehner, Tenn. Dep’t of
Health 3-4 (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/903943/151222ftcltrtennesseedoh.pdf (describing
how the FTC typically seeks to remedy problematic mergers before they are consummated, as it becomes difficult to
obtain effective remedial relief after assets have been integrated).
272 See, e.g., Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, at 89-91 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Apr. 28, 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/04/080428commopiniononremedy.pdf (Opinion of the
Commission on Remedy); Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 159 F.T.C. 1246, 1246-1247 (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/634181/150331phoebeputneycommstmt.pdf
(Statement of the Federal Trade Commission) (Commission unable to unwind merger of two hospitals merging to a
monopoly because of state certificate of need laws and regulations).
273 See Comment from Wellmont & Mountain States to Tenn. Dep’t of Health, supra note 216; Va. State Bd. of
Health, Minutes 19 (Sept. 17, 2015),
http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/Administration/Meetings/documents/pdf/Minutes%20September%2017%202015%20fi
nal.pdf (stating that the parties “requested that provisions requiring a Plan of Separation to be included with the
application for a cooperative agreement . . . be stricken” from the Virginia Cooperative Agreement Regulations).
274 See Comment from Wellmont & Mountain States to Tenn. Dep’t of Health, supra note 216, at 2.
275 See Hank Hayes, Will the Feds Stand in the Way?, K INGSPORT T IMES-N EWS (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.timesnews.net/Business/2016/01/11/Will-the-feds-stand-in-the-way (quoting Alan Levine, President and
CEO of Mountain States, “If the COPA is violated, we would have to submit a plan for separation, and that would
also subject us to FTC scrutiny at that point.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
65
The Plan of Separation, as described in the COPA application, is not an actual plan, but
rather a process by which a plan may be developed and implemented after the merger is allowed
to proceed. It contains numerous caveats and limitations that could undermine the effectiveness
of any such plan in restoring pre-consolidation market competition, including:
• 	Plan of Separation Does Not Guarantee a Structural Remedy: Mountain States and
Wellmont appear to focus on a potential divestiture of assets and operations to address
harms, but acknowledge that any plan developed post-merger would have to be viewed
through the lens of “then-current market circumstances” and could only restore
competitive conditions to the pre-consolidated state “to the extent reasonably
practicable.” It appears as though the New Health System also could avoid specified plan
components if changed circumstances in the market “would likely negate the
effectiveness of said components in restoring competition to its pre-consolidation
state.”276 Thus, Mountain States and Wellmont basically admit that the consolidated
assets may no longer be separable, or even exist, in the event that a Plan of Separation
must be implemented. We further note that the establishment of “a separate and
independent apparatus for payer contracting by the new competitive entity” is unlikely to
be an effective remedy.277
• 	Plan of Separation Does Not Guarantee Restoration of Pre-Consolidation Market
Competition: Based on the language in the COPA application, it is possible that the
geographic areas subject to any termination order may be smaller than the entire service
area of the New Health System.278 If that were the case and the New Health System were
only required to divest certain facilities and assets, the level of competition that currently
exists between two large hospital systems may not be fully restored. Similarly, the Plan
of Separation states that the “administrative, operational and clinical quality of all assets
and operations” would only have to be maintained at the level that exists at the time of
the termination order, which does not guarantee that competition would be restored to its
pre-consolidated state.279
• 	Plan of Separation Does Not Guarantee Timeline for Restoring Pre-Consolidation Market
Competition: The 240-day timeline for executing a plan could be waived if “the Parties
and the Commissioner agree it is not feasible” to meet it.280 This raises doubts about
when such a plan would have to be executed. Based on recent FTC experience, it can take
276 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, Exhibit 15.1 at 2 (Plan of Separation between Wellmont Health
System and Mountain States Health Alliance).
277 Id. at 3. For a discussion of why this is not likely to be an effective remedy, see Brief Amicus Curiae of
Economics Professors, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/10/071017econprofsamicusbrief.pdf.
278 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, Exhibit 15.1 at 1 (“The Consultant shall assist the Parties in
complying with the termination order to analyze competitive conditions in the markets subject to the
Commissioner’s termination order and identifying the specific steps necessary to return the markets to their pre-
consolidation competitive state.”) (emphasis added).
279 Id. at 3.
280 Id. at 2.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
66
a year or more to effect divestitures, even when there has not been significant facility,
clinical, and other integration between the parties.281
• 	Independent Review of Plan of Separation Contains Significant Caveat: Although F.T.I.
Consulting has endorsed the Plan of Separation, it offers the limitation that “[a]mong
other matters, later changes in market conditions may affect the views expressed in this
letter.”282 Thus, F.T.I. Consulting’s endorsement contains a caveat that effectively can be
used to disavow the feasibility of any plan that may be offered at a later date.
Recognizing that the Plan of Separation lacked sufficient detail, the Department sent a
letter to the parties describing the plan as “incomplete” and “minimal.”283 In response, the
applicants submitted a revised Plan of Separation that contained additional details for a
separation that would occur during the “Short-Term Period,” which the applicants define as 0 to
18 months post-closing.284 This additional commitment still does not address the issue of
separating the merged entity because it would only apply before the applicants are likely to have
fully integrated. For example, during this period, the applicants do not anticipate that the
“Common Clinical IT Platform will be fully implemented.”285 Likewise, they expect “the
consolidation of any significant clinical services to be limited” during this time.286 Mountain
States and Wellmont also do not plan to combine their physician services during this period.287
The applicants also commit not to transfer “assets that exceed 10% of the New Health
System’s total assets or roughly $300 million” during the Short-Term Period.288 They do not
provide further details that would allow the Department to determine the assets to which this
commitment would apply. For example, it is not clear if this means that no transfers are allowed
of an individual asset, the value of which exceeds roughly $300 million, or whether it means no
transfers of multiple assets that, in the aggregate, are valued in excess of $300 million. Because
“assets” is used in the plural, it appears that the commitment is limited to the latter and would
allow the former. If so, then significant transfers of individual assets valued at less than $300
million each would be feasible during the Short-Term Period. Thus, as the commitment is
281 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves ProMedica Health System’s Divestiture of former
Rival St. Luke’s Hospital (Jun. 24, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/ftc-approves-
promedica-health-systems-divestiture-former-rival-st (Divestiture of hospital approved in June 2016, four years after
Commission ruled that the proposed transaction violated the Clayton Act); Order to Maintain Assets at 1-2, Saint
Alphonsus Med. Center-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., No. 1:12-cv-00560-BLW (D. Idaho Dec. 10,
2015) (Order appointing trustee to oversee divestiture of hospital 22 months after district court enjoined the
transaction and over two and a half years after Commission filed complaint for permanent injunction).
282 Tennessee COPA Application, supra note 2, Exhibit 15.2 at 4-5 (Opinion on the Plan of Separation).
283 Tennessee Request for Information (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/TDH_Request_for_Information_1_3_28_16.pdf, at 5.
284 Revised Plan of Separation between Wellmont Health System and Mountain States Health Alliance Pursuant to
Grant of Certificate of Public Advantage by the Tennessee Commissioner of Health (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/Revised_Plan_of_Separation_9.9.16.pdf, at 1.
285 Id. at 3.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 1.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
67
written, it is not possible for the Department to determine whether any substantial portion of the
parties’ assets – for example, a small rural hospital – would truly be held separate during this
Short-Term Period.
The fact remains, however, that the parties have not provided the Department with a plan
to separate once they are fully integrated, which is when it will be most difficult to separate the
healthcare systems and why it is critical for the Department to receive a plan of separation that it
can assess before deciding whether to approve the COPA.
VIII. 	Practical Problems Encountered with Certificates of Public Advantage in Other
States
Although several states have enacted legislation similar to the Tennessee Hospital
Cooperation Act, very few hospital mergers have been approved pursuant to such legislation. We
are aware of only five states that purported to grant antitrust immunity to merging hospitals
under a COPA/cooperative agreement regulatory scheme – North Carolina, South Carolina,
Montana, Minnesota, and most recently, West Virginia.289 Of these states, North Carolina,
Montana, and Minnesota have repealed or modified the underlying legislation, which has
allowed the merged healthcare systems to exercise their monopoly market power unconstrained
by state regulatory oversight or, in all likelihood, antitrust enforcement. FTC staff has some
concerns about these COPAs, based on publicly available information, and we provide this
information to the Department in case it is useful in evaluating the proposed COPA application.
Mountain States and Wellmont have touted the COPA that Mission Health System
(“Mission Health”) operated under for 20 years in North Carolina as an example of a successful
COPA and a potential model for how to implement an effective COPA regulatory scheme.290
Given the difficulty of assessing whether the public policy goals of the Mission Health COPA
have actually been met, we view this example with skepticism and we hope the Department will
as well. Independent health policy experts have studied the Mission Health COPA, but have not
been able to determine whether the COPA successfully constrained prices, reduced healthcare
costs, or improved quality, due to the lack of objective data, particularly for commercially
289 Under the state action doctrine, antitrust immunity was purportedly granted to the following hospital systems:
HealthSpan Hospital System (Minnesota, 1994); Mission Health System (North Carolina, 1995); Benefis Health
System (Montana, 1996); Palmetto Health System (South Carolina, 1998); and Cabell Huntington Hospital (West
Virginia, 2016). In 1997, United Regional Health Care System was formed when the only two general acute-care
hospitals in Wichita Falls, Texas – Wichita General Hospital and Bethania Regional Health Care Center – sought
and obtained a purported antitrust exemption from the Texas state legislature. However, this does not appear to have
involved a COPA/cooperative agreement regulatory scheme.
290 See Jeff Keeling, Rules Governing Hospital Merger Published, B US. J. T RI-C ITIES T ENN./V A. (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://bjournal.com/rules-governing-hospital-merger-published/ (“Levine has pointed to a COPA that has governed
hospital care in the Asheville, N.C. market since the 1996 merger of Memorial Mission and St. Joseph’s hospitals as
a model for this proposed merger. The Mission system’s cost containment, health results and quality measures all
suggest it can be done, he said. Whether that can be successfully emulated, with appropriate variations, in a larger,
two-state system is a question that probably won’t be answered until the merger, if approved, has been in place for
several years if not longer.”).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
68
insured patients.291 More concerning, however, is that the North Carolina legislature recently
repealed the state’s COPA statute, leaving no effective constraint on Mission Health’s monopoly
market power.292 Although we are pleased that the North Carolina legislature no longer believes
a COPA statute is necessary or beneficial, and that problematic hospital mergers will no longer
be allowed to proceed under such a statute, we remain concerned about the current and future
state of competition in western North Carolina, where the repeal of the statute left intact the
monopoly market structure created by the Mission Health COPA, without leaving any
meaningful competitive or regulatory restraint on Mission Health.
In addition to the Mission Health example, we are aware of another hospital merger to
monopoly that was allowed to proceed under a COPA regulatory scheme that imposed conduct
remedies intended to mitigate the competitive disadvantages of the merger. For ten years,
Benefis Health System (“Benefis Health”) was subject to revenue caps and other cost-saving
efficiency commitments agreed to as part of the COPA.293 During this time, the Montana
Department of Justice routinely concluded that Benefis Health complied with the terms of the
COPA regulations, despite indications that Benefis Health sometimes exceeded its total revenue
291 See U RBAN I NSTITUTE COPA REPORT, supra note 238, at 16-17 (noting the limited public information available
to assess the impact of the COPA on prices, costs, or quality, and the seemingly limited access that consultants had
to data that might have allowed for an independent empirical analysis of the COPA’s effects); id. at 16 (“This case
study found no definitive evidence about whether the COPA’s state oversight has successfully replaced the former
competition that was lost by permitting the collaboration and combination of the only two general hospitals in the
population center of WNC.”) id. at 22 (“We did observe that the paucity of relevant objective data accessible to
parties and public alike made any outside assessment a challenge.”). See also Vistnes COPA Analysis, supra note
222, at 6-8, 11 n.14 (describing the scope of his analysis and acknowledging that he was unable to determine
whether the merger actually resulted in a substantial increase in market power or whether Mission Health acted on
incentives to evade regulations intended to curtail its market power); Capps COPA Analysis, supra note 222, at 14
(stating that “under the current regulatory framework, MHS has the ability to charge high prices . . . in direct
contradiction to the clear intent of the COPA” but acknowledging that he was unable to assess whether MHS has in
fact done so).
292 See S.B. 698, Gen. Assemb., 2015-2016 Session, Session Law 2015-288 (N.C. 2015),
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/Bills/Senate/PDF/S698v5.pdf (ratified by General Assembly Sept. 29, 2015;
signed into law by Governor Oct. 29, 2015) (repealing Article 9A of Chapter 131E of the NC General Statutes,
relating to Certificate of Public Advantage, effective Jan. 1, 2018). The North Carolina state legislature recently
accelerated the effective date of the repeal of the COPA statute to September 30, 2016. See H.B. 1030, Gen.
Assemb., 2015-2016 Session, Session Law 2016-94, at 93 (N.C. 2016),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2015/Bills/House/PDF/H1030v8.pdf (revising the effective date of repeal from
January 1, 2018 to September 30, 2016). For further discussion of the bill’s possible implications, see Mark Barrett,
NC Senate Considers Repeal of Law Governing Mission, Citizen-Times (Jun. 16, 2015), available at
http://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2015/06/16/nc-senate-considers-repeal-law-governing-
mission/28811673/. See also U RBAN I NSTITUTE COPA REPORT, supra note 238, at VII (“It would be shortsighted to
simply cease COPA oversight and return to antitrust review alone once consolidated providers have built market
power, because the window for antitrust review to address a merger is time-limited . . .”); id. at 21-22.
293 See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Certificate of Public Advantage at 43-51, In the Matter
of the Application for a Certificate of Public Advantage By the Columbus Hospital and Montana Deaconess Medical
Center, Great Falls, Montana (Mont. Dep’t of Justice 1996), https://dojmt.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/decisionamended19961.pdf.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
69
cap and suffered from quality of care deficiencies.294 Indeed, Benefis Health requested
amendments to the COPA commitments when it was unable to achieve the cost savings and
efficiencies that it had offered as justifications for approving the COPA.295 In 2007, at Benefis
Health’s urging, the Montana state legislature passed a bill that effectively terminated the COPA
agreement while allowing the health system to remain merged, despite the objections of the
Montana attorney general.296 As a result, Benefis Health has been able to freely exercise its
monopoly market power with no regulatory or antitrust oversight since 2009, when the
legislation took effect. Since that time, there have been concerns regarding significant price
increases by Benefis Health.297
294 See, e.g., Preliminary Findings Concerning Compliance with Terms and Conditions, In the Matter of the
Certificate of Public Advantage Issued to Benefis Healthcare, Great Falls, Montana (Mont. Dep’t of Justice Dec. 31,
1998), https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/progressreport19981.pdf (finding that Benefis Health
exceeded the total revenue cap by approximately $3.4 million in the first year of operation, and citing several quality
of care deficiencies and concerns); Letter from State of Mont. Department of Justice to Wayne Dunn, CFO, Benefis
Healthcare: Findings of the Department of Justice Regarding Compliance of Benefis Healthcare with the Terms and
Conditions of the Certificate of Public Advantage for the Years 2003 through 2005, at 2-3 (Aug. 15, 2007),
https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/findings20071.pdf (finding that Benefis Health exceeded the patient
revenue cap by $3.7 million in 2004, and by $1.8 million in 2005); id. at 5 (finding that “surveys continued to reflect
poor comparative responses from patients and families to the care and service received at Benefis” for 2005).
295 See Findings of Fact, In the Matter of the Application by Benefis Healthcare for Modification to the Certificate of
Public Advantage (Mont. Dep’t of Justice Mar. 22, 1999), https://dojmt.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/requestedmodifications19992.pdf. The Montana Department of Justice denied most of the
amendments to the revenue cap and cost savings targets proposed by Benefis Health, but did allow a downward
adjustment to the annual expense reduction target and a change to the inflation index used in the revenue cap model.
Thus, it appears that the COPA may have resulted in higher revenues and lower cost savings than originally
projected at the time the COPA received approval. See also Findings of Fact at 7-11, In the Matter of the
Application by Benefis Healthcare for Modification to the Certificate of Public Advantage (Mont. Dep’t of Justice
Apr. 4, 2003), https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/benefisfindingsoffact20031.pdf (describing how the
Montana Department of Justice approved several requests from Benefis Health to modify the COPA, including
removing investment income from the revenue cap, granting increases in the inflationary factor used in the revenue
cap model, eliminating restrictions on exclusive contracts with anesthesiologists, and allowing changes regarding
quality of care reporting requirements); Preliminary Findings Concerning Compliance with Terms and Conditions at
5, In the Matter of the Certificate of Public Advantage Issued to Benefis Healthcare, Great Falls, Montana (Mont.
Dep’t of Justice Jan. 18, 2004), https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/preliminaryprogressreport3.pdf
(describing how Benefis Health would have exceeded the revenue cap without such relief).
296 See M ONT. CODE A NN. § 50-4-603.(5). (amended 2007), http://leg.mt.gov/bills/mca/50/4/50-4-603.htm (limiting
the duration of a COPA to no more than 10 years from the date of issuance); Findings of Fact at 12, In the Matter of
the Application by Benefis Healthcare for Repeal of the Certificate of Public Advantage (Mont. Dep’t of Justice Oct.
2006), https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/decision20061.pdf (“The Department finds that there is not
sufficient evidence to conclude that increases in competition have eliminated the need for regulation over inpatient
hospital services.”).
297 See Jimmy Tobias, Costly Care: Great Falls Hospital Merger Holds Lessons For Missoula, M ISSOULA I NDEP.:
I NDY B LOG (Mar. 26, 2014), http://missoulanews.bigskypress.com/IndyBlog/archives/2014/03/26/great-falls-
hospital-merger-holds-lessons-for-missoula (citing the Benefis Health COPA as an example of the potential
problems associated with hospital mergers that create substantial market power, including complaints of significant
prices increases – up to 38% over three years for some health plans – after the COPA was rescinded; also reporting
that the annual Montana attorney general reports on non-profit state hospitals “show prices rapidly rising at Benefis”
from 2008 to 2010, including average prices at Benefis for esophagitis treatments increasing from $6,564 to $9,230,
for simple pneumonia procedures increasing from $7,722 to $13,076, and for vaginal births increasing from $3,475
to $4,832).

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
70
In sum, the COPA regimes implemented in other states illustrate the challenges with
regulating a hospital monopoly in perpetuity. If either the Tennessee or Virginia state legislature
were to repeal or revise the underlying COPA statutes, the regulatory oversight intended to
mitigate the anticompetitive effects of the merger could be eliminated, allowing the New Health
System to exercise unchecked market power.298
These challenges may be exacerbated under the proposed COPA because it involves
regulation by two different states. Potential challenges include the possibility for differing levels
of supervision or disparate determinations regarding whether the benefits of the COPA clearly
and convincingly outweigh the disadvantages. For example, if one state later decides to terminate
the COPA and put the Plan of Separation into effect, while the other state does not, it is unclear
how this conflict would be resolved.
Moreover, the COPA proposed by Mountain States and Wellmont involves many more
hospitals, outpatient facilities, and physicians than any prior COPA or cooperative agreement. As
such, the competition that would be eliminated and the resulting potential for consumer harm, as
well as the complexity of implementing and monitoring adequate conduct remedies, are
exponentially greater here than in any prior case.
IX. 	Conclusion
Existing competition between Mountain States and Wellmont benefits employers and
consumers in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia in a myriad of ways. Competition
constrains prices for inpatient, outpatient, and physician services, which ultimately benefits
community members by keeping their out-of-pocket healthcare expenses down. The competition
between Mountain States and Wellmont also has spurred both hospital systems to offer a wide
breadth of services in the local community and to strive to be high-quality providers of those
services in order to attract physician referrals and patient admissions.
The merger would eliminate this beneficial competition. Based on the record in this
proceeding and the FTC’s extensive experience evaluating healthcare mergers – as informed by
antitrust law, economic research, and healthcare policy – it is clear that the New Health System
would have a dominant share of the market, making it a near-monopoly and allowing it to
exercise significant market power. This would likely result in higher prices and reduced quality
for healthcare services in Northeast Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. Any cost-savings or
quality benefits of the merger would need to be extraordinary in order to outweigh – by clear
and convincing evidence – the significant competitive harm that is likely to result from the
merger, and there is no indication that this is the case. Moreover, Mountain States and Wellmont
have failed to show why many of the claimed benefits could not be achieved through an
alternative arrangement – either independently, through a merger or affiliation with a different
partner, or through another form of collaboration with each other – that would be less harmful to
298 See U RBAN I NSTITUTE COPA REPORT, supra note 238, at 21-22, 24.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
71
competition. Additionally, it is unlikely that the price or quality commitments offered by the
merging parties will mitigate the harms of the proposed merger, and could exacerbate pricing or
cause unintended reductions in the quality of care or access to care for consumers in Northeast
Tennessee and Southwest Virginia.
In summary, FTC staff respectfully encourages the Department to consider the following
factors and questions when reviewing the COPA application submitted by Mountain States and
Wellmont:
1. 	Will the proposed merger substantially reduce competition, allowing the New Health
System to negotiate higher prices for healthcare services, and reducing its incentives to
maintain or improve quality of care?
2. 	Are the claimed benefits (a) credible and verifiable, (b) likely to be achieved and passed
through to consumers, (c) achievable only through this merger, and (d) of sufficient
magnitude to outweigh by clear and convincing evidence the proposed merger’s
significant disadvantages?
3. 	Have Mountain States and Wellmont substantiated their plans sufficiently to ascertain the
steps, timeframe, and costs necessary to (a) consolidate clinical services, (b) surpass
volume thresholds that they are not already capable of achieving independently to
improve patient health outcomes, and (c) achieve projected synergies and cost
reductions?
4. 	Will the proposed regulatory commitments effectively mitigate the competitive harms of
the merger, and are they capable of being successfully implemented and objectively
monitored, to determine whether the COPA is meeting the stated public policy goals?
5. 	Does the COPA offer any meaningful mechanism to discipline the New Health System if
it fails to meet its regulatory commitments, and can the Plan of Separation offered by
Mountain States and Wellmont realistically be achieved?
6. 	If Tennessee decides that the New Health System has failed to meet its regulatory
commitments but Virginia reaches a different conclusion, how will Tennessee be able to
effectively require a separation of the New Health System?
7. 	How long does the Department intend to provide regulatory oversight of the COPA, and
what will happen in the event that the underlying legislation is repealed or revised to
allow the COPA to expire?
In our assessment, the likely benefits of the COPA do not outweigh the likely
disadvantages of the elimination of competition between Mountain States and Wellmont—and
the evidence falls far short of the “clear and convincing” standard in the Tennessee Hospital
Cooperation Act. The proposed commitments from the applicants do not change this conclusion.

FTC Staff Submission - November 21, 2016
72
We thank you for the opportunity to present our views and hope they will be helpful as
you evaluate the COPA application of Mountain States and Wellmont and the potential effects of
their proposed merger. We would be happy to provide any additional expertise and information
that we are authorized to share in connection with your review of the COPA application.
Please direct all questions regarding this submission to Goldie V. Walker, Attorney,
Bureau of Competition, 202-326-2919, gwalker@ftc.gov; and Stephanie A. Wilkinson, Attorney
Advisor, Office of Policy Planning, 202-326-2084, swilkinson@ftc.gov.

FTC Public Comment
Attachment A

DECLARATION OF COLIN DROZDOWSKI
I, Colin Drozdowski, declare:
I. Introduction
1. I am presently employed by Anthem, Inc. (“Anthem”) as the Vice President for
National Provider Solutions. Anthem is a health benefits company based in Indianapolis,
Indiana with many subsidiaries that conduct the business of insurance, one of which is Anthem
Health Plans of Virginia, Inc. (“Anthem Virginia”). Anthem is a primary licensee and Anthem
Virginia is a controlled affiliate licensee of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association. In
Virginia, Anthem Virginia operates under the trade name “Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield.”
Amerigroup Corporation (“Amerigroup”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Anthem that offers
Medicare and Medicaid insurance products in several states, including Tennessee.
2. I have earned a Bachelor’s of Arts and Masters of Economics. I have been
employed in the health care industry for over 20 years, all of them within various health plans.
Prior to joining Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ohio in 1992, I worked for the Federal Reserve
Bank in Cleveland, OH in the Economic Research Department. Since entering the health
insurance industry, I have assumed a variety of positions, with increasing responsibilities.
Throughout my career, I have always had a focus and an interest in provider contracting,
network management, provider relations, payment innovation and creative provider
collaborations. I have led both Medical Management and Medical Informatics teams. Within
the Anthem family (under National Provider Solutions) I oversee, either directly or indirectly, all
of the provider contracting and network management functions in our core (14 States) for
commercial business and segments of our government business. These states include ME, NH,
CT, NY, VA, GA, OH, IN, KY, MO, WI, CO, NV and CA. In addition, I also oversee provider
Page 1 of 26

contracting in counties outside of but contiguous to our core 14 states, such as Tennessee. In
total, our provider contracting efforts account for approximately $75 billion in annual medical
spend. I reside in Virginia and have lived in the Richmond area since August of 2000. I serve
my communities in a number of ways, and have been on the Boards of a number of health care-
related entities, including the Virginia Association of Free and Charitable Clinics (Board Chair),
Rx Partnership, and Physicians Immediate Care (urgent care provider).
3. I am familiar with many of the providers, hospitals and health systems in Virginia
and Tennessee.
4. I have been asked, based on my knowledge and experience, to address Anthem
Virginia’s and Amerigroup’s concerns about the proposed merger between Wellmont Health
System (“Wellmont”) and Mountain States Health Alliance (“MSHA”) or the “Parties.”
5. Wellmont and MSHA each provide health care services across the continuum of
care, including:
a. inpatient and outpatient hospital services;
b. physician services across a range of specialties; and
c. other ancillary services—including imaging, rehabilitation and physical
therapy, hospice, and sleep evaluation.
6. Generally speaking, inpatient procedures can only be performed at a hospital and
require the patient to remain at the hospital for more than 24 hours or overnight. Outpatient
procedures can be performed at a hospital or a non-hospital facility, such as an ambulatory
surgery center, and do not require an overnight or 24-hour stay. Whether a procedure is
performed on an inpatient or outpatient basis is a clinical decision made by a patient’s physician;
Anthem does not make that determination.
Page 2 of 26

Sullivan MSHA Indian Path Med. Ctr. Kingsport, TN 239
Unicoi MSHA Unicoi County Mem. Hosp. Erwin, TN 25
Washington MSHA Franklin Woods Comm.
Hosp.
Johnson City, 80
TN
Washington MSHA Johnson City Med. Ctr. Johnson City, 497
TN
9. Other than Wellmont and MSHA, there are no other hospitals in this 14-county
area. In counties where there are two hospitals, MSHA and Wellmont are clearly alternatives to
one another. Even in counties with only a single hospital (i.e., either a Wellmont or MSHA
hospital), the next closest alternative hospital in an adjacent county is frequently owned by the
other system. The best example of the close proximity of MSHA and Wellmont hospitals is on
the border between Virginia and Tennessee, in and around Kingsport and Bristol, Tennessee and
Bristol, Virginia. There are three relatively large hospitals in this area: Wellmont owns Holston
Valley Medical Center and Bristol Regional Medical Center, and MSHA owns Indian Path
Medical Center. All three of these facilities are located in Sullivan County, Tennessee.
10. In addition to hospitals owned by Wellmont and MSHA, each system employs
physicians and owns outpatient facilities throughout this 14-county area, including in cities and
towns where it does not own hospital facilities. For example, MSHA owns Johnston Memorial
Hospital in Abingdon, Virginia, but Wellmont employs a group of physicians and nurse
practitioners (Wellmont Medical Associates Abingdon) to serve this same community with
primary care, internal medicine, diabetic care and physical therapy services. To the best of my
knowledge, the parties both have physician practices in the Virginia counties of Lee, Russell,
Smyth, Washington, Wise and Wythe and in the Tennessee counties of Carter, Sullivan and
Washington. They both offer ancillary services in the Virginia counties of Russell, Washington
and Wise and in Sullivan County, Tennessee, to the best of my knowledge.
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11. Historically, Wellmont and MSHA have provided services at competitive rates,
expanded service offerings to meet demand, and worked to deliver quality care to the
communities they serve. This has all occurred in a competitive environment where each system
continually faced both actual competition and the threat of competition from the other. This
competition and threat of expansion drove these systems to offer high quality services at
competitive rates. Anthem Virginia and Amerigroup’s concern is that if Wellmont and MSHA
are permitted to form a single system, there will be no further competitive pressure to drive them
to improve quality, innovate or provide services at competitive rates.
12. We are also concerned about what a combined MSHA and Wellmont might do to
reduce competition from rival health plans. For example, MSHA has used its position as an
essential provider in certain areas to prevent competition with its Medicare Advantage product.
This has had a direct impact on Amerigroup’s ability to offer a competing Medicare Advantage
product throughout northeastern Tennessee. I discuss this in greater detail in paragraphs 50-51.
II. Background on Anthem’s Business in Virginia
A. Anthem’s Products and Membership in Virginia
13. Anthem Virginia offers several different health insurance products, including, for
example, health maintenance organization (“HMO”), preferred provider organization (“PPO”),
point-of-service (“POS”) and Medicare Advantage plans. Some of these products can either be
fully-insured or self-insured (i.e., administrative services only (“ASO”) products).
14. As of October 2015, in Virginia, Anthem had a total of 2,042,004 members.
B. Anthem Virginia’s Products and Membership in Southwest Virginia
15. For administrative convenience, Anthem Virginia divides its operations into five
regions: “Western,” “Central,” “Eastern,” “Northern,” and “Out of State.” Each region is further
Page 5 of 26

subdivided into sectors. When negotiating with a provider, Anthem Virginia staff will compare a
provider to other comparable providers in the same region or sector with respect to rates, case
mix, utilization, and profitability. We may also look at similarly situated providers in other
sectors and regions of the state.
16. The Western region of Virginia is divided into five sectors. Sector 1 includes
Bedford, Campbell, Amherst, and Appomattox Counties. Sector 2 extends northeast from
Rockbridge County to include Augusta, Highland, Rockingham, and Page Counties. Sector 3
comprises the area between Patrick and Halifax Counties along the North Carolina
border. Sector 4 begins along the West Virginia border at Bath County and runs south to
Franklin County and southwest to Bland and Wythe Counties. Sector 5 covers the extreme
southwestern corner of the state and extends eastward to Tazewell, Smyth, Grayson, and Carroll
Counties. Sector 5 contains all of the MSHA and Wellmont hospital facilities in Virginia and is
hereafter also referred to as “southwest Virginia.”
17. In Sector 5, Anthem Virginia offers the following products: HMO, PPO, POS,
and Traditional. Its HMO product is the newest offering in this area—Anthem Virginia began
offering HMO products throughout this area in 2012.
18. As of June 2015, in Sector 5, Anthem Virginia had a total of 86,211 members.
III. Amerigroup’s Products and Membership in Tennessee
A. Products and Membership in Tennessee
19. In Tennessee, Amerigroup offers Medicare Advantage and Managed Medicaid
under the state’s TennCare program. Neither Anthem nor Amerigroup offers commercial
insurance products in Tennessee.
20. Amerigroup contracts with health care providers in Tennessee to provide services
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to its members. Amerigroup’s goal in negotiating contracts with providers is to (1) improve
quality and (2) bend the cost trend for the state by keeping rate increases to a minimum. The
rates Amerigroup negotiates with providers directly impact the state’s costs. Providers who can
demand aggressive rate increases because they are essential to meeting network adequacy
standards can inhibit Amerigroup from keeping costs low and as a result drive up Medicaid costs
for the State.
21. As of April 2015, in Tennessee, Amerigroup had a total of 411,115 members.
B. Products and Membership in Northeast Tennessee
22. For administrative convenience, Amerigroup divides its business in Tennessee
into three regions: the “East Grand Region,” the “West Grand Region” and the “Middle Grand
Region.” The East Grand Region (or the East Region) includes the following counties:
Anderson, Bledsoe, Blount, Bradley, Campbell, Carter, Claiborne, Cocke, Franklin, Grainger,
Greene, Grundy, Hamblen, Hamilton, Hancock, Hawkins, Jefferson, Johnson, Knox, Loudon,
Marion, McMinn, Meigs, Monroe, Morgan, Polk, Rhea, Roane, Scott, Sequatchie, Sevier,
Sullivan, Unicoi, Union and Washington.
23. Less formally—and based on the definition provided by the state of Tennessee2—
Amerigroup refers to the far northeast counties within the East Grand Region as “northeast
Tennessee.” These counties are: Carter, Greene, Hancock, Hawkins, Johnson, Sullivan,
Washington and Unicoi.
24. Amerigroup has offered products in the East Grand Region, including northeast
Tennessee, only since January 1, 2015. Prior to this, Amerigroup’s contract with the state was
2 See http://hit.state.tn.us/tnmap/print tnmap.htm.
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limited to the Middle Region of Tennessee. In 2013, the state expanded its contracts to include
statewide coverage. In December 2013, Amerigroup was awarded a statewide contract to begin
in 2015 and as a result expanded into the Eastern and Western regions of Tennessee.
25. As of April 2015, in northeast Tennessee, Amerigroup had a total of 122,720
members.
IV. Anthem Provider Contracting
A. Provider Contracting in Virginia and Tennessee Generally
26. To offer lower premium rates to existing and potential customers, Anthem
Virginia and Amerigroup attempt to negotiate competitive rates for hospital and other medical
services. Our ability to negotiate such rates depends in large part on the existence of alternative
providers in the same geographic area that are efficient, have a good reputation for quality in
the community, and are attractive alternatives for our members. In an area where there are few
or no alternative providers, it is much more difficult for Anthem Virginia and Amerigroup to
negotiate competitive, favorable rates on behalf of our members. Although failing to reach an
agreement with a provider is always disruptive, the level of disruption is magnified where there
are few or no credible, alternative providers. When multiple providers can compete for
inclusion in our network, Anthem Virginia and Amerigroup generally have a greater ability to
walk away from, or credibly threaten to walk away from, negotiations if the provider demands
unreasonable rates or contract terms. Competition among providers gives us with the ability to
temper demands for rate increases.
27. Anthem Virginia’s contracts with hospital providers (otherwise known as facility
contracts) generally include both inpatient and outpatient services and the typical term for these
are 2-3 years. The facility contracts also cover reimbursement for hospital providers that are
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employed by the hospital (for example hospitalists or nurse anesthetists). Anthem Virginia also
endeavors to have all of its hospital providers participate in its quality program which is
described in further detail later in this declaration. By incorporating quality incentive payments
into the facility contracts, Anthem Virginia’s goal has been to increase quality incentives to
providers rather than giving the facility a fixed rate of increase each year.
28. Anthem Virginia or Amerigroup refer to “in-network” providers as providers
with whom they have a contract for services. Anthem Virginia or Amerigroup refer to “out-of-
network” providers as providers with whom they do not have a contract for services. If an
Anthem VA or Amerigroup member receives care from an out-of-network provider, the cost of
that care is higher than if that member were to receive care from an in-network provider. This
cost is born by Anthem VA or Amerigroup and the member. For this reason, members have an
incentive to seek care from in-network providers. The attractiveness of Anthem Virginia and
Amerigroup’s networks, therefore, depends in large part on whether members have in-network
access to a sufficient range of preferred providers. If Anthem or Amerigroup is unable to offer
an adequate network of providers, this directly impacts the attractiveness of the network and
could cause members to switch health plans, thereby impacting Anthem and Amerigroup’s
business.
29. Anthem Virginia’s preferred methodology for contracting for Virginia and
participating Tennessee hospitals is to pay rates based on the relative DRG weight multiplied
by a conversion factor. We also contract using case rates and per diems. Most of our facilities
include a stop loss threshold that pays a percent of charges once the threshold is met. The
percent of charges is only paid on the excess amount over the threshold and not on the total
charges on the claim. Except for that provision, none of our contracts are paid based on a
Page 9 of 26

percent of charges.
30. All of the above is true irrespective of whether the hospital or health system is a
for-profit hospital or a not-for-profit hospital. In my experience, I have not seen differences in
negotiations with a for-profit hospital versus a not-for-profit hospital. Both for-profit and not-
for-profit hospitals generally attempt to use their bargaining leverage to secure the highest
reimbursement rates available.
31. Historically, Anthem Virginia and Amerigroup have tried to offer broad networks
of providers through their health insurance products. To do so, they have offered reasonable
terms to providers in contract negotiations. Nevertheless, in some cases a provider may seek to
obtain rates higher than those offered, and it may decide to no longer participate in the plan’s
network. In my experience, a provider is much more willing to walk away from negotiations,
and risk going out of network, if it perceives that there are few or no competitive alternatives to
it in the same area for the same services.
32. If a provider perceives that it has few or no alternatives, it often will seek to
extract rates from insurers that are above competitive levels. I believe this would likely be the
case throughout the combined service area if the proposed merger were approved.
33. Anthem Virginia has recently started offering narrow network products and tiered
networks in certain parts of Virginia—although not yet in southwest Virginia. The opportunity
to offer narrow or tiered network products is important because it compels providers to
compete both on price and quality to be selected to participate in the narrow network or to be
included in the first tier of providers. If MSHA and Wellmont merge Anthem Virginia would
lose the ability to have MSHA and Wellmont compete against each other for future narrow
network products.
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patients in the Wellmont and MSHA combined service area to be an attractive alternative. The
most densely populated area of southwester Virginia is near the city of Bristol. A patient
travelling from there would need to drive over an hour to reach the nearest non-
MSHA/Wellmont hospital in Virginia at Clinch Valley Medical Center,3 or substantially further
to Buchanan General Hospital or Carilion Tazewell Community Hospital. That same patient
would also require about an hour to reach the nearest independent hospital in Tennessee,
Laughlin Memorial Hospital. Anthem’s internal studies reach a similar conclusion: without
MSHA or Wellmont facilities, we would not be able to provide adequate coverage for patients
in parts of southwest Virginia.
36. As discussed previously, Wellmont and MSHA are by far the largest hospital
systems in southwest Virginia. These systems are the only inpatient providers in a seven-county
area in Virginia that includes Dickenson, Russell, Smyth, Washington, Wise, Scott and Lee
counties.
37. Anthem Virginia has contracted with Wellmont on a continuous basis at least
since July 2002. Anthem Virginia also has contracted with MSHA since March 2001, but not on
a continuous basis.
38. In 2002, Anthem Virginia’s hospital contract negotiations with MSHA were
difficult and protracted. MSHA demanded double-digit rate increases. Anthem Virginia was
unwilling to acquiesce to the demands of MSHA and allowed MSHA to terminate its contract
and exit the Anthem Virginia network in May 2002. At that time, Anthem Virginia relied on
hospital facilities that are now owned by Wellmont in order to provide services to its members in
3 A patient in Bristol, Virginia might also seek treatment at Laughlin Memorial Hospital in Tennessee, but
even that facility is also roughly an hour away by car.
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this area—at that time, MSHA facilities were only located in Tennessee.
39. In 2003, Anthem Virginia and MSHA reached a new agreement at rates that were
acceptable to Anthem Virginia and all of the MSHA facilities became in-network as of October
1, 2003. In order to bring all the MSHA facilities back in network, Anthem agreed to a 6.5%
increase on the overall contract. This was substantially lower than the initial double-digit
increases sought by MSHA before they went out of network. I believe the ability of Anthem to
sell a network without MSHA helped us to avoid the initially proposed double-digit increases
and ultimately arrive at a more moderate increase.
40. Since 2003, Anthem and MSHA have renegotiated hospital contract rates 4 times;
the average term of these contracts has been 2-3 years. Negotiations with MSHA have typically
been long, drawn-out and subject to multiple layers of review at MSHA.
41. Starting in 2007, MSHA acquired several hospitals in southwest Virginia,
including Smyth County Hospital (2007), Dickenson Community Hospital (2009) and Johnston
Memorial Hospital (2009). After these facilities were acquired, MSHA demanded rate increases
for these facilities that were greater than Anthem Virginia had previously paid these facilities as
stand-alone entities. For example MSHA demanded a nearly 45% price increase for inpatient
services when it acquired Smyth County Hospital. Ultimately, Anthem agreed to a 8.47%
overall increase (18.1% on inpatient and 4.3% on outpatient). The facilities acquired in 2009
were brought in-network under the 2010 negotiations and Anthem Virginia agreed to an average
6% increase for these facilities, with higher rate increases in the early years of the contract term.
MSHA’s negotiation history with these acquisitions suggests that MSHA will seek the highest
rates that it can when its rates are not subject to review or oversight.
42. Anthem Virginia just completed its most recent negotiation with MSHA for a new
Page 13 of 26

Unicoi MSHA Unicoi County Mem.
Hosp.
Washington MSHA Franklin Woods Comm.
Hosp.
Erwin, TN 25
Johnson City, TN 80
Washington MSHA Johnson City Med. Ctr. Johnson City, TN 497
46. As noted previously, Anthem Virginia also directly contracts with certain
hospitals in the contiguous border counties in Tennessee, including Indian Path Medical Center
(MSHA), Holston Valley Medical Center (Wellmont) and Bristol Regional Medical Center
(Wellmont).
47. Wellmont and MSHA are, by every measure, the largest inpatient providers in
northeast Tennessee and account for 10 of the fourteen 14 hospitals in the area (indicated in bold
in the above table). These systems are the only inpatient providers in a seven-county area in
Tennessee that includes: Carter, Hancock, Hawkins, Johnson, Sullivan, Washington and Unicoi
counties.
48. The 4 other hospitals in northeast Tennessee that are not affiliated with Wellmont
or MSHA are not competitive alternatives to the Wellmont and MSHA hospitals for one or more
reasons: they are limited in capacity, they do not offer many tertiary services and/or they are too
distant from patients in the Wellmont and MSHA combined service area to be an attractive
alternative for patients. For example, a patient in Johnson City, Tennessee—the largest of the
Tri-Cities and the largest city in the region—would need to drive roughly 45 minutes to reach the
nearest non-MSHA or Wellmont hospital, Laughlin Memorial Hospital. Patients in other parts
of the Tri-Cities area would require more time to reach that hospital. If Wellmont and MSHA
were not in Amerigroup’s network, patients would have to travel to Knoxville or Chattanooga to
access essential tertiary services and as a result, Amerigroup would be unable to meet many of
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its network adequacy requirements. While there may be some non-MSHA/Wellmont hospitals
in East Tennessee, they are all small regional hospitals that offer more limited services.
1. Contracting with Wellmont and MSHA in Northeast Tennessee
49. Amerigroup has only contracted in the East Grand Region of Tennessee since
January 1, 2015. In order to develop products in the East Grand Region, Amerigroup attempted
to negotiate contracts with all of the available providers and for all of the products that
Amerigroup was licensed to offer in Tennessee, including (1) Medicare Advantage (or Medicare
Classic); (2) Dual Eligible Special Needs Plans (“D-SNP”); and (3) Managed Medicaid.
50. When Amerigroup approached MSHA’s provider contracting entity in Tennessee,
Integrated Solutions Health Network (“ISHN”)5 about a contract for MSHA’s facilities and
providers in Tennessee, ISHN refused to contract for Amerigroup’s Medicare Advantage product
in MSHA’s eight-county primary service area (based on the location of their acute care facilities
and physician practices). MSHA was only willing to contract with Amerigroup for its D-SNP
and Medicaid products in this service area. MSHA offers a Medicare Advantage product in
these counties and did not want to compete with Amerigroup for Medicare Advantage health
plan enrollees. Because it does not have access to certain of MSHA’s facilities for its Medicare
Advantage network, Amerigroup is unable to offer Medicare Advantage products in the
following counties: Carter, Greene,6 Hancock, Hawkins, Johnson, Sullivan and Unicoi.
51. ISHN has closely monitored Amerigroup’s activity with respect to sales of its
5 ISHN describes itself as a “regional health solutions company” headquartered in Johnson City, Tennessee. It
consists of approximately 2,000 physicians in northeast Tennessee, Southwest Virginia and Western North Carolina
and over 275 provider groups. ISHN (through AnewCare) handles all of the contracting for MSHA hospitals and
physicians in northeast Tennessee. It also handles contracting for a non-MSHA hospital: Laughlin Memorial
Hospital in Greene County, Tennessee.
6 Although MSHA does not have a hospital in Greene County, Laughlin Memorial is located in Greene County and
ISHN handles contracting for that facility as well.
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Medicare Advantage product in northeast Tennessee to ensure it is not marketing or selling a
Medicare Advantage product in the eight counties. For example on November 18, 2014, a
representative from ISHN emailed Amerigroup requesting that certain billboards in the Sullivan
and Washington county area promoting Amerigroups’ Medicare Advantage plan be removed.
ISHN felt that the billboards appeared to be marketing a Medicare Advantage product in
violation of the agreement. Amerigroup had to assure ISHN that it did not have an adequate
network to sell a Medicare Advantage product in that area.
D. Proposed Merger’s Impact on Provider Contracting in Southwest Virginia
and Northeast Tennessee
52. While the growth of Wellmont and MSHA through prior acquisitions have posed
certain challenges for Anthem Virginia’s and Amerigroup’s ability to serve this region, we have
been able to control cost increases through having the two systems actively competing with each
other. But I am concerned that if Wellmont and MSHA are no longer two independent systems,
there will be no competitive alternative providers to constrain their prices or spur them to
improve their quality and innovation in the delivery of health care in southwest Virginia and
northeast Tennessee. Furthermore, I am concerned that neither Virginia nor Tennessee has the
resources, funding or expertise, to monitor (in perpetuity) this entity to prevent abusive or
monopolistic behaviors, including but not limited inefficient operations, lower quality, less focus
on patients/consumers, unwillingness to participate in government programs (at competitive
rates), or the creation of their own health plan that they would then leverage to their own
advantage and to the detriment of the residents of this region
53. In some parts of southwest Virginia and northeast Tennessee, Wellmont and
MSHA each own certain acute care hospitals that are essential to have in our network in order to
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meet access requirements for a network product. In certain other areas, for example, Bristol and
Kingsport, Anthem Virginia and Amerigroup would not need all of the Wellmont and MSHA
hospitals to participate in their networks, and therefore could credibly threaten to leverage one
facility against another in contract negotiations. Furthermore, there are also local areas where
Anthem Virginia and Amerigroup do not need both Wellmont and MSHA physicians in-network
to offer an attractive network product. In these local areas where Wellmont and MSHA facilities
and physicians compete more directly, the hospital systems have bargaining power.
54. In addition to the loss of current competition between Wellmont and MSHA, I
have serious concerns about the impact of the merger on potential additional competition
between these systems in the future. The proposed merger will effectively eliminate any
potential for competition between the only two systems that operate across a broad area of
southwest Virginia and northeast Tennessee, where new entry is highly unlikely.
V. Quality and Innovation
A. Quality
1. Anthem’s Q-HIP® Program
55. In health care, as in other sectors of the economy, competition plays a crucial role
in driving quality and performance improvement. Providers compete with respect to their ability
to deliver the highest quality, best value to patients and to those who pay for the care, such as
health insurers like Anthem.
56. As a purchaser of healthcare services, Anthem relies on competition among health
care providers to drive improvements in quality. This competition on quality also impacts
Anthem’s negotiations with providers. For example, absent competition, a provider has a greater
ability to resist Anthem’s efforts to tie reimbursement rate increases to a provider’s performance
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on certain quality measures under Anthem’s Quality-In-Sights®: Hospital Incentive Program (Q-
HIP®).
57. Anthem regularly measures the quality of its hospital providers under its award-
winning Q-HIP® program. Q-HIP® promotes adherence to evidence-based medicine and best
practices that lead to improvements in patient outcomes and affordability. Anthem uses Q-
HIP®’s standard set of measures to compare acute care providers across its network and
determine their overall value. Anthem is continually developing and updating this program and
its tools to assess and measure provider quality, as assessing health care quality is a complex
endeavor. A provider’s level of quality is an essential component in determining the value of a
given provider to a network.
58. Measuring all aspects of health care quality is impossible, and incentivizing
providers to consistently improve on measurable components of quality is difficult. Anthem’s Q-
HIP® program measures (and therefore incentivizes) providers in a limited number of health
outcomes and patient satisfaction areas. Anthem depends on competition among health care
providers to drive providers to continuously improve on all aspects of quality. I am concerned
that the elimination of competition between Wellmont and MSHA will negatively impact quality
of health care in the communities served by these providers, particularly with respect to quality
elements that are difficult for Anthem to measure.
2. Wellmont and MSHA’s performance in Q-HIP®
59. MSHA and Wellmont participate in Q-HIP® and regularly submit data to Anthem
Virginia related to the Q-HIP® inpatient measures. This includes the Wellmont and MSHA
Virginia hospitals as well as three hospitals in Tennessee that Anthem Virginia contracts with:
Indian Path, Bristol and Holston Valley. Wellmont currently participates with Anthem on
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outpatient measures as well, but MSHA does not. However, under the newly negotiated 2015
contract, MSHA will participate in QHIP® on outpatient measures.
60. Q-HIP® participation is a negotiated term in Anthem Virginia’s contracts with
providers. Many providers negotiate with Anthem as to whether or not they will participate in
Q-HIP® and at what level. Typically, Anthem reduces the base reimbursement rate of a provider
that participates in Q-HIP® with the expectation that the provider has the ability to obtain a
higher rate if it meets certain thresholds.
61. Anthem is concerned that after the proposed merger the parties will have
decreased incentives to improve quality. Reliance on the Q-HIP® program alone is not enough
to drive quality improvements—market competition among providers is a much more effective
tool.
3. Amerigroup’s Quality Program
62. Amerigroup has had provider contracts in the East Grand Region for less than a
year. Accordingly, it is still in its initial phases of implementing its quality program there. It
does, however, currently incorporate certain pay-for-performance and incentive arrangements
into its contracts with providers, such as ISHN.
63. In other parts of Tennessee, Amerigroup offers episode-based payment programs
and plans to eventually offer these same programs in the East Grand Region as well. Episodes of
care focus on the health care delivered in association with acute healthcare events such as a
surgical procedure or an inpatient hospitalization. Episodes encompass care delivered by
multiple providers in relation to a specific health care event. Episode-based payment seeks to
align incentives with successfully achieving a patient's desired outcome during an “episode of
care,” a clinical situation with predictable start and end points. Episodes reward high-quality
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care, promote the use of clinical pathways and evidence-based guidelines, encourage
coordination, and reduce ineffective and/or inappropriate care. Episode-based payment is
applicable for most procedures, hospitalizations, acute outpatient care (e.g., broken bones), as
well as some forms of treatment for cancer and behavioral health conditions (e.g., ADHD).
Under the initiative, participating insurance companies will add additional episodes every year
with the goal of implementing 75 episodes by the end of 2019.
64. It is too early to opine how well ISHN is doing in its quality incentive program.
However, pursuant to its contract, Amerigroup already has paid ISHN a care management fee of
approximately $500,000. In October 2015, ISHN admitted to Amerigroup that is has not done
anything yet this year to implement care management as it is obligated to do under the contract.
4. Merger’s Potential Impact on Quality
65. Wellmont and MSHA, as independent entities, are both relatively well-rated in
terms of quality performance under QHIP®. However, my concern is that, in the absence of any
competitive alternatives to the combined system, there will be less incentive for Wellmont and
MSHA to continue to strive to improve the quality of care they provide.
66. I am not aware of any concrete plans that Wellmont and MSHA have developed
around how the their proposed merger will improve quality in southwest Virginia or northeast
Tennessee and how such improvements could not be achieved absent the merger. Furthermore, I
am concerned that in the absence of a competitive alternative to the merged system, there will be
no recourse for a health plan or its members if the merged system’s quality levels decline.
B. Innovation
67. Innovation is another important dimension of competition for health care
providers. Anthem continually is looking for ways to engage with providers on new, more
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effective and efficient ways to deliver health care, including population health management
strategies, risk contracts and shared risk arrangements, bundled and episode of care
reimbursement. Health care providers tend to be more innovative where they face competition
from other providers. For example, in California, Anthem has been able to partner with certain
hospitals to create a narrow network product (Vivity) consisting of some of the highest quality
hospitals in the Los Angeles area. This is in direct response to the competition that these
providers face from Kaiser as an integrated provider and health plan.
68. I am concerned that if Wellmont and MSHA merge, there will be no competitive
alternative providers to encourage the merged entity to innovate in how they furnish healthcare
services. While the two systems have discussed in general terms how their proposed merger will
improve care and help them better manage the health care of the population they serve, I have
not seen any detailed discussions of their plans or why any of their innovations could not be done
absent the merger. In the absence of competition, I am concerned that this goal will be
neglected.
VI. Entry
A. Virginia and Tennessee COPN/CON Laws Restrict Entry
69. Virginia currently has a Certificate of Public Need (COPN) law that requires any
potential entrant seeking to open or expand a medical care facility to file an application and
receive approval from the Virginia Department of Health. A COPN is required for a wide array
of facilities and services, including hospitals, surgery centers, substance abuse treatment, and
diagnostic imaging. Anthem monitors the COPN application process and sometimes submits
comments or testifies in favor of or against a potential application.
70. Tennessee has a similar Certificate of Need (CON) regime. Anyone who seeks to
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establish certain health care facilities and services—including hospitals, certain diagnostic
imaging services, and ambulatory surgical centers, among others—must first receive a CON
from the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency. Facility expansions beyond
certain dollar thresholds also require a CON.
71. COPN/CON laws significantly restrict potential entry from new competitors or
expansion by existing competitors.
B. Sparse History of Entry
72. Over the last ten years there has been virtually no new entry into southwest
Virginia and northeast Tennessee by outside providers—all entry and expansion has come from
Wellmont and MSHA. For example, in the early 2000s, MSHA expanded from Tennessee into
Virginia with the acquisition of Smyth County Hospital. Wellmont has similarly expanded
throughout southwest Virginia through various hospital, physician and outpatient facility
acquisitions. For example, Wellmont has acquired a number of cardiology physician practices,
allowing it to control a majority of the cardiologists in the region and form the Wellmont CVA
Heart Institute. In addition, Wellmont acquired Mountain View Regional and Lee Regional in
August 2007. These were added to the Wellmont contract in 2008 and received reimbursement
rate increases.
VII. Physician and Outpatient Competition
73. I also am concerned about competition for physician services and ancillary
services and facilities.
A. Physician Competition in Southwest Virginia and Northeast Tennessee
74. In southwest Virginia and northeast Tennessee, Wellmont and MSHA control a
substantial number of physicians—Wellmont employs an estimated 250 physicians and MSHA
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employs or negotiates through ISHN for over 350 physicians.
75. Physician negotiations with MSHA have been challenging recently. For example,
it took over two years for Anthem to successfully negotiate participation by MSHA contracted
physicians in Anthem’s HMO network in Virginia. Ultimately, Anthem Virginia was compelled
to pay PPO rates for HMO members, which was a rate higher than Anthem pays comparable
groups elsewhere in Virginia.
76. I am concerned that the merger could result in the combined system controlling a
substantial number of physicians across a number of specialties that could lead to increased
prices for physician services.
77. In addition, many hospitals contract on an exclusive basis with independent
physician groups to provide certain hospital-based services, such as anesthesiology, radiology,
pathology and emergency room services. Often, as part of our negotiations with hospitals, we
obtain assurance from the hospital that the hospital-based physicians will participate in our plans
at reasonable rates. In regions where there is adequate hospital competition (and thus alternative
hospital providers), we can threaten to steer patients to competing hospitals where physicians are
also in-network. If Wellmont and MSHA are allowed to combine, we will have no alternative
hospitals to leverage in our negotiations.
78. I also am concerned that if the parties merge they could use physician referrals to
increase the cost of care in ways other than demanding above market rate increases. For
example, after the merger the parties could incentivize physicians to refer care to the highest
priced facilities in the system or eliminate incentives for physicians to perform procedures at the
lower priced facilities (e.g. ambulatory surgery centers) in favor of higher priced hospital
facilities where they may have excess capacity. This is a concern particularly where a hospital
Page 24 of 26

has different rates for the different hospitals in its system. This could substantially drive up costs
in the same way that negotiating a higher unit price could.
79. Alternatively, absent competition, value-based payment methods to encourage
lower utilization and higher quality may be rejected or stalled in favor of continuing fee-for-
service reimbursement for longer than would occur in a competitive market.
B. Outpatient Services Competition in the Region
80. Health care is increasingly being delivered outside the hospital. Outpatient
services and other ancillary services are medical procedures or tests that can be done in a medical
center without an overnight stay in a hospital. Outpatient clinics, physician offices, and urgent
care centers are increasingly utilized by health care consumers and are an important point of
service location that often provides high quality services at a lower cost. Outpatient service
providers also are an important referral source for hospitals. Accordingly, competition for
outpatient services is increasingly important.
81. Just as Wellmont and MSHA control the vast majority of hospitals and providers
in the area, they also own many of the outpatient clinics and ancillary services in the area. For
example, MSHA owns rehabilitation, urgent care, hospice and laboratory facilities. Wellmont
also owns or will own facilities providing all of these same outpatient services to the best of my
knowledge. More specifically, Wellmont and MSHA offer overlapping outpatient services in the
following Virginia counties: Lee, Russell, Smyth, Washington, Wise and Wyth; as well as in
Sullivan County in Tennessee. There may be other counties with overlaps of which I am not
aware.
82. Given Wellmont and MSHA’s already large share of outpatient services and
recent expansion, Anthem is worried that the merger will deter future entry by outpatient service
Page 25 of 26

______________________
providers and/or stifle the limited competition that already exists. After the merger, not only will
the parties control a substantial share of inpatient services and physicians, but they also will
control a substantial share of outpatient services, affording them the ability to control referrals
and as a result, the entire continuum of the healthcare delivery system.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at
____________________, this ________ day of ___________ , 2015.
_ _____________
Colin Drozdowski
Page 26 of 26
18 December	Richmond, VA

FTC Public Comment
Attachment B

FTC Public Comment
Attachment C

2 | THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF NO. 9 | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | The impact of hospital consolidation—Update
Prices paid to hospitals by private health insurers within hospital markets vary
dramatically (22). The evidence points to differences in hospital bargaining leverage
as a principal driver of the difference between relatively expensive and inexpensive
hospital systems within the same hospital market.
Some evidence suggests that growth in prices is related to market
concentration. An important policy question is whether, in addition to leading
to a one-time price increase, hospital mergers increase the rate of growth of hospital
prices. A few studies have addressed this issue (see Table 1), with the most recent
studies giving somewhat conflicting answers to this question. Melnick and Keeler find
a positive correlation between price growth and market concentration (28). On the
other hand, Akosa Antwi et al. find that monopoly markets experienced the highest
rates of growth, but there was little relationship between changes in concentration and
the growth of prices (2).
Hospital mergers in concentrated markets generally lead to
significant price increases. Several studies have taken a retrospective look at
the impact of recent hospital mergers on prices paid to hospitals by health insurers.
This research focuses on a “case study” merger and examines the change in inpatient
prices after the merger compared with a set of “control” hospitals (see Table 2).
The magnitude of price increases when hospitals merge in concentrated markets is
typically quite large, most exceeding 20 percent. Analyses that use data spanning large
geographic regions that encompass many hospital mergers also find that, for the most
part, hospital mergers in concentrated markets result in significant price increases.
Price increases exceeded 20% when mergers
occurred in concentrated markets.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
In recent years, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has become more
aggressive in challenging cases and
has had dramatically more success
than during the 1980s and 1990s.
At the time of the 2006 synthesis,
after a decade and a half long
series of unsuccessful attempts to
block hospital mergers, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) had just
successfully litigated its first hospital
merger case. In this case, the FTC
challenged a consummated merger
and the court found that the merger
between Evanston-Northwestern
Hospital and Highland Park Hospital
(both located in Evanston, Ill.) led to
an increase in prices. The decision
in this case is important because it
established that proximate not-for-
profit hospitals in urban areas can
increase market power by merging.
Importantly, the case also established
that, post-acquisition, hospitals are
willing to use their increased market
power to raise prices.
The findings in the Evanston-
Northwestern case gave the FTC a
firm footing for litigation of hospital
merger cases. Since 2006, the FTC
has successfully brought suit to stop
several hospital mergers. Of particular
note is the ProMedica case, in which
a federal judge granted the FTC an
injunction in its antitrust challenge of
ProMedica’s acquisition of a hospital.2
It is the first prospective merger court
victory for the enforcement agencies
in decades.3
2 United States of America Federal Trade
Commission Office of Administrative Law
Judges, Docket No. 9346, In the Matter of
ProMedica Health System, Inc., December
12, 2011 (http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/
d9346/120105promedicadecision.pdf).
3 Prospective merger analysis seeks to assess
the competitive harm from a transaction
principally based on information available prior
to the consummation of the transaction.
Author/
Year
Location
of mergers
Time frame
of analysis 	Results
Dafny (2009) 	US 	1999–2005 	Merging hospitals had 40%
higher prices than non-
merging hospitals.
Haas-Wilson and
Garmon (2011)
Evanston, IL Mergers
of Evanston-NW &
Highland Park and
St. Therese & Victory
Memorial
1990–2003 	Post-merger, Evanston-
NW hospital had 20%
higher prices than control
group; no price effect at St.
Therese–Victory.
Tenn (2011) 	SF Bay Area, CA
Sutter/Summit merger
1999–2003 	Summit prices increased
28.4% to 44.2% compared
with control group.
Thompson (2011) 	Wilmington, NC
New Hanover-Cape
Fear merger
2001–2003 	3 of 4 insurers experienced
a large price increase;
1 insurer experienced a
decrease in prices.
Town et al. (2006) 	US 	1990–2002 	Aggregate hospital merger
activity increased the
uninsured rate by
.3 percentage points.
Table 2: Summary of hospital merger event studies since 2006

The impact of hospital consolidation—Update | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF NO. 9 | 3
Hospital competition improves quality.
PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION
It is important to distinguish between
consolidation and integration.
Consolidation is simply bringing
together two (or more) previously
independent entities. Integration
implies more—in particular,
elimination of unnecessary
duplication, creating systems to
bring the previously separate entities
together, and comprehensive
management of the organization as
a whole.
Limited data show that
consolidation between
physicians and hospitals is
increasing. Increasing numbers of
physicians are working as hospital
employees and increasing numbers
of physician practices are owned by
hospitals. The number of physicians
working as employees grew from
around 31 percent in 1996–97 to
36 percent in 2004–05 (26). Another
survey found that the percentage of
primary care physicians employed by
hospitals rose from under 20 percent
in 2000 to over 30 percent in 2008
and the percentage of specialists
employed by hospitals rose from
just over 5 percent to 15 percent
(25). The percentage of physician
practices owned by hospitals rose
from around 20 percent in 2002
to over 50 percent by 2008 (25).
On the other hand, the percentage
of hospitals with other kinds of
physician-hospital relationships, such
as physician hospital organizations
(PHOs) and independent practice
associations (IPAs), has fallen
steadily from 2000 through 2010 (3).
What is the relationship between hospital consolidation
and quality?
At least for some procedures, hospital concentration reduces
quality. Since the 2006 synthesis report, many new econometric studies have
examined the impact of hospital competition on quality of care, using data from
a variety of sources, including studies from outside the United States. The new
econometric studies can be divided into two types: those that examine markets with
administered prices and those that examine markets with market determined prices.
Hospital competition improves quality under an administered pricing
system. Studies of the impact of competition on hospital quality under an
administered price regime are based on the U.S. Medicare program and the English
National Health Service (NHS), which made a transition to administered prices in
a 2006 reform. The evidence presented in the 2006 synthesis was entirely from the
Medicare program. The findings from those studies were mixed, but the strongest
evidence was that tougher competition led to enhanced quality of care. Those results
are reinforced by newer studies from the NHS, which uniformly show a positive
impact of competition on the quality of care. The 2006 reform in the NHS was
intended to create competition among hospitals for patients, by allowing patients
to choose their hospital, while setting regulated prices in a manner very similar to
the Medicare DRG-based system.4 The studies all show a substantial impact of the
introduction of hospital competition in the NHS on reducing mortality rates (see
Table 3). While it is not possible to draw direct conclusions about the United States
based on evidence from the United Kingdom, these studies add to the growing
evidence base that competition leads to enhanced quality under administered prices.
Table 3: Summary of hospital quality-competition studies with administered prices
since 2006 (continued on next page)
Author/
Year
Location
of data
Time
frame of
analysis
Does
competition
increase
quality? 	Results
Cooper
et al.
(2011)
England 	2002–08 	Yes 	Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality
fell significantly faster after the reforms in less
concentrated markets. This led to 300 fewer
AMI deaths per year.
Gaynor
et al.
(2010)
England 	2003–04,
2007–08
Yes 	All-cause and AMI mortality fell significantly
faster after the reforms in less concentrated
markets. There were no effects on length of
stay, expenditures or productivity. This led
to 4,791 life years saved from deaths from
all-causes averted, and 1,527 AMI life years
saved. Benefits outweigh costs.
Bloom
et al.
(2010)
England 	2006 	Yes 	Hospitals in less concentrated markets have
better management, and better management
leads to reduced mortality. Adding an
additional hospital close by improves
management quality and thereby reduces
heart attack mortality by 10.7%.
4 The NHS reforms introduced: patient choice among hospitals, regulated prices, and performance incentives for
hospital managers. Previously a local public entity selectively contracted with hospitals (often sole source) to
provide care for their patients. Contract negotiations focused on price, not quality. Patients had little choice and
hospital managers had little incentive to compete for patients on quality. See Cooper et al. (13), Gaynor et al.
(20) for more details.

4 | THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF NO. 9 | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | The impact of hospital consolidation—Update
Physician-hospital consolidation studied so far
did not involve true integration.
Table 3: Summary of hospital quality-competition studies with administered prices
since 2006 (continued from previous page)
Author/
Year
Location
of data
Time
frame of
analysis
Does
competition
increase
quality? 	Results
Beckert
et al.
(2012)
England 	2008–09 	Yes 	Hip replacement patients are significantly
more likely to choose higher-quality
hospitals. A 5% increase in a hospital’s
mortality rate decreases demand by 6.9%.
Hospital mergers substantially reduce the
responsiveness of demand to mortality.
Gaynor
et al.
(2011)
England 	2003–04,
2007–08
Yes 	Coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG)
patients’ responsiveness to hospital mortality
rates is substantially higher after the reforms.
A 1% increase in a hospital’s mortality rate
reduces its market share by over 4% after the
reforms. The change in elasticity due to the
reform led to a significant reduction in mortality.
Competition improves quality where prices are market determined,
although the evidence is mixed (Table 4). There have also been substantial
additions to this literature since the 2006 synthesis. The findings from these studies
are more mixed than the findings of recent studies of markets with administered
prices. This stands to reason: if hospitals can compete on both price and quality, then
when they face tougher competition they will choose to compete by whichever means
is most effective. If buyers are considerably more responsive to price than quality (for
example, if price is easier to measure), then enhanced competition can lead to lower
prices, but also less attention to quality. On the other hand, if quality is particularly
salient, then tougher competition can enhance quality.
All of the U.S. studies except for one find that competition improves quality, while
the English studies uniformly find negative effects.5 The difference appears to most
likely be due to differences in the possibility of patient choice between the United
States and England (in the 1990s).
In the United States, prices are negotiated by price-sensitive insurers. These insurers
have strong incentives to obtain lower prices, since their customers, typically employers,
are responsive to price differences. Insurers, however, do not engage in sole-source
contracting. They contract with sets, or “networks,” of hospitals. Patients are thus free to
exercise choice of hospital within a network (which is often quite broad). Hospitals have
an incentive to compete on quality in order to attract patients within a network. As a
consequence, there are both price and quality incentives in play.
In contrast, in England in the 1990s, negotiation was done by a single local public entity
(Primary Care Trust, or PCT) for all individuals in a geographic area, and contracts were
sole source. Purchasers could use savings obtained via lower prices to purchase more
care (particularly elective care). Hospitals’ operating incomes came from contracts with
purchasers. Information on quality was not publicly available. This led to negotiations
focused on price, not quality. As a consequence, patients had little or no choice of hospital,
and there was far less incentive for hospitals to compete on quality to attract patients.
PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION, CONT.
Consolidation between physicians
and hospitals is of great interest both
because of the potential consolidation
has for creating integration, and the
impetus created by the ACA’s push
towards creating Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs) and emphasis
on bundled payments. In theory, there
are substantial gains to be made from
consolidation. However, there are
also concerns that consolidation may
have adverse impacts on competition.
Consolidation can simply be an
attempt by providers to enhance
bargaining power vis à vis insurers.
The research evidence on
physician-hospital consolidation
does not find evidence supporting
either clinical gains or cost
reductions (9, 27). The most likely
reason is that most consolidation did
not lead to true integration. Evidence
on this topic comes from examination
of physician-hospital organizations in
the 1990s. Current consolidation is
too recent to allow for studies of its
effects. While the successes of certain
prominent integrated organizations,
such as Geisinger Health System,
InterMountain Healthcare, or the Mayo
Clinic, are frequently mentioned as
support for gains from consolidation,
these are ad hoc examples, selected
for their positive results. They do not
constitute research evidence.
5 The English studies are of a prior reform in the 1990s which emphasized price competition (see Propper et al.
(31) for more details).

The impact of hospital consolidation—Update | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF NO. 9 | 5
A major next step for research in this area is sorting out the factors that determine
whether competition will lead to increased or decreased quality. Whether competition
leads to increased or decreased quality depends on its relative impacts on how
responsive hospital choice is to price versus quality. Future research can focus on trying
to recover estimates of these key elements, as well as understanding institutional and
policy factors that affect the competitive environment.
Table 4: Summary of hospital quality-competition studies with market determined prices
since 2006
Author/
Year
Location
of data
Time frame
of analysis
Does
competition
increase
quality? 	Results
Sohn and
Rathouz (2003)
California 	1995 	Yes 	Competition reduced angioplasty
mortality.
Encinosa and
Bernard
(2005)
Florida 	1996–2000 	No 	Low hospital operating margin
(possibly due to competition) led to
more patient safety events.
Propper et al.
(2004)
England 	1995–98 	No 	Hospitals facing more competitors
had higher mortality rates in a
deregulated environment.
Capps
(2005)
New York 	1995–2000 	Yes 	Hospital mergers had no impact on
many quality indicators, but did lead
to increases in mortality for AMI and
heart failure patients.
Propper et al.
(2008)
England 	1991–99 	No 	Mortality increased at hospitals
with a larger number of competitors
following deregulation.
Howard
(2005)
US 	2000–02 	Yes 	Demand for kidney transplants is
responsive to graft failure. As demand
becomes more responsive, hospitals
have to compete harder to attract or
retain patients.
Abraham et al.
(2007)
US 	1990 	Yes 	Quantity increases with the number
of hospitals. This will happen only if
quality increases or price falls. This
therefore implies that an increase in
the number of hospitals increases
competition.
Cutler et al.
(2010)
Pennsylvania 1994–95,
2000,
2002–03
Yes 	Removing barriers to entry in the form
of certificate of need laws led to entry
and increased market shares for low
mortality rate CABG surgeons.
Escarce et al.
(2006)
California,
New York,
Wisconsin
1994–99 	Yes 	Mortality for patients with a variety
of conditions is lower in less
concentrated markets in California
and New York. There are no effects in
Wisconsin.
Rogowski et al.
(2007)
California 	1994–99 	Yes 	Mortality for patients with a variety of
conditions is lower where hospitals
have more competitors.
Romano and
Balan (2011)
Chicago
Primary
Metropolitan
Statistical
Area (PMSA)
1998–99,
2001–03
Yes 	A hospital merger in the Chicago
suburbs had no effect on some quality
indicators, and harmed some others.
PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION, CONT.
Consolidation is often motivated
by a desire to enhance bargaining
power by reducing competition.
Burns et al. (10) find that hospital-
physician alliances increase
with the number of HMOs in the
market. They infer that providers
may be consolidating in order to
achieve or enhance market power.
More recently, Berenson et al. (6)
conducted 300 interviews with
health care market participants, and
reported that increased bargaining
power through joint negotiations is
one of several reasons for hospital-
physician alliances.
Ciliberto and Dranove (12) and
Cuellar and Gertler (14) are
econometric studies that examine
the impact of physician-hospital
consolidation. Both papers look
at the effects of physician-hospital
consolidation on hospital prices.
The two studies find opposite
results—Cuellar and Gertler
find evidence consistent with
anticompetitive effects of physician-
hospital consolidation, while Ciliberto
and Dranove find no such evidence.
It appears that consolidation is often
motivated by a desire to enhance
bargaining power by reducing
competition, but the limited evidence
on whether this leads to higher
hospital prices is mixed.
Physician-hospital consolidation is often
motivated by enhanced bargaining power.

6 | THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF NO. 9 | THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION | The impact of hospital consolidation—Update
Additions to the evidence base since the 2006 research synthesis reinforce
the findings that hospital competition leads to lower prices. The expanded
evidence on competition and quality shows that competition leads to
higher quality when there are administered prices. The evidence is less
straightforward when prices are market determined, although the majority of
studies show that competition improves quality. Our review of the research
on physician-hospital consolidation does not suggest that such consolidation
(absent true integration) will lead to cost reductions or clinical improvement,
and may lead to enhanced market power for providers.
Policy developments since the 2006 synthesis give policy-makers both some
cause for optimism and some cause for concern.
> 	The FTC’s recent successes in blocking horizontal hospital mergers
should prevent further consolidation, thereby constraining price
increases and likely improving the quality of care.
> 	Nonetheless, many hospital markets remain highly concentrated and
noncompetitive. And, the prospect that the ACA could encourage
greater physician-hospital consolidation gives some cause for concern.
> 	While the current evidence base is not very supportive of initiatives
to encourage physician-hospital integration, given the current
interest in this kind of consolidation and the promotion of ACOs and
bundled payments, more evidence is clearly needed on the impacts of
consolidation on costs, quality and prices.
Conclusions and
Policy Implications
THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is an initiative of the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation to produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs
and reports on today’s important health policy issues.
PROJECT CONTACTS
David C. Colby, Ph.D., the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Katherine Hempstead, Ph.D., the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Sarah Goodell, M.A., Synthesis Project
SYNTHESIS ADVISORY GROUP
Linda T. Bilheimer, Ph.D., National Center for Health Statistics
Jon B. Christianson, Ph.D., University of Minnesota
Paul B. Ginsburg, Ph.D., Center for Studying Health System Change
Jack Hoadley, Ph.D., Georgetown University Health Policy Institute
Haiden A. Huskamp, Ph.D., Harvard Medical School
Julia A. James, Independent Consultant
Judith D. Moore, Independent Consultant
William J. Scanlon, Ph.D., National Health Policy Forum
Michael S. Sparer, Ph.D., Columbia University
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FTC Public Comment
Attachment D

FTC Public Comment
Attachment E

FTC Public Comment
Attachment F

1
July 21, 2014
The Honorable Janet L. Sanders
c/o Antitrust Division
Office of the Attorney General
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108
Re: 	Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Partners Healthcare System, Inc., South Shore
Health and Educational Corp., and Hallmark Health Corp., Superior Court Civil Action
No. 14-2033-BLS
CC: 	Massachusetts Health Policy Commission
Dear Judge Sanders:
We, the undersigned, submit to you this comment in our capacity as academic economists with
expertise in the subjects of antitrust, competition policy, and health economics. 	We are
concerned that the consent judgment in the above-referenced matter will not fully address the
substantial alleged anticompetitive effects of the acquisitions proposed by Partners Healthcare
Systems, Inc. (“Partners”). We urge you to reconsider your support of the proposed settlement
and to file for injunctive relief to ensure the transactions cannot be consummated until and unless
a full trial on the merits can be held. 	Our review of the public documents issued by the
Massachusetts Health Policy Commission, together with our collective understanding of
healthcare organizations and markets (underpinned by extensive academic research, cited below),
leads us to believe that the evidence would show that these acquisitions are not in the public
interest. Moreover, we do not believe that the proposed restrictions on Partners’ conduct included
in the consent judgment will offset the consumer harm that is likely to arise from the acquisitions
of South Shore and Hallmark hospitals and their physician affiliates. 	Below, we provide three
distinct arguments underlying our conclusions.
***
1. 	There is scant empirical evidence that horizontal or vertical integration among healthcare
providers of this scale leads to efficiencies.
The proposed settlement permits several acquisitions with horizontal as well as non-horizontal
(“vertical”) overlaps. We challenge the implicit conclusion by the Attorney General that these
transactions are likely to generate merger-specific, verifiable benefits to consumers.
In its response to the Health Policy Commission’s Cost and Market Impact Review of the South
Shore and Harbor Associates acquisitions, Partners claimed the deal would “yield economic and
operational efficiencies, all of which will, in turn, result in the delivery of high quality, cost
effective health care to all patients served in the South Shore and contribute to moderating the

2
rate of growth in health care expenditures for the benefit of patients and employers.” 1
Unfortunately, systematic evidence from hundreds of hospital mergers around the nation provides
little empirical support for these assertions.
A 2006 survey article authored by two prominent health and antitrust economists and sponsored
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation concluded that hospital mergers yield modest cost
savings at best, and only when hospitals combine operations (as opposed to sharing a corporate
parent). 2 The authors also find that consolidation generally leads to significantly higher prices,
and to lower, rather than higher, quality of care. A 2012 update to the 2006 survey reviewed
subsequent research and affirmed the prior findings.3 In other words, hospital mergers have
consistently failed to generate the benefits promised by their proponents.
There are important non-horizontal components to these transactions, as Partners will acquire
several physician groups and clinics affiliated with South Shore and the other hospitals. We are
hopeful that such affiliations among various healthcare providers can generate savings and quality
improvements, but there is no convincing evidence to date that combining physicians and
hospitals under common ownership tends to result in cost savings. 	In a lengthy review of the
literature, Burns, Goldsmith, and Sen (2013) conclude that “Research on the effect of integration
on physician productivity and hospital profitability has produced mixed results.” 4 A recent study
found that increases in the market share of hospitals that own physician practices are associated
with increases in area prices and spending.5
The stated objectives of organizations formed through hospital-physician partnerships have much
in common with a key initiative of the Affordable Care Act, the Accountable Care Organization
(ACO). Hence the early performance of ACOs is probative. 	The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services recently reported that slightly less than half of ACOs participating in the
Medicare Shared Savings Program achieved savings relative to the CMS benchmark – about what
one would expect from a random sample of healthcare delivery organizations. 6 However, ACO
sponsors presumably expected better-than-average savings given the significant fixed and
ongoing investments required to form and operate these novel and heavily-regulated entities.
1 Partners HealthCare, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and South Shore Hospital’s Response to the Health Policy
Commission’s Preliminary CMIR Report dated December 18, 2013. Submitted to the Health Policy Commission on
January 17, 2014. http://www.connectwithpartners.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/PHS-BWH-SSH-CMIR-
Response.pdf
2 William B. Vogt and Robert J. Town, “How Has Hospital Consolidation Affected the Price and Quality of Hospital
Care?” The Synthesis Project, no. 9 (2006): 11, available at http://www rwjf.org/en/research-publications/find-rwjf-
research/2006/02/how-has-hospital-consolidation-affected-the-price-and-quality-of.html.
3 Martin Gaynor and Robert J. Town, “The Impact of Hospital Consolidation—Update,” The Synthesis Project, 2012,
available at http://www rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261.
4 Lawton Robert Burns, Jeff Goldsmith, and Aditi Sen, “Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Physicians: A Tale of
Two Tails,” Advances in Health Care Management 15, 2013, 39-117.
5 Laurence C. Baker, M. Kate Bundorf, and Daniel P. Kessler, “Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership Of Physician
Practices Is Associated With Higher Prices And Spending,” Health Affairs May 2014 vol. 33 no. 5 756-763.
6 CMS reported that 54 of 114 ACOs participating in MSSP in 2012 “had lower expenditures than projected. Of these,
29 achieved savings sufficiently large to trigger shared savings.
http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-Releases/2014-Press-releases-items/2014-01-30 html.

3
We do not intend to suggest that ACOs or their analogues for non-Medicare populations are not
promising mechanisms for improved care delivery (both in terms of cost and quality). Rather, we
observe that the success of ACOs is yet unknown, and permitting combinations that are extremely
difficult to unwind if they prove unsuccessful requires a significant leap of faith on three
dimensions: (1) clinical care coordination can be successful; (2) the benefits of clinical care
coordination cannot be achieved through joint ventures or contracts; (3) the benefits exceed the
likely anticompetitive effects.
2. 	The parties’ background and arguments do not warrant exceptional treatment
No court has yet to permit an otherwise illegal merger to proceed on the grounds that efficiencies
sufficiently offset alleged harm. 7 Notably, the courts require “proof of extraordinary efficiencies”
in circumstances where market concentration is high. 8 In our view, neither Partners’ historical
record nor its post-acquisition plans appear sufficiently compelling to meet this standard.
While Partners’ planned investments in the South Shore might not occur absent the proposed
acquisitions, it is not clear that net benefits to consumers will be positive. 	Partners has not
suggested that the acquisitions are intended to generate financial losses, hence it is plausible to
assume that the investments must be repaid over time through higher charges to payers (or,
equivalently, lower pass-through of cost savings). 	Partners plans to invest $200 million to
support its new investments in the South Shore. 9 If realized efficiencies exceed this figure, there
is potential for net consumer benefits. Yet Partners’ claimed efficiencies – which HPC’s experts
have deemed significantly inflated – amount to only $158.6 million over an eight-year period.10, 11
And, as noted earlier, systematic evidence from prior mergers suggests that savings are unlikely.
Partners’ track record also fails to inspire confidence that this new set of acquisitions will
generate the hoped-for efficiencies. Since its inception in 1994, Partners has pursued a strategy
of expansion and integration. 	Currently, Partners includes 8 general acute care hospitals and
contracts on behalf of several others. Its physician group, Partners Community Healthcare, Inc.
(PCHI), comprises more than 5,500 physicians.12 As a result of a 2012 acquisition, Partners also
owns a health plan.13 In spite of two decades of expansion and integration, Partners Healthcare is
consistently identified as having higher prices and higher medical expenses than other, less
7 FTC v. ProMedica Health Sys., No. 3:11 cv 47, 2011 WL 1219281, at *57 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2011)
8 “High market concentration levels require proof of extraordinary efficiencies, . . . and courts generally have found
inadequate proof of efficiencies to sustain a rebuttal of the government’s case,” United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833
F. Supp. 2d 36, 89 (D.D.C. 2011).
9 Massachusetts Health Policy Commission, “Review of Partners Healthcare System’s Proposed Acquisitions of South
Shore Hospital and Harbor Medical Associates,” HPC-CMIR-2013-1 and HPC-CMIR-2013-2, February 19, 2014, at 6.
10 “Why our Partnership with South Shore Hospital Will Improve Care and Reduce Costs,” 1/17/2014 press release.
This estimate does not include potential savings to the federal Medicare program, but only a small fraction of Medicare
savings accrue to Massachusetts residents. However, the HPC CMIRs note the risk of higher costs to Medicare
because hospital-affiliated physicians may bill for facility fees in addition to professional charges for office-based care.
11 We refrain from remarking on the efficiencies and investments detailed for the Hallmark transaction, as the CMIR
has yet to be finalized and Partners has not issued a response as of this writing.
12 Massachusetts Health Policy Commission, “Review of Partners Healthcare System’s Proposed Acquisition of
Hallmark Health Corporation,” HPC-CMIR-2013-4, July 2, 2014, at 7.
13 https://www nhp.org/whoweare/Pages/Partners-Healthcare.aspx.

4
integrated, systems.14 Moreover, several reports issued by Massachusetts state agencies, including
the Office of the Attorney General, have concluded that high prices are not well-correlated with
higher quality of care. These studies have also raised significant concerns about adverse impacts
of current and future consolidation on local healthcare spending.15
3. 	The proposed agreement does too little to curb the exercise of market power alleged to arise
from the acquisitions of South Shore Hospital, Harbor Associates and Hallmark Health
System.
In most cases, antitrust enforcers favor structural remedies – e.g., blocking or dissolving mergers
– for a variety of reasons well-described in a recent speech by Deborah Feinstein, the Director of
the Bureau of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission.16 Perhaps the most important of
these reasons is that regulators can only guess at the “but for” world and attempt to design
conduct requirements that seem likeliest to produce that world. Such endeavors are likely to be
most successful in mature industries where price and quality are relatively easy to measure,
demand and cost are relatively stable, and innovation is limited.17 These conditions do not
characterize healthcare markets of today. Nevertheless, the Attorney General has stated that the
restrictions in the consent judgment would accomplish more than successfully blocking this set of
acquisitions. 18 Economic theory and evidence suggest otherwise.
First, the requirement that Partners offer payers the right to engage in “component contracting,”
whereby payers may pick and choose which components of the Partners system they wish to
include in their various insurance products, does not eliminate the unilateral incentive for each
component to raise price following a merger. 19 Ordinarily, firms are reluctant to raise price
because they may lose customers to rivals. But if two erstwhile competitors share a corporate
parent, then when one raises its price, some of its customers shift their business to the other firm.
This keeps the revenues “in the family”, which blunts any disincentive to raise prices. Thus, a
14 For example, the Massachusetts Center for Health Information and Analysis recently reported the following: (1)
Partners had “acute hospital price levels in 2012 that were higher than the network median price across all payers’
networks”; (2) “Physician groups that were associated with Partners and Atrius Health had relative price levels that
were significantly higher than the network median price levels across most payers in 2011”; (3) “Partners was the only
physician group system examined that had a health status adjusted TME [Total Medical Expense] above the network
average physician group TME in the top three payers’ networks.” Center for Health Information and Analysis,
“Annual Report on the Massachusetts Health Care Market” August 2013, at 29.
15 For a summary of the 16 reports issued between 2008 and 2013, see http://www mahp.com/assets/pdfs/MAHP-cost-
drivers-in-the-cwealth.pdf.
16 Deborah L. Feinstein, “Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care: Proscription, Not Prescription,” June 18, 2014, at 14-
15. Available at http://www ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/06/antitrust-enforcement-health-care-proscription-not-
prescription
17 Ken Heyer, “Optimal Remedies for Anticompetitive Mergers,” 2012, Antitrust 26(2): 26-31.
18 “While a lawsuit could have blocked Partners’ expansion to South Shore Hospital, it also would have maintained the
unacceptable status quo in the health care market. Today’s resolution goes well beyond that by reducing the negotiating
power of Partners, limiting its ability to acquire physicians, and controlling costs across its entire network,” June 24,
2014, “AG Final Resolution with Partners Would Alter Provider’s Negotiating Power, Restrict Growth and Health
Costs,” available at http://www mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2014/2014-06-24-partners-
settlement html
19 In years 1-7 of the agreement, the four components are: Academic Medical Center Contracting Component,
Community Contracting Component, South Shore Contracting Component, and Hallmark Health Contracting
Component. In years 8-10, the South Shore and Hallmark Health components will be merged with the Community
Contracting Component. http://www mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2014/partners-settlement-062414.pdf at 17-18.

5
merger of rivals will result in prices above the levels that would prevail if the rivals were truly
independent. This is true even in the absence of explicit price coordination among the co-owned
former rivals.
Indeed, the Evanston Northwestern-Highland Park hospital merger in the northern suburbs of
Chicago in 2000 provides a case in point. Shortly after the merger, inpatient prices charged to
commercial payers increased by nearly 50%, far exceeding price increases among various control
groups in the Chicago area.20 Moreover, extensive empirical analysis shows that quality did not
improve relative to other area hospitals. 21 In light of this evidence, the merger was deemed
anticompetitive by an administrative law judge in 2005, a determination that was affirmed on
appeal to the full Commission in 2007.22 Concluding that “divesting Highland Park after seven
years of integration would be a complex, lengthy, and expensive process,” the Commission
ordered the parent entity (Evanston Northwestern Healthcare) to establish a separate and
independent contract negotiating team for Highland Park Hospital. Apparently no insurer has yet
availed itself of this option, suggesting that payers recognize that the benefits of separate
negotiation (which subsumes component contracting) are minimal. 	To our knowledge, prices
have not reverted back to competitive levels, despite the supposed return of competitive pricing
incentives. The FTC has since distanced itself from this remedy. 23 A recent simulation of such a
remedy in a different setting – a proposed hospital acquisition in Northern Virginia – also shows
that separate bargaining would have done little to mitigate post-merger price increases had the
FTC and Virginia Attorney General not successfully blocked the transaction. 24
Second, the price and total medical expenditure (TME) growth caps imposed by the consent
judgment will only bind if (a) prices and spending growth would otherwise increase; and (b)
prices and spending can be easily calculated and monitored. 	Healthcare inflation and spending
growth are no longer foregone conclusions. 	Total U.S. healthcare spending actually declined
between Q42013 and Q12014, notwithstanding a substantial increase in the insured population.
There are many ongoing initiatives to “bend the cost curve,” so this may not prove to be a one-
time event. To take but one example, the 2011 shift by Medicare to bundled payment for dialysis
treatments led to a 20 percent reduction in the use of expensive biologic drugs over the course of
a single year, and an additional 39 percent reduction the subsequent year.25 If the cost curve does
“bend”, residents of Massachusetts will reap more of the benefits in a less concentrated provider
market, and this settlement enables the opposite. We also note that the TME cap may be raised if
20 Deborah Haas-Wilson and Christopher Garmon, “Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective
Analysis,” International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2011, 18(1): 17-32.
21 Patrick S. Romano and David J. Balan, “A Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical Quality Effects of the Acquisition
of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, “ International Journal of the Economics of
Business, 2011, 18(1): 45-64.
22 In the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc., No. 9315, August 6,
2007, available at www ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/070806opinion.pdf.
23 “The Commission did accept a conduct remedy in its challenge to the combination of Evanston and Highland Park
hospitals....We have repeatedly rejected this sort of conduct remedy since.” Deborah Feinstein, “Antitrust Enforcement
in Healthcare: Proscription, not Prescription,” June 19, 2014, at footnote 43.
24 Gautam Gowrisankaran, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Town, "Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the
Hospital Industry," Accepted, American Economic Review, June 2014. For additional details on the transaction in
question, see http://www ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/061-0166/inova-health-systems-foundation-prince-
william-health-system.
25 2013 Atlas of CKD & ESRD, U.S. Renal Data System, available at http://www.usrds.org/2013/pdf/v2_ch11_13.pdf

6
non-Partners hospitals exceed the HPC’s benchmarks, and moreover that it pertains only to the
segment of Partners’ patients enrolled in a “Risk Arrangement.” 	According to the most recent
data available (from 2012), only 11% of Partners’ commercial business falls in this category.26
Even if the caps were to bind, implementation and monitoring will be exceedingly difficult.
There is widespread agreement that price is extremely hard to measure in the healthcare sector.
In addition, and as the dialysis example illustrates, payment modalities are evolving away from
fee for service and toward more sophisticated approaches such as bundling. Even the apparently
straightforward TME is challenging to measure, as it must be adjusted for patients’ health risk
and changes in health plan benefit design. And as many have noted, price and spending caps do
not address quality of the services provided, which could be reduced in order to maintain desired
margins.
Third, there are no protections in place after the agreement expires. If the acquisitions are indeed
anticompetitive, and if the restrictions imposed by the consent judgment bind, when they expire
the residents of the Commonwealth will face the full extent of the market power of a system
strengthened by the Attorney General’s decision to drop its investigation into Partners’ historical
contracting practices and to permit the new series of acquisitions to proceed unchallenged. There
are few well-documented analyses of conduct by hospitals following the expiration of similar
agreements, as remedies of this form are rare. 	However, the limited evidence available is not
encouraging.
For example, in 1997 New York State’s Attorney General agreed to drop its opposition to the
merger of Long Island Jewish Medical Center and North Shore Health System in exchange for a
series of post-merger commitments, including a 2-year price-growth cap. 	In 2000, hospital
executives reported significant improvements in reimbursement rates due to their stronger
negotiating position.27
Another example is the “Community Commitment” required by the judge who denied the FTC’s
1996 request for an injunction to bar the merger of Butterworth Health Corporation and Blodgett
Memorial Medical Center in Grand Rapids, Michigan.28 The Commitment, entered as a court
order, included a price freeze for 3 years, followed by a price growth cap set at the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) for an additional 4 years. Immediately following the expiration of the price cap
26 Public Comment by the Massachusetts Health Policy Commission in re Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Partners
Healthcare System, Inc., South Shore Health and Educational Corp., and Hallmark Health Corp., Superior Court Civil
Action No. 14-2033-BLS, http://www.mass.gov/anf/docs/hpc/hpc-submission-into-court-authorized-public-comment-
period.pdf
27 “After Merger’s Bumpy Start, North Shore-L.I.J. is Clicking,” New York Times, December 17, 2000.
http://www nytimes.com/2000/12/17/nyregion/after-merger-s-bumpy-start-north-shore-lij-is-
clicking html?src=pm&pagewanted=1
28 David Balto and Meleah Geertsma, “Why Hospital Merger Antitrust Enforcement Remains Necessary: A
Retrospective on the Butterworth Merger,” Journal of Health Law, 2011, 34(2): 129-165.

7
in 2004, the parent system raised prices 12 percent. 29 In recent years, price increases have far
exceeded CPI, including 8 percent price increases in each of 2010 and 2011.30
***
In closing, we emphasize that there is no longer any meaningful debate in the academic
community about whether provider competition is beneficial to consumers. In contrast, there is
significant evidence that efficiencies do not necessarily or generally follow from provider
mergers. 	Partners’ 20-year track record of integration paired with high prices and high medical
costs casts serious doubt on its assertions that the proposed acquisitions would yield substantial
efficiencies, let alone of the magnitude necessary to outweigh the alleged anticompetitive effects.
We urge the court and the Attorney General not to be unduly swayed by submissions from
community members and organizations in support of this judgment. Most hospital mergers –
particularly among non-profit organizations – draw substantial support from the affected
communities due to strong community ties. But the harmful impact of these mergers on prices
and insurance premiums generally affects a broader group of stakeholders, many of whom lack
the incentive or resources to voice their objections. 	In addition, they do so at the risk of
alienating powerful healthcare providers who may subsequently retaliate with impunity.
The court should be given the opportunity to weigh the evidence concerning whether the series of
acquisitions permitted by the consent judgment will substantially lessen competition, per Section
7 of the Clayton Act and the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, M.G.L. c. 93 A.
Leemore Dafny
Herman Smith Research Professor of Hospital and Health Services
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
David Dranove
Walter J. McNerney Professor of Health Industry Management
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
Laurence Baker
Professor of Health Research and Policy
Stanford University School of Medicine
29 “Spectrum Hikes Charges 12 Percent,” Grand Rapids Business Journal, June 4, 2004, available at
http://www.grbj.com/articles/63939
30 “Spectrum Health Plans Another Significant Rate Hike at Grand Rapids Hospitals,” June 7, 2011, mlive.com.,
available at http://www mlive.com/business/west-michigan/index.ssf/2011/06/spectrum_health_plans_8_percen html