Comment of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Concerning "Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements"

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Reform of Generator Interconnection 	) 	Docket No. RM17-8-000
Procedures and Agreements 	)
COMMENT OF THE STAFF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
April 10, 2017
I. 	Introduction
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR) concerning “Reform of Generator Interconnection Procedures and
Agreements.”1 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) staff appreciates the opportunity to
submit this comment.2
Over the past two decades, the electric power industry has experienced a profound
competitive transformation.3 Decisions by FERC and state regulators to reduce entry barriers in
1 FERC, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Dkt. No. RM17-8-000, 82 Fed. Reg. 4464 (Jan. 13,
2017) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. Parts 35, 37). The original deadline for comments was March
14, 2017. On February 23, 2017, in response to requests from several parties, FERC extended
the deadline to April 13.
2 This comment expresses the view of the FTC’s Office of the General Counsel, Office of Policy
Planning, and Bureau of Economics. The comment does not necessarily represent the views of
the FTC or of any individual Commissioner. The Commission, however, has voted to authorize
the filing of this comment.
3 Technological developments and regulatory innovations have often motivated the expansion of
competition in the electric power industry. At first, new technologies enabled new (and
relatively small) power generation resources to become more cost-effective, facilitating the entry
of independent power producers that compete with one another as well as with the large-scale
generating facilities historically owned by most electric distribution utilities. The rise of these
smaller generation resources precipitated the unbundling of generation from transmission,
facilitating competition in wholesale electricity markets. Several states then introduced
competition at the electric retail level, which allows independent marketers (as well as utility
affiliates) to seek customers on the basis of more attractive prices, service improvements,
environmental attributes, or bundling with hardware and software to help customers reduce their
electric bills. Some states are now examining how to accommodate more on-site generation that
can compete with central station generation.

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parts of the industry previously deemed “off limits” to competition led to or facilitated many
competitive developments in formerly monopolized electricity markets.
FERC’s consideration of reforms to its generator interconnection rules is a logical next
step in this procompetitive process because FERC and industry participants are concerned that
some transmission owners still can discriminate against generation entrants under the current
rules. Where it arises, such discrimination can result in anticompetitive delays and/or increased
costs for generation entrants that need to obtain essential interconnections with the transmission
grid.4
FTC staff supports FERC’s proposals to reform its interconnection rules to facilitate the
construction of generation interconnections to the grid. The reform of generation
interconnection rules is particularly timely in light of changes in technology and in relative fuel
prices that have resulted, and likely will continue to result, in substantial shifts in the sources of
electricity generation.5 In addition to alleviating potential transmission interconnection
discrimination, the proposed changes to FERC’s rules may provide generation entrants with
opportunities to innovate in ways that will reduce costs and lessen delays in the interconnection
process. FERC also proposes steps to increase the efficiency of the interconnection process,
which also should facilitate increased competition that will benefit electricity consumers.
4 FERC has been working for more than 20 years to alleviate undue discrimination in
transmission services as a means to remove barriers to entry and increase competition in electric
generation. Notable examples include the development of independent transmission system
operators (both Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs)) and the removal of legal barriers to merchant transmission firms that (if approved in the
transmission planning process) can build transmission lines to areas where new generators prefer
to locate. The FTC staff commented to FERC as far back as 1995 on independent transmission
system operators. Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade
Commission, Promoting Wholesale Competition through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, FERC Dkt. Nos. RM96-8-000 and RM94-7-001 (Aug. 7, 1995),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
federal-energy-regulatory-commission-matter-promoting-wholesale-competition./v950008.pdf.
FERC previously addressed interconnection issues in Order No. 2003, FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,146 at P 8.
5 NOPR at PP 24-25. For example, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that
natural gas and renewable resources will continue to expand their shares of the generation mix at
least through 2050. EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2017,
http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=9-AEO2017&region=0-
0&cases=ref2017&start=2020&end=2050&f=Q&linechart=&ctype=linechart&sourcekey=0.

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II. 	FTC Staff Statement of Interest
The FTC is an independent agency of the United States Government responsible for
maintaining competition and safeguarding the interests of consumers. The FTC fulfills these
missions through law enforcement, policy research, and advocacy. For example, in the field of
consumer protection, the FTC enforces Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices. To further its competition mission, the FTC
enforces antitrust laws regarding mergers and unfair methods of competition that harm
competition and consumers. In addition, the FTC often analyzes regulatory or legislative
proposals that may affect competition, allocative efficiency, or consumer protection. It also
engages in considerable consumer education, mostly through its Division of Consumer and
Business Education.6 In the course of all of this work, the FTC applies established legal and
economic principles as well as innovative developments in economic theory and empirical
analysis.
The energy sector, including the electric power industry, has been an important focus of
the FTC’s merger review and other antitrust enforcement, competition advocacy, and consumer
protection efforts.7 In particular, the FTC and its staff have filed numerous comments
advocating competition and consumer protection principles with state utility commissions, state
legislatures, the Department of Energy (DOE), and FERC.8 The FTC staff also issued two
6 For an overview of the FTC’s education efforts, see the FTC staff’s comment to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau concerning Request for Information on Effective Financial
Education, Docket No. CFPB-2012-0030 (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/11/1211cfpb.pdf.
7 See, e.g., In re DTE Energy Co., FTC Dkt. No. C-4008 (2001) (consent order),
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-and-proceedings/cases/2001/05/dte-energy-company-and-
mcn-energy-group-inc; In re PacifiCorp, File No. 971 0091 (1998) (consent agreement),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1998/02/9710091.agr_.htm; FTC
Conference on Energy Markets in the 21st Century: Competition Policy in Perspective (Apr. 10-
12, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2007/04/energy-markets-21st-
century-competition-policy-perspective.
8 A listing, in reverse chronological order, of FTC and FTC staff competition advocacy
comments to federal and state electricity regulatory agencies is available at
http://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/advocacy-
filings?combine=&field_matter_number_value=&field_advocacy_document_terms_tid=5290&f
ield_date_value%5Bmin%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_date_value%5Bmax%5D%5Bdate%5D=&
=Apply. In addition, the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection has been monitoring the
evolving uses of energy-related consumer data for privacy and data security issues. See, e.g.,
Letter from Jessica L. Rich, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC, to Eric Lightner,
Director, Federal Smart Grid Task Force, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability,
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, concerning a Voluntary Code of Conduct for Utilities and Third Parties
Providing Consumer Energy Use Services (Oct. 29, 2014),

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reports on electric power industry restructuring issues at the wholesale and retail levels.9 The
FTC staff (along with staff from FERC, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Agriculture, and DOE) contributed to the work of the Electric Energy Market Competition Task
Force, which issued a Report to Congress on Competition in Wholesale and Retail Markets for
Electric Energy in 2007.10 In 2016, the FTC organized a public workshop on distributed solar
energy to explore the competition, consumer protection, and regulatory issues associated with
this emerging generation technology.11
III. 	Background on the NOPR and Transmission Interconnection Queues
FERC issued the present NOPR to address concerns raised by the American Wind
Energy Association (AWEA) and other parties about the effectiveness and efficiency of existing
rules governing interconnection procedures and agreements.12 AWEA also filed a formal
petition requesting changes to interconnection rules for large generators.13 AWEA’s petition
points out that transmission owners have both incentives and abilities to engage in
anticompetitive discrimination against independent power generators’ entry attempts, at a time
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/599251/141029consumer_energy
vcccomment.pdf.
9 FTC Staff Report, Competition and Consumer Protection Perspectives on Electric Power
Regulatory Reform: Focus on Retail Competition (Sept. 2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/competition-consumer-protection-perspectives-electric-power-
regulatory-reform-focus-retail; FTC Staff Report, Competition and Consumer Protection
Perspective on Electric Power Regulatory Reform (July 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/competition-consumer-protection-perspectives-electric-power-
regulatory-reform (containing edited compendium of excerpts from previous comments that the
FTC and its staff provided to various state and federal agencies).
10 That report is available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/ene-pol-act/epact-final-rpt.pdf.
11 Something New Under the Sun: Competition & Consumer Protection Issues in Solar Energy
(June 21, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/06/something-new-
under-sun-competition-consumer-protection-issues.
12 In addition to receiving interconnection complaints and the AWEA petition, FERC held a
technical conference on interconnection issues before issuing the NOPR. NOPR at PP 22-23. At
that technical conference, AWEA and other participants – including transmission interconnection
applicants, transmission owners, and economic and technical experts – provided additional
details and comments, https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20160823100648-Transcript%20-
%20Revised%20-%20051316FERCTechConf.pdf.
13 Petition for Rulemaking of the American Wind Energy Association to Revise Generator
Interconnection Rules and Procedures (Petition) (June 19, 2015),
https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=13909575. See also NOPR at P 19.

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when there is an ongoing “dramatic transformation of the electric generation system.”14 The
kinds of discrimination identified by AWEA can delay a generator’s entry and/or raise its costs
during the interconnection process.15 FERC reached the same conclusion in Order No. 2003.16
According to its petition, AWEA’s members have continued to face anticompetitive
discrimination, which may have taken different forms since FERC issued Order No. 2003.17
The incentives to discriminate stem from the fact that many transmission owners also
own power generation facilities that would compete against generation entrants. The
transmission owners’ generating assets may yield higher profits if they can delay or increase the
costs of new generation entrants. Coupled with these incentives is an incumbent transmission
owner’s ability to delay and raise the costs of power generation entrants by virtue of its control
over the timing and costs of a generation entrant’s connection to the transmission system. The
transmission owner can raise entry barriers using tactics to delay and/or raise rivals’ costs,
reducing the competition and consumer benefits that would otherwise flow from generator entry.
Some concerns about anticompetitive interconnection delays and increased costs stem from what
may be biased interpretations of interconnection rules by transmission owners and from disputes
of dubious validity raised by transmission owners.18
In addition to concerns about anticompetitive behavior by transmission owners, the
transmission owners have expressed concerns about their ability to manage effectively the
interconnection process for power generation and energy storage entrants because many
applicants subsequently withdraw their requests for interconnections to the grid. When an
application in the interconnection queue is withdrawn, projected patterns of power flows and
transmission congestion will change. As a result, transmission owners must often restudy the
interconnection requests remaining in the queue. The resulting costs and delays are exacerbated
when additional interconnection applicants in the queue withdraw their applications. Thus, a
power generation applicant remaining in the queue could be subject to multiple interconnection
restudies. These additional studies can impose increased direct costs and delays on potential
power generation entrants, independent of concerns about anticompetitive increases in the cost or
frequency of interconnection restudies. In extreme circumstances, the added costs and delays
14 Petition at 1.
15 NOPR at PP 24-30.
16 Order No. 2003, supra note 4, at PP 11-12.
17 Petition at 7.
18 NOPR at PP 19, 26, 28. Examples of undue discrimination in the form of anticompetitive
delays include: postponing the start or the completion of an interconnection study; unnecessarily
expanding the scope or complexity of such a study; displacing an applicant’s position in the
interconnection queue by falsely asserting that changes in the design of the project require a
restudy; or engaging in sham disputes with an interconnection applicant that take time to resolve.
Moreover, it could be costly, difficult, and time-consuming to detect and document such forms
of anticompetitive discrimination.

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stemming from withdrawals of projects higher in the interconnection queue may threaten the
economic viability of entry plans that sit lower in the queue. This could result in a cascade effect
as additional entrants withdraw from the interconnection queue due to the added costs and delays
that they face.
IV. 	FERC’s Proposed Improvements Designed to Reduce Delays and Excessive
Costs Facing Power Generation Entrants19
FERC proposes several improvements to help generation entrants interconnect more
quickly and at lower cost, thus increasing the effectiveness of generation competition.20 Even if
transmission owners do not discriminate against power generation entrants, these improvements
will provide generation entrants with the opportunity to propose innovations in how
interconnections are built or funded.
• 	First, FERC proposes that each power generation entrant be allowed, at its own
discretion, to reduce the size (and associated costs) of its interconnection requirements by
installing onsite energy storage that reduces its interconnection needs.21 Existing rules
mandate that the interconnection requirements be sufficient to cover the entrant’s
generating capacity. FERC’s proposed alternative could be particularly attractive if, for
example, an interconnection equal to the generator’s full capacity would require major
transmission upgrades, whereas a slightly smaller interconnection would not. In this
scenario, the generation entrant might well choose to install onsite energy storage to
absorb any output that exceeds the size of the smaller, lower-cost interconnection for
which it applies.22 The generation entrant could then sell the stored electric energy when
its generators are not running at capacity. Such storage capability has the added benefit
19 Although the NOPR focuses on power generation entrants, the same concerns apply to energy
storage entrants that can also increase competition facing the power generation assets of
transmission owners. FERC extends the NOPR to cover these facilities. Id. at PP 134-39, 224-
30.
20 Id. at PP 32-230.
21 Id. at PP 161-80. A related proposal about the entrant’s project design would allow power
generation entrants to update the technology they will use without losing their place in the
transmission interconnection queue (id. at PP 212-23). The current system – which authorizes
the transmission owner to force the power generation entrant to the end of the interconnection
queue if the entrant’s equipment plans change – enables the transmission owner to delay and
raise the costs of rival power generation entry. Moreover, to the extent that projects
encompassing both generation and energy storage become more economical and enter the market
with greater force, the proposed reform may also increase competition in wholesale energy
markets more generally.
22 The use of onsite energy storage for this purpose could also be a temporary solution while the
generation entrant waits for an existing generator to exit the market and release the transmission
capacity it has been using.

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of allowing the generator to sell electricity during times of peak demand, when prices are
highest. The availability of this option could alleviate any anticompetitive effects of
forcing a generation entrant to purchase more interconnection service than it needs.
• 	Second, FERC proposes to authorize each power generation entrant, at its own discretion,
to build the facilities necessary to interconnect with the transmission system.23 (The
transmission owner would continue to own the facilities.) This option to build the
interconnection facilities is currently available to generation entrants only when the
transmission owner formally acknowledges that it is unable to construct the
interconnection facilities in a reasonable time.24 At the technical conference, multiple
parties explained that “they are often able to build more rapidly and at lower cost than
transmission owners.”25 Allowing such building by generation entrants that can more
easily absorb the cost and burden of constructing interconnection facilities could reduce
opportunities for anticompetitive delays or the imposition of excessive costs by
transmission owners.
• 	Third, FERC proposes to limit transmission owners’ ability to self-fund generation
interconnections.26 Currently, the generation entrant generally funds the facilities
constructed by the transmission owner to interconnect the generation entrant with the
transmission grid.27 The transmission owner, however, has the option to self-fund
construction of these facilities and recover those costs from the generation entrant.28
Generation entrants are concerned that the self-funding option can allow the transmission
owner to levy large upgrade costs on the generation entrant.29 (The transmission owner
23 NOPR at PP 52-63. The facilities can then be handed over to the transmission owner with
fewer competitive concerns because the grid operator (an ISO or RTO) will control the use of the
facilities and/or the open access rules for wholesale electricity trades (that still apply outside
IROs and RTOs) will be in effect. FERC does not propose any change in the quality assurances
that already exist under the narrower self-build option for generators. The NOPR makes no
mention about concerns about the quality of such interconnection facilities built by entrants.
Further, generation entrants have incentives to build reliable interconnection facilities because
their sales of power on the grid depend on the reliability of these interconnection facilities.
24 FERC proposes to allow interconnection customers to elect to build – though not own – their
own interconnection facilities regardless of the ability and willingness of the transmission owner
to construct the facilities. Effectively, this provision allows a generation entrant to compete
against the transmission owner to provide transmission construction services.
25 NOPR at P 56.
26 Id. at PP 64-77.
27 Id. at P 65.
28 Id. at PP 66-69.
29 Id. at PP 69, 72.

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presumably would avoid incurring these higher costs when interconnecting its own
generation facilities.30) A transmission owner’s ability to increase transmission
interconnection costs for the generation entrant – including by engaging in ineffective
bargaining with underwriters or other financial agents – can raise competitive concerns31
because, under existing rules, any added costs resulting from such behavior are passed on
to the power generation entrant.32 To address this concern, FERC proposes to permit
self-funding by the transmission owner only if the generation entrant agrees.33
We strongly agree that transmission owners’ existing ability and incentives to
discriminate against new power generators raise competitive concerns. Such discrimination can
result in consumer harm because anticompetitive discrimination diminishes an entrant’s potential
effectiveness, such as the ability to lower costs and bring additional sources of generation to
wholesale electricity markets.
FERC’s specific proposals give entrants competitive alternatives to the monopolized
services on which they must currently rely. The FTC staff has endorsed the creation of
competitive alternatives in the past for generators facing monopoly transmission providers,34 and
we continue to do so.
30 Id. at P 68.
31 The transmission owner will strive to avoid any extra costs of interconnecting its own
generation to the transmission system because any extra costs would reduce its own profits.
32 FERC proposes to require consent from the power generation entrant before a transmission
owner arranges financing of transmission upgrades. The default would be that the power
generation entrant arranges the financing for the required transmission upgrades. The power
generation entrant may find it preferable to arrange its own financing because, for example, it
expects that it can bargain more effectively than the transmission owner, or because it has
internal access to lower-cost funds.
33 NOPR at P 71.
34 See, e.g., Comment of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, FERC Dkt. Nos. RM11-24-000 and AD10-13-000, Third-Party
Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial Reporting for New Electric Storage
Technologies (Sept. 6, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
federal-energy-regulatory-commission-concerning-third-party-provision-
ancillary/120912fercstaffcomment.pdf (FTC staff comment to FERC on third-party provision of
ancillary services, encouraging FERC to insist that transmission providers adjust reserve
requirements for transmission customers to reflect the quality of the reserves self-supplied by
those customers); Comment of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission on Integration of
Variable Energy Resources, FERC Dkt. No. RM10-11-000, at 5-6 (Mar. 1, 2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-
federal-energy-regulatory-commission-concerning-integration-variable-

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V. 	Improving Transmission Congestion Information to Promote Efficient Power
Generation Entry
FERC and various electricity industry participants have observed that many proposed
generation interconnection projects obtain a position in an interconnection queue, only to
subsequently withdraw from the queue.35 Rather than proposing penalties for withdrawing from
an interconnection queue, FERC proposes to address concerns about the effects of withdrawals
by focusing on why potential power generation entrants sometimes withdraw from queues.36
FERC found that one reason applicants withdraw from interconnection queues is that
they do not receive sufficient, verifiably accurate information from transmission owners.37 From
the perspective of power generation entrants, key information includes transmission congestion
data, the record of generation curtailments at the proposed generation site, and means to verify
that the transmission owner performed an accurate analysis of interconnection facilities and
transmission upgrades needed to maintain reliable transmission service. As in the past, we
support information improvements that enhance entrants’ ability to make well-informed
decisions about where and when to invest, as long as the benefits of providing such information
exceed the costs to FERC and the transmission system of doing do.38 Although we commend
FERC’s efforts on this issue, we also encourage FERC to weigh the costs and benefits of the
proposed information improvements.39
energy/110304fercenergyresources.pdf (commenting on integration of variable energy resources
and encouraging FERC to help variable resources evaluate self-supply alternatives (to buying
regulation services from transmission owners) by providing more detailed specifications about
acceptable self-supply options).
35 NOPR at P 4.
36 Id. at PP 97-121.
37 Id. at PP 33-51.
38 Comment of the Federal Trade Commission on Integration of Variable Energy Resources,
FERC Dkt. No. RM10-11-000, Section III.C.1 (Apr. 8, 2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-comment-
federalenergy-regulatory-commissionconcerning-integration-variable-energy-resources-
vers.rm10-11-000/v100009ferccomment.pdf (“We applaud efforts to improve supply forecasts
where the benefits are found to exceed the costs. We note that better micro-forecasting
reportedly can be used to increase the efficiency of wind generation. This also could increase
productivity and reduce consumer costs.”).
39 NOPR at PP 122-33, 140-51. To improve transparency, FERC proposes to require each
transmission provider to disclose the method used to determine transmission changes required
for the power generation entrant to connect to the transmission grid. This should enable the
entrant to check the accuracy of the transmission connection study (as well as the validity of the
method that the transmission owner employs).

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FERC also proposes another set of reforms to enhance interconnection processes by
transferring underutilized transmission capacity from exiting generators to entering generators.40
Where feasible, using underutilized interconnection capacity helps avoid additional costs or
delays from connection studies, without additional risk to other generators or to the reliability of
the power system. As stated before, a period of changes in the generation mix will likely entail
both more entries and more exits by generators. Decisions on how to reassign freed-up
generation capacity can play a significant role in providing transmission capacity for use by
generation entrants quickly and at low cost.
VI. 	Facilitating Efficient Power Generation Entry by Reducing Potential Bias in the
Resolution of Transmission Interconnection Disputes
Competitive concerns in the transmission interconnection process include delays and
increased costs. The timeliness and objectivity with which interconnection disputes under the
control of transmission owners are resolved are likely to raise these same competitive concerns.41
FERC also has cited complaints that the existing dispute resolution processes conducted by the
RTOs and ISOs are biased in favor of transmission owners.42 Although appeals to FERC are
possible in such disputes, such appeals can add to the delays and costs incurred by power
generation entrants.
FERC proposes three reforms to address these concerns. First, RTOs and ISOs will be
required to demonstrate timeliness in the resolution of interconnection disputes.43 Second,
FERC proposes to allow either party in such a dispute to seek arbitration directly, without the
consent of the other party.44 Under this proposal, the generation entrant can engage a neutral
third party to resolve the dispute in a relatively timely fashion, without incurring the likely costs
and delays of a direct appeal to FERC.45 Both of these proposals are likely to reduce the ability
of transmission providers to delay resolution of transmission connection disputes. Third, FERC
proposes that ISOs and RTOs be required to develop objective dispute resolution mechanisms
using arbitrators or facilitators who have no current or past association with either party in the
dispute.46 If FERC adopts these proposals, we encourage FERC to carefully monitor progress
toward objective dispute resolution.
40 NOPR at PP 191-211.
41 Id. at PP 78-87.
42 Id. at P 81.
43 Id. at P 84.
44 Id. at PP 85, 87.
45 Id. at P 84.
46 Id. at PP 78-87.

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More broadly, we note that the original rationale for RTOs and ISOs was to eliminate
discrimination in the provision of transmission services in order to promote effective competition
in wholesale electricity markets.47 Bias toward incumbent transmission owners by RTOs and
ISOs in resolving interconnection disputes could represent a significant departure from the
independence of RTOs and ISOs – the first minimum characteristic required of RTOs and ISOs
under Order No. 2000. We encourage FERC to monitor the situation to ensure that RTOs and
ISOs have not been subject to regulatory capture. Evidence that RTOs and ISOs systematically
enable incumbent transmission owners to bias the resolution of transmission interconnection
disputes – and thereby delay or raise the costs to power generation entrants – could be a sign of
regulatory capture.
VII. 	Conclusion
The FTC staff appreciates the opportunity to comment on this NOPR. Please address any
questions concerning this comment to John H. Seesel, Office of the General Counsel, at
jseesel@ftc.gov or (202) 326-2702.
47 Id. at P 84; FERC Order No. 2000, FERC Dkt. No. RM99-2-000, at 2-3 (Dec. 20, 1999),
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf (“[T]he Commission reviewed
evidence that traditional management of the transmission grid by vertically integrated electric
utilities was inadequate to support the efficient and reliable operation that is needed for the
continued development of competitive electricity markets, and that continued discrimination in
the provision of transmission services by vertically integrated utilities may also be impeding
fully competitive electricity markets. These problems may be depriving the Nation of the
benefits of lower prices and enhanced reliability. The comments on the [Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking] overwhelmingly support the conclusion that independently operated transmission
grids will enhance the benefits of competitive electricity markets.”).