Shihhan Chou v. Stephen V. Mikus

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 21, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2136 Cir. Ct. No. 2024SC57

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

SHIHHAN CHOU,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

STEPHEN V. MIKUS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Vernon County:
TIMOTHY J. GASKELL, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 BLANCHARD, J.1 Stephen Mikus, pro se, appeals a money
judgment issued by the circuit court in favor of Shihhan Chou, following a trial

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(a) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2024AP2136

conducted using small claims procedures. The judgment is in the amount of
money that Chou claims Mikus owes her. At trial, Chou presented evidence in the
form of emails exchanged between the two of them showing that Mikus used
Chou’s credit card to pay for both his own expenses and their shared expenses,
which included rent, food, plane flights, and other travel expenses.

¶2 Mikus does not dispute that the email exchanges reflect a record of
relevant transactions. Instead, Mikus argues that: (1) the circuit court lacked
personal jurisdiction over Mikus; (2) the court improperly admitted
unauthenticated evidence; (3) there was not an enforceable contract between
Mikus and Chou; (4) the court erred by failing to conduct a line-by-line review of
the evidence of alleged debts; and (5) the court improperly dismissed Mikus’s
counterclaim for $5,000. I affirm because Mikus fails to show that the circuit
court erred in any of these ways.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In March 2024, Chou commenced this action in small claims court
seeking a judgment against Mikus in the amount of $6,448.75. Mikus brought a
counterclaim for a $5,000 judgment based on professional services that he
allegedly rendered to Chou related to filing a tax return and divorce proceedings
that she had been involved in, against another person who is not a party to this
case.

¶4 The following summarizes pertinent trial evidence.

¶5 Beginning at some point in 2020, and lasting through June of 2023,
Chou and Mikus were in a domestic relationship. During the relationship, and in
at least some instances afterward, Mikus used Chou’s credit card to pay for some

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of his own personal expenses and for expenses shared by the parties. In order to
keep track of what was spent, and by whom, Chou and Mikus maintained a chain
of emails that they both regularly updated. Chou sought admission of the email
chain as an exhibit, which the circuit court admitted. The email chain reflected a
running tally that the two kept of the net amounts that Mikus owed to Chou for his
personal expenses and one-half of their shared expenses. The unpaid amount
owed as of January 2024, as reflected in an email from Chou to Mikus, showed
that Mikus owed Chou $6,448.75.

¶6 At trial, Chou testified, but Mikus did not. Mikus cross examined
Chou, and he submitted exhibits regarding particular expenses during the course of
cross examination.

¶7 The circuit court determined that Chou’s claim for $6,448.75 is
supported by the email chain exhibit and by Chou’s testimony, which Mikus did
not dispute during trial. That is, the court found that the emails accurately
established what Mikus owed Chou in January 2024, at the end of their relevant
transactions and communications. The court dismissed Mikus’s counterclaim,
based on a determination that Chou did not understand, and that she acted
reasonably in not understanding, that Mikus expected to be paid for whatever
services he provided. Mikus appeals.

DISCUSSION

Personal Jurisdiction

¶8 Mikus argues that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over
him because the facts of the case are insufficiently tied to Wisconsin, because he
did not live in Wisconsin during his relationship with Chou, and because most of

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the debts that he incurred involved transactions in Mexico and Illinois. But it is
fatal to this argument that Mikus does not address the fact that he was in
Wisconsin when he was served in this case.

¶9 Whether there is personal jurisdiction under pertinent statutory
authority as applied to a set of facts presents an issue of law that this court reviews
independently. See Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp., 2011 WI 52, ¶14, 335
Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623.

¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 801.05 outlines the methods by which a circuit
court may obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant. One method of
establishing that a circuit court has jurisdiction over a person is the following:
“[i]n any action whether arising within or without this state, against a defendant
who[,] when the action is commenced,” “[i]s a natural person present within this
state when served.” § 801.05(intro.), (1), and (1)(a). Using this method to
establish personal jurisdiction is constitutional. See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of
Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990); Manitowoc W. Co. v. Montonen, 2002 WI 21, ¶8
n.3, 250 Wis. 2d 452, 639 N.W.2d 726.

¶11 The record includes a sheriff’s certificate of service showing that
Mikus was personally served in Viroqua, Wisconsin. Mikus fails to address this
certificate. Accordingly, he does not show that there was a defect in the
establishment of personal jurisdiction under WIS. STAT. § 801.05(1)(a).

Admissibility of Trial Exhibits

¶12 Mikus argues that the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence
the trial exhibits reflecting the email chain containing the running tally of the
amount Mikus owed Chou because the exhibits lacked authentication. This

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argument fails because Mikus forfeited an authentication objection by failing to
raise one in the circuit court.

¶13 In general, this court will not address an argument that the appellant
failed to raise in the circuit court in a timely and developed manner. See State v
Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶25, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530 (forfeiture is the
failure to timely assert a right and can include failure to timely object to an alleged
error in the circuit court). Here, the circuit court asked Mikus if he had any
objections to the introduction of the emails as trial exhibits, and in all but one
instance he responded that he did not. The only time Mikus might have intended
to raise an objection to an exhibit at trial does not involve an argument regarding
authentication.

Existence of Enforceable Contract

¶14 Mikus argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the
email thread identified by Chou at trial constituted an enforceable contract. At
times, Mikus more specifically argues that the emails do not support “the essential
elements” of contract formation, namely an offer, acceptance, and consideration.
On a closely related point, Mikus also emphasizes the absence of an explicit
agreed schedule specifying when he would repay Chou and in what amount or
amounts. He argues that the omission of such a schedule rendered any agreement
for repayment unenforceable. Mikus does not develop either of these points by
applying pertinent legal principles, supported by applicable authority, to facts in
the record, and I reject his contract-based arguments for that reason. See State v.
Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d 328, 337, 600 N.W.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1999) (“A party must
do more than simply toss a bunch of concepts into the air with the hope that either

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the trial court or the opposing party will arrange them into viable and fact-
supported legal theories.”).

¶15 Explaining further, and beginning with whether the email thread
constituted a contract, “[a] valid contract [in Wisconsin] requires an offer,
acceptance[,] and consideration.” Piaskoski & Assocs. v. Ricciardi, 2004 WI App
152, ¶7, 275 Wis. 2d 650, 686 N.W.2d 675. “Offer and acceptance exist when the
parties mutually express assent, and consideration exists if the parties manifest an
intent to be bound to the contract.” Id. Significantly here, “[w]hether the parties
assented and exchanged consideration are factual questions,” and this court will
uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact “on these matters unless its findings are
‘clearly erroneous.’” Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2)).

¶16 Mikus asserts that there was no evidence to support a finding that the
parties intended to make the running tally that is reflected in the email chain an
enforceable debt. But in making this assertion, he does not address the circuit
court’s findings, which would be a necessary first step in developing an argument
that the court clearly erred regarding this or any other element of contract
formation. Instead, Mikus asserts that the emails reflected an unenforceable
understanding that was, in his words, merely “romantic and discretionary” or
“informal or affectionate,” as opposed to an enforceable contract. As purported
legal authority in support of this assertion, he cites to an opinion discussing
divorce principles, Rosplock v. Rosplock, 217 Wis. 2d 22, 577 N.W.2d 32 (Ct.
App. 1998), but without a pinpoint citation or any discussion of any point made in
the opinion. See id. (stating that circuit court was obligated to construe the
unambiguous terms of the parties’ stipulation and judgment of divorce regarding
ex-wife’s income in determining maintenance payments, and also stating that ex-
wife’s additional sources of post-divorce income did not represent a substantial

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change of circumstances warranting maintenance modification). Accordingly, I
reject this aspect of his argument based on a lack of development.

¶17 Turning to Mikus’s other contract argument, he apparently means to
argue that the parties did not agree to a specific time for him to pay Chou back,
and that such a temporal component was an “essential term” for any agreement.
See Herder Hallmark Consultants, Inc. v. Regnier Consulting Grp., Inc., 2004
WI App 134, ¶¶7-8, 275 Wis. 2d 349, 685 N.W.2d 564 (“ordinarily a contract
must be definite and certain” as to its “essential” or “basic” terms in order to be
enforceable). However, Mikus does not identify or attempt to apply any pertinent
legal authority for the proposition that an explicit schedule or deadline for
repayment was an “essential” term on facts resembling those here, in the sense that
no enforceable contract could exist without it.

¶18 Further, Wisconsin courts can imply a reasonable time for
performance to avoid “a contract of indefinite duration.” See Farley v. Salow, 67
Wis. 2d 393, 402-03, 227 N.W.2d 76 (1975). And, regarding indefiniteness of
certain contract terms more generally, courts may consider the conduct of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances to determine whether there is a shared
understanding regarding an implied term of the contract. Herder, 275 Wis. 2d
349, ¶8 (“‘If parties evidently intended to enter a contract, the trier of fact should
not frustrate their intentions, but rather should attach a sufficiently definite
meaning to the contract language if possible.’” (quoted source omitted)).

¶19 Here, the circuit court found that undisputed evidence established
that the parties intended that Mikus pay Chou back for the amounts shown in the
email chain. The court specifically found that the evidence was “unequivocal and
clear” in establishing that Mikus owed Chou the amount stated as of January 2024.

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Implied in this finding is the determination that Mikus, through the email chain
and other email evidence submitted by Chou, demonstrated an intent to pay Chou
before she commenced this action. Because Mikus does not meaningfully address
the court’s findings or the evidence at trial, he does not show that the court clearly
erred.2

Calculation of Amount Owed

¶20 Mikus contends that the circuit court erred by relying on the email
chain as accurate without explicitly conducting a line-by-line review of the
expenses as reflected in the email chain. Mikus’s argument on this point is
difficult to track. As best I understand it, he contends that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that each item shown in the email thread was accurate as a
means of measuring damages based on his failure to pay. I conclude that his
argument fails for at least the reason that the record reflects a reasonably certain
evidentiary basis for the court to award damages in the amount of $6,448.75.

¶21 Mikus notes that our supreme court explained in Schubert v.
Midwest Broad. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 497, 502-03, 85 N.W.2d 449 (1957), that proving
damages for a breach of contract claim requires “reasonable certainty” regarding
the amount of damages. See also Christensen v. Sullivan, 2009 WI 87, ¶87, 320
Wis. 2d 76, 768 N.W.2d 798 (noting that burden of proving contract damages lies
with the plaintiff “‘to prove by credible evidence to a reasonable certainty that
damages were suffered and to establish at least to a reasonable probability the

2
Because I reject Mikus’s arguments that the circuit court erred in determining that the
parties had formed a valid and enforceable contract, I need not address Chou’s apparent argument
in the alternative that the judgment of the court should be affirmed based on an equitable doctrine
such as quantum meruit.

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No. 2024AP2136

amount of these damages’” (quoted source omitted)). Mikus contends that the
lack of evidence for any of the individual expenses reflected in the parties’ email
chain creates an unreasonable level of uncertainty regarding the amount of
damages, which left the circuit court with no basis to order damages in any
amount. However, as further explained in Schubert, “[c]ompliance with the rule
of reasonable certainty” does not require strict “mathematical accuracy.”
Schubert, 1 Wis. 2d at 503.

¶22 Here, the circuit court credited evidence from the parties’ email
thread, corroborated by Chou’s testimony, which reasonably supports a finding
that Mikus agreed to the amounts attributed to him as sums borrowed from Chou
and that he agreed with the running tally of those amounts to reach a total owed.
As noted above, Mikus does not develop a supported argument that the court
clearly erred regarding any of its findings. Nor does he provide a legally
supported argument tending to show that these findings did not provide the
required reasonable certainty.

¶23 On a more specific point, Mikus asserts that some of the dollar
amounts included in the email chain were not properly converted from pesos (the
currency used for some transactions) to dollars (the currency used for the running
tally and the judgment). But the email thread shows that Mikus calculated many
of the currency conversions himself and also that he agreed to the accuracy of the
running tally. Beyond that, he does not show through references to the record that
any particular entry in the running tally was inaccurate.

Counterclaim

¶24 Mikus argues that the circuit court erred in rejecting his
counterclaim of $5,000, which he based on a theory of quantum meruit. See W.H.

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Fuller Co. v. Seater, 226 Wis. 2d 381, 386, 595 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1999)
(“‘recovery in quantum meruit is based upon an implied contract to pay reasonable
compensation for services rendered’” (quoting Ramsey v. Ellis, 168 Wis. 2d 779,
785, 484 N.W.2d 331 (1992))). At trial, Mikus argued that Chou is indebted to
him for services that he provided to her in preparing a tax return and in supporting
her in divorce proceedings in Illinois. The circuit court dismissed the
counterclaim, based on a finding that Chou did not understand that she would be
required to pay him for these services. I conclude that, given the findings of the
court, it properly dismissed the counterclaim because it does not satisfy at least
one element for quantum meruit.

¶25 Pertinent here, a quantum meruit claim requires as one element that
the claimant prove that the claimant reasonably expected compensation for the
services allegedly provided. See Ramsey, 168 Wis. 2d at 785. This reasonable
expectation of compensation must be evident; for example, the claimant cannot
have intended that the services be a gift. See Estate of Lade v. Ketter, 82 Wis. 2d
80, 89, 260 N.W.2d 665 (1978). In his brief-in-chief, Mikus fails to articulate a
theory of quantum meruit supported by the law or the record here. I reject his
argument on this basis. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d
633 (Ct. App. 1992) (arguments that are inadequately briefed or unsupported by
legal authority will not be considered). In the interest of completeness, I now
explain why the record strongly supports the circuit court’s decision.

¶26 In cross examining Chou at trial, Mikus asked if she was aware that
Mikus expected to be paid for services that he rendered to her during her divorce,
including services related to a tax return. Chou testified, “No, I am not aware at
all[.] [T]hat is totally a false statement.” She further testified that her divorce
lawyer never asked Mikus for assistance in connection with the divorce. Mikus

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attempted to question Chou further on this topic, but the circuit court indicated that
this line of questioning was failing to build toward or to establish any relevant
point, but instead was merely wasting time. Mikus said that he could show that
information which he provided to Chou’s divorce lawyer was used on her behalf
in the divorce proceedings. The court responded that this was not relevant to a
dispositive issue, that being whether Chou understood, or could reasonably have
understood under the circumstances, that Mikus intended to be paid for his
services. On appeal, Mikus does not show that the court’s decision to require him
to terminate this line of questioning was an erroneous exercise of discretion.

¶27 In sum on the issue of the merits of the counterclaim, the circuit
court found that Mikus had no expectation of repayment, and Mikus fails to
develop any argument on this issue, including an argument that the court’s
dispositive finding was clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION

¶28 For all of these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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