State v. J. G., III

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 15, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2026AP469 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2023TP102
2023TP103
2026AP470 2023TP104
2026AP471 2023TP105
2023TP106
2026AP472 2023TP107
2026AP473
2026AP474
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

APPEAL NO. 2026AP469

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO G.E.G., A PERSON UNDER
THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.G., III

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
Nos. 2026AP469
2026AP470
2026AP471
2026AP472
2026AP473
2026AP474

APPEAL NO. 2026AP470

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO C.J.-J.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.G., III

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL NO. 2026AP471

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO A.R.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.G., III

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

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2026AP474

APPEAL NO. 2026AP472

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO S.R.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.G., III,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL NO. 2026AP473

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO K.J.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.G., III,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

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2026AP474

APPEAL NO. 2026AP474

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO N.H.-J.G., A
PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.G., III,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JOSEPH R. WALL, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 COLÓN, P.J.1 John appeals orders terminating his parental rights to
his six children, Ginny, Charlie, Alice, Sybill, Katie, and Nick.2 John argues that
the circuit court erred when it concluded that the State had proved by clear and
convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights, and
when it found that termination was in the children’s best interests. For the

1
These appeals are decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-
24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
We refer to the family members by pseudonyms to maintain confidentiality and
privacy, in accordance with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(g).

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following reasons, we disagree with John, and affirm the orders of the circuit
court.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In November 2021, the Department of Milwaukee Child Protective
Services (DMCPS) received a referral regarding possible neglect as it related to
Ginny, Charlie, Alice, Sybill, Katie, and Nick. The referral noted safety concerns
as to the condition of the home. An initial assessment worker was sent to the
home to investigate; she noted that the floor was covered in trash and other items,
including choking hazards within reach of the young children. There was also a
strong smell of cat urine as well as gnats throughout the home. The worker also
learned at that time that Molly, John’s wife and the mother of the six children,
would sometimes bite the children as a form of discipline, and that John would not
intervene to stop it.

¶3 When the initial assessment worker attempted to discuss the issues
with the condition of the home with John and Molly, they blamed the children,
who at that time ranged in age from seven years old to four months old, claiming
that they were not cleaning up after themselves. The initial assessment worker
discussed having age-appropriate expectations of the children and that the
condition of the home needed to be improved. However, the children were not
removed from the home at that time.

¶4 In April 2022, DMCPS received a second referral, this time
regarding concerns about Nick, as he was not gaining weight and had been
diagnosed with failure to thrive. Molly and John had missed several weight

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checks for Nick, and after being assessed by a DMCPS worker, Nick had to be
admitted to the hospital for several days.

¶5 The initial assessment worker visited the home for a second time and
noted that it was in worse condition than it had been previously. The worker noted
that there was garbage and other items completely covering the floors, including
toys, blankets, and food. The smell of cat urine was still strong throughout the
home and the children’s room had soiled clothes and diapers in it. The worker
later learned that John and Molly would leave the duties of cleaning the home and
feeding the younger children to Ginny and Charlie.

¶6 The agency attempted intensive in-home services, but these were
unsuccessful. The home remained in a deplorable condition, and Nick stopped
gaining weight after being released from the hospital and returning home. The
agency took temporary physical custody of the children, and the court found the
children to be in need of protection or services (CHIPS) on November 14, 2022.
The court entered identical dispositional orders for each of the children, outlining
the conditions that John would have to fulfill in order for the children to be
returned to the home.

¶7 The State filed petitions to terminate John’s parental rights on June
30, 2023.3 As grounds, the State alleged that the children were in continuing need
of protection or services (continuing CHIPS), and that John had failed to assume

3
The State also moved to terminate Molly’s parental rights based on identical grounds.
Her parental rights are not at issue in these appeals.

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parental responsibility for the children. On April 12, 2024, the circuit court
considered the children’s guardian ad litem’s motion to suspend visitation between
John and the three youngest children, contending that the children’s needs were
not being met at visits and that the children were having negative reactions to
visits. The court granted the motion.

¶8 A court trial took place throughout several days in September and
October 2024. At the conclusion of trial, the court found that the State had proven
the ground of continuing CHIPS as to all six children, and the ground of failure to
assume parental responsibility as to the three younger children. The court found
that there was insufficient evidence to prove that John had failed to assume
parental responsibility as to the three older children. A few days later, the
guardian ad litem filed a motion for visitation to occur only if the three older
children and parents mutually desired it, arguing that the children were struggling
with visitation and would benefit from having some control over the visits. The
motion was stipulated to by John and Molly, and the court granted it on October
14, 2024.

¶9 The dispositional hearing took place on February 26, 2025, at which
the circuit court heard testimony from various witnesses and ultimately determined
that it was in the children’s best interests for John’s parental rights to be
terminated.

¶10 John now appeals. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 The State has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
every element of the grounds alleged in the petition. See St. Croix Cnty. DHHS v.
Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶28, 368 Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107. On review, this
court examines all of the testimony and other evidence presented in analyzing
whether “any credible evidence” supports the verdict. Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS v.
Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶49, 325 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369. “Findings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the [circuit] court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). “The [circuit] court, not the appellate court, … resolve[s]
conflicts in the testimony, … and we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the findings made by the [circuit] court.” Tang v. C.A.R.S. Prot.
Plus, Inc., 2007 WI App 134, ¶19, 301 Wis. 2d 752, 734 N.W.2d 169.

DISCUSSION

I. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it found
that the State had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds
existed to terminate John’s parental rights under continuing CHIPS.

¶12 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.415(2) requires that the State prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that DMCPS made a “reasonable effort” to provide the
services ordered by the court in the dispositional order, and that the parent failed
to meet the conditions for safe return. “Reasonable effort” is defined as “an
earnest and conscientious effort to take good faith steps to provide the services
ordered by the court which takes into consideration the characteristics of the
parent or child … the level of cooperation of the parent … and other relevant

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circumstances of the case.” Sec. 48.415(2)(a)2.a. John argues that the State’s
evidence was insufficient because (1) DMCPS failed to provide “reasonable
efforts” tailored to his specific cognitive and socioeconomic limitations; and
(2) John’s failure to meet certain conditions such as housing was a result of
poverty rather than parental unfitness.

¶13 John points to the testimony of the ongoing case manager, Sarena
Farber, wherein she acknowledged that John had disclosed “struggles with
learning in school.” John takes issue with the fact that, despite DMCPS being
aware that he had struggled in school, it never “court-ordered” a psychological
evaluation for him to establish his level of intellectual functioning. While John
acknowledges that DMCPS did refer him for a psychological evaluation, he argues
that, when the evaluation was cancelled due to weather, DMCPS never made any
effort to reschedule it, “effectively leaving [his] specific learning needs
unaddressed for the duration of the case.”

¶14 John also points out that Farber admitted that her primary mode of
communicating with him was through text and email, despite the fact that Farber
knew that John “struggled with literacy and cognitive processing.” He argues that
DMCPS cannot claim it made “reasonable efforts” when it provided “complex,
text-heavy requirements to a parent with known learning disabilities” and then
claim he was uncooperative when he became overwhelmed or frustrated.

¶15 As an initial matter, we point out that DMCPS has no way of “court-
ordering” a psychological evaluation for John, so his contention that the agency
should have somehow done so is misguided. The dispositional order required that

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DMCPS make reasonable efforts to provide him with services including
(1) parenting education; (2) home management; (3) visitation; and (4) participation
in children’s services (as recommended). Because the court did not make any
order requiring that John complete a psychological evaluation, the agency was
under no obligation to assist him in doing so. Regardless, it appears that DMCPS
did refer John for a psychological evaluation. John purportedly did not fill out the
majority of the referral forms and, on the date of the evaluation, cancelled his
appointment, citing weather concerns, in spite of the fact that he had driven Molly
to complete her evaluation earlier that day. The evaluation was never rescheduled,
with John claiming that he did not have a phone number for the provider. We also
note that, at trial, Farber testified that John never reported that he had any
disabilities or concerns about his mental health and memory, only that he had
some “difficulty learning in school.”

¶16 John noticeably omits those facts which indicate that he repeatedly
frustrated DMCPS’s efforts to communicate with him. Farber testified that John
was not responsive and would hang up on her when she would call him. The
circuit court found that John and Molly were “at times” cooperative, but were “for
the most part, very, very antagonistic and uncooperative” with Farber “despite
[her] great efforts.” The court cited the fact that Molly and John would block
Farber’s phone number or wait days or weeks to get back to her. John cannot
blame Farber for attempting to communicate with him via text or email when he
prevented her from contacting him in any other manner.

¶17 John next takes issue with the fact that the State introduced evidence
indicating that he had refused to believe his children’s sexual assault disclosures

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regarding their paternal grandfather. He insists that the agency never provided
him with any of the specific details of the grandfather’s prior police records or the
exact allegations being made by the children. He cites to Kenosha Cnty. DHS v.
Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845, for the proposition that
“a parent cannot be found unfit for failing to meet a condition that is impossible to
satisfy without agency assistance.” He argues that, by withholding the specific
evidence that would have allowed him to grasp the entirety of the risk posed by
the grandfather, DMCPS failed to help him meet the condition of “safety.” He
insists he was essentially asked to “take the agency’s word for it” without any
evidence to overcome “familial loyalty and parental instinct.”

¶18 John again omits key facts that work against him. First, DMCPS
specifically discussed the concerns regarding the paternal grandfather with the
parents. The sexual assault allegations were also foundational to a change of
placement hearing, at which John was present, objected to the change of
placement, and had ample opportunity to hear the full extent of the evidence
presented against his father. John continued to believe that the paternal
grandfather posed no safety risk to the children, despite hearing the allegations in
full.

¶19 We also note that Jodie W. does not stand for the proposition that
John claims. Jodie W. held that a parent could not be found unfit based solely on
the fact that the parent was incarcerated. Id., 293 Wis. 2d 530, ¶49. The court did
so based on the fact that the parent was being held to a condition that it was
impossible for him to fulfill. That is not the same as the present case, where,
though it may be difficult for John to fully grasp or understand the extent of the

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allegations against the children’s paternal grandfather, it is by no means
impossible for John to nevertheless ensure the safety of his children. We therefore
reject John’s argument on this point.

¶20 Finally, John takes issue with the State’s argument that he had failed
to provide a “safe and clean home” and focused on his residing temporarily in a
camper. He points out that he remained consistently employed as a mechanic
throughout the proceedings and, again pointing to Jodie W., argues that a parent’s
rights cannot be terminated based solely on conditions that are a result of poverty.
He argues that DMCPS’s “failure to provide meaningful housing assistance,
beyond mere referrals to overcapacity shelters, constitutes a failure of reasonable
efforts.”

¶21 Again, we point out that Jodie W. does not stand for the proposition
that John claims. While securing a home for a family of eight on a single salary
may be difficult, it is not technically impossible. Additionally, John fails to
demonstrate what more the agency could have possibly done that would satisfy, in
his view, the standard of “reasonable efforts.” Farber testified that she directed
John and Molly to contact the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
and discussed utilizing various shelters with them; however, John and Molly were
purportedly not open to utilizing a shelter and stated that they would stay in his
truck. The agency was not under an obligation to secure housing for the family.

¶22 We also note that the condition of having a “safe and clean home” is
not a condition that could be satisfied simply by securing housing; concerns were
raised from the very beginning that the home was in deplorable condition, with a

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strong smell of cat urine throughout the home; trash, toys, and clothing covering
the floor; and soiled clothing in the children’s room. John ignores these facts,
which made up a large part of the State’s case on this point.

¶23 Overall, there was a substantial amount of credible evidence to
demonstrate to the court that DMCPS had made reasonable efforts to assist John in
fulfilling the conditions in the CHIPS dispositional order. His arguments misstate
the law and ignore the great body of evidence presented to the court that did not
work in his favor. It was not erroneous for the court to conclude that the State had
met its burden on this issue.

II. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it found
that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds
existed to terminate John’s parental rights under failure to assume parental
responsibility.

¶24 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.415(6)(a) states that failure to assume
parental responsibility is established “by proving that the parent … [has] not had a
substantial parental relationship with the child.” A “substantial parental
relationship” is defined as “the acceptance and exercise of significant
responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the
child.” Sec. 48.415(6)(b). In determining whether the parent has a substantial
parental relationship with the child, the court may consider factors including (but
not limited to): (1) “whether the person has expressed concern for or interest in the
support, care or well-being of the child”; and (2) “whether the person has
neglected or refused to provide care or support for the child.” Id.

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¶25 John argues that the State failed to prove the ground of failure to
assume parental responsibility. He argues that: (1) the circuit court’s “bifurcated”
finding was factually and legally inconsistent; (2) the court “over-indexed” on
post-removal behavior; (3) the State improperly used medical hearsay to establish
a lack of bond between him and the children; and (4) the “mutual desire” order
entered by the court created a self-fulfilling prophecy. We address each of these
arguments in turn.

¶26 John first argues that the court’s “bifurcated” finding, that the State
failed to prove John lacked a substantial parental relationship with the three older
children, but succeeded as to the three younger children, was logically flawed. He
asserts that, up until the time of removal in April 2022, all six of the children
resided in the same household under his care and financial support. He argues that
there was no evidence presented that he treated or provided more care for the older
children than the younger children. He concludes that, if the court found that his
actions in working to support his family, living with his children, and participating
in their upbringing, constituted a “substantial relationship” for the older children,
it necessarily would have to constitute a “substantial relationship” for the younger
children.

¶27 John’s logic is flawed; the circuit court found that the State failed to
prove that John had failed to assume parental responsibility as to the three oldest
children; that is not the same as the court affirmatively finding that John had
assumed parental responsibility or had a substantial parental relationship with
those children. In particular, the court’s finding was that there was insufficient
evidence, from the time that Ginny was born, until the referral in November 2021,

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to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard, stating “we don’t really
know what their life was like.” In contrast, the court noted that the time span from
the first referral in November 2021 until disposition would have constituted the
majority of the lives of the three younger children, and that there was ample
evidence to support a finding that John had failed to assume parental responsibility
for them during that time. Because the court never made an affirmative finding
that John’s actions, in working to support his family financially and living with the
children, was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial parental relationship,
John’s argument on this issue cannot hold water.

¶28 John next argues that the circuit court “over-indexed” on post-
removal behavior. He states that the court’s finding of unfitness as to the younger
children appeared to rely almost exclusively on John’s behavior after removal of
the children, particularly his lack of engagement at medical appointments and the
aforementioned housing situation. John cites to Tammy W-G. v. Jacob T., 2011
WI 30, 333 Wis. 2d 273, 797 N.W.2d 854, for the proposition that courts must not
ignore the period of time a parent did live with and support a child. He argues that
he “provided the only income for the household during that time,” and that his
lack of engagement during supervised visits “does not negate the years of daily
care and financial provision he provided prior to State intervention.”

¶29 John’s argument on this point is once again flawed. Nothing in the
record indicates that the court ignored the period of time that John and the children
resided together, it simply acknowledged that the majority of the evidence came
from the time period following the first referral to DMCPS in November 2021.
The court based its conclusion, that John had failed to assume parental

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responsibility for the three younger children, on the conditions that existed in the
home prior to and after removal, including that the home was in deplorable
condition, with a significant number of animals in the home, that the home
smelled of cat urine, and that the children would return to their caregivers with
urine-soaked socks and clothing. The court also pointed to the evidence showing
that John and Molly would have the older children feed and change the diapers of
the younger children, rather than taking care of the children themselves. At no
point, during the court’s findings of fact and verdict as to the failure to assume
ground, did the court even mention John’s lack of engagement at visits or medical
appointments or the parents’ struggles to secure housing. We therefore find that
John’s argument on this issue lacks merit.

¶30 John next argues that the State improperly used medical hearsay to
establish a lack of bond between him and the children, pointing to the testimony of
one of the children’s foster parents regarding the children’s “Complex PTSD” and
physical reactions to visits with him. John argues that expert testimony is required
for complex medical and psychological diagnoses. He asserts that, by allowing a
foster parent—a lay person—to testify that the children’s vomiting was a “stress
reaction” to him, the court allowed the State to establish a lack of bond through
non-expert, anecdotal evidence. He states that, without this testimony, there was
little evidence suggesting that the younger children did not have a substantial
relationship with him.

¶31 The point in the foster parent’s testimony to which John cites does
not appear to mention the children’s physical reactions to him or any vomiting
episodes, as he claims. “[W]e decline to embark on our own search of the record,

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unguided by references and citations to specific testimony, to look for other
evidence to support” a party’s argument. Tam v. Luk, 154 Wis. 2d 282, 291 n.5,
453 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1990). We note that the transcript does contain
testimony from the foster parent indicating that, at one point, Sybill’s clinical
diagnosis as given to her by a mental health therapist changed from “PTSD” to
“Complex PTSD.” The foster parent was then asked to explain her understanding
of Complex PTSD as it was explained to her by Sybill’s therapist; notably,
however, there was no objection made to this line of questioning at trial. “In order
to preserve an issue for appeal as a matter of right, a party must object to the error
at trial, stating the proper ground for the objection.” State v. Romero, 147 Wis. 2d
264, 274, 432 N.W.2d 899 (1988). John gives no reason for his failure to object at
trial, nor any argument as to why we should overlook that failure. We therefore
decline to address this issue any further.

¶32 Finally, John argues that the “mutual desire” order, wherein the
circuit court modified visitation with the three older children to be only upon
“mutual desire,” allowed the State to “terminate the parental relationship by
attrition.” He implies that the children were influenced by their foster parents in
choosing to decline visits with him, and states that this “de facto” termination prior
to disposition violated his due process rights.

¶33 As an initial matter, we note that the “mutual desire” order to which
John refers was entered into after the court’s finding of unfitness. The hearing on
the motion was held on October 14, 2024, whereas the court’s findings of fact and
verdict took place at a hearing ten days earlier, on October 4, 2024. It is illogical,
then, for John to argue that the mutual desire order could have possibly affected

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the court’s decision as to the grounds for termination. In addition, John had the
opportunity to object to the mutual visitation order at the time the motion was
brought before the court; he did not. He instead chose to stipulate to the order
after reviewing it with his attorneys, and for him to now claim that it somehow
deprived him of his due process rights is, in our opinion, disingenuous and
improper.

III. The court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it found that
termination was in the children’s best interests.

¶34 The decision to terminate a parent’s rights is within the circuit
court’s discretion. Gerald O. v. Cindy R., 203 Wis. 2d 148, 152, 551 N.W.2d 855
(Ct. App. 1996). We review the circuit court’s determination for an erroneous
exercise of discretion. See Rock Cnty. DSS v. K.K., 162 Wis. 2d 431, 441, 469
N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1991). The circuit court’s findings of fact will not be set
aside unless they go against the great weight of the evidence. Onalaska Elec.
Heating, Inc. v. Schaller, 94 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 288 N.W.2d 829 (1980).

¶35 The best interests of the child is the standard at disposition, WIS.
STAT. § 48.426(2), and in making its determination the circuit court looks to the
factors set out in § 48.426(3). Those factors include (but the court is not limited
to): (1) “[t]he likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination”; (2) “[t]he age
and health of the child,” both at the time of disposition and at the time of removal;
(3) “[w]hether the child has substantial relationships with the parent or other
family members,” and whether severance of those relationships would be harmful
to the child; (4) “[t]he wishes of the child”; (5) the duration of the separation
between the parent and child; and (6) whether the child would be able to enter into

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a more stable and permanent family relationship should the parental rights be
terminated. Id.

¶36 John argues that terminating his parental rights was an erroneous
exercise of discretion. He asserts that: (1) the circuit court failed to adequately
consider the substantial relationship he had with the three older children; (2) the
court erroneously dismissed the impact of socioeconomic hardship as a lack of
effort on his part; (3) the evidence of “harm” to the children was based on unfair
and speculative lay testimony; (4) the failure to reschedule his psychological
evaluation left the court with an incomplete record; and (5) the court
underestimated the importance of sibling and extended familial bonds. We
address each argument in turn.

¶37 John first argues that the circuit court failed to adequately consider
his substantial relationship with the three older children. He asserts that “the
court’s own findings during the grounds phase created a paradox that was never
reconciled at disposition,” pointing out that, as to the three older children, the
court found that he had maintained a substantial parental relationship with them.
John again points to the fact that he was the sole financial provider for the family
for years and that he lived with the children from the time they were born. He
argues that, to find that a “substantial relationship” exists for the purpose of
finding parental unfitness but then determine that the same relationship carries
little weight at disposition demonstrates that the court failed to give “adequate
weight” to this factor.

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¶38 We have already thoroughly addressed this issue earlier in this
opinion. We again point out that the circuit court at no point made an affirmative
finding that John had a substantial relationship with his three older children. The
circuit court cannot be faulted for failing to consider a fact that was never found to
have existed in first place. In addition, the record indicates that the court properly
considered the factors enumerated in WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3), including whether
the child had substantial relationships with the parent or other family members,
and whether severance of those relationships would have been harmful to the
child. Here, the court found that the three younger children did not “have really
much of a relationship whatsoever with either parent,” and certainly not a
substantial one. It pointed out that the three younger children had not had any
visits with John for eleven months prior to the dispositional hearing, and it
therefore concluded that it would not be harmful to them to sever the legal bonds
between them and John.

¶39 As to the three older children, the court noted that, because of their
ages, they were old enough to remember the time period where they lived with
John and Molly; however, the court also found that the children had “really settled
into a routine” and formed a bond with their foster parent. The court considered
the fact that the children had not requested any visits with John and Molly since
the mutual desire visitation order had been put into place. The court ultimately
found that, while the three older children had, at one point, had a bond with John,
the statute asks whether the children presently had a substantial relationship with
the parent, and based on the evidence presented, the court found that they did not
have a substantial relationship with either parent. This was properly within the

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court’s consideration under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3). Additionally, John fails to
make the logical connection between his providing financial support to the
children for the first few years of their lives and those children having a substantial
relationship with him, and we therefore reject his argument on this issue.

¶40 John also points again to the “mutual desire” visitation order,
arguing that it exacerbated the harm of severance, as it allowed the children to
dictate whether they saw him during the pendency of the case. He insists that the
court’s determination, that it was in the children’s best interests for his parental
rights to be terminated, “is a penalty for a parent’s inability to overcome the
immense psychological pressure placed on children in a foster-to-adopt
environment.”

¶41 Though we have already discussed it herein, it bears repeating that
John, after discussing it with his attorneys, stipulated to the entry of the mutual
visitation order. In addition, we point out that the order by no means blanketly
prohibited visitation with the children; it restricted visitation to be upon mutual
desire between John and the children. The order did not unconditionally prevent
John from visiting the children or maintaining a relationship with them. Further,
John’s assertion that the foster-to-adopt environment placed “immense
psychological pressure” on the children has no evidentiary basis. We therefore
reject John’s argument on this issue as well.

¶42 John next argues that the circuit court erroneously dismissed the
impact of socioeconomic hardship as a lack of effort on his part, with the court
particularly focusing on his failure to secure housing for the family. He insists

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that the record “is replete with facts that favor [his] industriousness,” pointing out
that he remained consistently employed as a mechanic, working to support his
children. Again pointing to Jodie W., John argues that his failure to secure
housing cannot be the sole basis for termination. He asserts that the court should
have considered whether his consistent employment within a specialized trade
represented a “protective factor” that could be leveraged with proper agency
support.

¶43 The evidence presented to the court at disposition was that John and
Molly were, at the time, residing in a camper at State Fair Park with six cats and
one dog. The only comment that the circuit court made as to that testimony was
noting that John and Molly “[had] not remedied the housing situation.” John’s
argument, that the court improperly focused on the housing situation,
mischaracterizes the testimony and the court’s decision. Further, John gives no
legal authority for the proposition that his consistent employment and specialized
trade as an auto mechanic should have “represented a ‘protective factor’ that could
be leveraged with proper agency support.” We may decline to review issues that
are inadequately briefed or unsupported by references to legal authority. State v.
Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). We therefore
reject John’s argument on this issue as well.

¶44 John next argues that the evidence of “harm” to the children, on
which the court relied in making its determination, was based on unfair and
speculative lay testimony. He points specifically to testimony that Katie and Nick
vomited after contact with him, and argues that the court “failed to consider the
countervailing fact that these children were removed at ages … where they were

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highly susceptible to the influence and anxieties of their caregivers.” John repeats
his prior argument, that the medicalized testimony from the foster parents was
improper, as it was “provided by a foster parent with a vested interest in
adoption.” He insists that the court failed to consider that he had successfully
cared for the children for years without similar “physical stress reactions,” and that
this suggests that the reported reactions were “situational to the foster care
environment, not inherent to [his] parenting.”

¶45 Again, we point out that John did not make any contemporaneous
objection at the time the testimony to which he cites was given. See Romero, 147
Wis. 2d at 274. John again implies that the children’s caregivers put
psychological or emotional pressure on the children, without providing any
evidentiary basis for those implications. We do not believe this argument merits
any further consideration, as we have thoroughly addressed these issues already
herein. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646.

¶46 John next argues that the failure to reschedule his psychological
evaluation left the court with an incomplete record. He points out that Farber
herself testified that John had struggled in school and that, while he had driven his
wife to her evaluation, he missed his own due to weather. John argues that the
court’s decision to terminate his parental rights without having a full
understanding of his cognitive abilities was an abuse of discretion. He concludes
that, if he has a learning disability, his “failure” to understand his children’s
medical needs was not a lack of interest but due to a lack of capacity that DMCPS
failed to properly address.

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¶47 John’s connection, between the lack of any psychological evaluation
as to his cognitive abilities and the court’s decision that termination of his parental
rights was in the children’s best interests, is strained. We have already addressed
the fact that DMCPS was not required by the court to assist him in completing a
psychological evaluation. In addition, his argument that, if he has a learning
disability, his demonstrated lack of understanding of his children’s medical needs
was not due to a lack of interest but due to his lack of capacity, is not supported by
any credible evidence, and is speculative in nature. We therefore do not address it
further.

¶48 Finally, John argues that the circuit court underestimated the
importance of sibling and extended familial bonds to the children. He argues that
the separation in this case was exacerbated by DMCPS’s refusal to consider the
paternal grandparents as a potential placement, again insisting that he was “never
fully briefed” as to the extent of the allegations against the grandfather. John
argues that his desire to keep his children with the paternal grandparents was
portrayed as him risking his children’s safety, and asserts that this should have
instead been “viewed as a desire for family continuity.”

¶49 The circuit court was under no obligation to view John’s desire to
allow the children to visit with or live with the paternal grandfather, in spite of the
sexual abuse allegations against him, as “a desire for family continuity” rather
than a willingness to risk the children’s safety. We also again reject John’s
argument that he was “never fully briefed” on the full extent of the allegations
made against the paternal grandfather, for the reasons stated previously herein.

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CONCLUSION

¶50 For the aforementioned reasons, we reject John’s arguments and
affirm the orders of the circuit court.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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