Brown County Health and Human Services v. J. L.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 1, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2026AP176 Cir. Ct. No. 2024TP20

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO J. G., A PERSON UNDER THE
AGE OF 18:

BROWN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J. L.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Brown County:
TAMMY JO HOCK, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2026AP176

¶1 HRUZ, J.1 Julie appeals an order terminating her parental rights to
her daughter, Jamie.2 Julie contends that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion when it concluded that termination of her parental rights (TPR) was in
Jamie’s best interests by failing to properly consider whether Jamie had a
substantial relationship with Julie and whether Jamie had a substantial relationship
with her biological siblings, both as required by WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c). We
reject this argument and affirm the court’s order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In June 2024, Brown County Health and Human Services (the
County) filed a petition to terminate Julie’s parental rights to Jamie, alleging that
Julie abandoned Jamie under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(1)(a)2. and (1)(a)3. The
County moved for partial summary judgment as to the grounds phase of the TPR
proceedings, which Julie opposed.3 After a motion hearing, the circuit court found
that grounds existed for TPR due to abandonment and that Julie was unfit. See
WIS. STAT. § 48.424(4). Julie does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
For ease of reading in this confidential matter, we refer to the appellant using a
pseudonym rather than her initials, and we do the same for the child.
3
A contested TPR proceeding involves a two-step procedure. Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS
v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. The first step is a factfinding
hearing, in which a jury or circuit court determines “whether any grounds for the termination of
parental rights have been” proved. Id., ¶26 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 48.424(3)). The termination
proceedings then move to the second step, a dispositional hearing, at which the circuit court must
consider the best interests of the child in determining whether to terminate the parent’s rights.
WIS. STAT. §§ 48.426(2), 48.427.

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No. 2026AP176

¶3 At the dispositional hearing, Jamie’s ongoing case manager,
Amanda Rooyakkers, testified that she became Jamie’s case worker in May 2024.
Rooyakkers stated that Jamie was placed into foster care on October 9, 2023,
when she was discharged from the hospital shortly after her birth. Jamie has been
placed with the same foster family since October 13, 2023. The foster family told
Rooyakkers that they plan to adopt Jamie, and Rooyakkers testified that the foster
family was “actively working” with Lutheran Social Services (LSS) to adopt
Jamie.4

¶4 Rooyakkers also testified that Jamie was nearly two years old as of
the date of the hearing, she was a healthy child, she had not had any significant
health concerns while the court had been involved with her life, and Jamie’s foster
parents were making sure that her medical needs were being met.

¶5 Rooyakkers opined that Jamie’s father did not have a substantial
relationship with Jamie because he had never met Jamie and “indicated no desire
to do so.”5 Rooyakkers also opined that Jamie did not have a substantial
relationship with Julie. Rooyakkers noted that Julie “did not have any contact
with [Jamie] for approximately her first year of life” and that “[Julie] saw [Jamie]
a few times after birth, and then there was a period of time of no contact until
approximately October of 2024 when she started doing some visitation.”
According to Rooyakkers, she believed “that those visitations have gone well,” but
she concluded that there was not “a substantial parent/child bond” and that Julie

4
LSS wrote a letter stating that Jamie is an adoptable child. This letter was received into
evidence without objection at the dispositional hearing.
5
The parental rights of Jamie’s father are not at issue in this appeal. We discuss Jamie’s
father only to the extent necessary to decide Julie’s appeal.

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No. 2026AP176

does not make any everyday decisions for Jamie. Rooyakkers also noted that
Jamie had “some contact” with two of her biological siblings and their adoptive
families but that she did not have contact with any other extended or biological
family members.6 Rooyakkers opined that terminating Julie’s parental rights
would not be harmful to Jamie due to the lack of a substantial relationship between
Jamie and either of her parents.

¶6 Rooyakkers then testified that she had not discussed this case with
Jamie due to her young age, but she was able to observe Jamie’s relationship with
her foster parents. Rooyakkers stated that Jamie had “an observable bond” with
her foster parents and that Jamie “looks to [her] foster parents for attention, for
affection, to get her needs met,” and when scared or upset. Jamie identifies her
foster parents as “Mom and Dad.” Rooyakkers prepared a report for the hearing
that was entered into evidence without objection.

¶7 Julie testified about the struggles she went through during her life,
including obtaining housing after an extended period of homelessness, maintaining
her sobriety, and the steps she has taken to cooperate with the County’s services.
Julie also discussed her visits with Jamie, stated that Jamie appears to enjoy those
visits, and stated that Jamie calls her “Mom.” Julie testified that she “would like a
chance to be [Jamie’s] mother.” Julie also offered explanations for her failures to
communicate with the County’s case workers regarding Jamie.

6
Rooyakkers testified that Jamie has five biological siblings. As of the dispositional
hearing, Julie’s parental rights of three of Jamie’s biological siblings had been terminated, and
those siblings had been adopted. One of Jamie’s remaining siblings had aged out of foster care,
and the other sibling resided with that sibling’s father.

Julie testified that Jamie had met two of the siblings who were adopted but she did not
believe Jamie had met her other siblings.

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No. 2026AP176

¶8 Applying WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3), the circuit court found that Jamie
was adoptable and that the likelihood of her adoption was “great” and
“significant” due to her foster family being “ready, willing, and able to adopt her.”
The court also found that Jamie was a month shy of turning two years old and that
she was healthy at the time of removal and continued to be healthy. Regarding
whether Jamie has substantial relationships with family members and whether it
would be harmful to sever those relationships, the court made the following
findings:

There’s not a substantial relationship…. And although
[Julie has] a limited amount of time that [she’s] spent with
[Jamie] and [she’s] developing a relationship of kinds, it’s
not a parental/child relationship at this point. Not what I
would consider a substantial relationship, and therefore,
given that it’s not a substantial relationship, I find that it
would not be harmful to [Jamie] to sever that relationship.

…. Siblings, that’s interesting because legally it sounds
like … [t]here could be a relationship with [the oldest
sibling] that [Julie] could even be involved in, but there
isn’t…. That wasn’t developed well enough for me to
know what kind of a relationship. There’s certainly
visitation with two other biological siblings, but they’re no
longer legally [Julie’s] children. So I don’t really think,
under the law, I’m supposed to consider them siblings in
looking at whether or not it’s harmful to sever the
relationship because they’re not technically siblings. And
then I think … only one of the others is adopted. There’s
no relationship….

…. I don’t know … how to really define them. Biological
siblings but no longer legal siblings. But there is no real[]
way for me to talk about severing those relationships or
whether there [are] relationships with them because they’re
not technically legally siblings anymore, as odd as that is.
So I don’t find that there are any substantial relationships
with family members that would be harmful to be severed
at this time.

¶9 The circuit court also found that Jamie was too young to express her
own wishes but that “the observations of the bond that she has [with her foster

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No. 2026AP176

parents] tell us a lot.”7 The court noted that Julie and Jamie have been separated
since Jamie’s birth and that Jamie has remained in foster care ever since, which
the court stated was “the crux of why there’s not a substantial relationship.” The
court found that termination of Julie’s parental rights would “[o]bviously” provide
Jamie with “a much more permanent situation.” Accordingly, the court concluded
that it was in Jamie’s best interests to terminate Julie’s parental rights, and it
entered a TPR order. Julie now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Julie argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion
during the dispositional phase of the TPR proceedings by failing to consider
whether Jamie has a substantial relationship with Julie and with Jamie’s biological
siblings, as required by WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c).

¶11 We review a circuit court’s ultimate determination in a TPR
proceeding for an erroneous exercise of discretion. See State v. Margaret H.,
2000 WI 42, ¶32, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. A court “properly exercises
its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law
and, using a demonstrated rational process, reaches a conclusion that a reasonable
judge could reach.” Gerald O. v. Cindy R., 203 Wis. 2d 148, 152, 551 N.W.2d
855 (Ct. App. 1996).

¶12 At the dispositional phase of the TPR process, “‘the best interests of
the child’ shall be the prevailing factor.” State v. B.W., 2024 WI 28, ¶7, 412

7
The circuit court did not specify whose observations of the bond between Jamie and the
foster parents it found telling, but we can reasonably infer it was referencing the case worker’s
observations.

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No. 2026AP176

Wis. 2d 364, 8 N.W.3d 22 (citation omitted). In determining the child’s best
interests, the circuit court must consider, but is not limited to, the following
factors:

(a) The likelihood of the child’s adoption after termination.

(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the
disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was
removed from the home.

(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the
parent or other family members, and whether it would be
harmful to the child to sever these relationships.

(d) The wishes of the child.

(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the
child.

(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable
and permanent family relationship as a result of the
termination, taking into account the conditions of the
child’s current placement, the likelihood of future
placements and the results of prior placements.

WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3).

¶13 On appeal, Julie contends only that the circuit court erred with
respect to its consideration of the factor in WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c). In
particular, she argues that the court erroneously exercised its discretion by
applying an improper standard of law by assessing whether Julie had a substantial
parental relationship with Jamie, as opposed to any type of substantial relationship
with her. In support thereof, Julie cites Waukesha County DHHS v. A.T.,
No. 2025AP167, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (WI App Apr. 2, 2025).8 In that case,

8
Unpublished opinions authored by a single judge and issued on or after July 1, 2009,
may be cited for their persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).

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No. 2026AP176

we noted that “substantial relationships” is not defined by § 48.426(3) but that
WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)(b) defines “substantial parental relationship,” which we
concluded was “instructive in assessing what a substantial relationship looks
like.”9 A.T., No. 2025AP167, ¶10. Julie contends that this statement
demonstrates that the “substantial relationship” standard in § 48.426(3)(c) is
distinct from the “substantial parental relationship” standard in § 48.415(6)(b).

¶14 We conclude that Julie’s argument is only partially correct and,
ultimately, is unpersuasive. As Julie herself notes, this court stated that the
definition of “substantial parental relationship” in WIS. STAT. § 48.415(6)(b) was
instructive for determining whether the mother in A.T. had a substantial
relationship with the child. See A.T., No. 2025AP167, ¶10. Thus, while there
may be differing standards, the two standards appear to be interrelated when
assessing whether a child has a substantial relationship with his or her parent
under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c).

¶15 Regardless, and more important for purposes of the facts in this case,
while the circuit court found there was a relationship between Julie and Jamie but
it was not a parent/child relationship, the court further found that Julie did not
have any substantial relationship with Jamie due to the length of the separation
between them. Thus, even if Julie were correct that the court was required to
consider more than whether she had a substantial parental relationship with Jamie,
the court did so. And the court clearly—and reasonably—exercised its discretion

9
WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.415(6)(b) applies to the grounds portion of a TPR proceeding,
specifically when the ground of failure to assume parental responsibility is alleged. This
paragraph defines “substantial parental relationship” as “the acceptance and exercise of
significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child.”
Id.

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No. 2026AP176

to determine that severing the limited relationship Julie had with Jamie during the
first two years of Jamie’s life would not be harmful to Jamie. Cf. State v. Y.P.V.,
Nos. 2022AP1935 and 2022AP1936, unpublished slip op., ¶¶12, 29 (WI App
Mar. 21, 2023) (holding that the circuit court failed to adequately consider the
effect of severing the birth mother’s relationship with her children, whom the
mother had raised until they were eight and nine years old, respectively). Further,
we note that WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3) does not prohibit a circuit court from
considering factors other than those enumerated in that subsection.

¶16 Julie also argues that the County presented insufficient evidence for
the circuit court to conclude that her relationship with Jamie was not substantial
because the County did not discuss the nature or quality of Julie’s visits with
Jamie. Julie does not point to any legal authority stating that the court must be
presented with information regarding the nature or quality of a parent’s visits with
his or her child to determine if that parent has a substantial relationship with the
child.10 See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App.

10
Julie does cite David S. v. Laura S., 179 Wis. 2d 114, 147, 507 N.W.2d 94 (1993), in
support of her contention that “[t]o determine what course of action is in the child’s best interests
a circuit court must understand, among other factors, the nature of the child’s substantial
relationships with family members.”

We do not find Julie’s argument persuasive insofar as David S. is highly distinguishable
from this case. David S. concerned the circuit court’s denial of the child’s grandparents’ motion
to intervene as parties in TPR and adoptive placement proceedings. Id. at 122, 133. Our supreme
court concluded that the circuit court “erroneously exercised its discretion in deciding [the
child’s] best interests without giving the grandparents an opportunity to be heard” because,

[t]o determine what course of action is in the child’s best
interests a circuit court must understand, among other factors,
the nature of the child’s substantial relationships with family
members. Unless the circuit court is willing to listen to people
who have formed such relationships with the child, it cannot
make a reasoned determination of the child’s best interests.

(continued)

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No. 2026AP176

1992) (stating that we need not address undeveloped arguments or arguments
unsupported by references to legal authority). There is no such requirement in
WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3). Further, the court’s finding in this regard is supported by
the undisputed evidence that Julie failed to visit Jaime for the first year of Jaime’s
life, and the limited number of her subsequent visits with Jaime, particularly given
Jamie’s young age.

¶17 Next, Julie separately argues that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion by failing to assess whether Jamie had a substantial
relationship with the two biological siblings Jamie had met. Julie acknowledges
that her parental rights to those siblings have already been terminated, but she
argues that this fact is “of no consequence” because WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c)
requires the court to consider the child’s connections with the child’s birth family.
See Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶19 (“[T]he substantial relationships
referenced in … § 48.426(3)(c) include the child’s emotional and psychological
connections to the child’s birth family.”).

¶18 This argument, too, is unpersuasive. In Margaret H., our supreme
court concluded that WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c) “directs focus on the legal
severance resulting from a termination of parental rights and requires courts to
assess the harmful effect of this legal severance on the emotional and

Id. at 147-48.

Thus, David S. does not support Julie’s argument that the circuit court must be presented
with information regarding the nature or quality of a parent’s visits with his or her child to
determine if that parent has a substantial relationship with the child. Further, unlike the court in
David S., the court here heard testimony from Julie about her relationship with Jamie. The court
then weighed that evidence and found that Julie’s relationship with Jamie was not a substantial
one due to the fact that Julie and Jamie have been “separated since [Jamie’s] birth.”

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No. 2026AP176

psychological attachments the child has formed with his or her birth family.”
Margaret H., 234 Wis. 2d 606, ¶26 (emphasis added). Because Julie’s parental
rights to Jamie’s two siblings had already been terminated and these siblings had
been adopted by another family prior to the dispositional hearing, Jamie’s and
Julie’s relationships with these two siblings had already been legally severed. See
id., ¶20 (“[A]doption severs the legal rights, connections, and duties between the
birth family and the child. The termination of parental rights, which generally
precedes an adoption, likewise yields the same outcome.” (footnote omitted,
citation omitted)). Thus, terminating Julie’s parental rights to Jamie did not result
in the legal severance of Jamie’s relationships with these siblings—that had
already happened.

¶19 Furthermore, and more importantly, Julie’s argument that the circuit
court was required to consider how TPR “affect[s] the broader relationships that
exist between the child and the child’s birth family” is immaterial under the facts
of this case. Julie does not point to any facts indicating that the termination of her
parental rights to Jamie will affect Jamie’s relationships with those siblings.
Indeed, Rooyakkers testified that Jamie’s contact with her biological siblings was
arranged by Jamie’s foster parents and the siblings’ adoptive parents. For obvious
reasons, Julie has nothing to do with those contacts, including either their
scheduling or context. Further, Julie does not point to any legal authority stating
that, under WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3)(c), a circuit court must consider a child’s
relationship with biological siblings when those siblings have already been legally
severed from the birth/biological family.

¶20 Thus, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion—
i.e., by failing to apply a proper standard of law—by not assessing whether Jamie
has substantial relationships with two of her siblings. While the court’s focus was

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No. 2026AP176

more on the basic fact of the “legal severance” of Julie’s rights to Jaime’s two
siblings, their adoption means that Julie has no legal or factual basis for her
claimed error. Accordingly, the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion
when it found that TPR was in Jamie’s best interests, even considering its impact
on Jamie’s relationships with “other [biological] family members.” See WIS.
§ 48.426(3)(c).

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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