State v. Gregory L. Bowie

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 8, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2240-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF397

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GREGORY L. BOWIE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Kenosha County: ANTHONY G. MILISAUSKAS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Gregory L. Bowie appeals from a circuit court
judgment convicting him of one count of possession of child pornography after he
No. 2024AP2240-CR

entered a no-contest plea pursuant to an agreement with the State. He also appeals
from an order denying his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel. Bowie’s arguments on appeal all center on his assertions that his
statements to law enforcement and evidence from his cell phone should have been
suppressed, and his trial counsel was ineffective regarding her suppression
attempts. For reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties do not dispute the following relevant facts. Special
Agent Nicolas Gates from the Wisconsin Department of Justice (DOJ) was
assigned to investigate a CyberTip from the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children. The tip had been generated by the social media platform
Pinterest. Pinterest had flagged several images of child sexual abuse material
(CSAM) associated with a username of “gbowie” followed by several numbers.
Gates discovered that “gbowie” had downloaded the CSAM material from an IP
address that was traced to the home of a woman who was identified as Bowie’s
aunt.

¶3 Gates, who knew that Bowie had a lifetime registration requirement
with the Sex Offender Registry Program (SORP), made contact with Bowie’s
aunt. The aunt told Gates that Bowie had stayed with her overnight a few times in
the past but he did not live there, and he was not staying there anymore.1

1
Bowie argues in his reply brief that the State’s brief “contains numerous factual errors”
and recites several alleged misstatements by the State. Although we direct all litigants to exercise
candor to this court when characterizing the facts, on appeal we rely solely on undisputed facts or
facts found by the circuit court under the proper exercise of its discretion.

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

¶4 We pause here briefly to discuss SORP. SORP requires all
registered sex offenders to provide specific personal information to “the
department,” defined as the Department of Corrections (DOC) by WIS. STAT.
§ 301.01(1) (2023-24),2 on an annual basis. WIS. STAT. § 301.45(3)(b)1.
Section 301.45(2)(a) lists the information that must be provided, including “[a]ll
addresses at which the person is or will be residing,” § 301.45(2)(a)5., and “the
name and Internet address of every public or private Internet profile [that] the
person creates, uses, or maintains,” § 301.45(2)(a)6m. If a registrant’s identifying
information changes, he or she must provide DOC “with the updated information
within 10 days[.]” Sec. 301.45(4)(a). A registered sex offender who “knowingly
fails to comply with any requirement to provide information” required by
§ 301.45(2)-(4) is guilty of a Class H felony. Sec. 301.45(6)(a)1.

¶5 Returning to the facts here, after failing to locate Bowie at his aunt’s
house, Gates visited the address in Racine that Bowie had provided in accordance
with SORP. Upon learning that Bowie no longer lived at the address he provided,
Gates asked SORP to issue Bowie a letter requesting an updated address. Bowie
responded with a new address in Kenosha.

¶6 Gates decided to interview Bowie regarding the Pinterest tip about
the CSAM downloaded by “gbowie.” While Gates and a detective from the
Racine Police Department were at Bowie’s workplace investigating the
CSAM-tip, a search warrant authorizing the seizure of all electronic devices and
their contents was being conducted at Bowie’s home. Gates, who was dressed in
jeans and a t-shirt, asked an employee at Bowie’s workplace if Bowie was

2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

available to talk with Gates. Bowie was available, and Gates showed Bowie his
DOJ badge.

¶7 According to Gates, due to the sensitive nature of the investigation,
he asked Bowie if he would like to talk away from his workplace. Bowie agreed.
He followed Gates to Gates’ minivan, which was not marked as a law enforcement
vehicle. Bowie was not handcuffed as he walked to the minivan. Once he reached
the van, Bowie got into the passenger seat, while Gates sat in the driver’s seat, and
the Racine detective was in the backseat.

¶8 Gates asked Bowie about the Pinterest account with the flagged
CSAM and about the email address linked to the Pinterest account. Bowie
confirmed that the email address was, in fact, one he had created. He further
confirmed that the Pinterest account tied to that email was one that he created and
used. Gates understood that, given Bowie’s confirmations and the information
Gates had from the CyberTip, he had probable cause to arrest Bowie for
possession of child pornography, but he did not do so at that point because of the
warrant that was simultaneously being executed at Bowie’s house.

¶9 Gates continued the interview with Bowie, requesting that he
provide numbers for any cell phones that he used. As Bowie struggled to locate
one of the numbers in a phone he had with him in the minivan, Bowie handed the
phone to the detective so he could help Bowie. The detective ultimately retained
the phone, over Bowie’s objection, pursuant to the search warrant authorizing the
seizure of electronic devices.

¶10 Using Gates’ laptop, Gates showed Bowie two of the images that
had been flagged in the CyberTip. Regarding one of the CSAM images, Bowie
told Gates he thought the girl depicted was “16, 17[,]” which still constitutes

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

possession of child pornography, or “18, maybe[,]” but the girl was actually 12,
which Gates knew because it is an image known to law enforcement where the
victim had been identified. Gates informed Bowie about the search warrant and
that the police would eventually take his phone and scan it for CSAM. Gates
explained to Bowie that “why we’re here to talk” is because “you have this social
media account” and, in that account, “you have images of child pornography.”

¶11 At the end of the interview in the minivan, Gates and the detective
handcuffed Bowie and drove him to his house, where the search warrant was being
executed.

¶12 A forensic examiner later analyzed Bowie’s phone and found CSAM
on it. Bowie was then arrested and charged with ten counts of possession of child
pornography, all as a repeater. Through counsel, Bowie filed two suppression
motions—one challenging the State’s use of his statements as involuntary, and the
other challenging the warrantless search of his cell phone. Counsel argued, in
part, that the State obtained Bowie’s statements in violation of his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Following the evidentiary hearing, defense
counsel argued that Bowie’s incriminating statements were involuntary and that
Gates obtained Bowie’s statements in violation of Miranda.3

¶13 The circuit court denied both suppression motions. It found that
Bowie voluntarily gave the statements, and the circumstances did not place him in
a custodial setting for Miranda purposes. With regard to the seizure and

3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda motion related only to the
period in which Bowie was in the minivan but not handcuffed. The State conceded that all
statements made after Bowie was handcuffed violated Miranda.

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

subsequent search of Bowie’s cellphone, the court concluded “there was probable
cause” at the time Bowie handed his phone to the detective for assistance.
Alternatively, the CSAM inevitably would have been discovered. Bowie moved
for reconsideration, which the court denied. In addition to having found probable
cause to seize and search the phone, the court clarified that discovery of the
images on the phone was inevitable because law enforcement would have seized
Bowie’s phone upon his arrest and subsequently obtained a warrant to search it.

¶14 Bowie then filed a complaint with the Office of Lawyer Regulation
(OLR) about his initial attorney (“trial counsel”), who litigated the motion to
suppress. He alleged that trial counsel “did not present the correct standard of
review … regarding Miranda and custodial interrogations” and wanted an
opportunity to testify at a new suppression hearing. He also argued that “under no
circumstances would a reasonable person required to comply with the registry
program feel free to just terminate the interrogation and leave knowing
non-compliance is a [C]lass H felony.” Bowie—through his fourth attorney—
moved to reopen the suppression motion for the sole purpose of providing Bowie
an opportunity to testify. After Bowie changed attorneys again, a new judge
denied the motion to reopen.4

¶15 After the denial of his motion to reopen, Bowie entered a plea of no
contest to one count of possessing child pornography as a repeater. The other nine
charges were dismissed and read in at sentencing. The circuit court imposed
initial confinement of four and one-half years and two years of extended

4
The Honorable Mary Kay Wagner presided over the initial suppression motion hearing.
The Honorable Anthony G. Milisauskas presided over the remainder of the pretrial proceedings,
the plea and sentencing hearings, and postconviction matters.

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

supervision. It granted Bowie over four years of sentence credit, which resulted in
him only serving approximately six months in confinement after sentence was
imposed.

¶16 Through appellate counsel, Bowie filed a postconviction motion to
withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He argued that
trial counsel raised the wrong suppression theories. Instead, Bowie asserted
counsel should have argued that Bowie had self-executing immunity from
prosecution because Gates compelled his statements by implicitly threatening him
with prosecution under SORP, should he have invoked his Fifth Amendment right
to silence. In other words, Bowie believed trial counsel should have filed another
suppression motion arguing: “The State of Wisconsin exploited this [SORP]
penalty provision to pressure Mr. Bowie into becoming a witness against himself
in a criminal prosecution.”

¶17 The circuit court held a hearing on Bowie’s postconviction motion at
which both trial counsel and Bowie testified. See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d
797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). Trial counsel summarized her suppression
strategy, confirming that she tried to suppress Bowie’s statements and the cell
phone evidence through Miranda. She recalled arguing the statements were
involuntary, but did not recall making or considering the specific argument
regarding coercion that Bowie now advanced, instead viewing SORP as a factor to
use in the Miranda custody analysis but not as an independent basis for
suppression.

¶18 The circuit court denied the postconviction motion. It rejected
Bowie’s testimony that he would not have entered a plea if trial counsel would
have pursued the SORP-based, self-incrimination argument. The court observed

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

that Bowie was aware of the SORP argument at the time he wrote to OLR and,
given that, he could have asked counsel to pursue that theory before entering a
plea if he so desired. It further noted that Bowie drastically reduced his sentencing
exposure by accepting the agreement, and he was released to extended supervision
shortly after sentencing. The court found Bowie’s testimony simply was not
credible and there was no ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Bowie appeals.

¶19 We include additional facts as necessary to our discussion below.

DISCUSSION

¶20 Although Bowie delineates several separate issues on appeal, he
primarily focuses on his argument that trial counsel was deficient in failing to
suppress his statements to law enforcement as compelled due to his legal
obligation to provide the SORP information specified by statute. Bowie argues his
statements were compelled because he could have been charged under the sex
offender registry law for failing to provide the requested information had he
invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence during the discussion with Gates.
Bowie also raises challenges to the voluntariness of his statements, argues his
Miranda rights were implicated by Gates’ questioning of Bowie, and asserts the
statements and the cell-phone evidence should have been suppressed.

I. Ineffective assistance of counsel

¶21 To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show
both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To
prove deficient performance, the defendant must point to specific acts or
omissions by counsel that are “outside the wide range of professionally competent

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

assistance.” Id. at 690. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. If a defendant fails to
make a sufficient showing on one prong of the Strickland test, we need not
address the other. Id. at 697.

¶22 As we now explain, because the law is at best unsettled, we conclude
trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to file a motion to suppress
Bowie’s statements to law enforcement and the cell-phone evidence based on a
legal theory that the evidence was compelled because the sex offender registry
laws penalize the invocation of the Fifth Amendment. See State v. Breitzman,
2017 WI 100, ¶49, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93 (a defendant must show that
trial counsel “failed to raise an issue of settled law” in order to establish
ineffectiveness).

¶23 According to Bowie, trial counsel performed deficiently by not
raising what he calls “a Kastigar claim” based on his SORP-compulsion theory of
suppression. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigar, the
Court concluded the government could compel a witness’ testimony through a
subpoena even after a witness had invoked his or her Fifth Amendment privilege
of silence because the government granted them immunity pursuant to federal
statutes. Id. at 442. It held that statutes compelling testimony upon a grant of
immunity are generally lawful, as were the statutes at issue there. Id. at 448.
Bowie effectively argues that, under Kastigar, the State must provide a grant of
immunity for compliance with SORP provisions requiring certain potentially
incriminating information and maintains that Gates implicitly compelled him to
incriminate himself by referring to SORP’s disclosure requirements. He claims on
appeal that he should have been granted “self-executing” immunity even though

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

he never asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege while talking with Gates and the
detective.

¶24 As the State aptly observes, Kastigar is inapposite. In Bowie’s
situation, the government never compelled him to speak through formal legal
process such as a subpoena. Further, unlike Kastigar, Bowie never invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege during questioning. Instead, Bowie argues that Gates
“implicitly compelled him” by referring to SORP’s disclosure requirements such
that he had to be granted “self-executing” immunity even though he failed to
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.

¶25 Bowie fails to convince us that settled law supports the theory that
he faults trial counsel for not pursuing. Without settled law, Bowie cannot meet
his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel had a clear duty to pursue this
theory in an attempt to suppress evidence. See id. To explain further, ineffective
assistance of counsel claims “should be limited to situations where the law or duty
is clear such that reasonable counsel should know enough to raise the issue.”
State v. Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, ¶33, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232 (citation
omitted). The law is not clear or settled when “there is no Wisconsin case law
directly on point on the issue” and existing case law does not “present a factual
situation similar enough to the facts of [the] case.” State v. Morales-Pedrosa,
2016 WI App 38, ¶26, 369 Wis. 2d 75, 879 N.W.2d 772.

¶26 Bowie has not demonstrated that settled law supported the
suppression of the evidence. Kastigar is inapposite, and Bowie cites to no
Wisconsin case that stands for the legal proposition he advances. He instead
attempts to rely on a specific “penalty-case exception” relied on by Wisconsin
courts in the probation context. See State v. Spaeth, 2012 WI 95, 343 Wis. 2d

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

220, 819 N.W.2d 769; State v. Quigley, 2016 WI App 53, 370 Wis. 2d 702, 883
N.W.2d 139; State v. Peebles, 2010 WI App 156, 330 Wis. 2d 243, 792 N.W.2d
212. It is unclear whether these cases apply to registered sex offenders under
SORP—as stated, Bowie cites to no case that has done so. Trial counsel cannot be
deficient for not raising a claim based on unsettled law. See Lemberger, 374
Wis. 2d 617, ¶18. Without settled law, Bowie cannot meet his burden of
demonstrating that his trial counsel had a clear duty to pursue the theory that a sex
offender registrant has an implicit “self-executing” privilege not to answer
SORP-related questions. See Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶49.

¶27 Citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), the State further
argues that under the current law, Bowie would not have been successful with
suppression even if trial counsel had raised the argument Bowie now advances.
The State argues that Kastigar does not apply to the facts presented here and
Murphy is on point. To explain, Murphy involved a situation in which a
probation agent learned that Murphy had admitted in treatment to committing a
rape and murder seven years earlier. 465 U.S. at 423. Murphy was prosecuted for
the rape and murder after the probation agent shared Murphy’s admissions with
law enforcement. Id. at 424. Murphy argued that his statements to the agent
could not be used against him because they were compelled. Id.

¶28 The Supreme Court disagreed that Murphy’s statements could not be
used because they were unlawfully compelled, holding that “the general obligation
to appear and answer questions truthfully d[oes] not in itself convert [a
defendant’s] otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones.” Id. at 427. It
explained that the government has not compelled a witness’ testimony when a
witness “under compulsion to testify” makes incriminating disclosures rather than
asserting his or her Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. (citation omitted). Wisconsin

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

courts have embraced Murphy, explaining that “a witness confronted with
questions that the government should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating
evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than answer if he desires not to
incriminate himself.” State v. Mark, 2006 WI 78, ¶26, 292 Wis. 2d 1, 718
N.W.2d 90 (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429).

¶29 Bowie could have asserted his privilege against self-incrimination at
any time during questioning by Gates. The fact that he chose not to assert it does
not mean that the statements he gave Gates against his own interest must be
suppressed. Bowie was entitled to remain silent and/or walk away from the
minivan, taking his cell phone with him. Further, because the
self-executing-immunity legal theory Bowie alleges trial counsel should have
advanced is not a settled point of law, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to
make the argument.

II. Other issues

¶30 Bowie also argues both that his incriminating statements were not
voluntary because they were coerced and they were made in violation of Miranda.
As relevant to Bowie’s arguments, Murphy identified two exceptions to its general
holding as set forth above. The first exception is Miranda. Murphy, 465 U.S. at
429-30. “[T]his extraordinary safeguard” against incriminating oneself “does not
apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for
which it was designed.” Id. at 430 (citation omitted). The second exception is in
“the so-called ‘penalty’ cases” in which the State not only compelled an individual
to appear and testify, but also sought to induce him or her through threat of
punishment. See id. at 434.

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

¶31 As noted in the previous section, Bowie has not demonstrated that
the situation challenged here presents a penalty case. We therefore turn to
Bowie’s contentions that Gates’ interrogation “tactic” of “request[ing] information
from him while purposefully masquerading under the guise of SORP” constituted
unlawful coercion, and his statements were involuntary and violated Miranda.

¶32 We first conclude that Gates’ interrogation “tactic” falls short of
clearing the “high bar” necessary to establish coercion. See State v. Vice, 2021
WI 63, ¶45, 397 Wis. 2d 682, 961 N.W.2d 1. “[I]t is settled law that police may
engage in active deception, including lying to a suspect, without rendering that
suspect’s statement involuntary.” Id. Similarly, we reject Bowie’s claim that
Gates “overbore [his] will.” Whether “a defendant’s will was overborne” goes to
the voluntariness of the statement under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., ¶¶30,
45. Here, Gates candidly told Bowie of his suspicions and the reasons law
enforcement was at Bowie’s workplace looking into his email and Pinterest
accounts. Bowie has failed to persuade us that Gates engaged in unlawful
coercion.

¶33 Based on the facts found by the circuit court, we also conclude that
Bowie has failed to establish that his statements were made in violation of his
Miranda rights. Miranda requires law enforcement to inform a suspect of his or
her right to remain silent and to have an attorney present before commencing a
custodial interrogation. State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, ¶27, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906
N.W.2d 684. The State does not dispute that Gates’ questioning of Bowie in the
minivan constituted interrogation, but argues that it was not custodial. We agree
with the State, as we now explain.

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

¶34 It is axiomatic that law enforcement must give certain warnings prior
to a custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). These
often-recited Miranda warnings inform suspects that they have the right to remain
silent; that anything they say can be used against them in a court of law; that they
have the right to have an attorney present; and that an attorney will be appointed
prior to questioning if the suspects so desire and cannot afford an attorney. Id. at
444-45. Because “Miranda and its progeny are aimed at dispelling the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,” the Miranda safeguards apply
“‘only to custodial interrogations’ under both the U.S. and Wisconsin
constitutions.” Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶30 (citation omitted).

¶35 When a person is subjected to a custodial interrogation, “[i]f the
warnings are not given, any statements made are inadmissible in court.” State v.
Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶1, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847. Our supreme court
has also concluded that “physical evidence obtained as the direct result of an
intentional violation of Miranda is inadmissible under Article 1, Section 8 of the
Wisconsin Constitution.” State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶83, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700
N.W.2d 899.

¶36 The reason Miranda warnings must be given when a suspect is in
custody and subject to interrogation is because the warnings are “aimed at
dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.” State v. Pheil, 152
Wis. 2d 523, 530-31, 449 N.W.2d 858 (1989). This is the rule under both the
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. See id. A circuit court determines
whether a suspect is in Miranda custody based on an objective consideration of
the totality of the circumstances. Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶31. Relevant factors
include, but are not limited to, “the degree of restraint; the purpose, place, and

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

length of the interrogation; and what has been communicated by police officers.”
Id., ¶32.

¶37 Based on the totality of the circumstances and considering the
relevant factors, we conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously determine
that Bowie was not in Miranda custody until he was handcuffed. In the time
before they entered the minivan, Bowie spoke with Gates outside his workplace,
not in a stationhouse. See Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶33 (holding even if a person
is subject to formal arrest, the court must “consider whether ‘the relevant
environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station
house questioning at issue in Miranda.’” (citation omitted)). Bowie willingly
followed Gates when asked if he would speak in his minivan, and had Bowie
asked, Gates testified he would have found a private office within his workplace to
meet.

¶38 In addition, Gates was wearing plain clothes, and the minivan was
unmarked. Bowie sat in the front passenger seat next to an unlocked door, not in
the rear seat of a locked squad car. Bowie was not restrained, searched, or
handcuffed until the end of the interview. He was not impeded from exiting the
vehicle whenever he wished.

¶39 We further observe that the interview in the minivan was relatively
brief. Forty-six minutes and six seconds elapsed between Bowie’s entrance into
the minivan and his arrival at his home. The noncustodial portion of the
conversation before Gates handcuffed Bowie was necessarily shorter than that,
and an interview length of 30 minutes does not support a determination of
Miranda custody. See Bartelt, 379 Wis. 2d 588, ¶38.

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No. 2024AP2240-CR

¶40 We conclude that no constitutional violation occurred because, based
on the undisputed facts, Bowie was not in custody during Gates’ questioning of
him prior to his arrest. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in determining
that his statements and the cell-phone evidence would be admissible if Bowie went
to trial.

CONCLUSION

¶41 Bowie has failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to raise an unsettled legal theory under Kastigar. Additionally, Bowie has
not shown that his pre-custody statements and the cell-phone evidence were
unconstitutionally obtained as coerced, involuntary, or in violation of Miranda.
Accordingly, Bowie is not entitled to withdraw his plea to possession of child
pornography. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of conviction and order denying
Bowie’s postconviction motion.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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