State v. Alexander C. Beaver

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 1, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP1768-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF188

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ALEXANDER C. BEAVER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Walworth County:
DANIEL S. JOHNSON, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 NEUBAUER, P.J.1 Alexander C. Beaver appeals from the portion
of a circuit court order that requires him to pay restitution for half of the value of a

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP1768-CR

car he jointly owned with the victim of his criminal conviction for disorderly
conduct “because there is no causal nexus between his disorderly conduct and her
loss of use of the car.” We disagree. The court did not err in finding a “causal
nexus” between Beaver’s disorderly conduct and the victim’s financial loss due to
her loss of use of their jointly owned car. This court affirms the order.

¶2 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.20(1r) requires a sentencing court to “order
the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this section to any victim of
a crime considered at sentencing ... unless the court finds substantial reason not to
do so and states the reason on the record.” Accordingly, “restitution is the rule
and not the exception” and “should be ordered whenever warranted.” State v.
Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d 324, 333, 602 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App.1999).

¶3 In disputes concerning the determination of criminal restitution, this
court addresses whether the circuit court misused its discretionary authority. See
State v. Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 57, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996). A
discretionary decision will only be reversed if the circuit court applied the wrong
legal standard or did not ground its decision on a logical interpretation of the facts.
See id. at 58.

¶4 The primary purpose of restitution is not to punish the defendant, but
to compensate the victim. Madlock, 230 Wis. 2d at 332. The restitution statute
“reflects a strong equitable public policy that victims should not have to bear the
burden of losses if the defendant is capable of making restitution.” Id. (citing
State v. Kennedy, 190 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 528 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1994)). The
statute is to be interpreted “broadly and liberally in order to allow victims to
recover their losses as a result of a defendant’s criminal conduct.” Madlock, 230

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No. 2025AP1768-CR

Wis. 2d at 332 (citing State v. Anderson, 215 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 573 N.W.2d 872
(Ct. App. 1997)).

¶5 Before restitution can be ordered, a causal nexus must be present
between the crime committed and the damage to be compensated. Madlock, 230
Wis. 2d at 333. In proving causation, a victim need only show that the defendant’s
criminal activity was a substantial factor in causing injury, damage, or loss; that
the defendant’s actions were the precipitating cause of the injury, damage, or loss;
and that it was the natural consequence of the actions. See id.; see also State v.
Behnke, 203 Wis. 2d 43, 59, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1996). The victim’s
burden “is not to prove that the actions were the sole factor.” Behnke, 203
Wis. 2d at 59.

¶6 As intended by the restitution statute, the “crime considered at
sentencing” is defined in broad terms. See State v. Canady, 2000 WI App 87, ¶10,
234 Wis. 2d 261, 610 N.W.2d 147. The “crime” encompasses “all facts and
reasonable inferences concerning the defendant’s activity related to the ‘crime’ for
which the defendant was convicted, not just those facts necessary to support the
elements of the specific charge of which the defendant was convicted.” Madlock,
230 Wis. 2d at 333. The sentencing court should consider the defendant’s “entire
course of conduct.” Id. (citing State v. Rodriguez, 205 Wis. 2d 620, 627, 556
N.W.2d 140 (Ct. App. 1996)).

¶7 On July 28, 2023, Beaver was convicted of disorderly conduct for an
incident that occurred on July 7, 2021.2 On January 5, 2024, at the restitution

2
Wisconsin’s disorderly conduct statute, WIS. STAT. § 947.01(1) provides:

(continued)

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No. 2025AP1768-CR

hearing, the victim of his crime testified to the following. As of July 7, 2021, she
and Beaver had been living together in her apartment for about six months. On
that date, she told Beaver she wanted to break up and a fight ensued between them
in which Beaver became physical with her. Beaver hit her, grabbed her neck, and
threatened himself with a knife and with a firearm. She was eventually able to get
Beaver to leave the apartment and he did so in the vehicle they jointly owned. The
vehicle has never been returned. As a result, the victim lost total use of the
vehicle. The victim provided documentation of, and the court admitted into
evidence, “the Kelley Blue Book [valuation] of [the] vehicle that [Beaver] took the
night that he left the apartment and didn’t give back.” Beaver did not testify at the
restitution hearing.

¶8 After the conclusion of the restitution hearing, the circuit court
entered an order on April 11, 2024, granting the victim restitution in the amount of
$5,380.37. This total included $1,802, which was half the value of the vehicle
jointly owned by the victim and Beaver. In ordering this amount the court made
the following findings:

On July 7, 2021, the Defendant engaged in conduct that
was violent and abusive that tended to case [sic] or provoke
a disturbance and that conduct was directed that [sic] the
victim, without the victim’s consent. The victim suffered
injuries that caused her pain and were observable by law
enforcement the following day. …

[A]s part of the Defendant’s conduct on July 7, 2021, the
Defendant took and never returned a 2002 Buick LeSabre
vehicle; [] the Defendant and the victim jointly owned the

Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane,
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the
conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.

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No. 2025AP1768-CR

vehicle; [] the fair market value of the vehicle at the time of
sentencing was $3,604… .

¶9 Based on these findings of fact, the circuit court made the following
conclusions of law and ordered:

There is a casual nexus between the Defendant’s crime
considered at sentencing and victim’s […] loss of the
vehicle […] because the Defendant’s violent and disorderly
conduct was a substantial factor in causing damage to or
loss of use of the vehicle […].

The victim is entitled to restitution for the amounts
regarding each of the identified categories, if they were
established by a preponderance of the evidence. […]

The victim established by a preponderance of the evidence
the amount [] for [the loss of the vehicle] by providing
credible testimony and evidence regarding [the amount].
[…]

As a result of the Defendant’s crime considered at
sentencing, the victim lost the use of the 2002 Buick
LeSabre … and is entitled to restitution for the loss of that
property under [WIS. STAT. § [973.20(2). […]

Return of the vehicle […] is impossible, impractical, and
inadequate because the current location of the vehicle […]
is unknown. … []

The Court must order restitution for the loss of the vehicle
based upon the greater of the value of the vehicle on the
date of loss or on the date of sentencing. No evidence was
presented regarding the value of the vehicle on the date of
the loss, but evidence was presented that the value of the
vehicle on the date of sentencing was $3604. []

Because the Defendant and the victim jointly owned the
vehicle, it is inequitable for the victim to receive full value
of the loss of the vehicle. Rather, the victim is entitled to
[half] the value - $1,802 – based upon the joint ownership.

¶10 On this record, it was not unreasonable for the circuit court to
conclude that Beaver’s disorderly conduct was a substantial factor in causing his
victim’s financial loss of the value of half the jointly-owned vehicle. Indeed, the

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No. 2025AP1768-CR

evidence in the present case supports a stronger causal nexus between the crime
and loss to warrant restitution than the nexus that this court found satisfactory in
State v. Rash, 2003 WI App 32, 260 Wis. 2d 369, 659 N.W.2d 189. In Rash, the
victim had just used a remote key to unlock his car when he was abducted by the
defendant at gunpoint, forced into the defendant’s car, and robbed. Id., ¶2. The
victim’s car was left behind unlocked. Id. Thereafter, the victim’s car was found
in a different location, damaged, and with items missing. Id., ¶3. It was
undisputed that someone other than the defendant had stolen the victim’s car,
damaged it and took items from it. Id. This court determined “it was reasonable
for the postconviction court to conclude that but for Rash’s crime, [the victim’s]
car would not have been taken and damaged and [his] property in the car would
not have been stolen. Id., ¶8. As in Rash, it was reasonable for the court to
conclude that, but for Beaver’s disorderly conduct, the victim would not have
suffered the financial loss of the value of half the jointly owned vehicle. See id.,
¶7.

¶11 The circuit court properly determined that the financial loss suffered
by Beaver’s victim as a result of Beaver taking the vehicle and depriving her of its
use, was substantially caused by Beaver’s disorderly conduct. The court properly
held that the victim carried her burden of proving that the amount of loss she
sustained was a result of the crime considered at sentencing. The court reasonably
concluded that the victim showed a “causal nexus” between Beaver’s disorderly
conduct and her loss of use of the jointly-owned vehicle and properly awarded
restitution for half the value of the jointly-owned vehicle.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

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No. 2025AP1768-CR

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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