Samantha Elliot v. Tyler Hansel

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 17, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP871 Cir. Ct. No. 2024SC51

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

SAMANTHA ELLIOT,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

TYLER HANSEL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Washburn County:
MELISSIA R. MOGEN, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 STARK, P.J.1 Tyler Hansel appeals from a judgment of replevin
requiring him to return a 2003 Mitsubishi Lancer Evolution (the vehicle) to

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2024AP871

Samantha Elliot.2 Hansel also challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss Elliot’s complaint because the value of the vehicle exceeded the limit for
small claims actions and the court’s ruling that the vehicle’s original title be
destroyed. For the reasons that follow, we reject Hansel’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On February 23, 2024, Elliot filed this small claims replevin action,
seeking the return of the vehicle from Hansel. Elliot and Hansel had been in a
long-term romantic relationship that had recently ended. Elliot alleged that they
purchased the vehicle together during their relationship in 2011 and that she was
the rightful owner because the vehicle was titled in her name. Elliot attached a
replacement copy of the title, listing her as the owner, to her complaint.

¶3 Hansel filed his answer and also a counterclaim against Elliot,
alleging that Elliot had transferred title to the vehicle to him in July 2019 and that
she “ha[d] somehow or another removed the lien holder[’]s name on the title.”
Hansel argued that Elliot’s complaint was “frivolous and deceitful” and requested
a money judgment for $25,000. Hansel later moved to dismiss Elliot’s complaint,
arguing that the value of the vehicle exceeded the amount in controversy for a
small claims replevin action under WIS. STAT. § 799.01(1)(c).

¶4 On May 1, 2024, the circuit court held a trial to the court, where both
Elliot and Hansel testified. The court first addressed Hansel’s motion to dismiss
on the record. Elliot testified that the vehicle’s value was $5,000 to $8,000
because “[i]t doesn’t even run.” In contrast, Hansel alleged that the vehicle was

2
Hansel is represented by counsel on appeal, while Elliot is self-represented.

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No. 2024AP871

worth $46,000, but with “all the modifications” that he made to the vehicle, the
value was closer to $82,000. Given the vast discrepancy, the court determined that
it would need more evidence as to the vehicle’s value, and it orally denied the
motion to dismiss on the record.

¶5 Elliot testified that when she and Hansel were in a relationship, they
purchased “quite a few vehicles” together, but when they “parted ways,” Hansel
“took everything,” including the vehicle at issue in this case “that’s in [her]
name.” Elliot produced a replacement title for the vehicle, which lists her as the
owner with no lien holders. In response, Hansel produced a title listing Elliot as
the owner and Nelson Nels Fairfax, the previous owner (hereinafter, Nels), as the
lien holder. Elliot’s signature was on the back of the title, dated July 5, 2019.
Hansel testified that he later inserted his name as the purchaser of the vehicle on
the title. It is undisputed, however, that Hansel never registered the vehicle in his
name with the Wisconsin Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), nor did he
request a new title for the vehicle.

¶6 Elliot admitted that it was her signature on the title, but she
explained that Hansel’s “name was not on [the title] when [she] signed,” that the
vehicle “was not ever to go to” Hansel, and that Hansel wrote his information on
the title later, noting that his signature is undated and in different color ink.
According to Elliot, she “didn’t convey the car to” Hansel; instead, she signed the
title because Hansel told her that Nels “was supposed to come and take [the
vehicle] back” and threatened her that “if [she] didn’t sell it back to [Nels], he was
going to put [her] in prison.” Elliot testified that years later, after their relationship
ended and Hansel refused to turn over the vehicle or the title, she went to the
DMV to get a replacement copy of the title. She stated that she was told by a
DMV employee that because it had been over ten years, “you don’t have a lien

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No. 2024AP871

holder on it anymore,” and Nels was removed from the title. See WIS. STAT.
§ 342.22(3).

¶7 For his part, Hansel testified that he purchased the vehicle from Nels
in 2011, that he paid for the initial payment on his own, that he received no
contributions from Elliot, that he still owed $3,000 to Nels for the purchase price,
that the last payment he made to Nels was two years ago because “it’s a loose
schedule … because [they are] friends,” and that the lien was active. Hansel
alleged that Elliot was listed as the owner because he did not have a valid driver’s
license at the time of purchase and that he got his license back in 2013. Hansel
stated that he watched Elliot sign the title and that it was always the understanding
that the vehicle would be transferred to him and titled in his name, but he
acknowledged that he did not sign contemporaneously with Elliot. He signed the
title as the purchaser “[n]ot all that long after” Elliot signed.

¶8 As to the value of the vehicle, Hansel supported his estimated value
of $46,000 by explaining that “it’s a very rare car,” that it is “listed in [the]
supercar category along with Lamborghinis [and] Porsches,” and that he had
“heavily” modified it as a “project car.” Hansel also presented a printout from
Kelley Blue Book, listing the value of the car as between $27,129 and $31,368.
Nevertheless, he admitted that the vehicle was not “drivable” because the “clutch
is tore [sic] out of it” and that it was damaged when he relocated the vehicle.
Neither party presented any additional expert testimony as to the value of the
vehicle.

¶9 After the close of evidence, the circuit court found in favor of Elliot
and issued an oral ruling to that effect, which was later memorialized by a written
decision and order. Significantly, the court found Elliot more credible than

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No. 2024AP871

Hansel. The court explained that it had been almost five years since Elliot signed
the title, and “Hansel has not complied with Wisconsin law relating to titling and
registering vehicles.” “As such, and based upon testimony of the parties,” the
court stated that it “believe[d] that there was some aspect of fraud or evasion of
legal requirements involved.” Therefore, it found that the vehicle was legally
titled in Elliot’s name and that she is the owner of the vehicle. It also found that
the vehicle was not worth the amount “[t]he defense would like the Court to
believe,” noting that “[t]here were no pictures of the vehicle, no car expert was
called to testify, nor was there any appraisal of the vehicle completed.”
Accordingly, the court concluded, based on the evidence provided, that it could
not “find that it is worth over $10,000.” The court thereafter entered a judgment
of replevin in favor of Elliot. Hansel appeals.3

DISCUSSION

¶10 Hansel presents three arguments for our review. First, he argues that
the circuit court erred by denying his motion to dismiss Elliot’s complaint because
the value of the vehicle “was above the threshold amount for small claims court.”4
Second, he argues that the court’s finding that Elliot was the owner of the vehicle
was clearly erroneous because “ownership of the vehicle … was established upon

3
Hansel did not file a reply brief in this case. By failing to file a reply, he has arguably
conceded any arguments raised in Elliot’s response brief that his initial brief did not already
address. See Apple Hill Farms Dev., LLP v. Price, 2012 WI App 69, ¶14, 342 Wis. 2d 162, 816
N.W.2d 914 (noting that the failure to file a reply brief was deemed a concession to the
respondent’s argument).
4
Although this is not the order in which Hansel presented his arguments on appeal, we
address them in this order because a conclusion in Hansel’s favor on the motion to dismiss issue
would prove dispositive with regard to the remaining issues. See Sweet v. Berge, 113 Wis. 2d 61,
67, 334 N.W.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1983) (stating that an appellate court need not address every issue
raised by the parties when one issue is dispositive).

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No. 2024AP871

[Elliot’s] signature on a vehicle title” and upon Hansel also “sign[ing] the title.”
Finally, Hansel challenges the court’s order to destroy the original title to the
vehicle. For the reasons that follow, we reject all of Hansel’s arguments and
affirm the judgment of the circuit court.5

I. Motion to Dismiss

¶11 Hansel’s motion to dismiss essentially argued that the small claims
court did not have jurisdiction over the replevin action because the value of the
vehicle “exceeded” “[t]he amount in controversy for personal property in a
replevin action.” On appeal, Hansel asserts that the circuit court erred by
determining that the value of the vehicle was under $10,000 “without credible
evidence.”

¶12 Under WIS. STAT. § 799.01(1)(c), small claims actions for replevin
are limited to those actions “where the value of the property claimed does not
exceed $10,000.”6 The circuit court’s determination of value is a finding of fact.7
5
We note that Hansel had filed a counterclaim, arguing that Elliot’s complaint was
“frivolous and deceitful” and requesting a money judgment for $25,000. It does not appear that
the circuit court addressed the counterclaim in its oral ruling or in its decision and order. Hansel
also does not address his counterclaim on appeal.

We see no basis for Hansel’s counterclaim. The court found Elliot to be credible, and it
decided the case in her favor. We therefore conclude that the court implicitly found that Elliot’s
complaint was not frivolous or deceitful and denied the counterclaim.
6
WISCONSIN STAT. § 425.205(1), however, creates an exception to WIS. STAT.
§ 799.01(1)(c) for consumer credit transactions. Section 425.205(1) provides that “a creditor
seeking to obtain possession of collateral … shall commence an action for replevin … in
accordance with [WIS. STAT.] ch. 799, notwithstanding [§] 799.01(1)(c) and the value of the
collateral or leased goods sought to be recovered.” Neither party suggests that § 425.205(1) is
applicable here. Although Hansel testified that he still owed money to Nels for the vehicle, Nels
was not the one seeking to obtain possession in this case.
7
The parties both failed to address our standard of review of the circuit court’s decision
in their appellate briefing.

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No. 2024AP871

We will not upset a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). Further, we defer to the circuit court’s finding
on the credibility of a witness, as it had “the opportunity to observe the witness’
demeanor and gauge the testimony’s persuasiveness.” Jacobson v. American
Tool Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 384, 390, 588 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1998). On appeal, we
will “search the record for evidence that supports findings the [circuit] court made,
not for findings it could have made but did not.” Dickman v. Vollmer, 2007 WI
App 141, ¶14, 303 Wis. 2d 241, 736 N.W.2d 202. However, we review a circuit
court’s decision on a motion to dismiss de novo. See Eternalist Found., Inc. v.
City of Platteville, 225 Wis. 2d 759, 769-70, 593 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1999).

¶13 We conclude that the circuit court did not err by denying Hansel’s
motion to dismiss. At the trial, the court heard testimony on the vehicle’s value
from both Hansel and Elliot. See Mayberry v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 2005 WI
13, ¶42, 278 Wis. 2d 39, 692 N.W.2d 226 (“In Wisconsin, the general rule is that a
non-expert owner may testify concerning the value of their property, regardless of
whether it is realty or personalty.” (citation omitted)). Elliot testified that the
value of the vehicle was between $5,000 and $8,000, explaining that she came to
that figure because “[i]t doesn’t even run.”

¶14 In contrast, Hansel testified that the vehicle was worth $46,000 and
that with “all the modifications that was put into it, the car is sitting at $82,000.”
Hansel admitted on direct and cross-examination, however, that the vehicle
“wasn’t drivable” because “[t]he clutch is tore [sic] out of it,” “the transmission is
out,” the “fifth gear … is out,” and the vehicle had been damaged when he initially
took possession of it from Elliot. Given Elliot’s and Hansel’s testimony, we
cannot conclude that the circuit court’s finding that the value of the vehicle was

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No. 2024AP871

below $10,000 was clearly erroneous, and, accordingly, it properly denied
Hansel’s motion to dismiss.

¶15 Hansel challenges this conclusion essentially on the basis of the
weight the circuit court gave to Elliot’s testimony over his own. First, he argues
that “[a]ccompanying the motion was a kell[e]y blue book valuation showing the
vehicle at issue’s value” and that “value was further testified to by [Hansel] along
with detailed corroborating information as to the nature and modifications of the
vehicle giving rise to its relatively high value.”

¶16 We agree that the record contains a document from Kelley Blue
Book showing that the vehicle’s “private party” value was between $27,129 and
$31,368. Nevertheless, although the motion to dismiss states that Hansel’s
counsel obtained a “basic valuation” of the vehicle using Kelley Blue Book, the
document does not state what “condition” of the vehicle was provided to obtain
this estimated value range. In fact, the included “Glossary of Terms” clearly states
that the private party value “depends on the car’s actual condition and local market
factors,” and all of the listed definitions for “condition”—i.e., excellent, very
good, good, fair—require that the vehicle “still [be] in safe running condition.”

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Given these factors, the circuit court did not err by refusing to rely on the Kelley
Blue Book value range.8

¶17 Second, Hansel argues that Elliot “simply provided a much lower
figure with no supporting information or sufficiently weighty testimony.” Hansel
further suggests that Elliot’s valuation was incorrect because “[t]he vehicle was
not in her possession,” “[s]he did not know the specifics of the vehicle,” and
“[s]he did not supply any competing valuation.” We reject Hansel’s arguments in
light of our standard of review.

¶18 Initially, we note that Hansel cites several cases for the proposition
that an individual may testify to the value of their property and that an expert is
not required; therefore, he does not dispute this proposition. See Mayberry, 278
Wis. 2d 39, ¶42. Given that the dispute in this case involved whether Elliot or
Hansel was the owner of the vehicle and that Elliot’s name was clearly listed as
the owner of the vehicle on both titles supplied to the circuit court by the parties,

8
Additionally, Elliot argues on appeal that “there are aspects of [the Kelley Blue Book]
valuation that [do not] tell the full story” because the vehicle “is titled as a prior salvage that was
rebuilt” and “[a] vehicle that has been rebuilt from a salvage title has obviously depreciated more
than a vehicle without a prior salvage title.” We agree with Elliot that both titles provided by the
parties in the record state “Prior Salvage, Rebuilt.” (Formatting altered.) See WIS. ADMIN. CODE
§ Trans 139.02(16) (Nov. 2024) (“‘Rebuilt salvage’ means any repaired vehicle that has ever had
a salvage notation on its certificate of title from Wisconsin or another jurisdiction.”). Elliot
failed, however, to provide any testimony or other evidence at the trial as to the impact of a
salvage title on the value of a vehicle. Nevertheless, we do note that the Kelley Blue Book
valuation provided by Hansel at the trial does not include any indication that the value range
provided was for a vehicle with a salvaged, reconstructed, or otherwise clouded title. To the
extent that the salvage title would support a common-sense inference, that inference would
support the circuit court’s finding that the vehicle’s value was below $10,000. See State v. Holt,
128 Wis. 2d 110, 124-25, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1985), superseded by statute on other
grounds, WIS. STAT. § 940.225(7) (explaining that as a matter of judicial efficiency, a respondent
may advance for the first time on appeal any argument that would sustain the circuit court’s
ruling).

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there is no question that Elliot was qualified to testify, and her testimony was
legally sufficient as to the actual value of the vehicle. See id.

¶19 Instead, Hansel’s arguments go to the weight the circuit court gave
to Elliot’s testimony. We reject this challenge. “The weight to be attached to a
non-expert owner’s testimony is for the trier of fact.” Id. (citation omitted). The
court clearly and specifically found, “[b]ased on the evidence provided,” that
Elliot’s testimony as to the value was “more credible.” We cannot and will not
question that finding. Further, as to Hansel’s suggestion that Elliot did not know
enough about the vehicle because it was not in her possession at the time of the
trial, we are not persuaded by this argument. Again, this fact goes to the weight of
Elliot’s testimony, and the court was well aware that she was not in possession of
the vehicle. Also, Elliot clearly knew enough about the vehicle to question Hansel
on cross-examination about issues with its condition in addition to the broken
clutch.

¶20 Finally, Hansel argues that the circuit court committed an error of
law because it “interpreted replevin actions to be operating completely
independent of amounts in controversy.” In short, Hansel appears to suggest that
the court may have believed that the value of a vehicle in a replevin action is
irrelevant. The problem with Hansel’s argument is that the circuit court never said
this. The court simply said, “It’s a replevin, [counsel]. Read the law,” and ended
the hearing. The court’s statement in this regard came after it had concluded on
the record that Elliot was the rightful owner of the vehicle and that the original
title should be destroyed. Hansel and his counsel both subsequently erupted
disrespectfully, talking over the court to challenge its rulings. Although we note
that WIS. STAT. § 425.205(1) does create an exception as to the value of the
vehicle in a replevin action, see supra note 6, the court’s written decision and

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No. 2024AP871

order does not mention § 425.205(1), and it made clear findings of fact and
credibility determinations regarding the value of the vehicle. Thus, Hansel’s
argument in this regard is a nonstarter.

II. Ownership of the vehicle

¶21 Hansel next challenges the circuit court’s finding that Elliot is the
owner of the vehicle. Hansel emphasizes that Elliot had signed the back of the
vehicle’s title transferring her ownership rights to Hansel and Hansel had taken
possession. Accordingly, he claims that under Wisconsin law, ownership of the
vehicle had transferred to Hansel at that time, regardless of whether Hansel had
subsequently transferred title through the DMV.

¶22 This is a small claims replevin action, and “[r]eplevin is an action for
possession where the factual question that must be resolved is ‘which party is
entitled to possession of the disputed property.’” See Mueller v. TL90108, LLC,
2020 WI 7, ¶12, 390 Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566 (citation omitted). A successful
replevin claim requires that the plaintiff show (1) that “the plaintiff is entitled to
possession of the property involved”; (2) that “the defendant unlawfully took or
detained the property involved”; (3) “[t]he value of the property involved”; and
(4) “[t]he damages sustained by the successful party from any unlawful taking or
unjust detention of the property to the time of the trial.” WIS. STAT. § 810.13(1);
see also Mueller, 390 Wis. 2d 34, ¶12.

¶23 In this case, the circuit court found that Elliot was the owner of the
vehicle and was entitled to possession. In its written decision, the court recounted
that both parties had produced a title to the vehicle: “Elliot produced a copy of a
title in which it lists her as the sole owner and that there are no lien holders for the
property,” and “Hansel produced a copy of a title showing” Nels as a lien holder,

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and the title “was signed by Ms. Elliot on July 5, 2019, and lists Mr. Hansel as the
proposed ‘new’ owner of the vehicle.”

¶24 According to the circuit court, “[b]oth parties had conflicting stories,
as to why Ms. Elliot signed the title in 2019.” Elliot testified that she had signed
the title but that Hansel’s “name was not on [the title] when [she] signed,” that the
vehicle “was not ever to go to” Hansel, and that Hansel wrote his information on
the title later. According to Elliot’s testimony, Hansel told her that Nels “was
supposed to come and take it back” and threatened her that “if [she] didn’t sell it
back to [Nels], he was going to put [her] in prison.” In contrast, Hansel testified
that when he had Elliot sign the title, the “understanding” was “that the vehicle
was going to be titled in [his] name,” but he admitted that he did not sign the title
concomitantly with Elliot.

¶25 The circuit court specifically found Elliot to be “more credible” than
Hansel on this issue. According to the court,

It has been almost 5 years since Ms. Elliot signed the title.
Mr. Hansel has not complied with Wisconsin law relating
to titling and registering vehicles. As such, and based upon
testimony of the parties, the Court believes that there was
some aspect of fraud or evasion of legal requirements
involved. Ignorance of the law and legal requirements is
not a defense and it does not negate the law. As far as the
State of Wisconsin is concerned, and this Court, the title is
legally in Ms. Elliot’s name and she is the legal owner of
the property.

Thus, the court found it significant that, over five years, Hansel had never
attempted to transfer the title through the DMV, see WIS. STAT. § 342.15, and it
specifically found that the circumstances demonstrated evidence of “fraud or
evasion of legal requirements.” Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case,
the court found that the replacement title listing Elliot as the owner was the clearer
evidence of ownership.

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No. 2024AP871

¶26 There is ample evidence in the record to support the circuit court’s
findings. Further, Hansel fails to address the court’s finding of fraud, and, given
his failure to file a reply brief, he has conceded Elliot’s arguments on this issue on
appeal. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the court’s finding
that Elliot was the owner of the vehicle was not clearly erroneous, and, as a result,
the court’s judgment of replevin must stand.

¶27 Hansel challenges the circuit court’s determination by focusing on
the fact of Elliot’s signature on the title. He appears to be arguing that, as a matter
of law, “ownership of the vehicle in question was established upon the transferor’s
signature on a vehicle title and the transferee signs the title.” In support of his
position, Hansel cites National Exchange Bank v. Mann, 81 Wis. 2d 352, 260
N.W.2d 716 (1978), which Hansel claims resolves the question of “when
‘ownership’ of a motor vehicle occurs.”

¶28 In that case, “[t]he sole issue on … appeal [was] whether a
transaction between National [Exchange Bank] and Kilbourn [American Leasing,
Inc.] gave a security interest in a motor vehicle” that could be asserted “against the
defendant, Donald L. Mann, who had previously bought and taken possession of
the vehicle but had not secured a title certificate.” Id. at 356. The court
considered Wisconsin law and the Uniform Commercial Code, and it determined
that vehicle ownership in Wisconsin is established by the contractual transfer and
physical delivery of the vehicle, given that a certificate of title is considered
evidence rather than conclusive proof of ownership. Id. at 362-63. Hansel
interprets this holding to mean that “[i]t is the underlying legal transaction that
divests ownership, not per se the immediate application made to the [DMV].”

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No. 2024AP871

¶29 We are not persuaded by Hansel’s argument. First, the facts in this
case and Mann are materially different, and Hansel does not argue to the contrary.
Therefore, the court’s holding in Mann does not require a certain result here.

¶30 Instead, Hansel appears to argue that the holding in Mann
demonstrates that the circuit court erred by considering the fact that Hansel never
had the vehicle title transferred though the DMV. We disagree with his assertion.
The circuit court did not determine that Hansel’s failure to transfer the title was
conclusive proof of ownership in Elliot’s favor. Rather, the court saw the failure
to transfer the title as evidence in support of Elliot’s claim of fraud, which called
into question what Hansel calls the alleged “underlying legal transaction.” The
facts that Hansel did not sign the title contemporaneously with Elliot and did not
transfer the title to his name through the DMV both support the court’s
determination that Elliot’s testimony regarding her reason for signing the title was
more credible. In other words, the court found that Hansel was never the intended
transferee. As a result, the court determined that the replacement title was the best
evidence of true ownership, and this finding was not clearly erroneous.

III. Title destruction

¶31 The third, and final, question is whether the circuit court properly
ordered that the original title to the vehicle be destroyed because Elliot had a
replacement title listing her as the owner of the vehicle. We need not resolve this
question, however, because both parties appear to agree that the original title
should be preserved until the appellate process is complete, at which time Hansel
does not dispute that the title should be destroyed. Once all of the appeals have
been exhausted, and if the circuit court’s ruling is upheld, then the original title
must be surrendered to the DMV to be destroyed as per the circuit court’s ruling.

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See WIS. STAT. § 342.13(3) (“A person recovering an original certificate of title
for which a replacement has been issued shall promptly surrender the original
certificate to the department.”).

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

15