State v. Jonathan James Petersen

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 19, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP581-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF809

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JONATHAN JAMES PETERSEN,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Kenosha County: ANTHONY G. MILISAUSKAS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, P.J., Gundrum, and Lazar, JJ.

¶1 GUNDRUM, J. Jonathan James Petersen appeals from a judgment
of conviction and an order denying his postconviction motion requesting that the
circuit court modify the “no social media” condition of his extended supervision
so as “to allow social media with agent approval.” Because we conclude the court
No. 2024AP581-CR

did not err in ordering the “no social media” condition or in denying Petersen’s
request to modify it, we affirm.

Background

¶2 Following his pleas to felony charges of stalking, false
imprisonment, and two counts of making terrorist threats, all while using a
dangerous weapon, the circuit court convicted Petersen of these crimes. A charge
of violating a harassment restraining order while using a dangerous weapon was
dismissed but read in. The convictions and read-in charge all relate to a June 13,
2022 incident that was the culmination of months of harassment and stalking by
Petersen of a young woman-victim who rebuffed his romantic advances. On that
date, Petersen entered a gas station where the woman worked and, with a knife and
fake but real-looking gun, threatened to kill her, others, and himself. The circuit
court sentenced Petersen to five and one-half years of initial confinement and six
years of extended supervision.

¶3 In her victim impact statement, which was incorporated into the
presentence investigation report (PSI), the young woman-victim explained that
prior to the June 13 incident, she had told Petersen

to please leave me alone. That did nothing other than make
it worse. [Petersen] found my social media accounts and
said harmful things about me on there. I blocked his
account. Every time I blocked his account, he would make
a new account and do it again. This continued until I
finally just had to delete my social media accounts.

¶4 During the sentencing hearing, the State requested various
conditions of extended supervision, among them a ban on Petersen’s use of social
media. In support of the requested ban, the prosecutor stated, “[G]iven the
description of his usage of social media to harass [the young-woman victim] and

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No. 2024AP581-CR

then how he was creating fake social media [accounts] to continue pursuing her
against her wishes[, we believe] that a condition of supervision should also be no
usage of social media sites.” Petersen’s counsel agreed that the State’s requested
conditions, including the “no social media” condition, were “appropriate,” adding
that Petersen “shouldn’t use social media until he can demonstrate that he can use
it responsibly without harassing other people.”1 The circuit court ordered “no
social media” as a condition of Petersen’s future extended supervision.

¶5 Following sentencing, Petersen filed a postconviction motion
sounding a different tune. Referencing his “First Amendment rights,” he claimed
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering the “no social
media” condition because the “total social media ban … is overly broad,” arguing
that the condition “should be modified to allow social media with agent approval.”
In the motion, Petersen asserted, inter alia, that he

has effectively been banished from social media to protect
a handful of victims. The only mention of social media in
the amended criminal complaint is information from [the
young-woman victim] that Mr. Petersen would “often
create fake social media accounts with similar usernames,
comment on her posts, and then delete the accounts.”
There was no allegation that Mr. Petersen used social
media to plan or execute his criminal activity on June 13,
2022.

1
Due to these comments by Petersen’s counsel, the State asserts Petersen should be
judicially estopped from challenging the “no social media” condition and/or has forfeited such a
challenge. Because we choose to resolve this appeal on the merits and do so in favor of the State,
we need not also address whether the State should prevail based upon judicial estoppel or
forfeiture. See Hegwood v. Town of Eagle Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2013 WI App 118, ¶1 n.1,
351 Wis. 2d 196, 839 N.W.2d 111 (When the resolution of one issue is dispositive, we need not
address other issues raised by the parties.).

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No. 2024AP581-CR

¶6 At the postconviction hearing on the motion, the State zealously
opposed Petersen’s requested modification:

[Petersen’s] Motion only talks about one part of the
statement where … [the young woman-victim] had
indicated that the Defendant was creating fake social media
accounts[,] contacting her[,] and then deleting them, but
that was not all that was reported in the case.

And a simple review of the Amended Criminal
Complaint details all of the problems she was having going
all the way back to January of 2022 when it started through
March of 2022 which then prompted her to obtain the
Restraining Order which even then didn’t stop his contact
and stalking of her which culminated in the [June 13, 2022]
hostage situation at the [gas station].

[The young-woman victim] had reported blocking him
on social media. When that occurred[,] he started showing
up where she worked. And he would also put things on
social media about her. Had multiple accounts that he
would use to harass her during the pendency of the stalking
she reported.

.…

The Defense argued that in this case there w[ere] the
[“]no contacts[”] that were Ordered. However, in my
experience in 22 years, even if the [c]ourt leaves it up to the
Agent whether or not someone can use the Internet or
social media, the Department of Corrections has admitted
they have no way to monitor it.

So they might approve it, but they are not monitoring it.
So how do we know or how are we able to protect other
potential victims who this Defendant feels slighted by for
not pursuing relationships with him ….

.…

[The “no social media” condition] needs to be there
because this was one of the factors that led to what
occurred at the [gas station] in this case.

(Emphases added.)

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No. 2024AP581-CR

¶7 The circuit court denied Petersen’s motion to modify the “no social
media” condition “based on the facts that the State gave,” adding that Petersen
“was involved with the victims in social media usage that was disturbing, creating
fake accounts[,] using comments[,] and deleting [the accounts]. That was a
concern for the [c]ourt at Sentencing.” The court also noted that Petersen “is able
to refile that Motion … when he is ready to go on [extended s]upervision because
that’s when it would [a]ffect [him] and the [c]ourt would have more information
as to … his activity in the prison system.”

¶8 Petersen appeals.

Discussion

¶9 “When reviewing a challenge to conditions of extended supervision,
we generally ‘review such conditions under the erroneous exercise of discretion
standard to determine their validity and reasonableness measured by how well
they serve their objectives: rehabilitation and protection of the state and
community interest.’” State v. King, 2020 WI App 66, ¶25, 394 Wis. 2d 431, 950
N.W.2d 891 (quoting State v. Stewart, 2006 WI App 67, ¶11, 291 Wis. 2d 480,
713 N.W.2d 165); see also State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60, ¶10, 341 Wis. 2d 281,
814 N.W.2d 854 (“It is also appropriate for circuit courts to consider an end result
of encouraging lawful conduct, and thus increased protection of the public, when
determining what individualized [supervision] conditions are appropriate for a
particular person.”). A defendant seeking modification of his or her supervision
conditions “bears the burden of showing cause for the modification.” King, 394
Wis. 2d 431, ¶24.

¶10 Here, Petersen seeks modification of the “no social media” condition
of his extended supervision, challenging the condition’s constitutionality under the

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No. 2024AP581-CR

First Amendment. “The constitutionality of a condition of probation [or extended
supervision2] raises a question of law, which this court reviews independently
without deference to the decisions of the circuit court ….” State v. Oakley, 2001
WI 103, ¶8, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200; King, 394 Wis. 2d 431, ¶25.

¶11 Our supreme court has made clear that “a convicted felon does not
stand in the same position as someone who has not been convicted of a crime.”
Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶19 (quoting Edwards v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 79, 84-85,
246 N.W.2d 109 (1976)). As a result, “[c]onditions of [extended supervision] may
impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they [1.] are not overly broad and
[2.] are reasonably related to the person’s rehabilitation.” Rowan, 341 Wis. 2d
281, ¶10 (third and fourth alterations in original) (citing Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447,
¶19). “A condition is reasonably related to the person’s rehabilitation ‘if it assists
the convicted individual in conforming his or her conduct to the law.’” Rowan,
341 Wis. 2d 281, ¶10 (quoting Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶21). “It is also
appropriate for circuit courts to consider an end result of encouraging lawful
conduct, and thus increased protection of the public, when determining what
individualized probation conditions are appropriate for a particular person.”
Rowan, 341 Wis. 2d 281, ¶10 (citing Edwards, 74 Wis. 2d at 83). The two-part
Rowan standard applies even where an extended supervision condition restricts a
fundamental right, such as the right to free speech restricted here. See Oakley, 245
Wis. 2d 447, ¶19 n.27 (collecting cases). Based on the foregoing law, we

2
“[A]uthority relating to the propriety of conditions of probation is applicable to
conditions of extended supervision.” State v. Koenig, 2003 WI App 12, ¶7 n.3, 259 Wis. 2d 833,
656 N.W.2d 499; State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 60, ¶10, 341 Wis. 2d 281, 814 N.W.2d 854
(analyzing “the condition of extended supervision at issue in [the] case under the … test we have
used previously to analyze the constitutionality of probation conditions.”).

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No. 2024AP581-CR

conclude that the “no social media” condition is constitutional and the circuit court
did not erroneously exercise its discretion by imposing it or denying its
modification.

¶12 Petersen asserts that the “no social media” condition is overly broad,
relying heavily upon the fact that the circuit court also imposed a “no contact”
supervision condition prohibiting Petersen from contacting the named victims in
this case. He complains that he “has been effectively banished from social media
to protect a handful of victims.” (Emphasis added.) In short, Petersen challenges
the “no social media” condition based on his apparent view that protecting the
young-woman victim and other June 13, 2022 victims is the only significant
interest promoted by the condition.3 Such a view is far too narrow.

¶13 As indicated, related to the goal of rehabilitation, “judges must also
concern themselves with the imperative of protecting society and potential
victims.” Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶12 (emphasis added); see supra ¶11. Thus, a
circuit court ordering conditions of supervision must consider not only the
particular victims in the case before it, who were affected by a defendant’s past
wrongful conduct, but also society as a whole, in order to protect potential future
victims. The court’s “no social media” condition in this case comports with these
considerations.

3
At one point, Petersen writes in passing: “While the conduct involved in this case is
threatening in nature, it does not require complete banishment from an important First
Amendment space in order to protect the public or the victims.” (Emphasis added.) Petersen,
however, fails to develop any argument as it relates to protecting “the public.” He instead focuses
his argument on his contention as represented here: “While protection of [the young woman-
victim] or other named victims may be a significant governmental interest, the complete ban on
social media is not narrowly tailored to that interest.” (Emphases added.)

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No. 2024AP581-CR

¶14 The “no social media” condition not only helps prevent Petersen
from harassing the young-woman victim and other June 13 victims in this case, it
also helps prevent him from harassing additional young-women victims, or others,
in the future. In considering whether the “no social media” condition is overly
broad, it appears to us that the first interest—prohibiting Petersen from harassing
the June 13 victims—would be more effectively achieved with the “no social
media” condition than with just the “no contact” condition alone, and,
significantly, preventing Petersen from harassing other members of the public
would not be achieved at all without the “no social media” condition. As the
prosecutor stated at the postconviction motion hearing, without the “no social
media” condition, “how are we able to protect other potential victims who
[Petersen] feels slighted by for not pursuing relationships with him.”

¶15 Petersen asserts that the “no contact” condition is sufficient to
protect the young-woman victim and other June 13 victims, but we disagree.
After months of harassment by Petersen, the young-woman victim obtained a
restraining order against him on April 18, 2022, prohibiting him from contacting
her. Demonstrating his complete lack of respect for a circuit court order directly
prohibiting him from contacting her, less than two months later, an undeterred
Petersen made contact with her at her workplace and engaged in the alarming
actions underlying this case. Additionally, Petersen harassed the young woman-
victim, in part, by saying “harmful things” about her, not just to her, on social
media. While it appears Petersen said those harmful things about the young-
woman victim on her own social media accounts, which would likely constitute
“contact” with her in violation of the “no contact” provision if he did that to her
again in the future, he has demonstrated significant tenacity, creativity and
computer savvy, making it more than plausible that he might well choose to harass

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No. 2024AP581-CR

her in the future by saying “harmful things” about her on other social media sites.
The “no contact” condition would not clearly help protect her from such actions,
but the “no social media” condition would. Thus, the latter condition provides the
young woman-victim, as well as other June 13 victims, protection that the “no
contact” condition alone would not clearly provide.

¶16 The “no social media” condition will also aid Petersen with his
rehabilitation4 by helping him conform his conduct to the law in relation to others.
As we have already suggested, the condition also will help prevent Petersen from
building a new harassment campaign against other potential future victims. We
note that the young-woman victim indicated in her victim impact statement that
once she deleted her social media accounts, thereby impeding Petersen’s
harassment attempts through that medium, he started harassing her in person,
which “culminated” in him terrorizing her and multiple others with both real and
real-looking-but-fake weaponry at the gas station on June 13. The “no social
media” condition can assist Petersen with conforming his conduct to the law by
preventing him from beginning a stalking or harassment social media campaign
against future victims, which Petersen has shown can ramp up into something
much more dangerous. The “no social media” condition imposed by the circuit
court advances both the extended supervision goals of rehabilitation of Petersen
and of “protect[ing] society and potential victims from future wrongdoing” by
him. See Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d 447, ¶¶12-13.

¶17 Petersen asserts that “[t]here was no allegation that social media was
used to plan or execute [his] criminal activity on June 13, 2022.” But, “the law is

4
Petersen acknowledges that “the social media ban may further [his] rehabilitation.”

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No. 2024AP581-CR

clear that a condition of supervision need not be related to wrongful actions by a
defendant in the particular case before the [circuit] court.” State v. Davis, 2017
WI App 55, ¶16 n.5, 377 Wis. 2d 678, 901 N.W.2d 488. That said, as the young-
woman victim explained in her victim impact statement and the State explained at
the postconviction hearing, Petersen’s use of social media was part and parcel of
his campaign of harassing the young-woman victim, which ultimately culminated
in the alarming events of June 13. In response to Petersen’s harassment of the
woman on social media, she blocked him. When she did that, “he started showing
up where she worked. And he would also put things on social media[,]” “sa[ying]
harmful things” about her there. Every time she blocked his account, “he would
make a new account and do it again” until the young woman-victim “just had to
delete” her own social media accounts.5 As the State argued, the “no social
media” condition “needs to be there because this was one of the factors that led to
what occurred at the [gas station] in this case.”

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the “no social media”
condition is not overly broad and is reasonably related to Petersen’s
rehabilitation.6 We relatedly conclude that the condition is lawful, that Petersen

5
Through his aggressive campaign of social media harassment, it appears Petersen
infringed upon the young-woman victim’s use of social media.
6
In his appellate briefing, Petersen develops a legal challenge only to the circuit court’s
rejection of his proposed modification of the “no social media” condition, which modification
would have allowed him to use social media with the approval of a Department of Corrections
(DOC) agent. We emphasize that Petersen did not seek modification of the “no social media”
condition to allow him to access certain social media sites that, for example, may aid him in
future employment opportunities while also presenting limited risk of harassment to the June 13
victims or other potential victims—e.g., a modification such as “no social media, except X, Y and
Z sites accessed for the purpose of ….” Nor did he even seek modification to clarify what the
court considers as “social media.”

(continued)

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No. 2024AP581-CR

failed to meet his “burden of showing cause for [his requested] modification,” see
King, 394 Wis. 2d 431, ¶24, and that the circuit court did not err in denying
Petersen’s request.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

Recommended for publication in the official reports.

Notably, even if the circuit court had granted Petersen his modification request, a DOC
agent also could have flatly prohibited him from accessing any social media sites for the entirety
of his extended supervision, just as the court’s order did. Or, an agent alternatively could have
permitted him unlimited access to and use of any social media sites, including those used by the
victims (as long as he did not contact any victims himself through those sites, due to the existing
“No Contact” order), which unlimited access would be inconsistent with the court’s intent with
regard to Petersen’s time on extended supervision. The question Petersen presented to the circuit
court was simply about “who will make the decision”—the court itself or an agent over whom the
court could not exercise control. It may well be that if Petersen had presented the court with a
persuasive request for a less unbridled, more specific modification, the court might have provided
him with satisfaction. Again, that question is not before us, however, because Petersen only
requested modification to allow his use of social media with an agent’s approval.

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