State v. Joshua W. Aide

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
October 29, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1096-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF499

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JOSHUA W. AIDE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Winnebago County: SCOTT C. WOLDT and DANIEL J. BISSETT, Judges.
Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP1096-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Joshua W. Aide appeals from a judgment
convicting him of one count of first-degree intentional homicide and two counts of
attempted first-degree intentional homicide. He also appeals from an order
denying his motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing.1 Aide
argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel
failed to present sufficient evidence of Aide’s mental health conditions to support
his theory of self-defense. We disagree and affirm.

¶2 Aide killed his ex-girlfriend Regan Bradshaw’s father (James) and
seriously injured both Regan and a family friend (Jacob) while Regan, James, and
Jacob worked on repairing Aide’s truck.2 The State charged Aide with one count
of first-degree intentional homicide and two counts of attempted first-degree
intentional homicide. Before trial, counsel entered a plea on Aide’s behalf of not
guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (NGI), and asked the trial court to
appoint an independent psychological examiner. The appointed examiner
concluded that the information before her did not support Aide’s NGI plea for any
such defense. Thereafter, Aide changed his pleas to “not guilty,” and the matter
proceeded to trial.

¶3 At trial, the State presented testimony to establish that Aide had been
desperately trying to reunite with Regan just prior to the shootings. Aide had
allegedly assumed that Jacob was Regan’s new boyfriend and had lost control,

1
The Honorable Scott C. Woldt presided over Aide’s jury trial and sentencing hearing
and entered the judgments of conviction. The Honorable Daniel J. Bissett presided over the
postconviction proceedings and entered the order denying Aide’s motion for a new trial.
2
To protect the privacy of the surviving victims, we refer to them using the pseudonyms
chosen by the parties.

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No. 2024AP1096-CR

shooting his victims because he thought Regan was dating another man. Aide
presented a very different account, testifying at trial that his three victims “literally
attacked me.” Aide told the jury that he shot his victims not “out of any sort of
jealousy[,]” but instead in self-defense. The trial court also “allow[ed] [Aide] to
present evidence of prior incidents of violence involving [Regan] against him.”

¶4 Based on Aide’s testimony that he had been “attacked” by the
victims, Regan had pointed a gun at him in the past, and he believed the victims
had conspired to kill him, the trial court granted Aide’s request to instruct the jury
to consider self-defense during deliberations. Aide only sought to use self-defense
as an absolute defense to first-degree intentional homicide (perfect self-defense).
He did not request that his mistaken beliefs as to the amount of force required be
considered as a mitigating factor or seek a jury instruction on the lesser-included
offense of second-degree intentional homicide (imperfect self-defense).

¶5 Ultimately, the jury credited the testimony of the surviving victims
and the State’s other witnesses more than that of Aide and his witnesses, and they
found Aide guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Aide to life
imprisonment without the possibility of extended supervision for the homicide,
and to consecutive sixty-year terms for each of the two attempts.

¶6 Aide filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial. He alleged
that trial counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to present sufficient
evidence to the jury of Aide’s mental health issues. To elaborate briefly, Aide
argued that it was ineffective assistance for counsel to fail to present a psychology
expert to testify. Aide contended that he suffers from several co-morbid mental
health disorders that led him to believe the level of force he used in the face of the
perceived threat from the victims was necessary to protect himself. He argued that

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No. 2024AP1096-CR

had the jury heard details about his psychopathology, they likely would have
acquitted him.

¶7 The postconviction court disagreed and denied Aide’s motion for
relief. The court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted because
Aide’s argument “that evidence should have come in by an expert as to some of
the psychological beliefs [or] diagnosis of the defendant … to help facilitate that
perfect self-defense claim is not … associated with a well-settled area of the law.”
As such, counsel could not be deficient. Aide appeals.

¶8 Aide raises one issue on appeal. He argues that it was ineffective
assistance “for his trial attorney not to have investigated his psychopathology with
an eye towards developing evidence to support his self-defense claim.” In his
postconviction motion, Aide submitted an expert report from a Colorado
psychologist who opines that Aide suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), paranoid personality disorder (PPD), and narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD). As in his postconviction motion, Aide now asserts that trial counsel’s
failure to investigate and present expert evidence regarding Aide’s disorders was
both deficient and prejudicial.

¶9 The legal standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel is well established. To prevail, a defendant must demonstrate: (1) that
counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning it fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,
meaning there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have
been different but for the counsel’s errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). On appeal, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous, but we review the ultimate legal question of whether

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No. 2024AP1096-CR

the defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance de novo. State v.
Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶24, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.

¶10 There are two different types of self-defense recognized in
Wisconsin law. “Perfect self-defense” is when a defendant argues that the force
he or she used against the victim was necessary to prevent the threat of imminent
death or great bodily harm. See State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶66, 255 Wis. 2d 194,
648 N.W.2d 413. “Imperfect self-defense” is when a defendant argues that he or
she used force to defend themselves from the threat of imminent death or great
bodily harm but the amount of force used was unnecessary under the
circumstances. Id., ¶69.

¶11 At trial, Aide’s counsel sought a jury instruction on perfect
self-defense. The trial court agreed that the evidence Aide offered sufficiently
warranted consideration of this defense, and the jury was so instructed. See WIS
JI—CRIMINAL 805. Aide’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument on appeal is
premised on his claim that trial counsel should have presented expert evidence of
Aide’s PTSD, PPD, and NPD in further support of the perfect self-defense theory.

¶12 In Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194,

[A] defendant seeking a jury instruction on perfect
self-defense to a charge of first-degree intentional homicide
must satisfy an objective threshold showing that she
reasonably believed that she was preventing or terminating
an unlawful interference with her person and reasonably
believed that the force she used was necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm.

Id., ¶4.

¶13 As noted above, Aide testified at trial that he believed that Regan,
her father, and their friend had conspired to kill Aide, so they lured Aide to

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No. 2024AP1096-CR

Regan’s property by telling him that the three were repairing Aide’s truck because
Aide would have wanted to repair it himself. Aide told the jury that he was
ambushed and “attacked” when he arrived at Regan’s. He testified that he knew
that Regan kept guns in her home and recounted past incidents in which Regan
had allegedly pointed a gun at him. Aide told the jury that on the day of the
shootings, he was physically confronted by Regan’s father with his fists, then by
the family friend with a wrench or other shiny item, and, finally, by Regan with
one of her guns. He said that he shot all three victims because it was necessary for
his survival.

¶14 Aide asked the trial court for an instruction on perfect self-defense
only, as noted above; he did not ask the court to instruct the jury on the
lesser-included charge of second-degree intentional homicide based on imperfect
self-defense. A defendant is entitled to an imperfect self-defense instruction only
if there is some evidence to show that he or she held a subjective belief that he or
she was in danger of imminent death or great bodily harm, regardless of whether
the belief was reasonable. Id., ¶124; WIS. STAT. § 940.01(2)(b) (2023-24).3
Without a request for an imperfect self-defense instruction, the jury could not
consider Aide’s subjective, actual beliefs and could only consider whether his
beliefs were objectively reasonable, that is, “what a person of ordinary intelligence
and prudence would have believed.” State v. Peters, 2002 WI App 243, ¶23, 258
Wis. 2d 148, 653 N.W.2d 300 (citation omitted).

¶15 On appeal, Aide does not fault his trial counsel for failing to request
a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense; instead, he faults counsel only for

3
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP1096-CR

failing to introduce expert evidence regarding his personal psychopathologies to
bolster his perfect self-defense claim.4 As we now explain, because the law is at
best unsettled as to whether, when deciding if a reasonable person in Aide’s
position at the time of the shootings would have found it necessary to use deadly
force, the jury is to consider the question from the viewpoint of a reasonable
person with PTSD, PPD, and NPD, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in
failing to offer expert testimony on the subject. See State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI
100, ¶49, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93.

¶16 Aide’s appellate argument for the admissibility of his proffered
expert evidence simply reaffirms that settled law does not support its admissibility.
Without settled law, Aide cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that his trial
counsel had a clear duty to pursue this line of investigation and offer this evidence.
See id. To explain further, ineffective assistance of counsel claims “should be
limited to situations where the law or duty is clear such that reasonable counsel
should know enough to raise the issue.” State v. Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, ¶33,
374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232 (citation omitted). The law is not clear or
settled when “there is no Wisconsin case law directly on point on the issue,” and
existing case law does not “present a factual situation similar enough to the facts
of [the] case.” State v. Morales-Pedrosa, 2016 WI App 38, ¶26, 369 Wis. 2d 75,
879 N.W.2d 772.

4
Aide also argues, at times, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately
investigate the role Aide’s psychopathologies played in his subjective belief that he had been
threatened at Regan’s property. We reject this argument because the Record demonstrates that
trial counsel adequately investigated this angle by exploring an NGI defense for Aide. Moreover,
the examining doctor’s NGI report would not have given reasonably competent counsel any basis
to conclude that Aide’s underlying mental condition impacted his decision to shoot James, Jacob,
and Regan. Aide repeatedly, affirmatively, and clearly told the examining doctor that he acted in
self-defense after being attacked, which was also Aide’s testimony to the jury.

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No. 2024AP1096-CR

¶17 Aide has not demonstrated that settled law supported the admission
of his proffered evidence. He concedes that “no published Wisconsin appellate
case has yet directly addressed the impact of a defendant’s PTSD specifically in
the self-defense context.” Relatedly, he asserts that “[p]ublication is warranted to
clarify that a person presenting a perfect self-defense claim can provide the jury
with evidence of their mental health to inform the jury what a reasonable person in
the defendant’s circumstances at the time would have believed.” Aide’s argument
for the admissibility of his proffered expert evidence simply reaffirms that settled
law does not support its admissibility. And without settled law, Aide cannot meet
his burden of demonstrating that his trial counsel had a clear duty to pursue this
line of investigation and offer this evidence. Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶49.
Based on all these reasons, we conclude that Aide fails to demonstrate that counsel
performed deficiently and, therefore, he cannot establish ineffective assistance of
trial counsel.5

¶18 In sum, Aide attempts to show ineffective assistance of counsel
based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate and put on expert testimony
regarding Aide’s psychopathologies and their apparent impact on his ability to
perceive threats. He argues that if the jury had been given this information, it
likely would have embraced Aide’s perfect self-defense argument and found him
not guilty of first-degree intentional homicide. While a defendant’s subjective
belief is admissible to show imperfect self-defense, Aide fails to persuade us that
this type of subjective evidence would be admissible to demonstrate the objective

5
Because the legal theory on which Aide’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim rests
is unsettled, we further conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in
denying Aide’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶27, 401
Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432.

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No. 2024AP1096-CR

reasonableness of a defendant’s assessment of a threat. Because Aide’s unique
approach to perfect self-defense is unsettled, trial counsel did not perform
deficiently. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and
postconviction order denying Aide’s motion for a new trial.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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