State v. Gary A. Karas

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 16, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP18-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF13

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GARY A. KARAS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Vilas County:
DANIEL L. OVERBEY, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Gary Karas appeals from a judgment convicting
him, following a jury trial, of two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child
No. 2024AP18-CR

(sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of
13 years). Karas raises several challenges to his convictions on appeal: the circuit
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss due to prosecutorial delay; the court
erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior conviction
in Florida for “lewd or lascivious molestation” of one of the victims in this case,
but not the sentence he received or that he was convicted upon a no-contest plea;
the court erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting other-acts evidence; and
the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of the charges.1 For the
following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In late 2014 and early 2015, George and Nick2 informed law
enforcement in Sheboygan County that Karas sexually abused them when they
were children. The sexual abuse occurred between 2003 and 2007 while Karas
was a religious education teacher for a church in Sheboygan County that the
victims and their families attended. The victims alleged that some of the abuse
occurred at Karas’ cabin in Vilas County. George further stated that he was
sexually assaulted by Karas in Wisconsin Dells and while at Disney World in

1
The Honorable Neal Nielsen, III decided Karas’ motion to dismiss. The Honorable
Kevin Klein decided the State’s other-acts motion. The Honorable Daniel L. Overbey presided
over the remainder of the case.
2
Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4) (2023-24), we refer to
the victims in this case using pseudonyms. We use the same pseudonyms used by the State on
appeal.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version. We note that Karas
was charged in 2020 based on conduct that occurred in the mid-2000s; however, neither party has
identified any significant or relevant changes in the pertinent statutes.

2
No. 2024AP18-CR

Florida. Additional victims also came forward to report similar incidents of sexual
abuse by Karas.

¶3 Based on George’s and Nick’s allegations of sexual assaults in Vilas
County, the State charged Karas in that county in January 2020 with two counts of
first-degree sexual assault of a child (sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a
person who has not attained the age of 13 years).3 The State alleged that Karas
sexually assaulted George in June 2004 (Count 1) and that Karas sexually
assaulted Nick between January 2003 and December 2007 (Count 2).

¶4 Karas filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on the State’s
“inexcusable and improper delay” in filing the complaint. Karas stated that he was
charged in Florida in February 2015 for sexually abusing George at Disney World
and that he based his decision to enter a plea in that case on the then-Vilas County
district attorney’s comments to his defense counsel that the district attorney would
follow-up with defense counsel with a decision on whether the State would file
charges against Karas in Vilas County. Following a hearing, the circuit court
denied Karas’ motion to dismiss the complaint. The court concluded that Karas
had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any delay in the filing or that
the Vilas County District Attorney’s Office’s decision not to file charges prior to
January 2020 “was in any way a deliberate device to gain an advantage” or
otherwise based on “any improper motive.”

3
The State originally charged Karas in the criminal complaint with first-degree sexual
assault of a child and repeated sexual assault of a child. The State later filed an amended
information. Karas does not challenge the legality of the State’s amendment.

3
No. 2024AP18-CR

¶5 Prior to the trial, the State filed a motion to admit other-acts
evidence. The State alleged that Karas was “well known for paying for church
families (all of whom had children who were pre-pubescent boys) to accompany
[Karas] on expensive vacations to various destinations.” According to the State,
all of the sexual assaults that it sought to admit as other-acts evidence occurred on
these trips, either in Vilas County, at Disney World, or in Wisconsin Dells.

¶6 In particular, the State sought to introduce evidence that Karas
sexually assaulted George multiple times while at Disney World in May 2004 and
while in Wisconsin Dells shortly thereafter. The State also sought to introduce
evidence that Karas sexually assaulted two other children, John and Jake, while on
similar trips. The State alleged that the assault of John occurred in Vilas County
between 2008 and 2010, and the assault of Jake occurred at Disney World in May
2008. In addition, the State moved to admit evidence of Karas’ 2016 conviction in
Florida for the sexual assault of George at Disney World, pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 904.04(2)(b)2. The circuit court held a hearing on the State’s motion, after
which it granted the motion in its entirety over Karas’ objection.4

¶7 Subsequently, Karas filed a proposed jury instruction requesting that
the circuit court instruct the jury that Karas was convicted in Florida “after
accepting a no[-]contest plea” and was sentenced to 20 years’ probation. Karas
also filed two motions to admit evidence related to the fact that he was convicted
in Florida only after entering a no-contest plea and that he did not receive a prison

4
We note that Karas filed several motions in the circuit court, including a motion for
reconsideration of the circuit court’s decision granting the State’s other-acts motion and a motion
for severance of the charges, all of which the court denied. Karas does not raise challenges on
appeal to the court’s decisions on many of these motions, and we discuss only the facts and
motions relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

4
No. 2024AP18-CR

sentence upon his conviction. The circuit court rejected the proposed jury
instruction and denied the two motions.5

¶8 A trial was held during which George, Nick, John, Jake, and a
State’s expert were among those who testified. At the close of the State’s case,
Karas moved to dismiss both counts based on insufficient evidence. The circuit
court denied Karas’ motion, and the jury convicted Karas of both counts. Karas
subsequently moved for “judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the jury’s
verdict,” arguing that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the charged
conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, which the court denied.

¶9 Karas now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Karas raises the following challenges to his convictions: the circuit
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss due to prosecutorial delay; the court
erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior Florida
conviction but not the sentence he received or that he was convicted upon a
no-contest plea; the court erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting the
other-acts evidence pertaining to John’s and Jake’s allegations; and the evidence at
trial was insufficient to convict him of the charges. We address each issue in turn.

5
At trial, the parties stipulated that Karas was convicted in Florida in 2016 of “a lewd or
lascivious molestation against a victim less than 12 years of age. That being [George], which is a
first[-]degree felony.”

5
No. 2024AP18-CR

I. Motion to dismiss for prosecutorial delay

¶11 A challenge to charges based on prosecutorial delay is rooted in due
process. See State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶45, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d
227. “Wisconsin has adopted a two-part test to determine whether pre-indictment
delay constitutes a due process violation.” Id. The defendant must show that he
or she “suffered actual prejudice arising from the delay and that the delay arose
from an improper motive or purpose such as to gain a tactical advantage over the
accused.”6 Id. (citation omitted). Whether a defendant’s right to due process was
violated presents a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Id., ¶26.

¶12 In July 2015, Karas’ counsel wrote to the Vilas County District
Attorney’s Office “to discuss the allegations against Karas in [Wisconsin] and any
potential charges that he may face in Vilas County.” According to Karas, the
former Vilas County district attorney spoke with Karas’ defense counsel on
January 19, 2016. Karas stated that the former district attorney informed Karas’
defense counsel that he would “carefully review the evidence in this case, speak
with the alleged victims or their parents, and advise whether the [Vilas County
District Attorney’s Office] would agree to not file charges against Karas in light of
the anticipated resolution of his pending Florida case.” On January 20, 2016,
defense counsel forwarded the former district attorney a letter from the Sauk
County District Attorney’s Office stating that Sauk County would not be

6
The State correctly posits that Karas misstates the law by arguing that to demonstrate a
due process violation in the prosecutorial delay context, he need only demonstrate that he
suffered prejudice “and/or” that the State’s delay arose from an improper motive or purpose.
Binding case law requires proof of both prejudice and improper motive or purpose. State v.
McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶45, 328 Wis. 2d 289, 786 N.W.2d 227; State v. Wilson, 149 Wis. 2d 878,
904, 440 N.W.2d 534 (1989).

6
No. 2024AP18-CR

prosecuting Karas for George’s allegations of sexual abuse in that county. The
Vilas County District Attorney’s Office did not contact Karas with a charging
decision until it filed charges in 2020.

¶13 Karas stated in his motion that on April 4, 2016, he pled no contest
in the Florida case to one count of “lewd or lascivious molestation” of George.
Karas argued in his motion that the State violated his due process rights by
bringing charges in 2020 because he “reasonably believed” that he would not face
charges in Vilas County “by virtue of the [Vilas County district attorney’s]
silence” and that he was now facing new charges “as a once convicted sex
offender,” limiting his defenses and exposing him to increased penalties if
convicted.

¶14 At the motion hearing, the then-current Vilas County district
attorney Martha Milanowski stated that the silence on behalf of her predecessor
did “not equal a decision not to charge” and that “[t]here were a number of matters
still under review in the Vilas County District Attorney’s Office when
[Milanowski] took office,” including Karas’ case. Milanowski further stated that
if the former district attorney had chosen not to file charges in Vilas County,
Karas’ file would not have been among the cases Milanowski had reviewed upon
taking office.

¶15 Karas fails to identify any evidence in the record demonstrating that
that the State’s delay in bringing charges against him was a deliberate attempt by
the State to gain an advantage over him. See McGuire, 328 Wis. 2d 289, ¶45.
Instead, he argues that “[t]here is no alternative/logical explanation for the State’s
delay, nor has it offered one since this case began.” This allegation is insufficient
to establish a due process violation. “A ‘bare allegation of improper tactical

7
No. 2024AP18-CR

purpose on the government’s part is insufficient to establish a malevolent
purpose.’” State v. Blanck, 2001 WI App 288, ¶24, 249 Wis. 2d 364, 638 N.W.2d
910 (citation omitted); Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, Inc.,
2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82 (“[W]e will not abandon
our neutrality to develop arguments.”).

¶16 Regardless, upon independently searching the record, we agree with
the State that the record contains no evidence that the delay in bringing the charges
in this case was a deliberate attempt by the State to gain an advantage over Karas.
Rather, the delay appears to be attributable to a lack of prosecutorial resources and
a change in leadership at the Vilas County District Attorney’s Office between
2016 and 2020. Moreover, if the State had sought to intentionally gain an
advantage over Karas by delaying charges until after he was convicted in Florida,
common sense suggests that the State would not have waited four years after the
Florida conviction to charge Karas in Vilas County. As the circuit court noted,
any delay in this case would likely have benefited Karas because the passage of
time “rarely works to the disadvantage of a defendant when a jury is looking at”
witness credibility.

¶17 Likewise, even if Karas could prove that the delay in bringing the
charges in this case was a deliberate attempt by the State to gain an advantage over
him, he has failed to prove that he suffered actual prejudice due to the charging
delay. See McGuire, 328 Wis. 2d 289, ¶45. Karas contends that he was
prejudiced because he entered his no-contest plea in Florida as a result of the
former district attorney’s silence. However, there is no evidence before us that
Karas followed up with the former district attorney after January 2016 and before
entering his no-contest plea in Florida just three months later. Although the Vilas
County District Attorney had purportedly advised defense counsel that he would

8
No. 2024AP18-CR

follow-up with a decision about charging Karas, Karas had not received any
notification from the Vilas County District Attorney’s Office regarding whether a
decision had been made about filing charges in Vilas County by the time Karas
entered his plea in Florida. Absent a charging decision or confirmation from the
district attorney, Karas therefore entered his plea in Florida independent of any
potential Wisconsin charging decision. Thus, as the State asserts on appeal, there
was no connection between the Vilas County District Attorney’s Office’s decision
on whether to file charges and Karas’ decision to enter a no-contest plea in
Florida.7

II. Prior conviction evidence

¶18 Next, Karas challenges the circuit court’s decision to admit the fact
of his prior Florida conviction pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)2. Relatedly,
Karas contends that the court violated his constitutional due process right to
present a defense by not allowing him to introduce evidence that he was convicted
in that case upon a no-contest plea and that he did not receive a prison sentence.

¶19 A circuit court’s decision to admit evidence is discretionary. State v.
Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶24, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811. A proper exercise

7
Karas also argues that by delaying charges until 2020, the State was able to leverage
the Florida conviction against Karas and keep Karas from testifying in his own defense. We
disagree that the Florida conviction provided any real advantage to the State. As we discuss later
in this opinion, Karas does not argue that the conduct underlying the Florida conviction was
improperly admitted as other-acts evidence. Whether Karas was convicted or not in the Florida
case, the jury would have heard evidence regarding the substantial similarities between Karas’
sexual assault of George in Florida and the assault in Vilas County. In addition, any modest
advantage the State gained was heavily outweighed by the fact that the victims were recalling
events that occurred between 2003 and 2007, and, therefore, any delay in charging could inhibit
the State’s ability to prove those allegations. Likewise, Karas does not argue that any evidence
favoring his defense was destroyed during the delay or that any potential witnesses he could have
called at trial had disappeared or passed away.

9
No. 2024AP18-CR

of discretion requires that the circuit court rely on facts of record, the applicable
law, and, using a demonstrable rational process, reach a reasonable decision. Id.
“Evidentiary rulings must also comport with a criminal defendant’s constitutional
right to present a defense.” State v. Munford, 2010 WI App 168, ¶28, 330
Wis. 2d 575, 794 N.W.2d 264. “Whether an evidentiary ruling infringes upon a
criminal defendant’s right to present a defense is a question of constitutional fact
for independent review.” Id.

A. Fact of conviction

¶20 The State moved to admit evidence of Karas’ Florida conviction
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)2. The State alleged that George disclosed
to law enforcement that while on vacation with Karas at Disney World in May
2004, Karas, on four to six occasions over a two-week period, touched George’s
penis with his hands when George would exit the shower. The State noted that
Karas was convicted of a felony in Florida in relation to those acts of lewd or
lascivious molestation.

¶21 The circuit court granted the State’s motion to admit the fact of
Karas’ Florida conviction pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)2., concluding
that the other-acts test outlined in State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d
30 (1998), did not apply to its analysis under that statute. The court further found
that evidence of Karas’ Florida conviction was “certainly relevant” and “highly
probative” under WIS. STAT. § 904.01 due to the “similarity (the acts and the time
frame and the victim)” between the acts underlying the Florida conviction and
Count 1. According to the court, this evidence was being admitted as character
evidence to demonstrate that Karas acted in conformity with his prior conviction.
Further, the court stated that Karas had failed to demonstrate that any prejudice

10
No. 2024AP18-CR

from the admission of his Florida conviction was substantially greater than the
evidence’s probative value. See WIS. STAT. § 904.03.

¶22 The prior-conviction statute, WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)2., has been
described as “an exception to the rule that prohibits other-acts evidence from being
offered to prove conduct.” State v. Hill, 2024 WI App 51, ¶12, 413 Wis. 2d 572,
12 N.W.3d 561 (citation omitted), review denied (WI Feb. 12, 2025)
(No. 2022AP1718-CR). Section 904.04(2)(b)2. states that

[i]n a criminal proceeding alleging a violation of
s. 940.225(1) or 948.02(1), sub. (1) and par. (a) do not
prohibit admitting evidence that a person was convicted of
a violation of s. 940.225(1) or 948.02(1) or a comparable
offense in another jurisdiction, that is similar to the alleged
violation, as evidence of the person’s character in order to
show that the person acted in conformity therewith.

“[P]rior conviction evidence is admissible ‘as evidence of the person’s character in
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith,’ meaning that the
evidence is admissible as propensity evidence.” Hill, 413 Wis. 2d 572, ¶16
(citation omitted). Only evidence of a prior conviction under § 940.225(1),
§ 948.02(1), or a comparable offense in another jurisdiction may be admitted
under the prior-conviction statute, not the factual details of the prior case. Hill,
413 Wis. 2d 572, ¶28.

¶23 The admission of evidence under the prior-conviction statute is not
subject to a traditional Sullivan analysis.8 “Instead, the admission of evidence
8
Initially, Karas asserted in his brief-in-chief that the circuit court erred by not applying
the other-acts test from State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), to the
prior-conviction statute. In his reply brief, and following this court’s decision in State v. Hill,
2024 WI App 51, 413 Wis. 2d 572, 12 N.W.3d 561, review denied (WI Feb. 12, 2025)
(No. 2022AP1718-CR), Karas conceded that Sullivan is inapplicable to the prior-conviction
statute.

(continued)

11
No. 2024AP18-CR

under this statute is, like all proffered evidence, subject to the requirements that
the evidence be relevant, see WIS. STAT. § 904.01, and that it overcomes the WIS.
STAT. § 904.03 balancing test ….” Hill, 413 Wis. 2d 572, ¶38. A circuit court
must consider whether the prior conviction for the same or a comparable crime in
another jurisdiction is factually similar to the current charge. Id., ¶44. If so, then
the prior conviction has probative value and is relevant under § 904.01. Hill, 413
Wis. 2d 572, ¶44. A court must also consider whether, under § 904.03, “the
probative value of evidence that a person was previously convicted of first-degree
sexual assault of an adult or child or a comparable offense in another jurisdiction,
absent any details of the case, is substantially outweighed by” the considerations
under § 904.03. Hill, 413 Wis. 2d 572, ¶47. Moreover, the greater latitude rule
applies to “all aspects” of the analysis under the prior-conviction statute, allowing
for “more liberal admission of evidence of a prior conviction for first-degree
sexual assault of an adult or a child (or a comparable offense in another
jurisdiction).” Id., ¶50.

¶24 Karas concedes that he was charged in Wisconsin under an
applicable crime for purposes of the prior-conviction statute. Further, Karas does
not dispute that the charge underlying his Florida conviction is a comparable
offense to WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1). Moreover, Karas concedes that the conduct at
issue in the Florida case was “almost identical” to the conduct underlying Count 1.

We note that the prior-conviction statute “does not prohibit the State from offering the
defendant’s prior conviction, including the factual details of the crime, as other-acts evidence
under WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(a), subject to the Sullivan analysis.” Hill, 413 Wis. 2d 572, ¶28
n.11. Here, the State sought admission of the fact of Karas’ conviction under the prior-conviction
statute, and it also sought admission of the factual details underlying that conviction as other-acts
evidence under § 904.04(2)(a). Karas does not challenge the circuit court’s decision to admit the
underlying facts of the Florida conviction as other-acts evidence.

12
No. 2024AP18-CR

Karas contends, however, that the prior conviction evidence was inadmissible
under WIS. STAT. § 904.03.9 See Hill, 413 Wis. 2d 572, ¶47.

¶25 Given the high degree of relevance to the charges at trial, the circuit
court concluded that the prior conviction evidence was not unfairly prejudicial.
Specifically, the court stated that “[w]hile the conviction evidence here is quite
prejudicial, that prejudice is not substantially greater than [the evidence’s]
probative value, nor is that prejudice unfair.”

¶26 Karas argues that the prior conviction evidence “led the jury to
decide the issue of Mr. Karas’ guilt on the Vilas County allegations based on an
improper inference” that Karas was a “bad” person, particularly because the victim
in the Florida case was one of the victims in this case. We disagree. Again, the
prejudice analysis in the context of the prior-conviction statute is distinct from the
prejudice analysis under Sullivan because “it is proper under the prior-conviction
statute to present prior conviction evidence to demonstrate propensity.” Hill, 413
Wis. 2d 572, ¶45. Furthermore, the prejudice analysis in this context “is not made
with regard to the details and circumstances of the prior case because the jury will
not hear those details; therefore, there is no possibility of those details causing
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” Id., ¶62.

¶27 Here, the circuit court properly considered the prejudicial effect of
the Florida conviction, determining that its probative value was too great to be

9
Karas contends that the circuit court admitted the fact of his Florida conviction “and the
identity” of George as the alleged victim in that case under WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)2.
However, it appears that the court admitted George’s identity in relation to the Florida conviction
under the State’s other-acts motion. To the extent the court intended to admit this evidence under
§ 904.04(2)(b)2., that decision is harmless because the court also granted the State’s other-acts
motion as it related to the Florida conviction.

13
No. 2024AP18-CR

outweighed by any prejudicial effect. The court provided the jury with a
cautionary instruction, WIS JI—CRIMINAL 276 (2016), thus mitigating the
possibility of unfair prejudice. See Hill, 413 Wis. 2d 572, ¶48. In light of the
court’s findings, the greater latitude rule, and the cautionary instruction provided,
we cannot conclude that the court erroneously exercised its discretion by admitting
the prior conviction evidence.

B. Evidence of no-contest plea and sentence

¶28 As noted above, Karas made several attempts to admit evidence that
he was convicted in Florida only after entering a no-contest plea and that he did
not receive a prison sentence upon his conviction. He filed proposed jury
instructions, a motion in limine, and a motion to admit “evidence of consciousness
of innocence.” The circuit court rejected the proposed jury instructions and denied
each motion.

¶29 The circuit court found that it would be misleading and confusing to
the jury to explain that Karas pled no contest in Florida. The court further stated
that admission of the type of plea and sentence Karas received in Florida would be
contrary to WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)2. and that neither Wisconsin nor Florida
law permits the admission of no-contest pleas “for any purpose.”

¶30 Defendants are granted the constitutional right to present a defense
under the compulsory process clause of article I, section 7 of the Wisconsin
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v.
Sarfraz, 2014 WI 78, ¶37, 356 Wis. 2d 460, 851 N.W.2d 235. However, this right
is not absolute. Id. Compulsory process only grants defendants the constitutional

14
No. 2024AP18-CR

right to present relevant evidence that is “not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effects.”10 Id. (citation omitted); see also Munford, 330 Wis. 2d 575,
¶28 (“The Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause right to present a defense
requires that a defendant be allowed to introduce relevant evidence, subject to
reasonable restrictions.” (citation omitted)).

¶31 Here, it is undisputed that, throughout the case, Karas maintained
that he was innocent and that the charges were fabricated by the victims, and
Karas advanced this theory at trial. On appeal, and consistent with this theory of
defense, Karas argues that the nature of his conviction in Florida would have
demonstrated that he made a “calculated decision to accept a resolution to his
Florida criminal case that guaranteed he would avoid incarceration” and that “he

10
“There is no abridgement on the accused’s right to present a defense, so long as the
rules of evidence used to exclude the evidence offered are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes for which they are designed.” State v. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, ¶41, 298 Wis. 2d 553,
725 N.W.2d 930. The exclusion of evidence is “‘unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate
only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.’ The weighty interest of the
defendant is to present ‘fundamental elements’ of his defense.” State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50,
¶52, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777 (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308,
315 (1998)).

In St. George, our supreme court concluded that the rape shield law did not, on its face,
violate the defendant’s right to present a defense. Id., ¶15. However, the court also considered
whether the proffered evidence was “so relevant and probative that the defendant’s right to
present it is constitutionally protected.” Id. (citation omitted). The court concluded that “the rape
shield statute ‘may in a given case impermissibly infringe upon a defendant’s right[]
to … compulsory process.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Karas does not raise the type of constitutional challenge raised in St. George. The
evidentiary rules used to exclude Karas’ proffered evidence are WIS. STAT. §§ 904.01 and
904.03. Because the right to present a defense is already limited by the evidence’s relevancy and
prejudicial effect—i.e., §§ 904.01 and 904.03—the rules of evidence used to exclude the evidence
in this case are not arbitrary or disproportionate. Accordingly, Karas essentially challenges the
circuit court’s decision to exclude the evidence under §§ 904.01 and 904.03, which we review for
an erroneous exercise of discretion. See Muckerheide, 298 Wis. 2d 553, ¶¶24, 39-41 (concluding
that the circuit court’s decision to exclude the defendant’s proffered evidence was not “arbitrary
or disproportionate” because the court “properly excluded” the evidence as irrelevant).

15
No. 2024AP18-CR

never admitted guilt” in that case or was found guilty by a jury. (Formatting
altered.) Thus, he contends that the evidence was relevant because it “tended to
make it less probable that he sexually assaulted [George] in Florida while also
diminishing [George’s] credibility before the jury.” Likewise, Karas asserts that
the evidence was “fundamental” to his defense because, without it, “the jury was
likely left with the impression that Mr. Karas was convicted of lewd and lascivious
molestation of [George] because he was … guilty.”

¶32 We disagree with Karas that the circuit court’s decision to exclude
the nature and sentence related to his Florida conviction violated his due process
right to present a defense. The court’s exclusion of Karas’ evidence was not
arbitrary or disproportionate because the court reasonably determined that this
evidence was inadmissible under WIS. STAT. §§ 904.01 and 904.03.
See Muckerheide, 298 Wis. 2d 553, ¶41. In reaching this conclusion, the court
considered the applicable law, applied the pertinent facts, and reached a
reasonable determination. See Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, ¶24.

¶33 A no-contest plea is “an implied confession of guilt for the purposes
of the case to support a judgment of conviction,” meaning the defendant
acknowledges that the State could meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Black, 2001 WI 31, ¶15, 242 Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d
363 (citation omitted); Hernandez v. Florida, 112 So. 3d 572, 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2013) (stating that a “plea of nolo contendere … is an admission of guilt for
the purposes of the case” (citation omitted)); United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412 n.26 (1947) (“Nolo
contendere ‘is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case.’” (citation
omitted)).

16
No. 2024AP18-CR

¶34 We agree with the State that the admission of the no-contest plea or
the sentence Karas received in the Florida case would have permitted the jury to
infer that “the reasonable doubt standard was nevertheless satisfied. Informing the
jury of the no[-]contest plea would … certainly not make George less credible.”
Whether Karas entered that plea to avoid a lengthy prison sentence does not
subtract from the fact that he conceded, by entering the plea, that the state of
Florida could prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, evidence of the
no-contest plea and the sentence Karas received was not relevant to whether he
sexually assaulted George in this case.

¶35 Moreover, admission of the nature of Karas’ Florida conviction and
the sentence he received would likely confuse or mislead the jury because the
no-contest plea was an admission that the state of Florida could meet its burden in
that case. The circuit court also reasonably determined that the jury would be
confused or misled because it would need to be explained the meaning of a
no-contest plea and how a no-contest plea differs from a guilty plea or an Alford11
plea. As explained, these distinctions were not necessary or relevant.

¶36 For all of these reasons, the circuit court’s decision to exclude
Karas’ evidence on relevancy and confusion of the issues was not arbitrary or
disproportionate.

III. Other-acts evidence

¶37 Next, Karas challenges the circuit court’s decision to admit Karas’
sexual assaults of John and Jake as other-acts evidence. See supra note 8. The

11
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

17
No. 2024AP18-CR

court granted the State’s motion to admit evidence that Karas sexually assaulted
John in Vilas County between 2008 and 2010, when John was between the age of
ten and twelve. According to the State, John was a “vacation guest in the
defendant’s Boulder Junction cabin” when Karas “pulled” John into Karas’ bed,
stuck his hand down John’s pants, and touched John’s penis. The State further
alleged that Karas kissed John and whispered to him, “I like you.” As to Jake, the
State alleged that he accompanied Karas on a vacation to Disney World in May
2008, when Jake was ten years old. During that trip, on five occasions, Karas
invited Jake to lie in his bed, Karas began to kiss Jake’s face and rub his chest, and
Karas “fondled” Jake’s genitals.

¶38 The circuit court found under the first prong of the Sullivan analysis
that the other-acts evidence was admissible to demonstrate intent, absence of
mistake, and “proof of motive (sexual gratification).” The court stated, “The
requirement to show acceptable purpose is not extraordinary and is bolstered here
by the greater latitude rule.” Under the second prong, the court found that the
evidence was relevant because, among other things, the allegations in this case
shared similarities with the allegations made by John and Jake. The court stated
that each allegation involved “sexual assaults of young boys under circumstances
of assumed trust and in locations where the victims were outside of their
‘protective zone.’”

¶39 Lastly, the circuit court found that the probative value of the
evidence was not outweighed by the risk of confusion, delay, waste of time, or
misleading the jury. Particularly, the court stated that the case would not become
one of “multiple trials” on the other-acts evidence and that the evidence would not
cause confusion or mislead the jury. The court noted that it would instruct the jury
as to the issues being tried and “as to any cautions necessary.” Furthermore, the

18
No. 2024AP18-CR

court found that the evidence would not be unfairly prejudicial because “[p]roving
motive, or intent, or absence of mistake by reference to other acts which are
similar does not improperly influence or affect the jury.” The court also stated
that its decision to admit the evidence despite “minimal” risk of unfair prejudice
was “bolstered” by the greater latitude rule.

¶40 Karas contends that the State failed to meet its burden under the
Sullivan test because motive, intent, and absence of mistake were not at issue and
the other-acts evidence was therefore not admitted for a proper purpose and was
irrelevant. Karas also asserts that the probative value of the evidence was
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.

¶41 Under the first step of the Sullivan test, a circuit court must consider
whether the evidence is offered for an acceptable purpose, such as establishing
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or
accident. State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶60, 320 Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832;
see also WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(a). Unlike the admission of evidence of a prior
conviction pursuant to § 904.04(2)(b)2., other-acts evidence may not be admitted
“to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith.” See § 904.04(2)(a). “As long as the proponent [of the
other-acts evidence] identifies one acceptable purpose for admission of the
evidence that is not related to the forbidden character inference, the first step is
satisfied.” Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶63 (footnote omitted). The greater latitude
rule applies to each prong of the Sullivan test, allowing “admission of other-acts
evidence with greater latitude.” State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, ¶5, 379 Wis. 2d
386, 906 N.W.2d 158; § 904.04(2)(b)1.

19
No. 2024AP18-CR

¶42 Here, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion
under the first Sullivan prong. The court reasonably determined that the
other-acts evidence was offered by the State to prove intent and “proof of motive
(sexual gratification).” Motive and intent are listed as permissible purposes under
WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(a). “Thus, the evidence was offered for a permissible
purpose.” See Dorsey, 379 Wis. 2d 386, ¶42.

¶43 “The second step in the Sullivan analysis is to assess whether the
evidence is relevant as defined by WIS. STAT. § 904.01.” Payano, 320 Wis. 2d
348, ¶67. “Because other[-]acts evidence is inherently relevant to prove character
and therefore a propensity to behave accordingly, ‘the real issue is whether the
other act is relevant to anything else.’” Id. (formatting altered; citation omitted).
“[F]or evidence to be relevant, the following questions must be answered
affirmatively: ‘(1) is the proposition for which the evidence is offered of
consequence to the determination of the action’ and (2) does the evidence have
probative value when offered for that purpose?” Id., ¶68 (citation omitted).

¶44 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion under the
second Sullivan prong. The court determined that the other-acts evidence “shed
light on the subject of inquiry” in terms of intent. This was a conclusion that a
reasonable judge could reach. “Whether other-acts evidence is ‘of consequence’
asks whether it is logically related to an element of the offense, that is, whether,
under the substantive law, it is related to ‘the ultimate facts and links in the chain
of inferences that are of consequence to the case.’” Dorsey, 379 Wis. 2d 386, ¶48
(citation omitted). The State was required to prove, among other things, that
Karas acted with the intent to become sexually aroused or gratified when he
assaulted George and Nick. See id. (“[A]n element of a crime constitutes a
consequential fact that the State must prove even if the defendant does not dispute

20
No. 2024AP18-CR

the element.” (alteration in original; citation omitted)); Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348,
¶69 & n.15 (same).

¶45 “Similarly, although motive is not specifically an element of a crime
that the State must prove, here it is logically related to the element of intent.”
See Dorsey, 379 Wis. 2d 386, ¶48. “‘Intent’ is defined as having a requisite
‘mental purpose.’ Motive is relevant to establishing purpose. ‘Evidence relevant
to motive is therefore admissible, whether or not defendant disputes motive.’” Id.
(citations omitted). Thus, particularly in the context of the greater latitude rule,
the other-acts evidence demonstrated Karas’ motivation for taking George and
Nick on vacations and his intent to become sexually aroused or gratified.

¶46 In addition, the circuit court reasonably determined that evidence of
Karas sexually assaulting John and Jake on trips similar to those involving George
and Nick was of great probative value, particularly in light of the greater latitude
rule. “The second question relating to probative value—whether the consequential
fact or proposition for which the evidence was offered becomes more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence—‘is a common sense
determination based less on legal precedent than life experiences.’” Payano, 320
Wis. 2d 348, ¶70 (citation omitted). The assaults of John and Jake and the charged
assaults of George and Nick all occurred on Karas’ trips with young boys under
the age of twelve and involved similar acts of sexual assault. Thus, the admission
of the other-acts evidence made the State’s claim that Karas sexually assaulted
George and Nick more probable than it would have been without the other-acts
evidence. See id., ¶76.

¶47 Karas argues that the State’s “true intention” behind introducing the
other-acts evidence, as demonstrated by the State’s closing argument, “was to

21
No. 2024AP18-CR

argue that Mr. Karas had a propensity to sexual assault prepubescent boys” and
that he escaped punishment. However, Karas did not object to the State’s closing
argument. Even if the State attempted to utilize the evidence in its closing
argument for an improper purpose, the circuit court admitted the evidence under
the first and second steps of the Sullivan analysis based on permissible purposes.
It was Karas’ duty to raise any objections to the State exceeding the court’s
pretrial ruling, but he failed to do so.12

¶48 When other-acts evidence is relevant and offered for a proper
purpose, “the evidence is admissible under Sullivan unless the opponent
demonstrates that ‘its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.’” Payano, 320 Wis. 2d 348, ¶80 (footnote omitted; citation
omitted). “The term ‘substantially’ indicates that if the probative value of the
evidence is close or equal to its unfair prejudicial effect, the evidence must be
admitted.” Id. (formatting altered; citation omitted).

¶49 Karas argues that the other-acts evidence was unfairly prejudicial
because it “created a situation where Mr. Karas, in order to have a chance of
securing an acquittal, had to discredit two additional allegations of sexual
misconduct that were not incorporated as charged counts in the State’s
Information.” In addition, Karas contends that the other-acts evidence “confused
the issues and invited the jury to find Mr. Karas guilty” using character evidence.

12
Karas does not raise challenges to the State’s closing argument under the plain error
doctrine or ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

22
No. 2024AP18-CR

¶50 Karas’ arguments disregard our standard of review and the greater
latitude rule afforded under WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2)(b)1. As explained, the circuit
court reasonably concluded that the other-acts evidence was highly probative. The
court also reasonably determined that the probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice because the evidence assisted the jury
with issues such as intent and motive. In other words, the court concluded that the
other-acts evidence would “not improperly influence … the jury.”

¶51 Likewise, the circuit court limited any unfair prejudice by providing
a cautionary instruction at the close of evidence. The court instructed the jury that
if it found that Karas had sexually assaulted John and Jake, the jury “should
consider [the evidence] only on the issues of motive, intent, absence of mistake or
accident.” The court told the jury that it could not “consider this evidence to
conclude that the defendant has a certain character or a certain character trait and
that the defendant acted in conformity with that trait or character with respect to
the offense charged in this case.” We presume that jurors follow the instructions
given by a court, and a cautionary instruction “can go ‘far to cure any adverse
effect attendant with the admission of the [other-acts] evidence.’” See Dorsey,
379 Wis. 2d 386, ¶55 (alteration in original; citation omitted). In light of the
probative value of the other-acts evidence, the greater latitude rule, and the
cautionary instruction, we cannot conclude that the court erroneously exercised its
discretion under the third prong of the Sullivan analysis.

IV. Sufficiency of the evidence

¶52 Finally, Karas argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to prove the charged conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. “The
question of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilt in a

23
No. 2024AP18-CR

criminal prosecution is a question of law, subject to our de novo review.” State v.
Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d 410. “When conducting
such a review, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State
and reverse the conviction only where the evidence ‘is so lacking in probative
value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493,
507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990)). Therefore, we “will uphold the conviction if there
is any reasonable hypothesis that supports it.” Id.

¶53 Karas does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to any
particular element of the crimes charged. Instead, his arguments on appeal focus
on what he claims are inconsistent and improbable accusations by George and
Nick, and he contends that George and Nick colluded against him. Karas argues
that “[g]iven the close relationship and prior conversations between” George and
Nick, “it is very possible that these individuals colluded, or at the very least,
discussed their respective allegations before and during the trial.” Karas also
states that given George’s “admission” at trial “that he continuously lied about the
extent and nature of the allegations to his family and law enforcement, no
reasonable trier of fact could have found” George’s “testimony to be credible or
coherent enough to warrant a conviction.” Further, Karas argues that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of guilt because “law enforcement did not
uncover any videos, audio recordings, DNA samples, or eyewitnesses to
corroborate” the victims’ accusations.

¶54 We reject Karas’ arguments. “[A]n appellate court must accept and
follow the inference drawn by the trier of fact unless the evidence on which that
inference is based is incredible as a matter of law.” Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at
506-07. It is not the function of an appellate court “to review questions as to

24
No. 2024AP18-CR

weight of testimony and credibility of witnesses. These are matters to be
determined by the trier of fact and their determination will not be disturbed where
more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from credible evidence.”
Johnson v. Merta, 95 Wis. 2d 141, 151, 289 N.W.2d 813 (1980).

¶55 George and Nick both testified that Karas touched their penises in a
sexual manner when they were under 13 years old. Their testimony was sufficient
to find Karas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See WIS. STAT. § 948.02(1)(e);
WIS. STAT. § 948.01(5) (defining sexual contact); WIS JI—CRIMINAL 2102E
(2015). The jury clearly believed George and Nick and found them both credible.
We will not reverse Karas’ judgment of conviction simply because he disagrees
with the jury.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

25