State v. Amanda K. Lenti

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 21, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP491-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CF1556

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

AMANDA K. LENTI,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County:
NICHOLAS J. McNAMARA, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Amanda Lenti appeals her convictions for
possession with intent to deliver tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and second-degree
No. 2024AP491-CR

reckless injury while using a dangerous weapon, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts. Specifically, as to the possession
with intent count, Lenti argues that, in the absence of chemical testing of the
subject marijuana, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. As to
the reckless injury count, Lenti argues that the evidence was insufficient because
the evidence established that she acted in self-defense. We reject Lenti’s
arguments and affirm the convictions.

BACKGROUND

¶2 As stated, a jury convicted Lenti of possession with intent to deliver
THC and second-degree reckless injury while using a dangerous weapon. The
evidence at trial included the following.

¶3 On July 7, 2021, at approximately 11:00 a.m., police were
dispatched to the area of James Madison Park in Madison, based on a report of a
shooting. Police encountered A.B., who had a bloody arm.1 A.B. told police that
he had been in an argument with another man and that the man shot him. While
speaking with A.B., the officer noticed that A.B. smelled of marijuana.

¶4 A.B. was taken to the hospital, where a doctor removed a bullet or
bullet fragment from A.B.’s right arm. Police searched A.B.’s clothing, which
was provided by hospital personnel, and found 13.5 grams of marijuana in a
plastic bag in one of A.B.’s pockets.

1
Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86 (2023-24), we refer to A.B.
using initials that do not conform to his actual name. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are
to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP491-CR

¶5 Police searched the vehicle A.B. had been driving and observed
blood on the right side of the driver’s seat. Police also found a small amount of
marijuana; a stolen handgun under the driver’s seat; several bundles of cash,
including one in the amount of approximately $1,500; a photo identification card
for A.B.; and a cell phone.

¶6 When police seized A.B.’s cell phone, it rang and police saw a
message on the lock screen from a person identified as Fo Nem. A search of
A.B.’s phone revealed text messages between A.B. and Lenti leading up to the
time of the shooting. The messages showed the two arranging to meet at an
apartment building on Fordem Avenue in Madison. Lenti’s phone accessed cell
towers near the Fordem Avenue address just before and during the time of the
shooting. Traffic cameras also identified A.B.’s vehicle driving from Fordem
Avenue and turning onto Johnson Street toward James Madison Park immediately
after the shooting.

¶7 A day after the July 7 shooting, Lenti’s friend Melissa Eisner
contacted police, and informed them that a friend of hers had been involved in a
shooting in Madison on July 7 at around 11:00 a.m. An officer interviewed Eisner
and testified to the following regarding Eisner’s statements.2 At about 11:30 a.m.
on the day of the shooting, Lenti left a “frantic” phone message with Eisner
indicating “that it was like a matter of life and death.” Lenti told Eisner to
download the mobile phone application Signal, which the officer knew to be an

2
The prosecution at trial introduced the substance of Eisner’s statements to police
through an officer’s testimony after Eisner, while testifying, generally denied remembering
anything about what Lenti had told her or what she had told police.

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No. 2024AP491-CR

encrypted communication application that people use to communicate “when they
don’t want anyone finding the communications.”

¶8 Lenti told Eisner that she was “involved in a shooting in self-
defense” in the entryway of an apartment building on Fordem Avenue on July 7.
Lenti had been trying to deliver five pounds of marijuana in three packages for a
dealer, “Fo.” The man who was supposed to purchase the marijuana pulled a gun
and threatened to kill Lenti, telling Lenti that he was “wanted in three states,”
which caused Lenti to give him the drugs. The man then turned around and began
walking away from Lenti. Once there was some separation between Lenti and the
man, Lenti drew her weapon and fired at him, shooting him in the arm.

¶9 Lenti further told Eisner that Lenti thought, “I’m fucked,” when she
gave the man the marijuana. Eisner understood Lenti to mean that Fo had fronted
her the drugs—i.e., gave her the drugs “on credit” with the expectation that she
would give Fo the proceeds following the sale—and that if Lenti lost the drugs and
did not have the money for them, she “would be in very deep trouble.”

¶10 The officer testified that, based on his training and experience, a
higher-level dealer will sometimes “front” drugs to someone they know and may
have had “other dealings with in the past” for that person to sell or deliver the
drugs to others on credit. The officer also testified that a person in Lenti’s position
who is robbed of fronted drugs may as a consequence suffer violence at the hands
of the dealer.

¶11 Lenti told Eisner that, after she shot the man, he fell, dropped the
packages of marijuana, and then ran away. Lenti initially also ran, but after she
saw the man running away, she circled back and retrieved the marijuana. Lenti
told Eisner that she was trying to get in touch with Fo to return the marijuana and

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No. 2024AP491-CR

that she had buried the gun. Eisner showed the officer a photo on her phone of a
.380 caliber handgun that Lenti had purchased when Lenti and Eisner lived
together.

¶12 The day after the shooting, police searched Lenti’s home in Jefferson
County. The officer heard Lenti tell her aunt, who was present at Lenti’s house, “I
gave him my address. He was going to come here to pick it up. He knows where
I live.” The officer thought that Lenti was referring to A.B., and her tone of voice
suggested concern “about retaliation for her shooting” him.

¶13 While searching Lenti’s house, police found a box of ammunition
for a .380 caliber handgun. They also found: a “grow chamber” and a notebook
logging attempts to grow various strains of marijuana; glass jars with various
strains of marijuana written on the lids; and, in various locations throughout the
residence, marijuana seeds. Police took Lenti into custody, during which time she
began yelling, “I was there,” and that she had been trying to sell a pair of Nike
shoes and had run away when someone put a gun to her head.

¶14 The jury also heard two recorded phone calls made by Lenti to a
friend while Lenti was in jail. During one of the calls, Lenti said that police did
not find “the thing they built” and asked the friend to go to her house and to “get
the bad shit out.” When the friend asked if it was “anything worth saving ... at this
point,” Lenti said that it was likely “all dead” and a fire hazard. During the other
call to the same friend, Lenti said that A.B. had told police that “some big black
guy” had shot him. Lenti also told the friend that Lenti had gone “to sell some
shoes to a ... different guy” than A.B. Lenti said the “different guy” hit her with a
gun and “tried to rob [Lenti] and rape [her] and [that Lenti] left.” She said that
perhaps “the guy that robbed me” was the person who shot A.B.

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No. 2024AP491-CR

¶15 By the time of trial, police had not recovered Lenti’s handgun or the
marijuana, and neither A.B. nor Lenti testified at trial.

¶16 The jury found Lenti guilty of possession with intent to deliver THC
and reckless injury while using a dangerous weapon. After the verdicts and before
sentencing, Lenti moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
conviction for possession with intent to deliver, arguing that because the State
never recovered—and therefore never tested—the alleged substance that Lenti
tried to sell to A.B., the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the substance was THC as opposed to a legal derivative of a
marijuana plant, such as cannabidiol (CBD) oil. Following briefing, the circuit
court denied the motion. Relying primarily on State v. Anderson, 176 Wis. 2d
196, 200, 500 N.W.2d 328 (Ct. App. 1993), the court concluded that the State
could prove the identity of an illegal controlled substance with evidence other than
a laboratory report, and that in this case, there was sufficient “circumstantial”
evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Lenti appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶17 On appeal, Lenti renews her argument that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction for possession with intent to deliver THC
(sometimes referred to in this opinion as marijuana). She also challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence as to the reckless injury conviction. For the reasons
explained below, we reject Lenti’s arguments.

I. Standards Governing Review of a Jury’s Guilty Verdict.

¶18 We accord great deference to the factfinder when reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493,

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No. 2024AP491-CR

507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). When reviewing a jury’s guilty verdict, we “may
not substitute [our] judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the evidence,
viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so lacking in probative
value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “If any possibility exists that the trier of fact
could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to
find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it
believes that the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence
before it.” Id. We “will only substitute [our] judgment for that of the trier of fact
when the fact finder relied upon evidence that was inherently or patently
incredible—that kind of evidence [that] conflicts with the laws of nature or with
fully-established or conceded facts.” State v. Tarantino, 157 Wis. 2d 199, 218,
458 N.W.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶77,
255 Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244 (“It is vitally important to maintain this
standard of review. An appellate court should not sit as a jury making findings of
fact and applying the hypothesis of innocence rule de novo to the evidence
presented at trial.”).

II. The evidence was sufficient to support Lenti’s conviction for possession with
intent to deliver THC.

¶19 To convict Lenti of possession with intent to deliver THC in
violation of WIS. STAT. § 961.41(1m)(h)1., the jury was required to find the
following four elements: (1) Lenti possessed a substance; (2) that substance was
THC; (3) Lenti knew or believed that the substance was THC; and (4) Lenti
intended to deliver the THC. WIS. JI–CRIMINAL 6035 (2024). Lenti’s challenge
focuses on the second element. She renews her argument that, because the State
never tested the substance that she possessed, the evidence was insufficient to

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No. 2024AP491-CR

support the jury’s finding that the substance was THC, as opposed to a legal
derivative of the marijuana plant.

¶20 Expert testimony and testing are not always necessary to identify a
controlled substance for purposes of the possession statutes. See Anderson, 176
Wis. 2d at 200. “Identification of a controlled substance can be established by
such circumstantial evidence as lay experience based on familiarity through prior
use, trading, or law enforcement; a high sales price; on-the-scene remarks by a
conspirator identifying the substance as a drug; and behavior characteristic of sales
and use.” Id. at 202-03 (internal quotation marks and quoted sources omitted).

¶21 Here, considered in the light most favorable to the State and the
verdict, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the
substance that Lenti possessed was THC, even in the absence of a laboratory
report. This evidence included the following. There was the testimony that Lenti
told Eisner that the substance was marijuana, strongly supporting a finding that
Lenti herself believed it was marijuana. There was also evidence that Lenti was
highly familiar with marijuana and was not new to drug sales and manufacturing.
Beyond this was the evidence that Lenti was growing marijuana on her property
and had enough prior dealings with Fo that he would front her a significant
quantity of marijuana. As the circuit court noted when denying Lenti’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the jury could reasonably find that Lenti
was not “a random person who[,] for the first time[,] completely disconnected
from any sort of drug business[,] all of a sudden is involved in this delivery.”

¶22 There was also evidence that, when Lenti attempted to sell what she
believed to be marijuana to A.B., A.B. robbed her at gunpoint, threatening to kill
Lenti unless she gave him the marijuana. This evidence included testimony,

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No. 2024AP491-CR

which the jury could have credited, that Lenti told Eisner that Lenti and A.B.
arranged for a sale of five pounds of a substance in the entryway of an apartment
building where neither of them lived. Further, the jury could have credited the
testimony that Lenti told Eisner that, as Lenti gave A.B. the marijuana, Lenti
thought she was “fucked,” which Eisner construed to mean that Lenti had been
fronted the marijuana and that her dealer, Fo, could harm her if she did not provide
him with the proceeds of the sale or the marijuana. The jury also heard evidence
that, after A.B. stole the marijuana, Lenti shot him, and after initially running
away, Lenti went back to retrieve the marijuana. An officer testified that five
pounds of marijuana was a significant quantity with an estimated street value of
thousands to tens of thousands of dollars. As the circuit court noted, this amount
of marijuana would have been “so valuable that a man stole it first from Ms. Lenti
at gunpoint and she was so desperate to get it back and it had such value and
importance to her that she not only got it back, but she shot somebody in order to
do that.” The court concluded, “I don’t think it’s a reasonable argument to suggest
that she’s shooting a man, potentially killing him, taking a risk of killing him[,]
because she wants five pounds of CBD oil.” A jury could reasonably determine
that a person would not shoot another person in order to retrieve an item unless it
was of high value and the theft could not be reported to the police, which supports
a finding that the substance was marijuana.

¶23 In addition, there was evidence reflecting that A.B. had a history of
involvement in the drug trade. This included the bundles of cash, gun, and
marijuana found in the vehicle he was driving, the smell of marijuana on his
person, and the marijuana found in one of his pockets. Also, when police found
A.B.’s cell phone, it rang and the officers saw a message on the lock screen from a

9
No. 2024AP491-CR

person named Fo, which established a factual basis to draw a connection between
A.B. and Lenti’s dealer.

¶24 Other evidence that supported the jury’s finding that the substance
Lenti delivered was THC (as opposed to CBD or some other legal derivative of the
marijuana plant) included that Lenti made calls from jail asking a friend to go to
her house to remove the “bad shit,” which she said had likely gone bad and now
was just a fire hazard. If credited by the jury as relevant evidence, the jury could
have reasonably inferred that she was talking about marijuana plants that had dried
up due to Lenti’s absence and inability to tend to them.

¶25 All of the evidence summarized above, taken together, supported the
jury’s finding that the substance for which A.B. and Lenti were risking their lives
was THC, not a legal marijuana-plant derivative.

¶26 Lenti’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. She argues that
at most, the evidence supported an inference that Lenti believed that the substance
was marijuana, but that such a belief “standing alone” was not enough to prove
that the substance was marijuana. However, even if that alone were not sufficient,
as noted above, the evidence supported much more than just Lenti’s belief that the
substance was marijuana. This was a decision for the jury to make. And the jury
had sufficient evidence to reject Lenti’s theory that was based on the absence of
testing, and to convict Lenti on the charge.

¶27 Lenti also attempts to distinguish Anderson, which, as stated, the
circuit court relied on in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the
verdict. As in this case, there, the defendant Anderson was convicted for
delivering marijuana even though the marijuana was not tested. Anderson, 176
Wis. 2d at 199. At trial, an individual to whom Anderson delivered the marijuana

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No. 2024AP491-CR

testified that he “got high” from marijuana a lot and that the “joint” Anderson
provided him made him lightheaded and tasted and smelled different from
cigarettes. Id. at 201. In addition, Anderson told police that he had smoked
marijuana in the past and would sometimes sell it, that the substance he was
charged with delivering was marijuana, that he and others “sat there and got high”
from the marijuana, and that what they smoked was “good shit.” Id. at 200.

¶28 On appeal, we rejected Anderson’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the jury’s determination that the substance Anderson
delivered was marijuana. Id. at 201-03. After noting that the identification of a
controlled substance can be established by a variety of “circumstantial” evidence,
we concluded:

Anderson’s in-custody statement to the police officer
established that he had sufficient lay experience based on
familiarity through prior use, trading, and law enforcement
so that his admission that he gave “marijuana” to his
friends at the time of the alleged offense was sufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was
in fact marijuana.

Id. at 202-03.

¶29 Lenti contends that Anderson does not support the conclusion that,
based on the evidence presented here, the jury could reasonably find that the
substance involved was illegal THC. She advances two reasons for this view.
First, she argues that when Anderson was decided in 1993, THC was defined in
the statutes differently such that then, any quantity of THC in a substance was
illegal, whereas now, hemp, which contains a trace amount of THC, is legal.
Therefore, in Lenti’s view, testing or else evidence specifically addressing the
effects experienced by someone who consumed the possessed substance, is
necessary to prove the second element of the crime. Second, she argues that

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No. 2024AP491-CR

Anderson is distinguishable because here, unlike in Anderson, “there was no
evidence that Lenti was an experienced user of marijuana” or that “she smoked
some of the product she gave to [A.B.]”

¶30 As for Lenti’s first argument, nothing about the changes in the law
contradicts the longstanding holding in Anderson, which is that evidence other
than a laboratory test can be sufficient to prove the identity of a controlled
substance in a drug-related crime, and the even longer-standing precedent on
which the Anderson court relied. See id. at 200-01 (discussing State v. Wind, 60
Wis. 2d 267, 208 N.W.2d 357 (1973), and State v. Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d 561, 196
N.W.2d 717 (1972)); see also Wind, 60 Wis. 2d at 272 (affirming a marijuana
conviction in the absence of testing specific for marijuana and based on
“circumstantial” evidence: namely, expert opinion that the substance was
“probably marijuana” and evidence that a police officer “asked [the defendant
Wind] for marijuana, and Wind agreed to sell marijuana and charged a price which
would indicate it was marijuana”). As the Johnson court observed in rejecting the
defendant Johnson’s argument that the circuit court erred in permitting a lay
person to identify the drug in question:

While a chemical analysis may be a more scientific
test to determine the nature of a drug, nevertheless as a
practical matter in this type of case where the substance has
been ingested, no such test is available. Without the use of
satisfactory circumstantial evidence, there could be no
convictions in this type of case. When a chemical analysis
is impossible, it need not be shown and if the circumstantial
evidence is sufficiently strong, it may support a verdict ….

Johnson, 54 Wis. 2d at 567; see also Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 331
S.W.3d 249, 254 (Ky. 2011) (collecting cases and noting that “even with the
adoption of [‘imitation controlled substances’] statutes by states across the

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No. 2024AP491-CR

country, courts still almost uniformly allow the introduction of circumstantial
evidence in the absence of chemical testing to identify alleged controlled
substances”).

¶31 That the legislature has distinguished different derivatives of the
marijuana plant does not mean that evidence other than a lab report cannot
establish that a substance is THC. As we have summarized at length above, the
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the attempted transaction between
Lenti and A.B. provided an ample basis for the jury to find that the substance was
illegal THC, not hemp or some other readily available legal derivative. Lenti’s
argument would suggest that chemical testing of the substance is now required for
the State to prove possession with intent to deliver THC, which is contrary to
Wisconsin precedent.

¶32 Regarding Lenti’s second argument—that, unlike in this case, in
Anderson there was evidence that the defendant was an experienced user of
marijuana and had smoked the marijuana at issue—this does not mean that the
evidence here was insufficient. Anderson concludes that the identity of a
controlled substance can be proven with a variety of evidence. Anderson, 176
Wis. 2d at 202-03. It does not require circumstances identical to those in
Anderson, i.e., evidence of prior experience with the controlled substance or the
substance’s effects once ingested.

¶33 In sum, as set forth above, the evidence supported the jury’s finding
that the substance that Lenti arranged to sell to A.B. was marijuana.

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No. 2024AP491-CR

III. The evidence was sufficient to support Lenti’s conviction for second-degree
reckless injury.3

¶34 Lenti raised a claim of self-defense at trial, and the circuit court
instructed the jury on self-defense. On appeal, Lenti argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding Lenti guilty of second-degree
reckless injury, specifically, that she did not act in self-defense. To convict Lenti
of second-degree reckless injury, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.23(2)(a), the
jury was required to find the following elements: (1) Lenti caused great bodily
harm to A.B.; and (2) Lenti “caused great bodily harm by criminally reckless
conduct.” WIS. JI–CRIMINAL 1252 (2015). For the jury to find that Lenti engaged
in “criminally reckless conduct,” it had to find that: (1) Lenti’s conduct “created a
risk of death or great bodily harm to another person”; (2) “the risk of death or
great bodily harm was unreasonable and substantial”; and (3) Lenti “was aware
that her conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great
bodily harm.” WIS. JI–CRIMINAL 1252 (2015); see also WIS. STAT. § 939.24(1).

¶35 In light of Lenti’s self-defense theory, if the jury found all the
elements of second-degree reckless injury, it then had to decide whether: (1) Lenti
believed that A.B. presented “actual or imminent unlawful interference with her
person”; (2) Lenti “believed that the amount of force [she] used ... was necessary
to prevent or terminate the interference”; and (3) Lenti’s “beliefs were
reasonable.” WIS. JI–CRIMINAL 805 (2023) (footnote omitted). On the self-
defense issue, the burden shifted to the State “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

3
Because Lenti does not challenge the penalty enhancer for use of a dangerous weapon,
we do not discuss it.

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No. 2024AP491-CR

that [Lenti’s] evidence did not negate an element necessary to convict.” See State
v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 640, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶36 Lenti acknowledges that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
conclude that Lenti fired the shot that hit A.B. Her argument is that the State
failed to prove that she acted unreasonably in doing so and therefore did not prove
that she engaged in criminally reckless conduct. In support of this argument, Lenti
highlights evidence that she told Eisner that she feared for her life when, according
to her, A.B. pointed a gun at her and threatened to kill her. Lenti also notes that
even though the jury could reasonably find that she shot A.B. only after A.B. took
the marijuana and turned around and the two were separating, the jury should have
found that the threat had not “entirely subsided.” According to Lenti, because
A.B. could have still shot at her after he turned and started moving away from her,
the evidence was not sufficient to prove that Lenti’s shooting A.B. was not acting
in self-defense. Lenti emphasizes evidence that A.B. lied to police while at the
hospital, saying that a “black man” shot him, which she submits would have
supported a “strong inference” that A.B. lied because he knew that he had been the
aggressor toward Lenti.

¶37 However, Lenti’s argument ignores the evidence supporting the
reasonable inference that Lenti shot A.B. because she was desperate to regain
possession of the marijuana, not because she believed it was necessary to prevent
A.B. from shooting her. As the jury heard, Lenti told Eisner that Lenti thought she
was “fucked” because she now owed her dealer either the marijuana or its value,
which was estimated to be thousands to tens of thousands of dollars, and the
evidence that, if Lenti was unable to compensate her dealer, she was likely to be
subjected to violence as a result. This evidence supported a reasonable inference
that Lenti had a motive to shoot A.B., even if he no longer posed an immediate

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No. 2024AP491-CR

physical threat to her. As the prosecutor emphasized in closing: “[Lenti] needed
the marijuana back. And that is not self-defense. Recovering your illicit drugs is
not self-defense.”

¶38 The State also presented evidence that Lenti did not consistently
maintain her self-defense theory. In a jail call to a friend, Lenti shared an entirely
different defense theory: that she never shot at A.B. at all, that she was selling
shoes to a third individual; that the third individual hit her and attempted to rape
her, but she escaped; and that the third individual must have been the person who
shot A.B. Based on Lenti’s statement during the call suggesting that she never
shot anyone, the jury had a reasonable basis to doubt Lenti’s contradictory theory
at trial that she shot A.B. but that it was in self-defense.

¶39 Moreover, even if the jury believed that A.B. lied to police about
who shot him, this would not mean that the jury was required to accept Lenti’s
self-defense theory. Instead, A.B.’s lie supported multiple inferences, including
that he was trying to misdirect police from learning about his role in the drug deal
and from finding his illegal gun. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
the evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Lenti shot A.B. and that when she
did, she lacked a reasonable belief that shooting him was necessary to prevent
A.B. from killing or seriously injuring her.

¶40 Accordingly, considering all the facts in the light most favorable to
the State and the conviction, the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that Lenti was not acting in self-defense when she shot A.B.

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No. 2024AP491-CR

CONCLUSION

¶41 For the reasons set forth above, we reject Lenti’s arguments and
affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17