Dane County v. Trent Joseph Meyer

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 14, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1630 Cir. Ct. No. 2024TR311

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

DANE COUNTY,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

TRENT JOSEPH MEYER,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Dane County:
JULIE GENOVESE, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 BLANCHARD, J.1 Trent Meyer, pro se, appeals a judgment of
conviction for driving a car faster than was reasonable and prudent under the
conditions, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(2). Meyer argues that the circuit

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This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(c) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2024AP1630

court lacked evidence sufficient to support a conviction. I conclude that the court
was presented with clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence to support a
conviction. Meyer also asserts that the court denied him his due process rights to
be heard and to present evidence. I conclude that Meyer was afforded meaningful
opportunities to be heard at trial and to present evidence. Accordingly, I affirm.

¶2 At a bench trial in the circuit court, a Dane County sheriff’s deputy
gave the following testimony, all of which was credited by the court. Late on a
Wednesday afternoon in December 2023, while traveling in the left lane of two
westbound lanes of Highway 12 north of Middleton, Meyer approached three cars
from behind. The posted speed limit in this area was 55 mph. One of the cars
ahead of Meyer was in the left lane, traveling about 65, while the two others were
in the right lane, going about 60. The deputy drove the last car in the right lane.

¶3 Meyer’s car approached the car in the left lane, at one point going
about 75 mph, until Meyer’s car was “close” to the other car’s rear bumper. As
Meyer approached from behind, the car in the left lane ahead of Meyer was
traveling slightly faster than the lead car in the right lane. When there was enough
space to allow it, Meyer merged into the right lane ahead of the lead car in that
lane, with his rear bumper “close” to that car’s front bumper. Meyer then
accelerated, passing the car in the left lane on its right. The deputy estimated that
Meyer’s car accelerated to 77 when it pulled away from the group. Deputy
Mueller was then able to position his vehicle behind Meyer’s and pace him at 77.
Meyer, followed by the deputy, passed what the deputy characterized as “heavier
traffic.” The deputy initiated a traffic stop and issued Meyer the ticket alleging a
violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(2).

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¶4 At the beginning of the trial, Meyer told the circuit court that he
would be the only witness for the defense. Following the County’s direct
examination of the deputy, Meyer asked the deputy about the lack of physical
evidence presented by the County, the procedure for properly requesting dashcam
footage, the speed of the other cars on the road, and the “normal” distance over
which an officer will observe a vehicle before making a traffic stop.

¶5 The circuit court afforded Meyer great latitude in how he cross
examined the deputy. The court also allowed Meyer to pause the examination
intermittently to allow Meyer to present to the court what appears to have been all
of the legal arguments and factual assertions that he wanted to make. At least five
times, the court courteously and unambiguously attempted to inform Meyer of
effective ways to ask questions, including calling his attention to the importance of
relevance. The court also asked Meyer questions to elicit his views on the facts
and to understand his legal arguments.

¶6 Eventually, after Meyer began to repeat some of his arguments, the
circuit court indicated that it was ready to issue a decision by finding Meyer
guilty. Meyer asked to speak further, which the court allowed. Meyer said that he
“never got a chance to say anything on [his] behalf.” The court replied by
summarizing the points that the court understood Meyer to have attempted to
convey through his cross examination of the deputy and his other statements. The
substance of the court’s summary was that, at the time of the incident, Meyer did
not know whether he was speeding and that Meyer thought that the driver in the
left lane was not keeping up with traffic. Meyer responded to this summary by
saying that the drivers of the other cars, as well as the deputy, should have also
received tickets. The court asked whether there was anything else that Meyer
thought the court might have missed. Meyer responded that the County had not

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proven unreasonable and imprudent speed under the conditions. The court said
that it disagreed and entered judgment against Meyer.

¶7 Turning from the background to a discussion of the merits, one basis
to reject Meyer’s arguments on appeal is that the County has submitted a
respondent’s brief on appeal with developed arguments in favor of affirming the
circuit court, but Meyer has not filed a reply brief. An appellant’s failure to
respond in a reply brief to an argument made in a response brief that calls for a
reply, based on the content of both the appellant’s opening brief and the
respondent’s brief, may be taken as a concession. United Coop. v. Frontier FS
Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578; Charolais
Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Sec. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493
(Ct. App. 1979) (“‘Respondents on appeal cannot complain if propositions of
appellants are taken as confessed which they do not undertake to refute.’” (quoted
source omitted)). Putting that to the side, as I now explain, I also reject his
arguments on the merits.

¶8 WISCONSIN STAT. § 346.57(2) makes it a violation for a person to
drive on a highway at a speed “greater than is reasonable and prudent under the
conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing.”
The statute further states that “[t]he speed of a vehicle shall be so controlled as
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any object, person, vehicle[,] or other
conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and
using due care.” § 346.57(2). For a conviction, § 346.57(2) requires that the
factfinder be satisfied to a reasonable certainty by evidence that is clear,
satisfactory, and convincing. WIS JI—CRIMINAL 2672; WIS. STAT. § 345.45.

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I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶9 Meyer argues that the circuit court erred because the County did not
elicit sufficient “physical evidence” of his speed and the conditions at the time of
the alleged unreasonable speed (such as from a squad car dashboard camera), and
for these reasons failed to meet the burden of proof.

¶10 This court’s review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
on appeal is “highly deferential” to the verdict. State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47,
¶21, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681. “[A]n appellate court is tasked with
deciding whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements’” of
the charged offense at the appropriate standard of review—here, proof by evidence
that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing. See State v. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44,
377 Wis. 2d 302, 901 N.W.2d 768 (citations omitted); City of Milwaukee v.
Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 21, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980); WIS. STAT. § 345.45. Thus,
the evidence was sufficient if any rational trier of fact could have been convinced
of the defendant’s guilt to a reasonable certainty by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence.

¶11 As summarized above, the deputy testified to Meyer’s speed at
multiple points during relevant events, including that Meyer was traveling more
than 20 mph above the posted speed limit. The deputy also testified regarding the
traffic conditions, the conditions of the road, and the close distances between
vehicles at relevant times. The deputy also testified that Meyer passed a car in the
right lane and that the vehicles came to a traffic light shortly after Meyer made the
pass. Regarding this last point, it was potentially relevant that Meyer reached the
speeds and engaged in the maneuvers testified to by the deputy and credited by the

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circuit court in proximity to a section of a divided highway that was controlled by
stoplights. On these facts, a reasonable factfinder could find Meyer guilty of
unreasonable and imprudent speed.

¶12 Meyer may intend to establish that merely driving to some degree in
excess of a posted speed limit does not necessarily constitute a violation of WIS.
STAT. § 346.57(2). This may be true as a general proposition, but it is beside the
point. To repeat, the deputy gave testimony that easily supports a finding that
Meyer drove faster than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions, in light
of actual and potential hazards, such as a potential collision with one of the other
cars or causing another car to swerve or brake in a way that could lead to some
form of accident.

¶13 Turning to Meyer’s assertions about “physical evidence,”
convictions can be sustained when they are not based on tangible forms of
evidence, as opposed to evidence presented in the form of testimony regarding
memories of observations of the type that the deputy gave here. See City of
Madison v. Geier, 27 Wis. 2d 687, 697-98, 135 N.W.2d 761 (1965) (opinion of
officer that motors were revved and tires squealed supported conviction for
violation of racing in violation of speeding ordinance); City of Milwaukee v.
Berry, 44 Wis. 2d 321, 324-25, 171 N.W.2d 305 (1969) (if a witness had a
reasonable basis to judge the speed of a vehicle and gives testimony on that topic,
the trier of fact generally decides what weight to give that testimony).

II. Due Process

¶14 Meyer asserts that he was denied due process in two ways: that he
was not granted the opportunity to testify in his defense; and that he was denied
the opportunity to show the circuit court the dashboard camera footage from the

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deputy’s vehicle. It could be a basis to reject these assertions that, in support,
Meyer merely cites to the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
fails to develop any point about the specific alleged shortcomings in trial
proceedings that is supported by legal authority. This court makes some
allowances for certain types of gaps or omissions in the briefing of parties who, as
here, are not represented by counsel. See Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d
442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992). But at the same time, “[w]e cannot serve as both
advocate and judge,” State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct.
App. 1992), and this court will not develop viable, fact-supported legal theories on
the appellant’s behalf, State v. Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d 328, 337, 600 N.W.2d 39
(Ct. App. 1999). Further, addressing Meyer’s positions as best I understand them,
neither argument is supported by the record under a correct application of law.

¶15 A procedural due process or related constitutional challenge presents
an issue of law that this court reviews de novo. See State v. Sorenson, 2002 WI
78, ¶25, 254 Wis. 2d 54, 646 N.W.2d 354.

¶16 Meyer relies on what he asserts was his right to testify in his own
defense at trial, but this argument is misplaced because he did not have this right
in the trial of this action.

¶17 The right to testify in one’s own defense attaches only in criminal
trials at which the defendant has a liberty interest at stake. See Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (“The right to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial
has sources in several provisions of the Constitution.”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7
(“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel[.]” (emphasis added)). But this was not a trial of a criminal
matter. It was a trial of a traffic forfeiture, specifically an alleged violation of

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WIS. STAT. § 346.57. See WIS. STAT. § 345.20(1)(b) (defining a traffic regulation
as “a provision of [chapters] … 341 to 349 for which the penalty for violation is a
forfeiture.”); WIS. STAT. § 346.60(3) (prescribing forfeiture penalties for offenses
including violations of § 346.57(2)). Under § 345.20(2)(a), subject to exceptions
that Meyer does not show apply here, the small claims provisions of WIS. STAT.
ch. 799 apply to traffic forfeiture actions in the circuit court. As part of these
small claims provisions, WIS. STAT. § 799.209(1) provides that “[t]he court …
shall conduct the proceeding informally, allowing each party to present arguments
and proofs and to examine witnesses to the extent reasonably required for full and
true disclosure of the facts.” In the absence of an applicable constitutional right,
such as the right to testify in one’s own defense in a criminal trial, Meyer must
show that the trial here violated rights afforded to him under § 799.209(1) or some
other applicable statute. See Dane County v. McGrew, 2005 WI 130, ¶¶9, 12, 50,
285 Wis. 2d 519, 699 N.W.2d 890 (defendant in traffic case not entitled to trial by
12 jurors because applicable statute prescribed six jurors and there was no
constitutional right to 12).

¶18 The circuit court granted Meyer ample opportunities to be heard at
trial in a manner that easily satisfied his rights under WIS. STAT. § 799.209(1).
The circuit court allowed him to question the witness called by the County, make
legal arguments, and assert all of the factual propositions that he thought were
relevant at the time of trial, sometimes in response to the court’s inquiries and
sometimes not. The court’s questions were appropriate to the context and were
clearly aimed at helping Meyer to provide his side of the case as he saw it. On
five separate occasions the court asked Meyer if he had anything else to add. Each
time, he said that he did, and then the court allowed him to make further
statements and argument. The court also overruled multiple arguably valid

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objections by the County, seemingly erring on the side of allowing Meyer to make
his argument. All of these facts easily support the conclusion that the court
ensured “full and true disclosure of the facts” as required by § 799.209(1).

¶19 Meyer also contends that the circuit court denied him the
opportunity to play the deputy’s dash camera video at trial, but this argument is
not supported by the record. Meyer told the court at trial that he had the video in
his possession. He raised a concern that it did not include information about the
deputy’s vehicle’s speed. After a digression regarding the process of requesting
and obtaining the video, Meyer moved on without ever requesting an opportunity
for the video to be played for the court. The County had the burden to prove the
violation. But if Meyer wanted to rely on any aspect of the video in his defense it
was his responsibility to request its presentation to the court. The court did not
prevent him from making that request.

¶20 For all of these reasons, I affirm the circuit court’s entry of the
judgment of conviction.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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