State v. Linda Sue La Roche

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 13, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP766 Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF1468

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

LINDA SUE LA ROCHE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Racine County: TIMOTHY D. BOYLE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, P.J., Gundrum, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP766

¶1 PER CURIAM. Linda Sue La Roche appeals from a judgment
entered on jury verdicts convicting her of first-degree intentional homicide and
hiding a corpse. La Roche also appeals from an order denying her postconviction
motion for a new trial. See WIS. STAT. §§940.01(1), 940.11(2) (2023-24).1
La Roche claims that her trial counsel were ineffective for failing to:
(1) investigate and introduce an expert testimony about the cause and timeframe of
the victim’s death, (2) cross-examine witnesses about the victim’s physical
appearance on the day she left La Roche’s house, and (3) investigate and present a
third-party liability defense based on another allegedly-similar murder. La Roche
further requests a new trial based on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors.
We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged La Roche with the 1999 murder of Peggy Lynn
Johnson. Johnson’s brutally beaten body was found in a cornfield in Racine
County, Wisconsin with multiple injuries at various stages in the healing process.
Johnson’s body went unidentified for twenty years, known only as Jane Doe
throughout this time.

¶3 In 2019, La Roche reportedly bragged to a woman in Florida, where
La Roche was then living, that La Roche had killed a woman in Illinois in 1999.
La Roche had taken in Johnson because Johnson’s mother had recently died, and
Johnson had nowhere else to go. Johnson lived with La Roche and her family as a
nanny and housekeeper for several years in Illinois before she died. Johnson was

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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last seen in the passenger seat of a car driven by La Roche, who claimed to have
left an alive Johnson by the side of a rural road.

¶4 From the time Johnson left La Roche’s home through the
investigation into Johnson’s death over 20 years later, La Roche provided differing
accounts as to where she took Johnson on the day she was last seen, ranging from
having taken Johnson to meet her grandmother at a nearby restaurant in Illinois, to
taking her to a restaurant to meet some unknown person, to finally admitting that
La Roche left Johnson at the side of a rural road somewhere in Wisconsin.
Several of La Roche’s children witnessed La Roche committing various acts of
violent physical and verbal abuse against Johnson while Johnson lived with the
family.

¶5 After less than two hours of deliberation at the close of a seven-day
trial in 2022, the jury convicted La Roche of first-degree homicide and hiding a
corpse for having beaten Johnson and left her body in a cornfield. The circuit
court imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment, without the possibility
of parole pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 973.014(1)(c), on the homicide count and five
years of imprisonment for hiding a corpse.

¶6 La Roche filed a postconviction motion seeking a new trial on the
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. La Roche argued that trial counsels’
failure to investigate and introduce expert testimony regarding the time and cause
of Johnson’s death, to cross-examine witnesses regarding Johnson’s physical
appearance when Johnson was last seen, and to advance a third-party liability
defense were deficient and prejudicial. La Roche also filed a “MOTION TO
INCLUDE THIRD PARTY LIABILITY,” arguing that this case and a different
1999 murder case in Illinois were “similar” in “time,” “place,” and “circumstance”

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because the bodies in both cases were discovered in 1999, in fields approximately
40 miles apart, and with some similar injuries.

¶7 The circuit court held a Machner2 hearing at which both of
La Roche’s trial attorneys testified. The court held a subsequent hearing related to
La Roche’s third-party liability claim with testimony from Dr. Doug Kelley, who
had performed the autopsy on Johnson, and Dr. Lindsey C. Thomas, who was
apparently proffered as a competing expert to Dr. Kelley.3 The court filed a
written decision denying La Roche’s motion for a new trial. It concluded that
La Roche “failed to meet the burden of establishing that her trial counsel were
ineffective.” La Roche appeals, renewing the arguments from her postconviction
motion.

DISCUSSION

¶8 “Whether counsel was ineffective is a mixed question of fact and
law.” State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶19, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334.
“The factual circumstances of the case and trial counsel’s conduct and strategy are
findings of fact, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous; whether
counsel’s conduct constitutes ineffective assistance is a question of law, which we
review” independently. State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶37, 378 Wis. 2d 431,
904 N.W.2d 93. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must satisfy two tests: first, that counsel’s performance was deficient;

2
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
3
La Roche has failed to provide us with the transcript from the hearing on her
third-party liability motion. “[I]n the absence of a transcript we presume that every fact essential
to sustain the circuit court’s decision is supported by the record.” Butcher v. Ameritech Corp.,
2007 WI App 5, ¶35, 298 Wis. 2d 468, 727 N.W.2d 546 (2006).

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No. 2024AP766

and second, that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “If the defendant fails to satisfy either
prong, we need not consider the other.” Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶37.

¶9 Based on our examination of the record and the circuit court’s
findings from the Machner hearing and the third-party liability hearing, we
conclude that trial counsels’ performance was not deficient because it was
objectively reasonable. “Counsel’s conduct is constitutionally deficient if it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19,
264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305. “The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct
must be evaluated ‘on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of
counsel’s conduct.’” Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶23 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 690). We address La Roche’s arguments in turn below.

¶10 First, La Roche argues deficient performance for trial counsels’
failure to present a defense expert to testify about the cause and time of Johnson’s
death. She argues that “[i]nvestigating time of death, compared to the 46 days
Johnson was missing would have shown that LaRoche could not have been
responsible for the murder.” However, La Roche fails to develop any argument to
explain how she arrives at this conclusion. The postconviction court found that
La Roche had shown neither “why [time and cause of death] would have been
necessary for trial counsel to address” nor “how she was prejudiced by such
failure.” La Roche’s arguments to this court on appeal are equally flawed.

¶11 At the Machner hearing, counsel testified that Johnson’s cause of
death was not an issue at trial and focusing on the cause of her death would not
have comported with the defense strategy to show reasonable doubt that La Roche
killed Johnson. The circuit court found that counsel supported its trial strategy

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No. 2024AP766

with “appropriate and targeted points through cross examination of the state’s
medical examiner.” The court also found that trial counsel were “experienced trial
attorneys … familiar with developing trial strategy,” and concluded that their
“strategy and representation on this issue was reasonable and appropriate and does
not rise to the level of being ineffective.”

¶12 Strategic trial decisions, when rational, do not constitute deficient
performance. Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶38. Here, the circuit court found the
attorneys’ decision to not call an expert witness or solicit testimony on a subject
counsel believed was inconsequential to the jury’s verdict to be a reasonable
strategic choice that does not constitute deficient performance. See id., ¶75
(“Reviewing courts should be ‘highly deferential’ to counsel’s strategic decisions
and make ‘every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.’” (citation omitted)). La Roche
has failed to establish otherwise.

¶13 La Roche next argues ineffective assistance based on counsels’
“fail[ure] to properly cross examine prosecution witnesses” about Johnson’s
“physical condition” or “physical appearance on the day she left.” Contrary to
La Roche’s assertions, the circuit court concluded that this claim was “without
merit,” and explicitly found that “the record is replete with questioning and
argument by trial counsel on this very topic.” The court noted that trial counsel’s
closing argument thoroughly addressed Johnson’s physical appearance and
“counsel highlighted the holes in the state’s case and showed that those who last
saw [Johnson] did not see any injuries on her.” The court found counsel thorough
and strategic in its approach to this topic, concluding that “trial counsel was
anything but ineffective on this issue.” La Roche makes no challenge to the

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court’s factual findings, and the record supports both its findings and conclusion
that counsel did not perform deficiently in this regard.

¶14 In sum, La Roche does not contest any of the circuit court’s findings
as to counsels’ strategy or performance, nor does the record establish that the
findings are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we accept the court’s factual
determinations and uphold its finding that trial counsel had valid strategic reasons
for its challenged decisions discussed above. See Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431,
¶37. Because counsels’ decisions were reasonable, La Roche fails to establish
deficient performance and, therefore, ineffective assistance of counsel, as to these
alleged errors.

¶15 La Roche also makes an ineffectiveness claim based on trial
counsels’ failure to bring a third-party perpetrator defense to point the finger at the
unknown perpetrator of another murder around the time of Johnson’s. See State v.
Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 623-24, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984). To succeed on
a Denny motion, a defendant must establish that there was a legitimate tendency
that another person committed the crime by showing a third person’s motive,
opportunity, and direct connection to the crime. See State v. Wilson, 2015 WI 48,
¶3, 362 Wis. 2d 193, 864 N.W.2d 52. An offer of proof in support of such a
motion is insufficient if it merely “‘affords a possible ground of suspicion against
another person[.]’” Id., ¶51 (citation omitted).

¶16 La Roche argues that her trial counsel had grounds for a motion to
admit evidence from the Illinois case based on her claim that the female victim’s
body in that case was found several months after Johnson’s body, was disposed of
in a cornfield like Johnson’s, and had “u-shaped markings” that were “similar” to
some of Johnson’s many injuries. However, as the postconviction court properly

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No. 2024AP766

found, La Roche failed to establish: (1) the existence of a person with a motive to
commit the homicide charged here; or (2) that such a person had an opportunity to
commit the murder; or (3) a legitimate tendency to connect such a person to the
acts underpinning the charges alleged in the complaint. Indeed, La Roche did not
suggest an identity for the alleged third-party perpetrator. Thus, the existence of
the other 1999 murder provides at most “a possible ground of suspicion against”
an unidentified person, which is insufficient to sustain a Denny motion. See
Wilson, 362 Wis. 2d 193, ¶83.

¶17 Accordingly, La Roche failed to make a showing that her trial
counsel performed deficiently by forgoing a Denny motion. An attorney does not
perform deficiently by failing to file a motion that would have been denied. State
v. Wheat, 2002 WI App 153, ¶23, 256 Wis. 2d 270, 647 N.W.2d 441.

¶18 Finally, La Roche asks this court to order a new trial because, she
argues, the cumulative effect of the errors discussed above prejudiced her; she
asserts that the result of the trial would have been different absent these errors.
Since we have rejected all of La Roche’s alleged arguments, we decline to order a
new trial.4 See Mentek v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 799, 809, 238 N.W.2d 752 (1976)
(“Zero plus zero equals zero.”).

4
We note that La Roche makes a passing request asking this court to order DNA testing
on scrapings found under Johnson’s fingernails. However, because La Roche does not develop
any argument showing why this would matter to her case or further pursue this request, we
decline to order DNA testing or to discuss this issue further.

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No. 2024AP766

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that La Roche has failed to
establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and a new trial is not warranted.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying
postconviction relief.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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