State v. Marie L. Hanson

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 18, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2316-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF401

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

MARIE L. HANSON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Winnebago County:
MICHAEL S. GIBBS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP2316-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Marie L. Hanson appeals from her judgment of
conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine entered on her no
contest plea. She claims the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress evidence derived from a traffic stop and subsequent search of the vehicle
in which she was a passenger. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Background

¶2 On June 26, 2022, a City of Menasha police officer performed a traffic
stop that ultimately led to the arrest of Hanson and charges for possession with intent
to deliver methamphetamine and felony bail jumping. She moved to suppress
evidence from the stop, and an evidentiary hearing on that motion produced the
following evidence.

¶3 The officer testified that he performed a traffic stop on a vehicle based
on information indicating the registered owner did not have a valid driver’s license.
The officer made contact at the passenger side of the vehicle, where Hanson was
seated. When Hanson checked the glove box for proof of insurance, the officer
observed “[m]ultiple torch lighters,” which are typically used for the “[l]ighting of
various narcotic products.” He further indicated that such lighters are not often used
to light cigarettes because of “the torch aspect of it, the little tubing of the flame.”

¶4 With no proof of insurance located in the glove box, Hanson and the
driver indicated they would try to call the registered owner to see if they could get
a copy of such proof. While they did this, the officer returned to his squad car, ran
their background information, and learned both Hanson and the driver “had past
drug history or current open cases.” Specific to Hanson, she had “a current open
case through Outagamie County for drugs,” with the officer testifying to being
“fairly certain” it was for a felony-level offense. The officer also learned Hanson

2
No. 2023AP2316-CR

had a warrant for her out of the State of Georgia for narcotics use with a specific
warning regarding “dangerous drugs.” Aware of Hanson’s drug-related record and
“actually seeing something that I know is directly associated oftentimes with
narcotics,” the officer called for a K9 unit to come to the scene.

¶5 Returning to Hanson and the driver, the officer spoke on the phone to
the registered owner of the vehicle, who advised he did not have insurance on it.
When asked if it was “okay” that the driver and Hanson had his vehicle, the owner
hesitated and simply responded, “I guess.” The officer testified that “[i]t sound[ed]
like he d[idn’t] even know they ha[d] the car.” The officer observed that Hanson
“was noticeably shaking, and her knee was going up and down, and [she was] biting
at her fingernails. Again, both those are common signs of nervousness.” The driver
was smoking a cigarette “somewhat fast,” which the officer stated also oftentimes
indicates nervousness. The officer added that there was “no reason for an insurance
situation [to cause them to] be that nervous.”

¶6 On cross-examination, the officer acknowledged that his original
basis for stopping the vehicle—his belief the driver might not have a valid license—
was cleared up as soon as the officer learned that the driver was not the (unlicensed)
registered owner of the vehicle. The officer stated that once he learned they did
have permission to drive the vehicle, but there was no insurance on it, he then
needed to complete the paperwork for the insurance violation. He indicated it
normally takes “five-ish minutes” to fill out the citation, but that he also “review[s]
it, make[s] sure it’s accurate as far as some of the data,” and he then prints it out.
He testified that the torch lighters he observed in the glove box were not illegal to
possess, “so I guess you can have one to use for, I guess, whichever event you want
to.”

3
No. 2023AP2316-CR

¶7 The K9 officer who responded to the traffic stop involving Hanson
testified next. He stated his K9, Athos, is “trained in narcotics detection. Those
detections would be cocaine, MDMA, methamphetamines, or other narcotics.” The
circuit court admitted into evidence training certificates for the K9 officer and
Athos. The K9 officer described some of the training he and Athos had completed
as well as various types of “alerts” Athos will give to show he has identified a
narcotic odor, including his body becoming rigid, his ears tucking back, and his
breathing increasing. The K9 officer agreed that different K9s alert differently.
Addressing Athos’ “record” on sniffs, the K9 officer stated Athos has approximately
a 97 percent record of correctly alerting to drugs that are or have been present in a
vehicle, with those alerts subsequently “substantiated by some other means.”

¶8 When the K9 officer and Athos arrived at the scene, the officer had
Athos perform a sniff of the vehicle. The window of the passenger side door was
open to some extent, and Athos

kind of jumped up, which is already an alert for me when he
wants to get up and get into this vehicle. Then his body was
[rigid], his ears tucked back, and his breathing increased; and
then if I recall, he started sniffing down the door seam, and
then he went down and started—I think he—I can’t
remember which direction he continued to sniff.

At that point, he’s trying to get to the source of this
trained odor that we’re on. In my opinion, that was an alert.
From what I’ve seen in all the training that we’ve done, that
was definitely an alert for K9 Athos.

¶9 On cross-examination, the K9 officer indicated that he “used Athos in
the field” 44 times in 2022, which included “quite a few traffic stops,” as well as
building searches and tracking. The K9 officer’s body camera video was played,
during which the officer described the alert by Athos: “[H]e jumps up into the
window, and he’s increasing his breathing, it’s almost exactly what I look for every

4
No. 2023AP2316-CR

time.… [T]hat is an alert in this case.” Discussing the video, the K9 officer further
stated,

So once he gets up there [on the window], his tail was kind
of wagging, and then it will slow down. His breathing
increased and his body is [rigid].

…The fact that he’s not willing to leave that right away
… [is] telling me that there’s something or had been
something in that vehicle that he’s trained on.

The officer further explained that “[i]t’s just a combination of everything that he’s
doing and the totality of the circumstances, what he’s doing is showing that he’s
alerting on the car.”

¶10 Hanson argued to the circuit court that evidence flowing from the
search should be suppressed primarily due to a lack of reasonable suspicion to
extend the traffic stop for the K9 sniff but also due to a lack of probable cause to
search the vehicle. The court disagreed with Hanson as to both reasonable suspicion
and probable cause and denied her suppression motion. Hanson eventually pled no
contest to the charge of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, and the
bail-jumping charge was dismissed but read in. The court withheld sentence and
placed Hanson on probation for three years. Hanson appeals.

5
No. 2023AP2316-CR

Discussion

¶11 Hanson contends the circuit court erred in determining the traffic stop
was lawfully extended, based upon reasonable suspicion of a criminal violation, to
allow for the dog sniff and in determining the search of the vehicle was lawful, based
upon probable cause. We conclude the court did not err.

¶12 Reviewing a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,
we apply the clearly erroneous standard to the court’s factual findings. State v.
Smiter, 2011 WI App 15, ¶9, 331 Wis. 2d 431, 793 N.W.2d 920 (2010). Our review
of whether the facts constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause, however, is
de novo. State v. Powers, 2004 WI App 143, ¶6, 275 Wis. 2d 456, 685 N.W.2d
869; State v. Moore, 2023 WI 50, ¶8, 408 Wis. 2d 16, 991 N.W.2d 412.

Reasonable Suspicion

¶13 Hanson acknowledges that the officer’s extension of the traffic stop
beyond the time needed to write a citation to the driver for operating the vehicle
without insurance would be lawful “if it [was] supported by reasonable suspicion,”
but she claims the officer lacked such suspicion. We disagree.

¶14 “Reasonable suspicion is ‘a low bar.’” State v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47,
¶25, 402 Wis. 2d 416, 975 N.W.2d 598 (citation omitted). In determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists, we must consider what a reasonable police officer
would have reasonably suspected given his or her training and experience. State v.
Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996). Taking “everything
observed by and known to the officer[],” we “determine whether the officer[] had
‘a particularized and objective basis’ to reasonably suspect [the defendant] of
criminal activity.” Nimmer, 402 Wis. 2d 416, ¶26 (citations omitted). We look at

6
No. 2023AP2316-CR

the totality of the facts taken together. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 58. As facts
accumulate, reasonable inferences about their cumulative effect can be drawn. Id.

¶15 A traffic stop may be lawfully extended “and a new investigation
begun” if an officer already involved in a lawful investigation “becomes aware of
additional suspicious factors which are sufficient to give rise to an articulable
suspicion that the person has committed or is committing an offense or offenses
separate and distinct from the acts that prompted the officer’s intervention in the
first place.” State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94-95, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App.
1999). The officer initiating the traffic stop in the case now before us became aware
of such additional suspicious factors.

¶16 At the time the officer extended the stop longer than necessary to write
a citation for an insurance violation, he was aware that: (1) there were “[m]ultiple
torch lighters” in the glove box directly in front of Hanson and that such lighters are
not often used to light cigarettes but are typically used for the “[l]ighting of various
narcotic products”; (2) Hanson had “a current open case through Outagamie County
for drugs” as well as a warrant out of Georgia for narcotics use, with a specific
warning regarding “dangerous drugs”; (3) both Hanson and the driver, who also had
a “past drug history or current open cases,” were exhibiting noticeable physical
signs of nervousness—beyond the sort of nervousness one would expect for only an
“insurance situation”; and (4) Hanson and the driver’s permission to use the vehicle
was weak. Even without this last point, the officer easily had “a particularized and
objective basis” to reasonably suspect drugs may be present and extend the stop for
a sniff by the K9 unit. See Nimmer, 402 Wis. 2d 416, ¶26 (citation omitted).

7
No. 2023AP2316-CR

Probable Cause

¶17 Once the K9 alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle, the officers
searched it and located drug-related evidence that led to Hanson’s arrest and the
subsequent charges in this case. Hanson contends the officers lacked probable cause
to search the vehicle and that the circuit court erred in concluding otherwise. We
disagree.

¶18 “The quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause to
search is a ‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.” State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607
N.W.2d 621 (citation omitted). Added to the evidence of “[m]ultiple torch lighters”
and their connection to drug use, Hanson’s notable and current record related to
illegal drugs, and her, as well as the driver’s, excessive nervousness was the alert
by the trained drug dog—a “signal,” as the circuit court called it in its ruling—
indicating drugs were likely in the vehicle. Hanson’s drug record indicated she had
a significant and recent problem with illegal drugs, the torch lighters suggested other
items related to illegal drug use may also be present in the vehicle, and the excessive
nervousness of both the driver and Hanson indicated consciousness of guilt—their
awareness that the vehicle contained illegal drug evidence and this officer might
find it. The alert by Athos easily pushed the totality of the evidence over the
threshold of a fair probability that evidence of a drug crime would be found in the
vehicle. Thus, the search was supported by probable cause.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2023-24)

8