Trempealeau County v. C. B. O.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 4, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1520-FT Cir. Ct. No. 2024ME8

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF C. B. O.:

TREMPEALEAU COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

C. B. O.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Trempealeau County:
THOMAS W. CLARK, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2024AP1520-FT

¶1 HRUZ, J.1 Carl2 appeals orders for his involuntary commitment
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20 and for his involuntary medication and treatment
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g). Carl argues that Trempealeau County
presented insufficient evidence to prove that he is dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
and 2.c. We conclude that the County presented sufficient evidence to prove Carl’s
dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Carl was emergently detained on February 24, 2024, because he
allegedly threatened to kill everyone at his apartment building and subsequently fled
from police officers in a motor vehicle chase while the officers pursued him with
sirens and lights activated. Following a hearing, the circuit court found probable
cause to involuntarily commit Carl under WIS. STAT. § 51.20. The court ordered
that Carl be evaluated by two examiners and scheduled a final hearing for March 7,
2024.3 Carl was examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Jeffrey Marcus, and a psychologist,
Dr. James Black.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2021-22). This
is an expedited appeal under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.17 (2021-22). All references to the Wisconsin
Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
2
For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential appeal using a
pseudonym, rather than his initials.
3
The final hearing was originally scheduled for March 7, 2024, in order to comply with
the fourteen-day deadline set forth in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(7)(c), with the last possible day being
March 8, 2024. At the March 7 hearing, Carl recognized the presiding judge, the Honorable
Rian Radtke, from Judge Radtke’s previous position as corporation counsel in Trempealeau
County. Carl requested that the presiding judge be substituted, and due to the statutory deadline
being the next day, requested that the final hearing be delayed. See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(10)(e).
The final hearing was rescheduled to March 12, 2024, within the seven-calendar-day deadline to
reschedule under § 51.20(10)(e), with the Honorable Thomas W. Clark presiding. Carl does not
raise any issues on appeal regarding the substitution of Judge Clark or the final hearing delay.

2
No. 2024AP1520-FT

¶3 City of Independence Police Officer Natalie Landrum, Dr. Marcus,
and Dr. Black testified at the final hearing. Landrum testified that her department
was “recently called to an event involving” Carl. Specifically, Landrum stated that
she was dispatched to Carl’s apartment because a resident at that apartment complex
reported that Carl had threatened its residents, “along the lines of, ‘I’m going to kill
somebody.’” Landrum stated that she responded to the call, that Carl was not at the
apartment complex when she arrived, and that Carl was subsequently located a few
miles away driving on a county road.

¶4 Officer Landrum stated that she drove to meet Carl at that location,
and when she arrived, there was a deputy pulled up beside Carl’s parked vehicle
trying to talk to him. Landrum pulled her vehicle in front of Carl’s vehicle, but Carl
then reversed his vehicle and drove around the deputy. Landrum and the deputy
then followed Carl as he drove to another city, primarily via the highway. Landrum
testified that spike strips were deployed in an attempt to stop Carl, but Carl drove
around them.

¶5 Carl eventually stopped his vehicle in front of an office building.
Police officers then tried to remove Carl from his vehicle, but they were unable to
do so because the vehicle’s doors were locked. While speaking to Carl, one of the
deputies observed a baseball bat in the vehicle within Carl’s reach. Police officers
then placed spike strips around Carl’s vehicle and thereafter broke the
passenger-side window of his vehicle to unlock the doors. Carl started his vehicle
again, but it was subsequently turned off by a deputy who was able to reach inside
the vehicle. Officer Landrum stated that at least five officers were touching Carl’s
vehicle at that time and that they could have been injured if Carl had attempted to
drive away. Officers subsequently removed Carl from his vehicle. Landrum

3
No. 2024AP1520-FT

described Carl’s state at that moment as “agitated,” and she noted that Carl did not
“make a lot of sense when he would talk.”

¶6 Doctor Marcus testified that he examined Carl and that he suffers from
schizoaffective disorder, which is a recognized mental illness under WIS. STAT.
ch. 51. Marcus further stated that Carl displays psychotic symptoms—including
hallucinations, disorganized thinking, and persistent paranoid delusions—as well as
affective symptoms—including emotional dysregulation and mood instability—of
a schizoaffective disorder. Marcus noted that Carl “lacks insight into the extent of
his condition and to the presence of psychotic symptoms” and questions his
diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. Marcus expressed that Carl was dangerous to
others under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 2.c. due to his “threatening behavior.”

¶7 Regarding treatment, Dr. Marcus opined that Carl was not competent
to refuse medication or treatment because Carl was incapable of applying an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of, and alternatives to, his
medication. Specifically, Marcus testified that Carl “lacked insight into his
condition, what he had, why he needed to take the medication, and specifically what
the risks were of him remaining untreated. He did not connect some of the problems
which led to his detention to the fact that his condition was untreated.”

¶8 In his report, which was entered into evidence Dr. Marcus noted that
Carl “has a known history of schizoaffective disorder, with multiple [WIS. STAT.
ch.] 51 commitments and numerous past hospitalizations.” Marcus also noted that
Carl “has an extensive history of treatment non-adherence which has resulted in
periods of psychotic decompensation over the years.” Regarding Carl’s threat at the
apartment complex and the subsequent police chase leading up to this current ch. 51
petition, Marcus opined that Carl’s “dangerous behavior appeared associated with

4
No. 2024AP1520-FT

unstable psychotic and manic symptomatology. His condition was untreated at the
time of his detention. It is expected that his symptoms and behavior will begin to
improve with his current treatment.”

¶9 Doctor Black testified that he examined Carl, and he also opined that
Carl suffers from schizoaffective disorder, as well as an unspecified neurocognitive
disorder. Black opined that Carl was dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.
due to Carl “walking around his apartment [building] naked, yelling at other
residents,” and being in a “slow-speed car chase with the police” where he refused
to get out of the vehicle and forced the police to break one of its windows to remove
him from his vehicle. Black testified that, during this incident, Carl “was quite out
of touch with reality in terms of his ability to understand what was happening to
him.” Black also opined that Carl was dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. due to
Carl not having the “insight or willingness” to follow through with his treatment.4
Black then stated that, “without question,” Carl would continue to decompensate if
he were not treated.

4
During its closing argument, the County argued that Carl was dangerous under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., 2.d., and 2.e. The County did not argue that Carl was dangerous under
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Nevertheless, the circuit court found him dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., and
“on appeal, the respondent is not barred from asserting any valid grounds to affirm the lower court’s
ruling.” See State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 475, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997).

The circuit court did not find Carl dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e. in its oral
ruling or its written order. The County does not raise any arguments regarding § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.
on appeal; thus, we deem this argument abandoned and do not address it further. See A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n issue
raised in the [circuit] court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned.”).

5
No. 2024AP1520-FT

¶10 The circuit court found Carl was mentally ill, a proper subject for
treatment, and dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 2.c.5 Regarding
dangerousness, the court made the following factual findings:

[Officer] Landrum talked about the chase through residential
neighborhoods…. [T]hen most-telling, when the officers
were trying to extract [Carl] from the car … that he tried to
start the car and drive away with officers touching him in the
car when that clearly would be a very dangerous position for
the officers as well as himself.

The court then entered orders for Carl’s commitment and for his involuntary
medication and treatment. Carl now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶11 Carl argues that the County presented insufficient evidence to prove
that he is dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 2.c. A petitioner
seeking to have a person committed under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 bears the burden of
proving “all required facts by clear and convincing evidence.” WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(13)(e). Whether a petitioner meets this burden presents a mixed question
of law and fact. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶24, 391 Wis. 2d 231,
942 N.W.2d 277. “[W]e will uphold a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous.” Id. Whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard is a
question of law that we review de novo. Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57,
¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783.

5
In its oral ruling, the circuit court appears to have not explicitly made a finding that Carl
was a proper subject for treatment. However, the court found that Carl was a proper subject for
treatment in its written order of commitment. Carl does not raise any arguments regarding the lack
of an oral finding that he is a proper subject for treatment. Carl also does not challenge that he is
mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment.

6
No. 2024AP1520-FT

¶12 Our review also requires us to interpret statutes. “Statutory
interpretation and the application of a statute to specific facts are questions of law
that we review de novo.” Garcia v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶7,
273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365. “[S]tatutory interpretation ‘begins with the
language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the
inquiry.’” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted).

¶13 Three elements must be met for a person to be subject to a WIS. STAT.
ch. 51 commitment. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶29. The subject must
be: (1) mentally ill, (2) a proper subject for treatment, and (3) dangerous under one
of the five standards set forth in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. D.J.W., 391
Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶29-30. The circuit court found Carl dangerous under
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b., which states that a person is dangerous if he or she evidences

a substantial probability of physical harm to other
individuals as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or
other violent behavior, or by evidence that others are placed
in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical
harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or
threat to do serious physical harm.

The court also found Carl dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., which states that a
person is dangerous if he or she evidences “such impaired judgment, manifested by
evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there is a substantial
probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or herself or other
individuals.”

¶14 Carl argues that the circuit court erred by finding him dangerous under
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b because the court did not make a finding that his threat
to his neighbors was a threat to do harm that would place others in reasonable fear

7
No. 2024AP1520-FT

of violent behavior. He further contends that the “police incident” did not amount
to violent behavior and that his response to the police was “understandable.” As a
corollary to the latter point, Carl argues that law enforcement engaged in an
overreaction during its interaction with him on February 24, 2024. We disagree
with Carl in all of the foregoing respects.

¶15 First, on our de novo review, we conclude that the report of Carl’s
threat to his neighbors contributes to a determination that he was dangerous under
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Carl is correct that the circuit court did not make an
explicit finding that he threatened to do serious harm or that his threat put people in
reasonable fear of violent behavior.6 However, the court clearly found Officer
Landrum’s testimony to be credible. See Jacobson v. American Tool Cos., Inc.,
222 Wis. 2d 384, 390, 588 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1998) (“If a circuit court does not
expressly make a finding about the credibility of a witness, we assume it made
implicit findings on a witness’[s] credibility when analyzing the evidence.”). Carl
ignores Landrum’s testimony stating that the entire reason she began to interact with
Carl was due to the report that Carl made a threat to residents in his apartment
complex that he was “going to kill somebody.” A threat to “kill somebody” satisfies
the requirement of a threat to do “serious physical harm” under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
See generally R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 431 N.W.2d 708
(Ct. App 1988). In this case, the fact that a threat of this nature was reported to law
enforcement is a proper consideration in evaluating Carl’s overall dangerousness.
The people who heard this threat clearly feared the threat enough for one of them to
call the police, and the police determined that the threat was credible enough to

6
Carl does not argue that the circuit court failed to make sufficient factual findings to
satisfy our supreme court’s requirements in Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d
231, 942 N.W.2d 277.

8
No. 2024AP1520-FT

respond to the call. Thus, the record permits an inference that the caller was put
into fear of violent behavior from Carl.

¶16 Regardless, Carl’s actions during the “police incident” independently
satisfy WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.’s dangerousness requirement. Carl contends
that the police “overreact[ed]” to his fleeing from them, that he did not create this
conflict, and that we can only “speculate” as to whether Carl was going to harm the
police officers when he turned on his vehicle while the officers were touching it.7
In so arguing, Carl ignores and dismisses much of the evidence establishing his
dangerousness.

¶17 Doctor Marcus testified that Carl lacks insight into the existence and
severity of his condition. Marcus also stated that Carl is not competent to refuse
medication and that, without medication, his psychosis will worsen and his behavior

7
The County argues that Carl raises, for the first time on appeal, an argument that the
police “overreact[ed]” to the situation and created conflict via a “high degree of force,” and that
Carl therefore “waived” this argument by not raising it in the circuit court. See Tatera v. FMC
Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810 (“Arguments raised for the first
time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited.”).

First, we note that the County uses the incorrect term when it argues that Carl “waived” his
argument by not raising it in the circuit court. Our supreme court clarified in State v. Ndina, 2009
WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, that although Wisconsin courts previously used the
terms “forfeiture” and “waiver” interchangeably, those terms “embody very different legal
concepts. ‘Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Id., ¶29 (citation omitted). Given
that the County argues that Carl failed to timely raise an argument, the proper concept here is
forfeiture.

That matter aside, the County is perhaps correct that Carl failed to raise this argument
before the circuit court and that this court could conclude that Carl forfeited the argument.
However, Carl raises a fair point that the argument is simply part and parcel of his overall
sufficiency of the evidence argument. In any event, forfeiture is a rule of administration, and it
does not affect our power to address issues. Dalka v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 WI App
90, ¶6, 334 Wis. 2d 686, 799 N.W.2d 923. We choose to address Carl’s argument on its merits.

9
No. 2024AP1520-FT

will become more threatening and erratic. In support of this opinion, Marcus gave
the example of Carl’s “risky behavior” when he fled from the police. Likewise,
Dr. Black attributed Carl’s behavior—specifically, his behavior during his threat
made at the apartment complex and the subsequent flight from the police—to Carl’s
mental illness.

¶18 Moreover, the conflict at issue was created by Carl, insofar as his
threat to kill his neighbors precipitated the call to police. Carl ignored a deputy’s
attempts to peacefully talk to him, he reversed his vehicle when Officer Landrum
stopped in front of him (driving around the spike strips that were placed to stop him
in the process), he fled to another city,8 he refused to get out of his vehicle when
instructed to do so, and he started his vehicle again while surrounded by officers.

¶19 Further, Officer Landrum testified that five police officers were
touching Carl’s vehicle and could have been injured when Carl started his vehicle.
The circuit court also found that Carl starting his vehicle placed the officers in a
“very dangerous position.” Carl does not directly contend that this factual finding
is clearly erroneous; he simply notes that there was no evidence that he tried to, or
did, actually move the vehicle after he started it. While no officers were hurt, Carl’s
act of starting his vehicle, in this context, constituted violent behavior that evidenced
a substantial probability of physical harm to others. At the very least, Carl’s act
constituted a threat of violent behavior that placed the officers in reasonable fear of
serious physical harm. See generally Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2014 WI

8
At the final hearing, Dr. Black characterized Carl’s flight from the police as a “low-speed
car chase.” We pause to note that, regardless of the speed at which he drove, the incident took
place on a Saturday afternoon, and, in the process of fleeing, Carl drove through residential and
business areas.

10
No. 2024AP1520-FT

127, ¶¶4, 34-37, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603 (explaining the meaning of
“threat” in the context of WIS. STAT. ch. 51).

¶20 Because we conclude that the County provided sufficient evidence to
prove that Carl is dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and Carl does not
contest the other elements of his commitment, we affirm the circuit court’s order for
Carl’s involuntary commitment.9 Given that Carl does not raise any independent
arguments regarding the order for his involuntary medication and treatment, we
affirm that order as well.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

9
Carl additionally argues that he is not dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.
Because we conclude that the County sufficiently proved that Carl is dangerous under
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b., we need not address the issue of whether Carl is dangerous under
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d
716 (stating that we need not address all issues raised by the parties if the resolution of one of the
issues is dispositive).

11