Trempealeau County v. R. B.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 4, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1052-FT Cir. Ct. No. 2023ME26

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONDITION OF R.B.:

TREMPEALEAU COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

R. B.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Trempealeau County:
THOMAS W. CLARK, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 GILL, J.1 Rachel2 appeals an order extending her involuntary
commitment pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20. Rachel argues that Trempealeau

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2021-22).
This is an expedited appeal under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.17 (2021-22). All references to the
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2024AP1052-FT

County presented insufficient evidence of her dangerousness, an essential element
for the extension of a commitment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In July 2023, Rachel was emergently detained and subsequently
involuntarily committed pursuant to WIS. STAT. ch. 51. Prior to her emergency
detention, the County was notified that Rachel had been hearing voices telling her
to kill herself and that she had been injuring herself by hitting her arms on walls
and doors. In December 2023, the County petitioned to have Rachel’s involuntary
commitment extended. Rachel was examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Jeffrey
Marcus. Shortly thereafter, the circuit court held a final hearing to determine
whether to extend Rachel’s commitment.

¶3 At the hearing, Dr. Marcus testified that he diagnosed Rachel as
having a psychotic disorder.3 He opined that Rachel would decompensate and
present a danger to herself if treatment were withdrawn. Marcus additionally
testified that Rachel’s mental illness was treatable, that she had improved
substantially while on her medication, and that she had been amenable to
treatment.4 However, Marcus then explained that Rachel had recently been

2
For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant in this confidential matter using a
pseudonym, rather than her initials.
3
At the hearing, Dr. Marcus testified that Rachel’s psychotic disorder is either a bipolar
disorder or a primary psychotic disorder, but he explained that he was unable to narrow down the
diagnosis further. Marcus then opined that either diagnosis meets the definition of mental illness
as defined in WIS. STAT. ch. 51.
4
Doctor Marcus also opined that Rachel was competent to decide whether to accept
medication. The circuit court did not enter an order for Rachel’s involuntary medication or
treatment.

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No. 2024AP1052-FT

hospitalized twice5 and that her condition could “deteriorate rapidly” “if there is
not follow-through.”

¶4 Jamie Kurth, a social worker for Trempeauleau County’s
Department of Human Services, also testified at the hearing. Kurth stated that she
was Rachel’s case manager, that Rachel had been doing well while committed, but
that Rachel had been subject to “a lot of stressors lately.” According to Kurth, one
week prior to the final hearing, Rachel had been stressed and had been having
some suicidal ideations. Kurth also expressed concern about Rachel’s ability to
get transportation to her treatment appointments, as she does not have a driver’s
license.

¶5 The circuit court found that Rachel would present a substantial
probability of physical harm to herself if treatment were withdrawn under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. and § 51.20(1)(am). The court then ordered that Rachel’s
commitment be extended for one year.6 Rachel now appeals.

5
Dr. Marcus did not explain why Rachel had been hospitalized twice.
6
In the event that the circuit court extended her commitment, Rachel asked the court to
order only a six-month extension, as opposed to twelve months. In response, the County
requested that Rachel’s commitment be extended by twelve months. The court extended Rachel’s
commitment by twelve months.

Rachel included a footnote in her appellate brief stating: “The circuit court entered a
twelve-month order based on the fact that Dr. Marcus did not testify to a ‘time limit,’ but this fact
actually weighs against the court’s order. … The County has the burden to prove the necessity of
a commitment.” However, Rachel does not develop any arguments or reference any legal
authority related to the duration of the extension of her commitment. We need not address
undeveloped arguments. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App.
1992). In addition, we deem any argument regarding the duration of the extension abandoned,
based on Rachel’s failure to raise it with sufficient prominence in her appellate briefs. See A.O.
Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins., Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n
issue raised in the [circuit] court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned.”).

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No. 2024AP1052-FT

DISCUSSION

¶6 The sole issue on appeal is whether the County provided sufficient
evidence to prove that Rachel is dangerous under WIS. STAT. § 51.20. Whether
there was sufficient evidence of Rachel’s dangerousness presents a mixed standard
of review. See Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶38-39, 349
Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607. We will not disturb a circuit court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id., ¶38. Whether those facts satisfy
the statutory standard, however, is a question of law that we review de novo.
Id., ¶39.

¶7 In order to extend a subject’s involuntary commitment, the petitioner
must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that three elements are
met: “the subject must be (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for treatment; and
(3) dangerous to themselves or others.”7 Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI
40, ¶¶17-18, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733; Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020
WI App 46, ¶8, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761. Dangerousness can be proven
through any one of the five standards set forth in WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.
M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶17-18. Rachel was found dangerous under
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a., which requires showing that a person “[e]vidences a substantial
probability of physical harm to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of
recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.”

¶8 Further, on extension of a commitment, dangerousness may be
established through WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) in conjunction with one of the five

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Rachel does not dispute that she is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment.

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No. 2024AP1052-FT

standards in § 51.20(1)(a)2. See M.W., 402 Wis. 2d 1, ¶19. Section 51.20(1)(am)
states that the requirement of a “recent overt act, attempt, or threat … may be
satisfied by showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject
individual’s treatment record, that the individual would be a proper subject for
commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” The goal of § 51.20(1)(am) is

to avoid the “revolving door” phenomena whereby there
must be proof of a recent overt act to extend the
commitment but because the patient was still under
treatment, no overt acts occurred and the patient was
released from treatment only to commit a dangerous act
and be recommitted … [in] a vicious circle of treatment,
release, overt act, recommitment.

S.H., 393 Wis. 2d 511, ¶9 (alteration in original; citation omitted). However,
“[e]ach extension hearing requires proof of current dangerousness. It is not
enough that the individual was at one point a proper subject for commitment.”
Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶24, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.

¶9 Rachel argues that the County failed to present any evidence of her
current dangerousness under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. In doing so, Rachel
ignores the evidence presented regarding her dangerousness at the extension
hearing.

¶10 Doctor Marcus stated that Rachel had been “hospitalized twice this
year,” and that she would “deteriorate rapidly” and become a danger to herself if
treatment were withdrawn. Specifically, Marcus opined that, based on Rachel’s
medical history, there was a “high likelihood” that if treatment were withdrawn,
Rachel would suffer from a lack of judgment that would result in self-harm, and/or
suicidal ideation.

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No. 2024AP1052-FT

¶11 Kurth testified that although Rachel had been generally doing well
throughout her commitment, she had been under “a lot of stressors” and the stress
had been causing Rachel to have some suicidal ideations shortly before the
extension hearing. Further, Kurth stated that if Rachel’s commitment were not
extended, she would not be able to arrange her own transportation to her treatment
appointments.

¶12 Based upon the above testimony, we conclude that the County
proved that Rachel presents a danger to herself under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.,
through the framework of § 51.20(1)(am). Rachel attempts to discount the
foregoing by emphasizing evidence showing that she has been cooperative with
treatment during her commitment and her mental health has been improving.
However, her circumstance is exactly the type that is envisioned by WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(am). And, despite the fact that Rachel has been doing well with her
treatment plan, she has nevertheless recently experienced suicidal ideations.
Therefore, the clear and convincing evidence shows it is likely that if Rachel’s
commitment were not extended, she would quickly decompensate, become a
danger to herself, and subsequently be subject to another commitment. See S.H.,
393 Wis. 2d 511, ¶9.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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