State v. Jasen Randhawa

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 5, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1818-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF4787

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JASEN RANDHAWA,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: MARK A. SANDERS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and White, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2021AP1818-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jasen Randhawa appeals the judgment, entered on
his guilty pleas, convicting him of three counts of second-degree reckless
homicide and one count of second-degree reckless injury. He also appeals the
order denying his postconviction motion for resentencing. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 According to the criminal complaint, at approximately 2:34 a.m. on
October 23, 2016, Randhawa’s vehicle ran a red light and crashed into the driver’s
side of an Uber vehicle. Randhawa’s vehicle crash data recorder indicated he was
traveling 63 mph just prior to impact, which was more than twice the posted speed
limit. Three women who were passengers in the back seat of the Uber vehicle
were killed, and the driver was seriously injured. Witnesses told police that
Randhawa and his passenger fled the scene on foot.

¶3 The complaint relayed the contents of two different videos, taken
during cab rides in the hours after the accident, during which Randhawa discussed
making a false allegation that his car had been stolen in order to avoid
responsibility for the crash. The complaint additionally alleged that Randhawa’s
license was revoked at the time of the crash as a result of a 2015 conviction for
operating while intoxicated. According to the complaint, Randhawa had one prior
conviction for operating after revocation.

¶4 The State charged Randhawa with twelve offenses: three counts of
second-degree reckless homicide; one count of second-degree reckless injury;
three counts of hit and run involving death; one count of hit and run involving
great bodily harm; three counts of operating a motor vehicle while revoked
causing death; and one count of operating a motor vehicle while revoked causing
great bodily harm.

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¶5 Randhawa ultimately pled guilty to three counts of second-degree
reckless homicide and one count of second-degree reckless injury causing great
bodily harm. The other charges were dismissed and read in at sentencing. The
circuit court imposed consecutive fifteen-year prison terms with initial periods of
confinement of eleven years on the second-degree reckless homicide charges and a
consecutive ten-year prison term with six years of initial confinement on the
charge of second-degree reckless injury. The total sentence of fifty-five years
requires Randhawa to serve thirty-nine years of initial confinement followed by
sixteen years of extended supervision.

¶6 Postconviction, Randhawa sought resentencing. He argued that his
sentences were based on inaccurate information and improper factors.
Additionally, Randhawa claimed that the circuit court erred when it imposed
consecutive sentences without explaining its reasons for doing so. The circuit
court denied the motion without a hearing.

II. DISCUSSION

¶7 On appeal, Randhawa continues to challenge his sentences.
Sentencing is left to the broad discretion of the circuit court, subject to review only
for an erroneous exercise of that discretion. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42,
¶¶17, 39, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. A court properly exercises its
sentencing discretion when it relies on a “process of reasoning ... reasonably
derived by inference from the record” and reaches conclusions “founded upon
proper legal standards.” Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457
(1975). Because circuit courts are presumed to have acted reasonably, as there is a
strong policy against interference with the court’s discretion, the complainant must
show by clear and convincing evidence some unreasonable or unjustifiable basis

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on the record to demonstrate an erroneous exercise of discretion. See id. at 183-
84; see also State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶34, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409;
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶18.

¶8 Randhawa frames portions of his argument as implicating his due
process right to be sentenced upon accurate information. This court independently
reviews the constitutional issue of whether a defendant has been denied his due
process right to be sentenced upon accurate information. State v. Tiepelman,
2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1.

¶9 “A defendant who requests resentencing due to the circuit court’s
use of inaccurate information at the sentencing hearing must show both that the
information was inaccurate and that the court actually relied on the inaccurate
information in the sentencing.” Id., ¶26 (citation and one set of quotation marks
omitted). Actual reliance generally requires that the sentencing court gave
“explicit attention” or “specific consideration” to the inaccurate information and
that the inaccurate information “formed part of the basis for the sentence.” State
v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶28, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 N.W.2d 491 (citation omitted).
Here again, the defendant must establish this reliance “by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id., ¶22. If the defendant shows that the court actually relied upon
inaccurate information at sentencing, the burden shifts to the State to prove that
the error was harmless. Id., ¶23.

¶10 With these standards in mind, we will analyze Randhawa’s claims as
to how the circuit court erred at sentencing.

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A. The circuit court properly considered information provided by private
counsel retained by the family of one of the victims.

¶11 Randhawa argues that the circuit court considered misleading and
prejudicial information provided by a private attorney for one of the victims who,
according to Randhawa, improperly inserted himself into the role of prosecutor.
He claims that the circuit court’s consideration—over Randhawa’s objection—of
the materials and information provided by private counsel violated long-standing
public policy and statutes precluding private prosecution.

¶12 The State does not challenge the core proposition that private
counsel may not prosecute a case. See generally State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351,
355-56, 218 N.W. 367 (1928) (“In the prosecution of criminal actions, the district
attorney prosecutes for public wrongs, not for private wrongs, and such
prosecution should be by a public officer, and not a private party. This court …
has declared it to be the public policy of the state.”). Instead, the State’s position
is that that is not what happened here. The State contends that private counsel
merely advised the circuit court of the position of one of the victim’s families as to
sentencing.

¶13 The parties agree that crime victims in Wisconsin have the right to
“have the court provided with information pertaining to the economic, physical
and psychological effect of the crime upon the victim and have the information
considered by the court.” WIS. STAT. § 950.04(pm) (2021-22)1; see also WIS.
CONST. art. I § 9m(2)(j); Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶65. The parents of a

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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deceased person are “victims” within the meaning of Wisconsin’s Constitution.
See WIS. CONST. art. I § 9m(1)(a)2.

¶14 Randhawa claims that private counsel’s submission went far beyond
simply advising the court of the victim’s family’s position on sentencing. He
contends that the submission included misleading information about both the
police investigation into the crash and Randhawa’s history. Randhawa challenges
private counsel’s assessment of Randhawa’s “braggadocio” in a Facebook post, as
well as the allegation that Randhawa was street racing at the time of the crash and
that Randhawa declined to answer questions from police about it.

¶15 Private counsel’s submission to the court, which was offered after
Randhawa pled guilty and after his sentencing exposure was set, made clear that
he was expressing the position of the victim’s family. We agree with the State that
an attorney providing that information to a circuit court no more prosecutes a case
than does a crime victim delivering a statement at a sentencing hearing. Such
involvement does not amount to a violation of the public policy against private
party involvement in a criminal prosecution.

¶16 While Randhawa may have disagreed with the descriptions used by
private counsel, they amounted to subjective value judgments and assessments of
the circumstances surrounding the accident offered to support the sentencing
request by the victim’s family—value judgments and assessments the circuit court
was free to reject. Randhawa was not entitled to resentencing on this basis.

B. The circuit court properly considered general deterrence as a
significant factor in calculating Randhawa’s sentence.

¶17 Randhawa additionally claims that the circuit court relied on
inaccurate information at sentencing. Specifically, Randhawa contends that the

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circuit court relied on general deterrence as a primary reason for imposing the
fifty-five-year sentence and wrongly assumed that others would be deterred by the
extreme sentence. He argues that it is widely accepted in social science that
general deterrence is not accomplished by long sentences and that long sentences
do not make for fewer crime victims by deterring others from committing crimes.

¶18 Randhawa is not arguing that general deterrence is an improper
factor for a circuit court to consider in sentencing a defendant. Indeed, far from
being improper, the law is settled that “deterrence to others” is a proper sentencing
objective. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶40. Although “general deterrence”
should not be the “sole aim in imposing sentence,” United States v. Barker, 771
F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985), what weight to give it among relevant sentencing
factors in a particular case is left to the sentencing court’s “wide discretion.” State
v. Leighton, 2000 WI App 156, ¶52, 237 Wis. 2d 709, 616 N.W.2d 126. A court
errs in this endeavor only if it “gives too much weight to one factor in the face of
other contravening factors.” State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 160, ¶10, 246 Wis. 2d
744, 632 N.W.2d 112.

¶19 Randhawa contends that the circuit court’s belief that a lengthy
sentence might deter others who would drive drunk involved reliance on
inaccurate information about the deterrent effect of sentences on other would-be
drunk drivers. He argues that the circuit court relied on inaccurate information
because his lengthy sentence is “certain to be completely ineffective for its stated
purpose” as “individual severe sentences, especially in non-intentional crimes
involving impairment or recklessness, cannot be expected to deter others.”

¶20 The sources Randhawa relies on, which include an expert’s opinion
and citations to journal articles, cannot define the bounds of a constitutionally

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appropriate sentence. See generally State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶¶37-38,
389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (holding that “social science research cannot be
used to define the meaning of a constitutional provision” and adding that “[i]t is
the legislature that is structured to assess the merits of competing policies and
ever-changing social science assertions”). In its decision resolving Randhawa’s
postconviction motion, the circuit court noted: “The differing view of an expert
does not render the court’s determination inaccurate.” We agree. Differing
opinions about the circuit court’s sentencing objective of general deterrence does
not constitute inaccurate information so as to allow for resentencing under
Tiepelman.

¶21 Moreover, established precedent accepts general deterrence as a
valid sentencing objective for cases involving defendants who commit drunk
driving offenses. See, e.g., Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶61 (explaining that part of
the circuit court’s reasoning behind the defendant’s sentence was society’s
“interest in punishing [the defendant] so that his sentence might serve as a general
deterrence against drunk driving”); see also State v. Whitaker, 2021 WI App 17,
¶33, 396 Wis. 2d 557, 957 N.W.2d 561 (citing Gallion for the aforementioned
proposition). Randhawa’s claim that the circuit court violated his due process
rights by relying on inaccurate information in this regard fails.

C. The circuit court did not give undue weight to improper factors by
imposing a sentence at odds with Randhawa’s evidence showing
sentences imposed in other vehicular homicide cases.

¶22 Next, Randhawa argues that the circuit court gave undue weight to
improper factors when it sentenced him. He claims the circuit court refused to
consider his evidence of sentences in comparable cases and asserts that “[n]o
sentence in the 30 cases documented came close to the 39 years of initial

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confinement ordered here.” According to Randhawa, the “virtual life sentence” he
received “was both unusual and extremely harsh.” He asserts that the circuit court
improperly relied on the “charged emotional environment of the sentencing
hearing.”

¶23 We begin by noting that individualized sentencing has been a
cornerstone of Wisconsin’s criminal justice jurisprudence because no two
convicted felons stand before the sentencing court on identical footing and no two
cases will present identical factors. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶48. Insofar as
Randhawa relies on State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938
N.W.2d 530, for the proposition that a court “may … consider information about
the distribution of sentences in cases similar to the case before it,” the decision
does not suggest that a sentencing court erroneously exercises its discretion by
electing not to consider sentences in other cases. Id. ¶43 (citation omitted).

¶24 Randhawa’s reliance on In re Judicial Admin. Felony Sentencing
Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984) (per curiam), is similarly
misplaced. In that case our supreme court declined the legislature’s request to
promulgate felony sentencing guidelines and stated that it would not interfere with
circuit courts’ sentencing discretion “by requiring judges to consider how
convicted felons have been treated in other Wisconsin courts[.]” Id. at 202-03.

¶25 Randhawa has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
circuit court relied on an improper factor—i.e., the charged emotional
environment—when it sentenced him. Rather, the record reflects that the circuit
court exercised its discretion not to consider the other cases that Randhawa
contended were comparable. Randhawa engaged in reckless behavior that he
knew was illegal, which resulted in the deaths of three innocent people and serious

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No. 2021AP1818-CR

injuries to a fourth. He then fled from the scene and initially sought to cover up
the crimes. Randhawa agreed to a plea deal that included a recommendation for a
thirty-five to forty-year period of initial confinement by the State and ultimately
received a sentence of initial confinement time within that range. We are not
convinced that this was unduly harsh. See State v. Davis, 2005 WI App 98, ¶15,
281 Wis. 2d 118, 698 N.W.2d 823 (holding that a sentence is unduly harsh only if
the length of the sentence imposed by a trial court is “so excessive and unusual
and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and
violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper
under the circumstances” (citation omitted)).

¶26 Randhawa has not satisfied his burden of showing that the circuit
court relied on an improper factor when it sentenced him. Like the ones before it,
this claim fails.

D. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by
imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment.

¶27 Lastly, Randhawa argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised
its discretion when it did not explain why it imposed consecutive rather than
concurrent sentences. Given that all of the charges related to one reckless act by
the defendant, Randhawa claims the rationale for concurrent sentences is strong.

¶28 In sentencing Randhawa, the circuit court discussed the “ripples” of
effect that Randhawa’s actions had. The circuit court specifically mentioned the
separate and distinct effects that Randhawa had on each of the four victims and
their families. The circuit court also noted in its order denying Randhawa’s
postconviction motion, its decision to sentence Randhawa to consecutive terms
was based on the same factors warranting the overall length of the sentence. The

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circuit court explained that it had structured the sentence to “account for the
separate harms to each of the separate victims.” See State v. Stenzel, 2004 WI
App 181, ¶22, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20 (affirming a sentencing involving
consecutive terms in an OWI homicide case with multiple victims). “To impose
anything less than consecutive sentences in this case,” the court continued, “would
unduly depreciate the profound, life-long and life-ending impact the defendant’s
conduct had on the four separate victims and their families.” These remarks
provide a “rational and explainable basis” for the sentences imposed. See Gallion,
270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶39 (citation omitted); see also State v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903,
915, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that a postconviction motion
challenging a sentence affords the circuit court an opportunity to further explain
the sentencing rationale).

¶29 We conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion when it
imposed consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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