Kenosha County v. L.A.T.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 11, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP603 Cir. Ct. No. 2021ME171

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF L.A.T.:

KENOSHA COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

L.A.T.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Kenosha County:
JODI L. MEIER, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2022AP603

¶1 LAZAR, J.1 L.A.T.2 appeals from orders of the trial court, entered
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20, for her civil commitment and for involuntary
medication and treatment. L.A.T. asserts that the trial court failed to conduct an
adequate colloquy before accepting her stipulation to the commitment and
involuntary medication orders, that such a colloquy should be mandatory in all
civil commitment cases, and that her stipulation was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. She further asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
to prove that she was dangerous and that the trial court’s findings were insufficient
to establish the specific dangerousness she asserts is required by Langlade County
v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.

¶2 This court concludes that colloquies between the trial court and
those individuals who stipulate to civil commitment and/or involuntary medication
orders are not mandatory in every case, that there was an adequate colloquy with
L.A.T., and that L.A.T.’s stipulation was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This
court further concludes that, due to the stipulation, sufficient evidence was
presented to establish L.A.T.’s dangerousness. Finally, this court concludes that,
while the requirement for specificity with respect to dangerousness pronounced in
D.J.W. is applicable to initial commitments and not just to recommitments, there
is no merit to L.A.T.’s final argument because L.A.T. knowingly entered into a

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2019-20).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
L.A.T. filed a motion for a three-judge panel on April 13, 2022, asserting that the question of
protocol for stipulations in commitment cases warranted a published decision. This court
disagrees. Accordingly, the motion is hereby denied.
2
This court refers to Appellant by her initials to protect her confidentiality. Despite
filing a motion for a three-judge panel, L.A.T. did not file a reply brief in this appeal, leaving this
court without the benefit of additional argument.

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stipulation as to all three elements (including dangerousness) required for
commitment.

¶3 On October 10, 2021, L.A.T.—then in her early fifties—moved back
to her parents’ residence in Wisconsin from Colorado, where she had been living
since early 2020. Her return was a surprise to her parents. They had financially
supported L.A.T. while she was in Colorado, and they knew that the lease for the
apartment she had been living in (cosigned by her father) had expired, but L.A.T.
had exhibited “[e]xtreme anger” with her father in phone calls from Colorado.
This anger had escalated to “harassment second to none,” and L.A.T.’s parents had
not had recent contact with her. L.A.T. was calm her first day home, but by the
second day she appeared stressed, so her parents began locking their bedroom
door on the third day. Her parents called crisis intervention because they felt
L.A.T. was stressed, angry, and disorganized in her thoughts and speech.

¶4 Three days after her return, on October 13, L.A.T. had an argument
with her parents and began following her father around the home as she tore up the
crisis intervention paperwork. L.A.T. threw a roll of tape at her father, and when
her parents fled the house, L.A.T. locked them out. L.A.T.’s parents again called a
crisis intervention worker who then called the police. L.A.T. was agitated and
uncooperative; ultimately, the police handcuffed her and brought her to an
emergency room for medical evaluation and emergency involuntary civil
commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.15.

¶5 After probable cause to continue the case was found, L.A.T.
requested a jury trial on her commitment, which took place on November 3, 2021.
L.A.T.’s father testified regarding the October 13 incident, explaining that
although L.A.T. had had issues with mental health in the past, he had never seen

3
No. 2022AP603

her so angry or violent before. He feared for his safety due to L.A.T.’s
unpredictability, so he decided to quickly leave the house when L.A.T. started to
walk to where he stood after she had thrown the tape at him. He further testified
that L.A.T. pushed her mother (his wife) out of the house and pushed on the door
when her mother’s foot got caught in the doors.

¶6 Next, the state-appointed psychiatrist who had evaluated L.A.T.,
Dr. Sangita Patel, testified that L.A.T. suffered from mental illness (either bipolar
disorder or schizophrenia); that she believed L.A.T. was treatable, based in part on
the fact that L.A.T. had responded well to treatment in the past; and that L.A.T.
“pose[d] a substantial risk of harm towards other people.” Patel based these
opinions upon L.A.T.’s aggression toward the community, the hospital nurse, and
the staff at the psychiatric facility in which she had been placed for the several
weeks since she was committed. Finally (outside the presence of the jury3), the
psychiatrist gave her opinion that psychotropic medications would have a
therapeutic value for L.A.T. Patel’s “Report of Examination,” previously filed on
October 22, 2021, was admitted as an exhibit in the trial.

¶7 After a lunch break in the trial, counsel for the County and for
L.A.T. informed the trial court that L.A.T. was willing to stipulate to the
commitment and involuntary medication orders. The trial court asked L.A.T.
whether she heard what her attorney said, and she answered that she did. L.A.T.
then said that she would like to see the stipulation “on paper,” specifically what
“[t]he medication is.” The court explained that the “stipulation is agreeing to the

3
The issue of involuntary medication is not within the jury’s province, but rather is
determined by the trial court alone. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(7)(d).

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No. 2022AP603

… request” which was “the six-month commitment and … the medication order.”
The court further stated that it could not determine “what medication” because that
is a question for the medical doctors, and that the involuntary medication order
would provide that L.A.T. “could be administered medication without [her]
consent.”

¶8 At this point, L.A.T. conferred with her counsel off the record. She
then confirmed to the trial court that she had sufficient time to consult with her
attorney and that she had had her questions answered. L.A.T. replied, “I think.
Yes.” to the court’s question of whether she was agreeing to the six-month
commitment with the involuntary medication order “that could be used if needed.”
Her attorney confirmed that answer.

¶9 The trial court stated, on the record, that it found the grounds for
commitment had been established as follows:

I did hear testimony from Dr. Patel and we all did this
morning and based on her testimony I do find that grounds
for the commitment have been established. Dr. Patel
testified that [L.A.T.] does have a mental illness and that
her behavior does meet one or more of the standards ... of
the statutes.

Dr. Patel further testified that [L.A.T.] is a proper
subject for treatment and that her condition is likely to be
controlled with appropriate medication. That evidence
presented by Dr. Patel who is qualified to make those
determinations.

I do find first of all Dr. Patel to be credible in her
testimony and I find the evidence to be clear and
convincing of that and the parties are stipulating so I will
order that [L.A.T.] be committed for six months from
today’s date ….

The maximum level of treatment shall be a locked
inpatient facility of such as Winnebago or like facility until
she’s discharged by the doctors.

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No. 2022AP603

¶10 The trial court also found, based upon Patel’s testimony at trial and
the stipulation by the parties, that medication and treatment would have
therapeutic value. The court further found that Patel explained the advantages,
disadvantages, and alternatives to medication to L.A.T., but due to L.A.T.’s
mental illness, there is a “lack of competency to refuse psychotropic medication or
treatment because of the substantial incapability of applying an understanding of
the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to her condition in order to make an
informed choice whether to accept or refuse psychotropic medication.” Based
upon that, the court ordered medication and treatment to be administered to L.A.T.
regardless of her consent.

¶11 The trial court signed an order for involuntary medication and
treatment on the day of the trial (November 3, 2021) and an order of commitment4
the next day. L.A.T. appeals both orders.

DISCUSSION

¶12 To issue a civil commitment order, a trial court must find that a
petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that the subject individual
is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous to him/herself or
others under at least one of the five statutory standards. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231,
¶29; WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)1.-2., (13)(e). This is especially critical because “[i]t
may be true that an erroneous commitment is sometimes as undesirable as an

4
The trial court utilized order form “ME-911, 03/20 Order of Commitment/Extension of
Commitment/Dismissal” that does not specify the statutory paragraph under which the court finds
dangerousness or how that dangerousness has manifested in the subject individual. That form has
since been revised (as of March, 2022) to specify statutory dangerousness by paragraph. All trial
courts should now use the new form.

6
No. 2022AP603

erroneous conviction.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979). So, courts
are to take special care in this area of law.

¶13 The review of a civil commitment order—determining whether the
petitioner has met the burden of proof—presents a mixed question of law and fact.
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783.
A trial court’s findings of fact are upheld unless they are clearly erroneous, id.,
and an appellate court will “accept reasonable inferences from the facts.”
Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878
N.W.2d 109 (citation omitted). Whether those facts satisfy the statutory standards,
however, is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Marathon County v.
D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶18, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901.

I. Colloquies with the court are not required for every stipulation.

¶14 Both parties agree that there is an unpublished5 appellate decision
directly on point, holding that trial courts are not required to conduct colloquies
with people subject to WIS. STAT. ch. 51 proceedings to establish that they are
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily accepting a stipulation to the extension of
an involuntary civil commitment. See Dane County v. N.W., No. 2019AP48,
unpublished slip op. (WI App Aug. 29, 2019), review denied (WI Dec. 10, 2019)
(No. 2019AP48). The court in N.W. held that the statutorily mandated colloquies
in criminal pleas and proceedings for termination of parental rights cases are not
required in Chapter 51 cases. Id., ¶8.

5
Unpublished authored cases may not be cited for precedential value but may be cited
for persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(a), (b).

7
No. 2022AP603

¶15 L.A.T. argues against that decision, implicitly seeking its reversal at
some point even though our supreme court denied a petition for review in N.W.
L.A.T. also asserts that the statutory presumption articulated in WIS. STAT.
§ 51.59(1), that subject individuals are not to be deemed incompetent to manage
their affairs solely due to a civil commitment, has been or should always be
rebutted in cases like hers. Both of these arguments are without merit.

¶16 In a case involving waiver of the right to counsel—which can be
analogized to waiver of trial and acceptance of a civil commitment stipulation—
our supreme court discussed the requisite competence to make such a choice,
noting that “[t]here undoubtedly is a logical tension between a finding of
competence to make that decision and the ultimate finding of the very proceeding
in which the defendant goes it alone when the final decision of the jury is mental
illness.” S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 333, 469 N.W.2d 836
(1991). But that court aptly relied upon the clear statutory presumption under
WIS. STAT. § 51.19(1). S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 334; see also Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1101 n.33 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974) (“The presumption in a civil commitment proceeding must be that the
individual is indeed competent.”).

¶17 Not only is the lack of a mandatory colloquy in WIS. STAT. ch. 51
cases supported by case law, but it is also supported by practice and reality. Many
persons in need speak with their counsel before a recommitment (or even initial
commitment) and waive their rights to contest the petition, waive their right to
appear in person (or by zoom or telephone), and stipulate to the entry of both
orders for commitment/recommitment and for involuntary medication. That
information is relayed to the trial court by letter and then affirmed on the record by
counsel. This is done for many reasons, not the least of which is that some

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No. 2022AP603

individuals find appearances in court to be traumatic or too stressful or they agree
that the supervision of the county and the administration of medications has been
helpful in allowing them to remain in the community, a group home, or even
inpatient placement.

¶18 That being the case, it would be harmful to these individuals to
require them to appear in court to undergo a colloquy before the trial court could
accept their stipulation. This bolsters a conclusion that there should not be a
bright-line mandatory colloquy rule in civil commitments. Moreover, when the
individual is present in court and the trial court has the ability to conduct such a
colloquy, some flexibility has to be permitted. People subject to civil commitment
proceedings run the gamut from being able to verbally express themselves clearly
to having disabilities that impair their speech; but they may still be able to express
their choices. In addition, there may often be nervousness and possible agitation
that could lead to the “logical tension” discussed in S.Y. S.Y., 162 Wis. 2d at 333.
Even so, that presumption of competence exists, and there is no basis in law or in
practice to require colloquies in all civil commitment cases. Since there was a
colloquy with L.A.T., it can be reviewed by this court.

II. The colloquy with L.A.T. was sufficient.

¶19 L.A.T.’s counsel asserts that the transcripts show she was confused
about the stipulation and could not have knowingly and intelligently entered that
agreement. First, L.A.T. complains that the trial court was a bit flippant and
engaged in inappropriate joking banter. It is true that there was some casual
byplay, but it was not excessive, and it showed that the trial court was treating

9
No. 2022AP603

L.A.T. with the same kind and friendly demeanor6 it showed in its interactions
with the jurors. More important, there was a lengthy colloquy with L.A.T., to wit:

[County’s Attorney]: It’s my understanding over the lunch
hour that [L.A.T.] may be willing to stipulate to the
commitment and medication order.

....

[L.A.T.’s Attorney]: That is my understanding at this
moment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: [L.A.T.], did you hear what your attorney
has stated?

[L.A.T.]: I did.

THE COURT: Is that the case?

[L.A.T.]: I would—yes, it is. I would like to see it on
paper what the stipulation is. The medication is.

¶20 It was at this point that L.A.T. and the trial court were talking a bit at
cross purposes. L.A.T. wanted to see the proposed orders (something that the trial
court could have done by printing out the form orders), and she wanted to know
which medication could/would be administered to her without her consent
(something the trial court would not have known). The proposed orders—in fact,
the signed orders—do not venture into the medical professionals’ domain and
mention any medication by name; the involuntary medication order just states that
medication and treatment, including psychotropic medications, “may be
administered to [L.A.T.], regardless of … her consent … during the period of
commitment, or until further order of the court.”

6
The trial court also expressed concern about whether L.A.T. had been given some of
the pizza and water brought for the jury.

10
No. 2022AP603

¶21 After the trial court explained that the choice of medication was up
to the treating doctors, L.A.T.’s counsel asked to speak with her off the record.
Following that discussion, the trial court continued its colloquy with L.A.T.:

THE COURT: Attorney Rolf, did you have an
opportunity—

[L.A.T.’s Attorney]: Yes.

THE COURT: —to have whatever discussion you wanted
with [L.A.T.]?

[L.A.T.’s Attorney]: I did, Your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: [L.A.T.], did you have enough time to get
whatever questions you had answered by Attorney Rolf?

[L.A.T.]: I did.

THE COURT: Okay. And based on that discussion what
is the position of [L.A.T.], Attorney Rolf? Or—or
[L.A.T.]? Are you agreeing to the six-month commitment
with the involuntary medication order if it’s need—if that
could be used if needed?

[L.A.T.]: I think. Yes.

[L.A.T.’s Attorney]: She says yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

¶22 Taken together, it is evident that the trial court conducted a thorough
and sufficient colloquy with L.A.T. about the stipulation. L.A.T. has failed to
rebut the statutory presumption that she was competent to consider the options
available to her, to review and analyze how the trial had gone that morning, and
whether she could stipulate to the two orders (for commitment and involuntary
administration of medication). It was her burden to overcome that presumption
because the County had established the basic facts. State v. Kummer, 100 Wis. 2d
220, 228, 301 N.W.2d 240 (1981) (“‘[E]xcept as otherwise provided by statute’ a
presumption is a procedural device which ‘imposes on the party relying on the

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No. 2022AP603

presumption the burden of proving the basic facts, but once the basic facts are
found to exist the presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable
than its existence.’” (quoting WIS. STAT. RULE 903.01 (1977))).

¶23 Accordingly, this court upholds the trial court’s determination that
the stipulation was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made by L.A.T.
Nevertheless, the remaining issues relating to the trial court’s dangerousness
finding must be addressed.

III. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding of
dangerousness.

¶24 By stipulation, L.A.T. conceded that there was sufficient evidence to
support a dangerousness finding. The analysis could end at that point. But even
disregarding L.A.T.’s valid stipulation, the County met its burden of proof on the
issue of dangerousness with testimony from Dr. Patel and L.A.T.’s father.

¶25 Patel testified at the jury trial and her examination report was
admitted into evidence. In her opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, L.A.T. was mentally ill and suffered from “[s]chizophrenia versus
bipolar affective disorder—manic and psychotic.” She further testified that this
mental illness “substantially impact[s] ... or [a]ffect[s] [L.A.T.]’s judgment,
behavior and capacity to recognize reality.” Patel further opined at trial that
“[L.A.T.]’s not able to separate her delusions from reality that are impairing her
judgment. Because of this paranoia she’s immensely angry at her parents ….”

¶26 When asked whether, in her professional opinion, Patel believed that
L.A.T. “pose[d] a substantial probability of serious physical harm to herself or
others at this point,” Patel responded that, “in [her] opinion, [L.A.T.] does pose a

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No. 2022AP603

substantial risk of harm towards other people.” When asked to elaborate, Patel
explained:

Based on behaviors across the board. At home. In the
community. In like in the emergency room she was
aggressive towards the nurse who was trying to do the
assessment on her. She was taken there for medical
clearance. The aggression she’s manifesting at Winnebago
Mental Health Institute. Again, that is clearly above the
underlying paranoia.

… So she has aggressed towards the staff on the unit.
She has thrown registry through the trap when she was put
in the seclusion through the trap door.

… She has been because of her behave—these
behaviors she has—she needed to be put in secured
quaran—a locked room for multiple times through her
hospital stay.

Such aggression when acted towards the elderly people
like with her parents that can—that—that can lead to—that
will have a potential consequence. Could even be life-
threatening consequence. There are elderly people, young
staff in the hospital can move away from the targeted
aggression, but elderly won’t be—won’t be able to do that
or protect themselves.

¶27 In Patel’s examination report, she opined that L.A.T. was dangerous
under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. (“[A] substantial probability of physical harm
to other individuals as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent
behavior, or by evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent
behavior and serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent overt act,
attempt or threat to do serious physical harm.”). That report provided additional
relevant information on dangerousness:

[L.A.T.]’s aggressive behaviors are a product of underlying
paranoia, lack of insight and inability to understand or
follow directions or trust people. She is particularly
paranoid about her parents and has displayed physical
aggression towards them. Her erratic thoughts inhibit her
ability to look at the situations in realistic fashion and

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No. 2022AP603

problem solve instead she has been lashing out in
aggressive fashion.

¶28 Patel wrote about how the initial stay with L.A.T.’s parents began
cordially, but that L.A.T.’s “behaviors apparently continued to escalate,” and her
parents reported being “fearful” of L.A.T., but couldn’t provide specific examples
until a few days later when they were locked out of their home:

[L.A.T.] apparently had become physically aggressive and
threw masking packing tape at her dad and had physically
pushed the mother. Elderly mother particularly was very
fearful of [L.A.T.] and was tearful at times when she was
talking to the crisis worker. Crisis worker further notes that
when she was trying to talk to [L.A.T.], she was becoming
aggressive and “approached the work[er] in a threatening
manner.” [L.A.T.] was then taken into custody by PPPD
Patty and Kelly for domestic violence and disorderly
conduct.

¶29 During the morning of her jury trial, L.A.T.’s father also testified as
to her conduct and his concerns over her aggressive behavior. Most telling was
his simple statement that he “saw a level of anger in [his] daughter that [he] had
never seen starting to develop” on her third day home. He was concerned things
were “not gonna go well.” On the day in question, L.A.T. began to taunt her
parents, and she “got extremely, extremely angry.” L.A.T.’s father said he had
“never seen her that angry and violent [his] whole life.” He refused to allow her to
drive his car out of fear she could harm herself or others on the road. After L.A.T.
threw the roll of tape at him, her father believed that she was extremely violent, he
was in fear for himself, and he didn’t know what L.A.T. was capable of doing to
him and his wife because she was so unpredictable. All he knew was that he and
his wife had to leave their home immediately. He saw his wife pushed out the
door by L.A.T. Even though they could have re-entered the home through a side
door, they remained in the garage to avoid any violence against them.

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No. 2022AP603

¶30 Finally, after hearing the testimony from the morning of her jury
trial, L.A.T. determined that she no longer wanted to contest the civil commitment
and medication orders and instead agreed to stipulate to both.

¶31 The trial court made no findings as to L.A.T.’s dangerousness with
respect to a particular statutory paragraph but did find that “grounds for the
commitment have been established.” Based upon the stipulation, it was not
necessary to elaborate. The court then stated that “Dr. Patel testified that [L.A.T.]
does have a mental illness and that her behavior does meet one or more of the
standards … of the statutes.” It appears that the court was referring to WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b., the provision dealing with harm to others. Patel did opine, in
her report of examination, that L.A.T. was dangerous under this statutory
provision. She also testified that she believed L.A.T.’s judgment was impaired,
providing a possible basis for a finding of dangerousness under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c.7

¶32 L.A.T. contends that her conduct did not rise to the level of
“dangerous” under any of the statutory provisions. She contends that her conduct
is akin to that in two unpublished decisions where dangerousness was not found
by the trial courts: Milwaukee County v. Cheri V., No. 2012AP1737, unpublished
slip op. (WI App Dec. 18, 2012), and Chippewa County v. M.M.,
No. 2017AP1325, unpublished slip op. (WI App May 1, 2018). L.A.T.’s
arguments fall flat because of her stipulation. Regardless, a review of both of
these cases establishes that they are distinguishable based on the facts that were
revealed during L.A.T.’s trial.

7
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c provides that an individual is dangerous if the individual
“[e]vidences such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or
omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or
herself or other individuals.”

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No. 2022AP603

¶33 In Cheri V., the subject of a potential commitment order had been
agitated, yelling, and pointing a finger at another patient—but there was no
evidence of threats or intent to harm others. Cheri V., No. 2012AP1737, ¶7. That
court held that none of the statutory prerequisites were met because “yelling at and
pointing a finger at another person, irrespective of how dangerous that other
person might be” is not sufficient evidence of dangerousness. Id. Here, L.A.T.
did more than just yell and point. She threw an item, broke other items in the
home, and pushed her mother out the door. She approached her parents
aggressively in a manner that frightened them and caused them to rapidly leave
their home. She acted aggressively toward the hospital nurse trying to provide a
medical clearance. She acted so aggressively at Winnebago Mental Health
Institute that she was quarantined away from other patients. These behaviors are
more serious—more dangerous—than that single act identified in Cheri V.

¶34 In M.M., there was loud speech (“very, very, very loud” speech) and
“aggressive, verbal behavior,” and M.M., the person subject to a potential
commitment order, stood very close to a psychologist, invading his personal space.
M.M., No. 2017AP1325, ¶4. However, that psychologist testified that he did not
feel intimidated, nor did he ever feel in danger to the point that he needed to stop
his interview. Id. Here, L.A.T.’s aggression had escalated to throwing an item
and closing in on her parents so threateningly that they felt they had no choice but
to leave their home to preserve their safety. L.A.T.’s father also refused to allow
L.A.T. to drive his car out of fear for her and the community’s safety. See R.J. v.
Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 522, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988)
(concluding that fear for safety of others—who are not aware of a threat to
themselves—is a valid fear to be considered in civil commitment cases). L.A.T.’s
conduct at Winnebago Mental Health Institute caused her to be isolated due to the
staff’s concerns for other patients’ (and staff’s) safety.

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No. 2022AP603

¶35 Given the valid stipulation and all of these facts, this court concludes
that the County met its burden to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
L.A.T. was statutorily dangerous as manifested by recent conduct to warrant civil
commitment. There remains one further step that this court must consider:
whether the type of dangerousness must be specifically identified by the trial
court.

IV. L.A.T.’s stipulation satisfies the statutory requirement on
dangerousness.

¶36 There is no dispute that the trial court did not state which statutory
paragraph described L.A.T.’s dangerousness, either in its oral ruling or written
order. Patel’s examination report found dangerousness under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b., and she opined in her testimony, discussed above, that L.A.T.
was dangerous to her parents, the hospital nurse, the institute’s staff, and the
public and community.

¶37 L.A.T. contends that a trial court must pinpoint or identify the
specific paragraph of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)a.2. that describes the dangerousness
of an individual before it can issue a commitment order, as required in D.J.W.,
391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶3. The County disagrees, noting that D.J.W. was a
recommitment rather than an initial commitment proceeding like this one. This
court concludes that the D.J.W. requirement for “specific factual findings with
reference to the subdivision paragraph” of the statute, id., also applies to initial
commitments. It further concludes, though, that L.A.T.’s stipulation satisfies the
specificity requirements.

¶38 The two reasons set forth in D.J.W. in the context of recommitments
justify an extension of this mandate to all civil commitment cases. “First, it
provides clarity and extra protection to patients regarding the underlying basis for

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a recommitment.” Id., ¶42. Civil commitments are significant curtailments of an
individual’s personal liberty and they can carry with them an additional
deprivation of personal autonomy when accompanied by an involuntary
medication and treatment order. “[C]ivil commitment cases are to be handled with
the utmost diligence and care.” D.K., 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶26. Second, as the D.J.W.
court elaborated:

[A] requirement of specific factual findings ... will clarify
issues raised on appeal of recommitment orders and ensure
the soundness of judicial decision making specifically with
regard to challenges based on the sufficiency of the
evidence. See Klinger v. Oneida County, 149 Wis. 2d 838,
846-47, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989) (“[A]s this court has stated
many times, the circuit court must make a record of its
reasoning to ensure the soundness of its own decision
making and to facilitate judicial review.”). A more
substantial record will better equip appellate courts to do
their job, further ensuring meaningful appellate review of
the evidence presented in recommitment proceedings.

D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶44.

¶39 Several unpublished appellate opinions have also extended the
D.J.W. requirement to all civil commitment cases for the two-fold reasons of
providing clarity and protecting individuals from guesswork and providing
appellate courts with a better ability to ensure the soundness of circuit court
judicial decision-making. See Milwaukee County v. A.J.G., No. 2021AP1338,
unpublished slip op. ¶13 (WI App May 3, 2022) (“[W]e are not persuaded that an
individual in an original commitment is entitled to any less protection or clarity
than an individual in a recommitment proceeding.”); Outagamie County v.
D.G.M., No. 2020AP967, unpublished slip op. ¶18 n.5 (Sept. 21, 2021)
(“While D.J.W. addressed a recommitment petition and not, as here, an initial
commitment, we assume the court's ruling regarding the specific reference to a
statutory dangerousness standard equally applies to initial commitments.”);

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No. 2022AP603

Shawano County v. S.L.V., No. 2021AP223, unpublished slip op. ¶16 (Aug. 17,
2021); Outagamie County Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. M.D.H.,
No. 2020AP86, unpublished slip op. ¶7 n.4 (July 13, 2021); Trempealeau County
v. B.K., No. 2020AP1166, unpublished slip op. ¶17 n.3. (July 27, 2021);
Winnebago County v. A.A.L., No. 2020AP1511, unpublished slip op. ¶17 n.8
(Mar. 24, 2021) (“We recognize that [D.J.W.] specifically dealt with
recommitment proceedings, but we see no reason why the court’s mandate would
not apply for initial commitments as well. The ‘purpose of making specific factual
findings’ is equally applicable to initial commitments.” (citation omitted)). These
courts found no basis to distinguish between original commitments and
recommitments.

¶40 This court agrees that individuals in civil commitment cases, be they
initial or recommitment, are vulnerable individuals whose rights to liberty must be
carefully protected. It matters not whether they are facing their first commitment
or a second (or tenth) extension: they deserve heightened care to ensure that their
rights to personal freedom and to be free from involuntary medication and
treatment, should the circumstances so warrant, are not inappropriately violated.
They deserve equal clarity and protection. A trial court’s specification of which
type of statutory dangerousness has been found provides the added benefit that
appellate courts will be able to more accurately assess the soundness of the trial
court’s judicial decision-making. Accordingly, that extra D.J.W. protection is
equally applicable for an initial commitment.

¶41 In this case, the trial court made no oral findings regarding L.A.T.’s
dangerousness as it relates to a specific statutory provision. In the typical case,
this would necessitate a reversal and, if the time for the commitment or
recommitment had expired, no remand because the trial court would have lost
competency. See Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶¶34-35, 402 Wis. 2d

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1, 974 N.W.2d 733. In this case, however, L.A.T. entered into a stipulation as to
all three elements, including dangerousness. While it would have been best for the
trial court to state which statutory paragraph applied, the stipulation satisfactorily
covered that base. An individual who enters a stipulation and stops the entry of
further evidence at trial cannot be allowed to later eviscerate the stipulation by
arguing a lack of specificity of a dangerousness finding. The County relied upon
the stipulation and did not call the rest of its witnesses. The trial court conducted
an appropriate colloquy and determined that L.A.T. conceded that she was subject
to a treatable mental illness and that she was dangerous under one or more
statutory provisions. That is sufficient. Absent the stipulation, the trial court
would have had to make a better record. Given the stipulation, the orders are
affirmed.

CONCLUSION

¶42 Civil commitments are massive curtailments of liberty, and citizens
have the inherent right to be free from unjustified commitments. That applies
equally, or perhaps more so, to the right to be free from orders for the involuntary
administration of medication and treatment. In this appeal, the issues centered
upon two topics: stipulations by persons in need in a civil commitment and the
sufficiency and specificity of dangerousness findings by the trial court. These two
issues are necessarily intertwined. L.A.T. challenges the stipulation she made in
the middle of her WIS. STAT. ch. 51 jury trial. That stipulation, however, was
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily by L.A.T. It stands. Moreover,
this court declines to mandate that trial courts must conduct a colloquy on the
record with each person entering a stipulation in a civil commitment case.

¶43 This court further concludes that while D.J.W.’s requirement for
specificity of which level and type of dangerousness is found applies to initial

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commitments and not just recommitments, the trial court did not err when it did
not specify a dangerousness provision. L.A.T. may not enter an agreement
stipulating dangerousness and then argue that the trial court was in error for
relying upon that concession when entering the appropriate orders. Accordingly,
this court affirms, in its entirety, the trial court’s order committing L.A.T. and the
corresponding order for involuntary administration of medication and treatment.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)4.

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