State v. Steven W. Bowers

2023 WI APP 4

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2021AP1767-CR

Complete Title of Case:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

STEVEN W. BOWERS,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Opinion Filed: December 29, 2022
Submitted on Briefs: October 25, 2022
Oral Argument:

JUDGES: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:

Appellant
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the
briefs of Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, and Nicholas S. Desantis,
assistant attorney general.

Respondent
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the
brief of R. Rick Resch and John H. Bradley of Strang Bradley, LLC,
Madison.
2023 WI App 4

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 29, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1767-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF95

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

STEVEN W. BOWERS,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Taylor County:
ROBERT R. RUSSELL, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

¶1 STARK, P.J. The State of Wisconsin appeals from the circuit court’s
decision suppressing evidence obtained from a search of Taylor County Detective
No. 2021AP1767-CR

Sergeant Steven Bowers’ Dropbox1 account (Account).2 Bowers used his Taylor
County e-mail address to create the Account, which he allegedly used to share
confidential sheriff’s department case files with the producers of a television show.

¶2 Bowers was charged with misconduct in public office, and he filed a
motion to suppress evidence on the basis that law enforcement conducted a
warrantless search of his Account in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
circuit court ultimately granted Bowers’ motion, and the State filed a motion for
reconsideration of that decision, which the court denied. On appeal, the State argues
that Bowers had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his Account, and, in the
alternative, if a search occurred, the warrantless search was justified by probable
cause and exigent circumstances.

¶3 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Bowers had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of his Account. Although it was established
using Bowers’ county e-mail address, Bowers paid to create the private Account,

1
Dropbox is a digital file hosting service that allows users to upload, store, and share
documents and photographs on the “cloud” that can be accessed remotely. See Dropbox, Features,
https://www.dropbox.com/features (last visited Dec. 13, 2022).
2
The State filed its notice of appeal after the circuit court entered a written order denying
the State’s motion for reconsideration. When it denied the State’s motion for reconsideration, the
court upheld its prior oral decision granting Bowers’ motion for reconsideration, which granted
Bowers’ motion to suppress evidence after initially denying his motion. Bowers argues that “[t]he
State here has appealed a denied motion to reconsider, not a granted motion to suppress.” Despite
Bowers’ arguments, neither party appears to argue that the court’s reasoning for either its
February 11, 2020 oral decision denying Bowers’ initial motion to suppress evidence or its
December 14, 2020 oral decision granting Bowers’ motion for reconsideration should be affirmed
on appeal. Instead and as we will explain below, Bowers and the State developed a different record
through motions to supplement and an additional evidentiary hearing. Thus, the court’s oral ruling
and subsequent September 14, 2021 written order arguably concluded that suppression was
appropriate based on entirely new grounds. Given that the court did not issue a written order from
its December 14, 2020 oral ruling granting Bowers’ motion to reconsider and given that the court
provided new bases for suppression of the evidence based on the State’s motion for reconsideration,
we conclude that the question before us is appropriately whether the court properly granted
suppression of the evidence in this case.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

the Account was password protected and accessible through Bowers’ private
devices, and the Account was not stored on county property. In addition, although
Bowers’ Account was held by Dropbox, an independent entity, Bowers did not grant
a third party access to his password or the Account when sharing the case files.
Thus, law enforcement engaged in a search of Bowers’ Account within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. Further, while law enforcement had probable cause to
search the Account for evidence of Bowers’ alleged misconduct in office, we
conclude that no exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of the
Account. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶4 For the purpose of this appeal, the facts in this case are largely
undisputed. In February 2017, the Taylor County Sheriff’s Department (the
department) was working with the television program “Cold Justice” on a homicide
cold case (Murder 1).3 According to the State, the department agreed to provide
information to Cold Justice’s producers only about the Murder 1 investigation.

¶5 The State claimed that Bowers shared two additional homicide files
(Murder 2 and Murder 3) with Cold Justice without the department’s permission.
Bowers is alleged to have provided Murder 2’s paper file—which included “one
box of reports and one box of medical records”—to Cold Justice’s producers. As
to the Murder 3 information, the State alleged that Bowers uploaded the file to his
Account and then used the Account to share the file with his girlfriend and two
members of Cold Justice’s staff. According to the State, the department became

3
The State and Bowers use the names Murder 1, Murder 2, and Murder 3 for the cold-case
files. For consistency, we will do so as well.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

aware of this unauthorized release of information when another officer overheard
Cold Justice’s producers talking about the Murder 2 and Murder 3 cases.

¶6 On February 27, 2017, Taylor County’s then-Sheriff Bruce Daniels4
e-mailed Bowers regarding Bowers’ release of the Murder 2 and Murder 3 case
files.5 Bowers replied later that day, admitting that he had shared the files without
seeking permission. As a result, the department, with help from the Taylor County
Information Technology (IT) Department, sought to gain access to Bowers’
Account by first contacting Dropbox on March 1, 2017. According to IT Director
Melissa Lind, Dropbox was not “cooperative,” stating that it “would have to run
through different chains to turn over any documents from anyone’s account.”

¶7 The department then successfully sought to gain access to Bowers’
password-protected Account through his official county e-mail address. Bowers
had used his county e-mail address to set up his Account, although he paid for it
with his own funds. Lind testified that on March 2, 2017, she performed a password
reset on Bowers’ Account, which then “e-mailed a link to [Bowers’ county] e-mail
address.” Given that she had access to Bowers’ county e-mail account through her
role in IT, she then entered his e-mail account and used that link to change Bowers’
Account password, effectively severing Bowers’ access to his Account. Lind then
personally accessed Bowers’ Account “with the [district attorney] and [Daniels]
present.”6 According to Lind, the search of Bowers’ Account revealed both that the
Murder 3 file was in the Account and that Bowers had shared the case file with

4
Daniels retired from his position in 2019.
5
Daniels also testified that the department’s data records manager informed him that
Bowers had shared both paper and electronic versions of the records.
6
Daniels testified that prior to instructing Lind to access Bowers’ e-mail and Account, he
sought “legal advice” from the district attorney.

4
No. 2021AP1767-CR

individuals outside the department. Lind testified that prior to accessing the
Account, she did not know exactly what was in Bowers’ Account or with whom
Bowers may have shared information.

¶8 The State initially charged Bowers with one count of felony
misconduct in public office, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 946.12(2) (2019-20),7 but the
charges were later amended by Information to two counts—one for the disclosure
of Murder 2’s paper file and one for the disclosure of Murder 3’s file via Dropbox.
Bowers filed a motion to suppress the evidence derived from the warrantless search
of his Account on the ground that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
Account and the search therefore violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Bowers
also argued that his e-mail confession admitting that he shared the files was obtained
in violation of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and could not be used
in subsequent criminal proceedings.

¶9 The circuit court held a hearing on the motion to suppress, where
Daniels testified regarding the circumstances behind the department gaining access
to Bowers’ Account. At that hearing, the State’s argument focused on an IT
agreement that Bowers had signed in 2007 (the 2007 policy). The 2007 policy
stated, “I have no expectation of privacy for any material on Taylor County
equipment, even if that material was generated for my personal use.” It further
provided that “Taylor County retains exclusive ownership and control of all
hardware, software, and the data that is generated through the use of its facilities.
The Information Technology Department reserves the right to monitor all
information technology usage and to access any electronic communications at any

7
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise
noted. We note that there are no changes between the 2017-18 and 2019-20 versions of WIS. STAT.
§ 946.12.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

time.” During the suppression hearing, the State argued that “[t]he IT policy makes
it very clear that when someone starts using their county e-mail, they have no
expectation of privacy” and that “[t]here was no reason for the IT Department or
[Daniels] to believe they had anything but the right to review those
communications.”

¶10 In an oral ruling, the circuit court denied Bowers’ motion to suppress.
In reaching its decision, the court reiterated the terms of the 2007 policy, explaining
that it gave the county’s IT department permission “to monitor all information
technology usage, and to access any electronic communication at any time.”
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment issue was “covered
under the terms of” the 2007 policy and Bowers had “no expectation of privacy in
his private account that was used on Taylor County equipment.”8

¶11 In response, Bowers filed a motion to supplement the record and for
reconsideration. In particular, Bowers emphasized that “Dropbox is not stored on
[Bowers’] computer but rather is a separate remote storage facility for digital
information that one pays to use, [and] none of the data discovered was ever
discovered on any Taylor County [e]quipment.” He also argued that the 2007 policy
was not in effect at the time of the search and that there were other policies—a 2011
policy supplement related to use of his county-issued cell phone, signed by Bowers,
and a 2012 update of the 2007 policy (the 2012 policy), which Bowers did not
sign—in effect at the time.

8
The circuit court also found that no violation of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967), occurred, as Bowers’ employment was not threatened and his confession was voluntary.
The alleged Garrity violation is not at issue in this appeal.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

¶12 The circuit court changed course. By oral ruling, it granted Bowers’
motion for reconsideration, reversed its prior decision, and suppressed the Dropbox
evidence. In reaching its decision, the court found that the 2012 policy “was the
controlling IT policy at the time of the Dropbox search,” not the 2007 policy, and
that “under the terms of the 2012 IT policy, [Bowers’ Account] was not an account
held on Taylor County equipment.” The court further found that the cell phone
policy, signed by Bowers in 2011, was in effect at the time of the search, and that
policy allowed Bowers to use his department-issued cell phone for work and
personal use as if it were his own device. Therefore, Bowers “did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in [his cell phone],” which he could use to “access his
Dropbox account.” Finally, the court found that “Bowers’ Dropbox account was a
personal account.” Ultimately, the court granted suppression on the basis that
Bowers “had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the smartphone and, further,
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a Dropbox account that was used for his
personal use and not housed on Taylor County equipment.”

¶13 The State, in response, filed its own motion for reconsideration and a
motion to supplement the record. Lind testified at the subsequent motion hearing,
explaining how she gained access to Bowers’ Account. According to Lind, under
the 2012 policy, “[t]he IT Department reserve[d] the right to monitor all information
technology usage, and access any electronic communications at any time.” She
reiterated that the county owns the e-mail addresses the employees use, but she
explained that “Dropbox is a cloud-based storage center” that can be accessed from
“any device with an internet connection” if an individual has a username and
password. Thus, Dropbox is tied to an e-mail address, not to a physical device
controlled by the county. In particular, she clarified that Bowers’ county-issued cell
phone was not related to the Account. Finally, Lind explained that had Bowers used

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

his personal e-mail address to set up the Account, she would not have been able to
gain access in the same manner.

¶14 Lind also testified regarding the reason why the department acted as
it did. She explained that “part of the concern driving the timing of … getting into
[Bowers’] Dropbox” was Bowers’ ability to “sign[] into the Dropbox account and
delete[] files before” the department could investigate. Lind also admitted,
however, that Dropbox keeps any deleted files for thirty days and that when she
contacted Dropbox, she never asked them to preserve the files in Bowers’ Account.

¶15 After the hearing, the State filed a second motion in support of its
request for reconsideration. There, the State argued that: (1) Bowers “had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the Dropbox account he created with his Taylor
County email address” and the circuit court’s ruling—relying on Bowers’
expectation of privacy in his county-issued cell phone—was in error because there
was no testimony connecting Bowers’ cell phone to his Account; (2) other
jurisdictions have not acknowledged an expectation of privacy in similar Dropbox
accounts; and (3) the department “also had probable cause of a crime and exigent
circumstances necessitating a warrantless search.”

¶16 The circuit court denied the State’s motion for reconsideration. The
court found that Bowers’ Account was not owned by the county, was not subject to
the 2012 policy, and Bowers had an expectation of privacy in the Account. The
court observed that the department would have been justified in searching Bowers’
county-issued e-mail account, but the department searched his Dropbox, not his
e-mail account. On the issue of exigent circumstances, the court reiterated Lind’s
testimony at the hearing that Dropbox archives files for a period of time; therefore,
the court concluded “that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify Taylor

8
No. 2021AP1767-CR

County accessing this account without a warrant.”9 The State appeals. See WIS.
STAT. § 974.05(1)(d)2.

DISCUSSION

¶17 On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court erred by granting
Bowers’ motion to suppress evidence for two reasons. First, the State claims that
Bowers had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his Account; therefore, there
was no “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.10 In the alternative,
the State argues that even if a search occurred, it was justified by probable cause
and exigent circumstances. We review a circuit court’s decision on a motion to
suppress under a two-part standard. State v. Lonkoski, 2013 WI 30, ¶21, 346
Wis. 2d 523, 828 N.W.2d 552. We will uphold the court’s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous, but we review the application of the facts to the
constitutional principles independently. Id.

I. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

¶18 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

9
The circuit court did not specifically address the State’s argument that it needed to
quickly ascertain who may have had access to the information to potentially stop the information
from spreading further.
10
We note that while the State argued in the circuit court that the IT policy—either the
2007 or the 2012 version of the policy—allowed the department to search Bowers’ Account, it has
abandoned that argument on appeal. Therefore, we will not address that argument. See A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 491, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]n issue
raised in the [circuit] court, but not raised on appeal, is deemed abandoned.”).

9
No. 2021AP1767-CR

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.11 The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.” Camara v. Municipal Ct. of City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). An individual’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment apply where he or she has “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
property or location.” State v. Guard, 2012 WI App 8, ¶16, 338 Wis. 2d 385, 808
N.W.2d 718 (2011); State v. Tentoni, 2015 WI App 77, ¶7, 365 Wis. 2d 211, 871
N.W.2d 285 (“In order to have standing to challenge a search on Fourth Amendment
grounds, a defendant must have ‘a legitimate expectation of privacy’ in the area or
items subjected to a search.” (citation omitted)). It is the defendant’s burden to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) that he or she had an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and item seized and (2) that
society is willing to recognize the defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable.”
Tentoni, 365 Wis. 2d 211, ¶7.

¶19 On the second question—whether the defendant’s expectation of
privacy was objectively reasonable—we consider the factors outlined in State v.
Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502. See State v. Baric, 2018
WI App 63, ¶18, 384 Wis. 2d 359, 919 N.W.2d 221. Those factors include:

(1) whether the defendant had a property interest in the
premises; (2) whether he [or she] was legitimately (lawfully)
on the premises; (3) whether he [or she] had complete
dominion and control and the right to exclude others;
(4) whether he [or she] took precautions customarily taken
11
The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
E.g., State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, ¶18 & n.6, 315 Wis. 2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598. “The Wisconsin
Constitution contains a substantively identical provision, art. I, sec. 11, that this court interprets
consistently with the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶27, 235 Wis. 2d 524,
612 N.W.2d 29.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

by those seeking privacy; (5) whether he [or she] put the
property to some private use; and (6) whether the claim of
privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy.

Id. (alterations in original; citation omitted). “Although these factors guide our
analysis, they are not controlling,” and “[w]e consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Id.; see also Guard, 338 Wis. 2d 385, ¶17. As relevant to the issue in
this case, “the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in digital files shared on
electronic platforms is determined by considering the same factors as in any other
Fourth Amendment context.” See Baric, 384 Wis. 2d 359, ¶19.

¶20 The State does not appear to challenge Bowers’ assertion that he had
a subjective expectation of privacy in his Account, see Tentoni, 365 Wis. 2d 211,
¶7, arguing only that if Bowers had a subjective expectation of privacy, that
expectation was not objectively reasonable. We therefore address only whether
Bowers’ expectation of privacy in his Account was objectively reasonable.12 We
begin with an analysis of the Dumstrey factors. The State admits that the first two

12
We also note that there was parallel litigation related to this case in federal district court,
Bowers v. County of Taylor (Bowers I), 598 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Wis. 2022), which the State
did not address in its briefing before this court. There, Bowers brought an action, on a slightly
different factual record, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018), against Daniels and Lind for an unlawful
search of his Account. As the court explained in that case, there is “uncertainty in the law” on the
question of whether a person has an expectation of privacy in cloud-stored data. Bowers I, 598
F. Supp. 3d at 731. The court nevertheless determined “that Bowers had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his Dropbox account and that defendants should have obtained a warrant before
searching his account,” but it ultimately concluded that Daniels and Lind were entitled to qualified
immunity because Bowers’ reasonable expectation of privacy was not clearly established at the
time. Id. at 725. While the federal court’s analysis is not dispositive, we find it persuasive and
informative under the circumstances. See City of Weyauwega v. Wisconsin Cent. Ltd., 2018 WI
App 65, ¶12 n.4, 384 Wis. 2d 382, 919 N.W.2d 609 (“Although federal court decisions, other than
United States Supreme Court decisions on questions of federal law, do not bind us, we may follow
federal court decisions that we find persuasive.”).

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

factors “cut in Bowers’ favor,” those factors being that Bowers had a property
interest in his Account, as he independently set up and paid for it, and that he
maintained the Account lawfully. See Dumstrey, 366 Wis. 2d 64, ¶47.

¶21 As to the third factor, the State claims that Bowers did not have
“complete dominion and control” over the Account as he shared access with other
people, including his girlfriend and employees of Cold Justice. Bowers, however,
did not share the password to his Account or otherwise provide others access to his
entire Account.13 Instead, Bowers used his Account to share specific documents
with third parties. As Bowers argues, “[h]e decided who saw what and under what
circumstances in his Dropbox.”

¶22 The State also claims the fact that Bowers used his county e-mail
address to create the Account diminished his dominion and control because “law
enforcement was able to gain access using his county-owned e-mail address.” We
agree with Bowers that this is a slippery slope argument. In essence, the State argues
that an individual’s expectation of privacy is diminished where a location or an item
is accessible or capable of being broken into. Cf. United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he mere ability of a third-party intermediary to
access the contents of a communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35-36
(2001) (discounting an application of the Fourth Amendment that would “leave the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology”). We agree that under the

13
While Bowers asserts in his briefing before this court that he “never shared his password
with anyone,” he fails to provide support for this particular assertion with evidence from the record.
The State, however, does not appear to dispute Bowers’ claim, noting that he shared the documents,
but not specifically alleging that he shared the password to his Account. Further, although Bowers
observes that the Bowers I decision was “[o]n a slightly different factual record, albeit derived from
the same facts,” that case does state that Bowers did not share his password. See Bowers I, 598 F.
Supp. 3d at 723.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

circumstances of this case, Bowers maintained dominion and control over his
Account.

¶23 Next, the State argues that the fourth factor also cuts heavily against
Bowers because he took few “precautions customarily taken by those seeking
privacy.” See Dumstrey, 366 Wis. 2d 64, ¶47. The State asserts the same arguments
as above, namely that Bowers shared access to his Account and that he used his
county-owned e-mail address to create the Account instead of a personal e-mail
address. Again, these arguments are unpersuasive. Bowers took privacy
precautions to protect his Account by using a password to regulate access to it. See,
e.g., United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551, 554 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (recognizing
a reasonable expectation of privacy in password-protected computer files); United
States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 719 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Courts addressing the issue
of third party consent in the context of computers, therefore, have examined
officers’ knowledge about password protection as an indication of whether a
computer is ‘locked’ in the way a footlocker would be.”); United States v. Thomas,
818 F.3d 1230, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding, in a consent-to-search case,
that by not password protecting his files the defendant “assumed the risk that the
other [user] would allow the police to view the computer’s contents”). Again, there
is nothing in the record to establish that Bowers shared his Dropbox password with
anyone; he shared only specific files. Further, Bowers could not have anticipated
that using his county-owned e-mail address would destroy his privacy in a
password-protected account containing data saved on noncounty property, as he was
not given notice of this possibility. See Bowers v. County of Taylor (Bowers I),
598 F. Supp. 3d 719, 730 (W.D. Wis. 2022) (“[T]he county’s IT policy says nothing
about monitoring private accounts that are linked to work email. In the absence of

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

a clearer notice from the county, Bowers was entitled to assume that a private
account was private.”).

¶24 As to the fifth factor, the State claims that “it does not appear that
Bowers put the property to some ‘private use,’” as he used the Account for sharing
county documents with other people. See Dumstrey, 366 Wis. 2d 64, ¶47. While it
is true that Bowers utilized Dropbox to share the case files, the record is unclear as
to whether Bowers used his Account for any other personal purpose. Bowers does
not specifically assert that he stored personal documents or files in his Account, but
he argues that “everyone including [Lind] assumed that there was private
information on the Dropbox” as Lind’s testimony “acknowledged that Bowers’[]
Dropbox could have contained photographs and personal documents.” We agree
that given the function of Dropbox as a file-storing and file-sharing service for both
personal and business use, a reasonable assumption is that Bowers’ Account
contained more than just the county’s records and that the Account was put toward
some other private use as well. See Dropbox, https://www.dropbox.com (last visited
Dec. 13, 2022).

¶25 Finally, as to the sixth factor, the State argues that Bowers’ claim of
privacy is not “consistent with historical notions of privacy.” See Dumstrey, 366
Wis. 2d 64, ¶47 (citation omitted). According to the State, “[h]istorical notions of
privacy do not include spaces that a person shares with others.” See State v.
Eskridge, 2002 WI App 158, ¶19, 256 Wis. 2d 314, 647 N.W.2d 434 (concluding
that historical notions of privacy do not include apartment common areas as they
are shared areas accessible to and used by other tenants). We disagree with the
State’s portrayal of a Dropbox account as a shared space. Again, Bowers did not
share the password to his Account with other individuals or open the Account to

14
No. 2021AP1767-CR

access by others.14 Instead, he merely shared certain files he had uploaded to that
Account with others.

¶26 When an individual uses Dropbox as Bowers did, we are persuaded
that a Dropbox account is most reasonably comparable to a modern-day version of
a container used to store personal documents and effects. See Riley v. California,
573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 (1981),
for the proposition that a “container” is “any object capable of holding another
object”). It is well established that individuals generally have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in locked or closed containers, see United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 835 (7th
Cir. 2000), which are comparable to password-protected accounts, see Bowers I,
598 F. Supp. 3d at 729 (noting “the well-established rule that individuals generally
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in locked or closed containers, which are
comparable to a password-protected account”); Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718-20
(comparing a password-protected computer to locked footlocker or suitcase).

¶27 In particular, Lind testified that “Dropbox is a cloud-based storage
center, [that] can be accessed from one device or a thousand devices. As long as
you have a username and password, you can get to Dropbox anywhere in the world
on any device with an internet connection,” and therefore Dropbox is not tied to “a
physical device of any kind” and was not stored on county property or controlled by
the county. Lind explained that even though she had the e-mail address associated

14
In fact, Dropbox states on its website that “[f]or security reasons, sharing an account
with others is not recommended. Sharing your Dropbox password with others also violates the
Dropbox Terms of Service.” Dropbox, Help Center: Account Sharing,
https://help.dropbox.com/account-access/share-account (last visited Dec. 13, 2022). Further,
Dropbox notes that “[i]t’s not necessary to share an account in order to share files with someone.
In this case the person you want to share with should create their own account, and then you can
send a link to the file.” Id.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

with Bowers’ Account, when she contacted Dropbox to obtain access, Dropbox
would not provide access to the Account. According to Lind, Dropbox was not
“cooperative,” telling her that it “would have to run through different chains to turn
over any documents from anyone’s account,” which “could [take] weeks,”
“because, in their mind, the [A]ccount belonged to” Bowers. In summary, we
conclude that an analysis of the Dumstrey factors under the facts of this case weighs
in favor of a finding that Bowers had an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the private, password-protected Account that he personally created and
maintained on noncounty property.

¶28 The State identifies several cases from other jurisdictions, however,
that it argues support its position. First, the State presents Clark v. Teamsters Local
Union, 349 F. Supp. 3d 605 (E.D. Ky. 2018), as “helpful in examining whether an
expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.” In Clark, a wrongful termination
case alleging a claim for invasion of privacy, an employer accessed Clark’s
computer after she was terminated and, like in this case, “used a lost password
function to recover and review the files in Clark’s Dropbox to search for work-
related files.” Id. at 621. Clark, like Bowers, had set up the Dropbox account using
her work e-mail address. Id. at 622. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky granted Clark’s employer summary judgment on the basis that
Clark had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Dropbox account. Id. at 621-
22. The court’s rationale was that if employees “do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their work e-mails, then it logically follows that
individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a Dropbox account
that is tied to their work e-mail and that they lose access to if they lose access to the
e-mail.” Id. at 622.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

¶29 We are not persuaded that the Clark court’s decision has any bearing
on this case. Clark is an invasion of privacy case, which involved “intrusion upon
seclusion.” Id. It did not address whether an employer’s access to an employee’s
Dropbox account was an objectively reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, in addition to the fact that Clark hails from a lower federal
court in another jurisdiction, the legal analysis in that case was distinct from the
legal analysis in this Fourth Amendment case.

¶30 Second, the State invokes the so-called third-party doctrine, arguing
that regardless of the Dumstrey factors, “Bowers lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information he stored in his Dropbox folder [because] he deliberately
shared it with several other people, including the producers of a national television
show.” According to the State, “this sharing alone is fatal to Bowers’ claim that he
had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the Dropbox account.”

¶31 The third-party doctrine provides that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he [or she] voluntarily turns over to third
parties.” United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). In Miller, for example, the United States Supreme
Court held that a bank depositor has no “legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’” in
financial information that he or she “voluntarily convey[s]” to “banks and expose[s]
to [the bank’s] employees in the ordinary course of business.” Miller, 425 U.S. at
442. According to the Court,

The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person
to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him
to Government authorities, even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party
will not be betrayed.

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

Id. at 443 (citation omitted).

¶32 Later, in Smith, the third-party doctrine was applied in the context of
information provided to a telephone company. There, the Court held that the
government’s use of a pen register—a mechanical device used to record numbers
dialed on a telephone—was not a search. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1, 745-46.
Considering that the pen register did not record the content of the phone calls, the
Court explained that it was doubtful “that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.” Id. at 742. According to the Court,
when Smith made a call, he “voluntarily conveyed” the numbers he dialed to the
telephone company and, therefore, “assumed the risk” that those records “would be
divulged to police.” Id. at 744-55.

¶33 The State also cites United States v. Maclin, 393 F. Supp. 3d 701
(N.D. Ohio 2019), in support of its position that the third-party doctrine applies in
this case.15 Maclin involved child pornography stored in a Dropbox account and
the related warrant-authorized search of that account. Id. at 706. In that case,
although the account was password protected, the defendant shared the password,
and therefore access to the account, with multiple individuals. Id. at 711. The
defendant further “trie[d] to distance himself from any association with the
account.” Id. As a result, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
Dropbox account, explaining that “[c]ourts have consistently held there is no

15
The State also cites United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2016), but it argues
in its reply brief that it did so only “for the general proposition that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information he [or she] voluntarily turns over to third parties.”

18
No. 2021AP1767-CR

reasonable expectation of privacy in files contained in peer-to-peer sharing
services.” Id.

¶34 Apart from the fact that Maclin falls outside our jurisdiction, we
conclude that it is distinguishable based on the facts of the case. Unlike the
defendant in Maclin, who shared his password—and thereby access to his entire
account—with other people and did not even claim ownership of the account, see
id. at 711, Bowers did not share his password or disclaim ownership of his Account.
Further, based on the fact that Maclin shared his password, the court analogized his
use of Dropbox as more akin to a peer-to-peer network sharing service and
recognized a lack of reasonable expectation of privacy in files shared on those
platforms. See id.; see also Baric, 384 Wis. 2d 359, ¶¶21-22. However, a peer-to-
peer service is different from a cloud-based storage account like Dropbox. For
example, “[a] crucial aspect of peer-to-peer file-sharing is that the default setting
for these networks is that downloaded files are placed in the user’s ‘shared’ folder,
which allows others in the network to access the files.” Audrey Rogers, From Peer-
to-Peer Networks to Cloud Computing: How Technology is Redefining Child
Pornography Laws, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1013, 1031 (2013) (citation omitted). In
contrast, “[a] cloud user may permit shared access to his [or her] files by designating
users,” but “[u]nlike peer-to-peer networks, private cloud services require that a
person designate who may have shared access.” Id. at 1032. Here, Bowers did not
use his Dropbox like a peer-to-peer network: he did not share his password, and he
individually designated who could have access to certain files.

¶35 Bowers argues that the third-party doctrine does not apply under the
circumstances given the current case law. Initially, we recognize that the
application of the third-party doctrine in the context of a cloud-storage account like
Dropbox is both unclear and undeveloped. See generally Steven Arango, Cloudy

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No. 2021AP1767-CR

with a Chance of Government Intrusion: The Third-Party Doctrine in the 21st
Century, 69 CATH. U. L. REV. 723 (2020); Eric Johnson, Note, Lost in the
Cloud: Cloud Storage, Privacy, and Suggestions for Protecting Users’ Data, 69
STAN. L. REV. 867 (2017); David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the
Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations
in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205 (2009). Bowers argues, however, that
“[t]he extension of Fourth Amendment protection to cloud-stored data and the
accounts that hold the data is implied by United States Supreme Court precedent”
in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), and Riley. Specifically,
Bowers claims that the third-party doctrine does not apply to the type of search that
occurred here because the department did not gain access to the files from a third
party; the Account itself was not a business record, like in Miller; and the
information was not “surface-level identifying information or metadata,”16 like in
Smith.

¶36 Bowers argues that these important distinctions between Miller and
Smith were drawn by the Supreme Court in Carpenter. There, the issue was
whether the third-party doctrine applied to cell phone location data obtained from
wireless carriers. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211-12. Law enforcement used
Carpenter’s cell-site location information to establish that he was near the locations
of several robberies when they occurred and then charged him with those robberies.
Id. at 2212-13. In concluding “that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through [cell-site
location information],” the Court “declined to extend Smith and Miller to cover

16
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “metadata” as “[s]econdary data that organize, manage,
and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data.” Metadata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1186 (11th ed. 2019).

20
No. 2021AP1767-CR

these novel circumstances.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. The Court recognized
the limits of the Miller and Smith decisions, noting that the decisions “did not rely
solely on the act of sharing” but involved other considerations. Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2219. Ultimately, the Court reasoned that “[g]iven the unique nature of
cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does
not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection” because
there is “world of difference between the limited types of personal information
addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information
casually collected by wireless carriers today.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2219.

¶37 Additionally, Bowers points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley,
where the question was “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.”
Riley, 573 U.S. at 378. The Riley Court held that “the search incident to arrest
exception does not apply to cell phones” and that law enforcement “must generally
secure a warrant before conducting such a search,” subject to “other case-specific
exceptions.” Id. at 386, 401-03.

¶38 In reaching this conclusion, the Court addressed privacy interests in a
cell phone by referencing the phone’s ability to access cloud-stored data. Id. at 397.
According to the Court, a cell phone differs from a “container whose contents may
be searched incident to an arrest” as it may potentially “display data stored on
remote servers rather than on the device itself” that would “extend well beyond
papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee.” Id. at 397-98. As a
result, the government conceded that “the search incident to arrest exception may
not be stretched to cover a search of files accessed remotely—that is, a search of
files stored in the cloud,” and the Court reasoned that “[s]uch a search would be like
finding a key in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to

21
No. 2021AP1767-CR

unlock and search a house.” Id. at 397. Thus, Bowers argues that what was “implied
in the pre-digital Smith, became express in the modern Riley: the content data
stored in the cloud, on remote servers, are Fourth Amendment papers and effects.”

¶39 We agree with Bowers that the third-party doctrine does not apply to
the type of search performed here. We are persuaded by the Bowers I court’s
discussion, which explained that

Smith and Miller are about an expectation of privacy in
particular information; the question in both cases was
whether the government needed a warrant before seeking
information from a third party who also has access.

In this case, Bowers isn’t contending that he had a right to
keep the case files themselves private. Bowers’[] claim is
about restricting access to his account, not protecting the
particular files at issue or preventing third parties from
sharing the files. One can lose a right to keep information
private by disclosing it to the public, but that doesn’t mean
the government can force entry into someone’s home on the
ground that the home contains public documents. As another
example, if someone sends an email to a friend, the Fourth
Amendment won’t prevent the friend from sharing the
contents of the email with the police, but that doesn’t mean
the police are entitled to hack an email account because all
the emails are being shared with a third party.

Bowers I, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 730 (citation omitted).

¶40 We agree that Bowers is not arguing that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the case files turned over to the Cold Justice employees.
The department could have obtained the documents from that third party without
ever searching Bowers’ Account if it simply desired the documents. 17 To be clear,
while Bowers does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
the files in his Account that were created by other parties, he does have a reasonable

17
In fact, according to the complaint, the department did receive the case file from Murder
2 back from the Cold Justice producer.

22
No. 2021AP1767-CR

expectation of privacy in the contents of his Account, which is what the department
searched. Further, the department did not gain access to Bowers’ Account through
the Dropbox company or from any other third-party company that had access to the
Account. See id. (“Many cases involving the third-party doctrine involve
information that the government actually received from the third-party.”).

¶41 Instead, the department seized control of Bowers’ private Account
located on servers outside the department by using Bowers’ county-owned e-mail
address to change his Dropbox password.18 It then accessed and searched the
information in his Account. The department did not receive the evidence from a
third party, and it did not simply obtain specific files from Bowers’ Account. The
department seized and searched at least portions of, if not all of, Bowers’ Account.
Accordingly, the third-party doctrine cases that the State relies upon are inapt under
the circumstances of this case. We agree with Bowers that the Court’s decisions in
Miller and Smith do not clearly control the department’s actions here, as the
department did much more than obtain access to metadata or Dropbox’s business
records.

¶42 The State focuses on the fact that Bowers created this Account with
his county-owned e-mail address. Apart from using that e-mail address, however,
Bowers created the Account on his own. Bowers paid for the Account with his own
money, and the Account was password protected. The department did not search
its own devices to access the information in Bowers’ Account; it used the internet
as a tool to access the outside server on which the Account was located. Apart from
the 2007 or the 2012 policies, which the State no longer argues are applicable, the

18
“A seizure deprives an individual of ‘dominion over his or her person or property’ ….”
State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶23, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (citation omitted).

23
No. 2021AP1767-CR

State does not cite any other terms or agreements that would destroy Bowers’
reasonable expectation of privacy in his Account and allow the department to access
it. In essence, the State does not explain how using a county e-mail address to set
up an outside account permits the county to search everything within that private
account, absent other factors.

¶43 Use of cloud storage to house an individual’s private information is
just the latest technological development seeking to test the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment. See Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment must keep
pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its guarantees will
wither and perish.”); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (warning that advancing technology must
not be permitted to “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment”). As
Bowers argues, cloud storage has become the equivalent of “a 21st century container
used to hold private papers and effects.” See Bowers I, 598 F. Supp. 3d at 729;
Johnson, supra, at 886 (“Now, as information is increasingly produced and stored
in digital form, cloud storage has become the digital equivalent of a traditional
storage area.”); Couillard, supra, at 2223 (“The cloud is now used to store many of
the same materials as a briefcase or backpack.”).

¶44 We are also to consider societal expectations in determining whether
a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in searched or seized property. See
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990). Here, we conclude that society is
willing to recognize that a user has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her
Dropbox account. According to Dropbox, it boasts over 700 million users on its
platform, and it specifically tells its users that “[w]ith Dropbox, your files belong to
you, not us, so you can be sure we’re not reselling your data.” Dropbox,
https://www.dropbox.com (last visited Dec. 13, 2022). By using a password that is
not shared, these users expect their cloud-storage accounts to remain private unless

24
No. 2021AP1767-CR

the user shares the files with others, even if the information is stored by a third party.
See Johnson, supra, at 886 & n.126 (“This is the equivalent of renting a safety
deposit box, locking it, and trusting the bank not to break the lock.”).

¶45 Thus, under the totality of the circumstances and when considering
the Dumstrey factors, we conclude that Bowers had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his Account. Law enforcement seized Bowers’ Account and searched it
without a warrant, thereby violating Bowers’ Fourth Amendment rights.

II. Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances

¶46 The State argues, in the alternative, that even if a Fourth Amendment
search occurred in this case, any search was justified by probable cause and exigent
circumstances. “A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable and is
constitutional only if it falls under an exception to the warrant requirement.” State
v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶30, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120 (citations
omitted). “One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances
doctrine, which holds that a warrantless search complies with the Fourth
Amendment if the need for a search is urgent and insufficient time to obtain a
warrant exists.” Id.

¶47 Under this exception, “a warrantless search does not violate a
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights if: (1) the government can show that there is
probable cause to believe that ‘evidence of a crime will be found’; and (2) there are
exigent circumstances.” State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 2014 WI 87, ¶70, 357 Wis. 2d
41, 849 N.W.2d 748 (citing State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶¶17, 21, 233 Wis. 2d
280, 607 N.W.2d 621). In order for the government to establish probable cause for
a search, it must demonstrate that there “is a ‘fair probability’ that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280,

25
No. 2021AP1767-CR

¶21 (citation omitted). Courts “evaluate the existence of probable cause objectively,
concerned with whether law enforcement acted reasonably,” State v. Robinson,
2010 WI 80, ¶26, 327 Wis. 2d 302, 786 N.W.2d 463, eschewing “technicality and
legalisms in favor of a ‘flexible, common-sense measure of the plausibility of
particular conclusions about human behavior,’” State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 83,
532 N.W.2d 698 (1995) (citation omitted).

¶48 As to exigent circumstances, in Wisconsin, consistent with
United States Supreme Court precedent, we recognize

four circumstances which, when measured against the time
required to procure a warrant, constitute exigent
circumstances that justify a warrantless entry: (1) an arrest
made in “hot pursuit,” (2) a threat to the safety of the suspect
or others, (3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed, and (4) a
likelihood that the suspect will flee.

Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶30.

The objective test for determining whether exigent
circumstances exist is whether a police officer, under the
facts as they were known at the time, would reasonably
believe that delay in procuring a search warrant would
gravely endanger life, risk destruction of evidence, or greatly
enhance the likelihood of the suspect’s escape.

Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶24; see also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525,
2534 (2019) (“[U]nder the exception for exigent circumstances, a warrantless search
is allowed when ‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure
a warrant.’” (citation omitted)). “The State bears the burden of proving the
existence of exigent circumstances.” State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, ¶29, 235 Wis. 2d
524, 612 N.W.2d 29. The question of whether exigent circumstances justified a
warrantless search is also a mixed question of constitutional fact, id., ¶26, as is
whether law enforcement had probable cause, State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶10, 317
Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569.

26
No. 2021AP1767-CR

¶49 On appeal, the State argues that law enforcement had both probable
cause and exigent circumstances to justify a search of Bowers’ Account. We agree
with the State that law enforcement had probable cause to search Bowers’ Account.
Daniels testified that the county’s data manager informed him that Bowers had
shared both paper and electronic county records without permission. Further,
Bowers himself informed Daniels that he had shared the case file records without
authorization prior to the search. Lind testified that she was aware that Bowers’
Account contained county property that “should not be out there.” Bowers was
ultimately charged with the unauthorized sharing of these records. Therefore, there
was a “‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found in
Bowers’ Account. See Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶21 (citation omitted).

¶50 The State further argues that exigent circumstances existed “because
the State had an urgent need to figure out what information was shared with whom
and to stop it from being disseminated further.” According to the State, “Lind
testified that at the time of the alleged search, law enforcement did not know exactly
what case files Bowers had stored in the Dropbox account” and no one knew “who,
or how many people, had access to the case files information Bowers had shared.”
The State claimed that the “sensitive” nature of the information typically contained
in a case file, such as information related to victims, confidential informants, and
medical records, made it “imperative that law enforcement determine, as quickly as
possible, what information was shared with whom in order to promptly prevent it
from being disseminated any further” by those individuals.

¶51 We disagree that under the facts of this case the search of Bowers’
Account was necessitated by exigent circumstances. While we accept the State’s
argument that it needed to determine what information had been shared and with
whom in order to stem the further release of the information, we do not agree that

27
No. 2021AP1767-CR

the need for official action was so compelling that there was no time to secure a
warrant.

¶52 Daniels was made aware on February 27, 2017, that Bowers had
shared the Murder 3 case file, yet the search of Bowers’ Account did not take place
until March 2, 2017. The State appears to argue that there were “reason[s]” for this
delay—including Lind’s attempt to contact Dropbox directly and the need to seek
legal advice from the county’s district attorney—and the delay therefore “does not
make what happened here any less of an emergency.” We disagree. The fact that
law enforcement first attempted other avenues to obtain the evidence it sought
actually cuts against its argument that there was any exigency involved. In effect,
the delay in seeking a search warrant appears to have created the State’s claim of an
emergency. Under the circumstances, law enforcement clearly had time to obtain a
search warrant prior to accessing Bowers’ Account.

¶53 To the extent the State is claiming that Bowers’ potential destruction
of evidence created the exigency, we are also unpersuaded. In the circuit court, the
State argued that there was a risk that Bowers, or someone else with access, would
delete the records from his Account, thereby erasing both the evidence and any
record of with whom Bowers shared the information. The State claimed at that point
“law enforcement would have no idea what had been leaked to whom outside the
organization.” The court specifically found, however, that “Dropbox does archive
files for a period of time after they are deleted,” which Lind testified was thirty days.
Therefore, there was no “imminent” risk that the evidence would, in fact, be
destroyed. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).

¶54 Finally, the State argues that exigent circumstances existed due to a
threat to the safety of others. According to the State, “case files can contain

28
No. 2021AP1767-CR

information that could be dangerous to release, such as information about
confidential informants [and] juvenile identifying information,” and “[p]rotecting
an individual’s safety is a traditionally accepted circumstance that can justify an
exigency.” The State, however, cites only to Robinson, 327 Wis. 2d 302, ¶30, for
the general proposition that a threat to safety is an exigency. Not only does the State
fail to provide any specific details concerning how the release of the confidential
information would have in fact threatened anyone’s safety in this case, but it also
fails to cite any legal authority stating that the release of confidential information
itself could create an exigency sufficient to eclipse the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.

¶55 Further, while the State argues that “law enforcement already knew
Bowers had shared case files containing medical records in paper form,” the State
notes only that “the files Bowers shared turned out to contain juvenile identifying
information.” (Emphasis added.) The State does not assert that this information
was known to law enforcement prior to the search. See Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524,
¶43 (“[W]e do not apply hindsight to the exigency analysis; we consider only the
circumstances known to the officer at the time he made the entry and evaluate the
reasonableness of the officer’s action in light of those circumstances.”).

¶56 Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the State failed
to demonstrate that law enforcement had no time to obtain a warrant and that there
was an urgent need to act without one. Accordingly, the State has not met its burden
to establish both probable cause and exigent circumstances necessary to overcome
the presumption that the search of Bowers’ Account was unreasonable.

¶57 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court properly
denied the State’s motion for reconsideration of its decision suppressing evidence

29
No. 2021AP1767-CR

obtained from a search of Bowers’ Account. Bowers had both a subjective and
objective reasonable expectation of privacy in his Account. Therefore, law
enforcement engaged in an unlawful search of his Account within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, and no exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search
of the Account.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

30