State v. Najee S. Hudson

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
September 9, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP191-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CF56

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

NAJEE S. HUDSON,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for La Crosse County:
RAMONA A. GONZALEZ, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

Before Fitzpatrick, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.
No. 2022AP191

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. The State appeals a circuit court order granting
Najee Hudson’s motion to suppress statements made during a custodial
interrogation. The State argues that the circuit court applied the wrong legal
standard in determining that Hudson’s statements should be suppressed, and that
the court improperly cut short the presentation of evidence at the suppression
hearing by issuing its ruling before the State had finished presenting its case. We
agree. The circuit court’s ruling—that Hudson did not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, that his subsequent statements were
involuntary, or both—was based almost exclusively on a single fact that is not
decisive under either inquiry. When properly applied, both inquiries consider the
totality of the circumstances, and the truncated record made during the circuit
court proceeding does not allow us to determine whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, Hudson’s statements should be suppressed based on reasoning
other than that provided by the circuit court. We therefore reverse the suppression
order and remand for a full and fair hearing on Hudson’s motion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Law enforcement executed a search warrant of Najee Hudson’s
home to obtain evidence of an alleged sexual assault. Hudson was arrested during
the search, transported to a police station, and interrogated by Investigator Brooke

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Pataska. Pataska’s body camera recorded the entirety of the custodial
interrogation, which lasted just over one hour.1

¶3 The State charged Hudson with several counts related to sexual
assault and bail jumping. In due course, Hudson moved to suppress all statements
made during his custodial interrogation on at least two separate bases: (1) that he
did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights
consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination; and
(2) that his statements were involuntary, and their use at trial would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, because they were not the product of
his “free and unconstrained will,” and instead were the product of improper police
pressure.

¶4 The circuit court held a Miranda-Goodchild hearing on Hudson’s
motion to suppress.2 At the hearing, the prosecutor began to present her case by
calling Pataska as the State’s first witness. The prosecutor also moved to admit
Pataska’s body camera footage and a transcript of the interrogation into evidence.

¶5 The prosecutor announced her intention to play the video recording
of the interrogation from minute mark 00:25 to 09:39, and to periodically pause
the recording to ask questions. The 09:39 minute mark is significant because it is

1
The parties agree that the interrogation was “custodial.” Custodial interrogations have
been defined to mean “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.” See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
2
Named after Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, and State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d
244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), such evidentiary hearings are designed to determine the adequacy
of Miranda warnings, whether the defendant validly waived his constitutional rights, and whether
the ensuing statements were voluntarily made. See State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶25, 262 Wis. 2d
457, 663 N.W.2d 798.

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at 09:39 that Hudson signed a form that contained a “Statement of Miranda
Rights” on the top half, and a “Waiver of Rights” on the bottom half. However, as
discussed at greater length below, the circuit court cut off the presentation of
evidence and issued its ruling before the prosecutor was able to play that portion
of the video.

¶6 We now summarize the portions of the video that were played at the
hearing. After Hudson and Pataska entered the interrogation room, Hudson started
to tell Pataska about being detained at his home, and he indicated that no one had
explained to him what was going on. Pataska responded that Hudson had been
arrested, and that she had to read Hudson his rights before she could continue to
ask him questions.

¶7 During the exchange that followed, which lasted several minutes,
Pataska repeatedly told Hudson that she could not talk to him until she read him
his rights, and she did in fact read Hudson the statement of rights, as well as a
portion of the waiver of rights form. Hudson expressed concern that he was
supposed to be home when his mother was done with work and that, if he waited
to speak with Pataska until his lawyer arrived, he would have to wait in jail and
would not be home to help his mother. At times, Hudson asserted that he wanted
to talk to Pataska, at other times, he indicated that he did not “want to sign [his]
rights over,” and at yet other times, he reviewed the waiver of rights form and
expressed confusion and concern about its contents.

¶8 At minute 08:30 of the recorded interview, Hudson, who was
looking at the form, said that he should have already left for home. Pataska
responded, “that’s where I want to figure out what happened, and figure out what
was going on.” Hudson stated “I want to talk to you, I want to talk about this,”

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and he reached for a pen on the table. He then stated, “I do have a lawyer but like
he’ll be contacted ….” Hudson huffed in apparent frustration, picked up the pen,
and said: “I really feel like this means something else right now that this is
[inaudible] like me signing my fucking rights over.”3

¶9 At that point, the prosecutor paused the recording to ask Pataska a
question. As Pataska began to answer, the circuit court interrupted her testimony,
stating: “I don’t see anything in the submissions that said that anybody checked to
see how long it would take a lawyer to get there. Did anybody do that during the
course of this interview?” Pataska said she had not. The court responded: “All
right. That’s enough for me. I’m gonna suppress the statement.”

¶10 The circuit court explained its ruling as follows. Hudson was “very
clearly not understanding” what was going on, and he was “concerned” about the
length of time it was going to take to get a lawyer to speak with him. Pataska
should have made efforts to “find out how long it would take an attorney to get
there to speak with him.” If Pataska “had at least made the call” and informed
Hudson that it would “take a half hour or 20 minutes” for a lawyer to arrive, then
Hudson “would have had the information [he] needed to make a knowing and
voluntary waiver.”

3
The parties appear to dispute what Hudson’s precise words were at this point in the
recording. The State, citing the transcript of the recording, asserts that Hudson said: “I really feel
like this means something else right now. Like this is not necessarily in my [inaudible].” In
contrast, Hudson asserts that he said: “I really feel like this means something else right now.
This, like, this is not me signing my motherfucking rights or whatever.” We note that Hudson’s
version appears more consistent with what we hear on the video recording, as represented above.
However, his precise wording need not be resolved because, under any version, Hudson was
expressing confusion over the meaning of the waiver of rights form.

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No. 2022AP191

¶11 The prosecutor asked the circuit court to allow her to continue
playing the video recording. The court refused, stating “the issue for me is a
determinative issue.” It reiterated:

It … was clear [Hudson] was concerned about timing. It
was clear he was concerned about … waiting in jail. It
would have been a simple matter for the … officer to find
out how long it would take a lawyer to get there, and then
he would have had the information necessary to make a
knowing and voluntary waiver.

¶12 The prosecutor then asked if she could continue presenting witness
testimony, and she represented that “this was not the first time Mr. Hudson had
been read his rights and waived [them].” The circuit court again refused,
explaining:

Again it’s not a question about whether he had
known his rights or how often he’s read his rights. The
issue is what information he had at this particular time to
make the decision that was knowing and voluntarily made,
and it was clear that the issue here was timing; and he
needed to have the information about how long it would
take a lawyer to get there.… [A]nd that is why I’m
granting the motion to suppress.

¶13 The prosecutor objected on the ground that the pertinent legal
standard is “a balancing test,” and “that there are factors to be taken into
consideration[.]” The circuit court stated that Pataska’s failure to obtain
information about how long it would take to get a lawyer there was “for me a
determining factor” and that, if the court was wrong, the State could “prove that on
appeal.”

¶14 Hudson’s attorney then asked the circuit court to clarify whether it
was granting Hudson’s motion to suppress on the ground that his Miranda waiver
was invalid, or that his subsequent statements were involuntary, or both. The

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No. 2022AP191

court stated: “Voluntariness grounds …. I don’t believe that it was knowing and
voluntarily made when he was denied the opportunity to know how long the
lawyer would take to get there.” From the court’s statement, it was not apparent
whether the “it” that the court determined was “unknowing” and “involuntary”
was Hudson’s waiver of rights, his subsequent statements to Pataska, or both.

¶15 The circuit court issued a written order granting Hudson’s motion to
suppress on the “grounds of voluntariness.” The written order provides that “[t]he
court found that Mr. Hudson’s statements to law enforcement … were not
knowingly and voluntarily made because he was denied the opportunity to know
how long it would take to receive legal counsel prior to making a statement to law
enforcement.” The State appeals the order.

DISCUSSION

¶16 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth a
privilege to remain silent in the face of government accusation, which is often
referred to as the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V;4
State v. Rejholec, 2021 WI App 45, ¶18, 398 Wis. 2d 729, 963 N.W.2d 121. To
safeguard that privilege, the State may not use statements stemming from an
accused’s custodial interrogation at a subsequent trial unless it demonstrates that it
used procedural safeguards prior to taking the accused’s statements. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Prior to any questioning, the accused must be

4
See also WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8(1) (“No person … may be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself or herself.”). Wisconsin courts have generally interpreted
Wisconsin’s self-incrimination clause consistently with the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the Fifth Amendment. See State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶18 & n.3, 318 Wis. 2d
301, 767 N.W.2d 236.

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No. 2022AP191

warned that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be
used in evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney
(either retained or appointed). Id.; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420
(1986). A defendant may waive these rights and proceed with an interrogation,
provided that his waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently obtained.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

¶17 Separately, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of an
involuntary confession for purposes of prosecution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;5
see Rejholec, 398 Wis. 2d 729, ¶21; State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶32, 262 Wis. 2d
457, 663 N.W.2d 798. The admission of an involuntary statement into evidence at
trial is a violation of the accused’s constitutional right to due process. State v.
Vice, 2021 WI 63, ¶28, 397 Wis. 2d 682, 961 N.W.2d 1 (citing State v. Hoppe,
2003 WI 43, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407).

¶18 When the State seeks to introduce an accused’s custodial statements
into evidence and the defendant challenges their admission, the State has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it has complied with
these constitutional dictates. Jiles, 262 Wis. 2d 457, ¶26; State v. Lee, 175 Wis.
2d 348, 359, 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993). This requires the State to prove
that the accused was adequately informed of his Miranda rights and validly

5
See also WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8(1) (“No person may be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.”). Wisconsin courts have generally interpreted the
protections against coerced confessions provided by Wisconsin’s due process clause consistently
with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause. See Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶18 & n.3.

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No. 2022AP191

waived those rights and, also, that his statements were themselves voluntary.6 See
Jiles, 262 Wis. 2d 457, ¶26; Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 359.

¶19 On appeal, the State asserts that the circuit court erred in suppressing
Hudson’s statements, and it requests that we either reverse the court’s order or
remand with instructions to hold a full and fair suppression hearing and apply the
proper legal standard. The State bases its argument exclusively on its analysis of
the voluntariness of Hudson’s statements, and it makes no argument about whether
Hudson validly waived his Miranda rights.7 Hudson, in contrast, argues that the
circuit court’s ruling can and should be sustained, whether on involuntariness
grounds, Miranda waiver grounds, or both.

¶20 For the reasons we now explain, we conclude that, whether the
circuit court suppressed Hudson’s statements because his Miranda waiver was

6
We observe that, under the “impeachment exception,” “‘[a] finding that statements
were obtained in violation of Miranda does not inexorably lead to a finding of involuntariness
with the attendant prohibition against impeachment use of the statements.’” State v. Rejholec,
2021 WI App 45, ¶27 & n.10, 398 Wis. 2d 729, 963 N.W.2d 121 (quoting State v. Mendoza, 96
Wis. 2d 106, 118, 291 N.W.2d 478 (1980)). “‘A statement of the defendant made without the
appropriate Miranda warnings, although inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, may be
used to impeach the defendant’s credibility if the defendant testifies to matters contrary to what is
in the excluded statement.’” Id. (quoting Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d at 118). “‘It is only if the
statements are also found to be involuntary that their use for impeachment purposes is
precluded.”’ Id. (quoting Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d at 118-19).
7
In its reply brief, the State insists that the circuit court’s suppression ruling was based
exclusively on Fourteenth Amendment voluntariness grounds. It further contends that we could
not sustain the court’s ruling on Miranda waiver grounds because the State did not raise the
Miranda waiver issue in its notice of appeal or appellate brief and because there are “simply …
no findings of fact” or “any decision [for this court] to review.” These arguments are factually
and legally wrong. As a factual matter, although the circuit court stated at times that Hudson’s
statements were involuntary, it also stated at other times that Hudson’s waiver was not knowing
and voluntary. And as a legal matter, we are entitled to affirm a circuit court’s ruling on grounds
other than those expressed by the circuit court. See State v. Trecroci, 2001 WI App 126, ¶45, 246
Wis. 2d 261, 630 N.W.2d 555; State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 648, 416 N.W.2d 60 (1987).

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No. 2022AP191

invalid, his statements were involuntary, or both, the court applied the wrong legal
standard. For the reasons we explain below, the fact that Pataska did not look into
or inform Hudson of how long it would take for an attorney to arrive is not by
itself decisive under either inquiry.

I. Miranda Waiver

¶21 As discussed above, to admit a defendant’s custodial statements into
evidence, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant received and understood a set of Miranda warnings sufficient to advise
him of his constitutional rights, and that he validly waived those rights following
the administration of the warnings. Jiles, 262 Wis. 2d 457, ¶26.

¶22 A waiver is valid if it is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Rejholec, 398 Wis. 2d 729, ¶19. A waiver is “voluntary” if it is “‘the product of a
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.’” Id.,
¶29 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421). A waiver is “knowing and intelligent” if it
is “‘made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’” Rejholec, 398 Wis. 2d 729,
¶29 (quoted source omitted); State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶30, 318 Wis. 2d 301,
767 N.W.2d 236. For a waiver to have “‘been made with full awareness both of
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it,’” Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 356 (quoted source omitted), the accused must at
least be “cognizant at all times of ‘the State’s intention to use [his] statements to
secure a conviction’ and of the fact that [he] can ‘stand mute and request a
lawyer.’” Id. at 365 (quoted source omitted). However, an awareness of every
consequence of waiving one’s rights is not required, nor is an awareness of “all
information that might be ‘useful’” or “that might ‘affect one’s decision to

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No. 2022AP191

confess.’” Id. at 364-65 (quoted source omitted). For instance, knowing a list of
“‘all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of the interrogation,’” though
potentially useful to the defendant in assessing the wisdom of waiving his rights, is
not required for the waiver to be knowing and intelligent. Id. at 365 (quoted
source omitted).

¶23 Law enforcement’s “‘deliberate or reckless’ withholding of
information” can render a waiver unknowing and unintelligent if such tactics
“deprive[] a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the
nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.” Moran, 475 U.S.
at 423-24; see also Rejholec, 398 Wis. 2d 729, ¶¶30, 34 (addressing
misrepresentations). However, to the extent that such withholding of information
deprives a defendant of non-essential information, it does not render his waiver
unknowing or unintelligent. See Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶34.

¶24 As discussed above, the circuit court’s stated reason for suppressing
Hudson’s statements was that Pataska did not find out and inform Hudson how
long it would take for his attorney to arrive. However, Hudson does not defend
the circuit court’s analysis by pointing to any United States Supreme Court or
Wisconsin case that requires a defendant to know how long it will take for his
attorney to arrive, or that prohibits law enforcement from withholding such
information, to ensure that the defendant comprehends the nature of his rights or
the consequences of the decision to abandon them. Indeed, United States Supreme
Court and Wisconsin cases appear to point in the opposite direction. See Moran,
475 U.S. at 432-24 (concluding that police’s failure to inform a suspect that his
attorney was attempting to call him did not affect suspect’s knowing, intelligent,

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No. 2022AP191

and voluntary waiver); State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 213-15, 401 N.W.2d
771 (1987); Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶34.8

¶25 The circuit court’s focus on this single factor was also inconsistent
with other case law, which requires an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances. See State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶91, 307 Wis. 2d 98, 745
N.W.2d 48 (discussing how the waiver analysis requires a case-by-case
examination of all facts and circumstances, including “the suspect’s background,
experience, and conduct”); Rejholec, 398 Wis. 2d 729, ¶29 (only if the totality of
the circumstances demonstrates that a defendant, with the requisite level of
comprehension, made an uncoerced choice, may a court conclude that a waiver
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary).

¶26 Accordingly, to the extent that the circuit court determined that
Pataska’s failure to inform Hudson of how long it would take for his attorney to
arrive decisively rendered his waiver unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary, we
conclude that the circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard.

II. Voluntariness of Statements

¶27 As discussed above, to admit a defendant’s statements into evidence,
the State must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his statements
8
In Hanson and Ward, law enforcement failed to inform the respective suspects that
their attorneys were waiting outside of the interrogation room, ready and willing to speak with
them. See State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 213-15, 401 N.W.2d 771 (1987); Ward, 318 Wis.
2d 301, ¶34. In both cases, our supreme court concluded that the failure to advise the suspects of
“the immediate availability of a particular attorney” did not in itself render their waivers
unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d at 208; Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301,
¶36. In Hanson, the court explained: “Although a suspect who was ready to waive his rights
might change his mind when told an attorney was waiting to see him, the critical factor would be
the convenience of seeing the attorney, not the intelligent or perceived need for legal counsel.”
Id. at 212.

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No. 2022AP191

were voluntary. State v. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, ¶72, 392 Wis. 2d 505, 945 N.W.2d
609. Statements are “voluntary” if they are “‘the product of a free and
unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of
a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on
the defendant by representatives of the State exceeded the defendant’s ability to
resist.’” Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶18 (quoted source omitted).

¶28 In determining whether a defendant’s statements were voluntary, we
again examine the totality of the circumstances. Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶38.
The totality of the circumstances contemplates balancing the characteristics of the
defendant against the police tactics employed to obtain the defendant’s statements.
Id., ¶¶38-39. In evaluating police conduct, we examine the length of the
questioning, the general conditions or circumstances in which the statement was
taken, whether any excessive physical or psychological pressure was used, and
whether any inducements, threats, methods, or strategies were used in order to
elicit a statement from the defendant. Id., ¶39. To evaluate the defendant’s
personal characteristics, we consider his “age, education and intelligence, physical
or emotional condition, and prior experience with law enforcement.” Id.

¶29 However, “[w]e cannot properly label a statement involuntary unless
there is ‘some affirmative evidence of improper police practices deliberately used
to procure a confession.’” Dobbs, 392 Wis. 2d 505, ¶72 (quoted source omitted).
Therefore, “[b]efore we balance personal characteristics against police pressures,”
we must make a threshold finding of coercion or improper police tactics. See
Vice, 397 Wis. 2d 682, ¶ 31. It is important to note that coercive or improper
conduct may take “subtle forms,” State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 238, 401
N.W.2d 759 (1987), and that “coercion can be mental as well as physical.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448; see also Vice, 397 Wis. 2d 682, ¶48 (considering the

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No. 2022AP191

cumulative coercive effect of tactics that were not deemed coercive in and of
themselves). “To aid us in identifying coercive police conduct, we review cases in
which courts have analyzed various police tactics to determine whether they were
coercive.” Id., ¶33.

¶30 Again, Hudson does not defend the circuit court’s analysis by
pointing to any United States Supreme Court or Wisconsin case concluding that
law enforcement’s failure to advise a suspect of how long it will take for his
attorney to arrive is improper or coercive. And, once more, Wisconsin precedent
appears to point in the opposite direction. See Ward, 318 Wis. 2d. 301, ¶37
(concluding that law enforcement’s deliberate withholding of information on the
status and location of Ward’s attorney did not affect the voluntariness of Ward’s
statements).

¶31 Additionally, even if Pataska’s failure to inform Hudson of how long
it would take for his attorney to arrive amounted to a coercive or improper police
tactic, it would not decisively render Hudson’s statements involuntary. Vice, 397
Wis. 2d 682, ¶35 (“[W]hen a defendant establishes coercive police tactics, the
resulting statement is not automatically rendered involuntary.”). Rather, the
conduct must still be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances and
balanced against other conditions and the personal characteristics of the accused.
See id.

¶32 Accordingly, to the extent the circuit court determined that Pataska’s
failure to inform Hudson of how long it would take for his attorney to arrive
decisively rendered his subsequent statements involuntary, we conclude that the
circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard.

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III. Remedy

¶33 Having concluded that the circuit court applied incorrect legal
standards when determining that Hudson’s statements must be suppressed, we
now briefly address the parties’ arguments that we could affirm or reverse the
court’s order using different reasoning and the correct legal standards. Hudson
argues that we should affirm the circuit court’s order on alternative grounds, and
the State argues that we should reverse.

¶34 The validity of a waiver is a question of law that we review de novo,
see Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶17, and, in assessing the voluntariness of statements
we independently apply the constitutional principles of due process to the facts as
found by the circuit court. See Dobbs, 392 Wis. 2d 505, ¶29. As such, we would
typically be free to reverse the circuit court’s legal conclusions on either inquiry,
or to affirm based on alternative reasoning or grounds other than those employed
by the circuit court. See State v. Baudhuin, 141 Wis. 2d 642, 648, 416 N.W.2d 60
(1987). However, as we have discussed, both inquiries require us to examine the
totality of the circumstances and here, the circuit court truncated the presentation
of evidence before either side could elicit facts that might be relevant to a totality-
based inquiry. The State carried the burden of proving the validity of Hudson’s
Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of his statements, and the circuit court
refused to allow the prosecutor to finish playing the portions of the video
recording she wanted to present, to finish her examination of Pataska, or to present
any additional evidence necessary to meet the State’s burden of proof. Likewise,
Hudson was precluded from presenting evidence that could be relevant to either or
both inquiries. Under these circumstances, the record developed at the Miranda-
Goodchild hearing does not allow us to assess whether, based on the totality of the
circumstances, Hudson’s Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,

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No. 2022AP191

or whether his subsequent statements were themselves voluntary. Accordingly,
we remand this case to the circuit court to conduct a full and fair Miranda-
Goodchild hearing.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5. (2019-20).

16