Waupaca County v. DeAnn R. Golla

2022 WI APP 40

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2021AP1076

†Petition for review filed

Complete Title of Case:

WAUPACA COUNTY,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DEANN R. GOLLA AND DAWN M. ZEINERT,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. †

Opinion Filed: June 23, 2022
Oral Argument: April 25, 2022

JUDGES: Kloppenburg, Fitzpatrick, and Graham, JJ.

Appellant
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendants-appellants, the cause was submitted on the
briefs of and oral argument by Michael P. Van Kleunen of Axley
Brynelson, LLP, Waukesha.

Respondent
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the
brief of Diane Meulemans and Tiffany R. Wunderlin, of Waupaca
County Corporation Counsel, Waupaca. There was oral argument by
Andrew T. Phillips.
2022 WI App 40

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 23, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1076 Cir. Ct. No. 2016CV214

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

WAUPACA COUNTY,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DEANN R. GOLLA AND DAWN M. ZEINERT,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waupaca County:
TROY NIELSEN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Kloppenburg, Fitzpatrick, and Graham, JJ.

¶1 KLOPPENBURG, J. Sisters DeAnn R. Golla and Dawn Zeinert
challenge the authority of Waupaca County (“the County”) to enforce provisions in
the County’s General Zoning Ordinance as to the construction of an addition to an
No. 2021AP1076

existing structure on their shoreland property. 1 Specifically, Golla argues that the
side yard setback and land use permit provisions that apply to structural alterations
on any property in the County do not apply to the addition on her property. The
circuit court rejected Golla’s challenge, determining first that a 1988 side yard
setback variance (generally, “the 1988 variance”) that allowed the construction of
the existing structure on Golla’s property does not exempt Golla from the need to
obtain a variance from the side yard setback for the addition. Addressing a new
argument raised by Golla on a second motion for reconsideration, the court also
determined that the shoreland zoning statute, WIS. STAT. § 59.692 (2019-20),2 does
not prohibit the County from enforcing its General Zoning Ordinance provisions
imposing a side yard setback and requiring a land use permit as to the addition.

¶2 Accordingly, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment to
the County, determining that it was undisputed that Golla constructed the addition
without applying for and obtaining a side yard setback variance or a land use permit
from the County in violation of the General Zoning Ordinance side yard setback and
land use permit provisions. At the conclusion of a remedies hearing, the court
rejected Golla’s argument that the County’s failure to follow the razing statute, WIS.
STAT. § 66.0413, barred injunctive relief. The court then considered the applicable

1
Following the lead of the parties, we refer to the County Zoning Ordinance that applies
to all property in the County as the “County General Zoning Ordinance” or “General Zoning
Ordinance,” to distinguish it from the “County Shoreland Zoning Ordinance” or “Shoreland Zoning
Ordinance” that applies only to property in the shoreland.

Also following the lead of the parties, we will refer both to DeAnn R. Golla and Dawn
Zeinert collectively, and to DeAnn R. Golla individually, as “Golla.”
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise
noted. Any amendments to WIS. STAT. § 59.692 since the addition was constructed in 2016 have
not changed the language at issue in this appeal.

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factors for injunctive relief for a zoning violation, including the extensive nature of
the violation and that Golla had been “put on notice time and time again both orally
and in writing of the County’s position” that construction of the addition could not
proceed without a side yard setback variance and a land use permit. The court
granted the County’s request for injunctive relief and ordered removal of the
addition.3

¶3 On appeal, Golla seeks reversal of the circuit court’s decisions
denying her second motion for reconsideration and granting the County’s request
for injunctive relief. Regarding the court’s denial of her second motion for
reconsideration, Golla argues that she is entitled to summary judgment dismissing
this action because WIS. STAT. § 59.692 prohibits the County from enforcing the
side yard setback and land use permit provisions in its General Zoning Ordinance
as to the addition on her shoreland property. The County responds that the 1988
variance that allowed construction of the original structure that encroaches on the
side yard setback does not allow construction of the 2016 addition that also
encroaches on the side yard setback without a new variance in connection with a
land use permit. Additionally, the County argues that § 59.692 does not prohibit the
County from enforcing the side yard setback and land use permit provisions in its
General Zoning Ordinance as to the addition.

¶4 We conclude that Golla was required to obtain a variance for the
addition because the 1988 variance does not exempt Golla from compliance with
the side yard setback and land use permit provisions in the General Zoning
Ordinance as to construction of the addition. We reach this conclusion based on the

3
The parties stipulated to, and the circuit court ordered, a stay of the court’s order pending
appeal.

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unambiguous language in the 1988 variance and Golla’s failure to develop an
argument based on that language or supporting legal authority to the contrary. We
also conclude that WIS. STAT. § 59.692 does not bar the County from enforcing the
side yard setback and land use permit provisions in its General Zoning Ordinance,
which apply to structural alterations on all property in the County, as to the
construction of the addition on Golla’s shoreland property. We reach this
conclusion based on the statutory language, interpreted in relation to the statute’s
scope, purpose, and context, the language of related statutes, and statutory history.
Because it is undisputed that Golla did not obtain a side yard setback variance or
land use permit before constructing the addition, the circuit court properly granted
partial summary judgment to the County on the violations alleged in the complaint.

¶5 As to the circuit court’s decision granting the County’s request for
injunctive relief, Golla argues that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in
granting injunctive relief in two respects: (1) injunctive relief is barred because the
requirements in WIS. STAT. § 66.0413, which authorizes counties to order a property
owner to raze a building, were not met; and, alternatively, (2) the court failed to
properly analyze the factors that apply to injunctive relief for a zoning violation.
Based on a plain meaning interpretation of the language of § 66.0413 and case law
explaining what injunctive relief is available under WIS. STAT. § 59.69(11), which
authorizes counties to enforce zoning ordinances “by injunctional order,” we
conclude that the statutory razing requirements do not limit or otherwise affect the
circuit court’s authority to grant injunctive relief under § 59.69(11), as requested by
the County. Based on our review of the record, which includes the court’s detailed
and comprehensive consideration of the applicable factors, we conclude that the
court properly exercised its discretion.

¶6 Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

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BACKGROUND

¶7 The following undisputed facts, taken from the stipulated facts filed
with the circuit court and testimony by Golla and the County Zoning Administrator
at the remedies hearing, provide necessary context for the issues raised on appeal.4

¶8 Golla owns property located on Dake Lake in the Town of Dayton,
Waupaca County. The property is located in a “sewered residential” area under the
County General Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 34, Section 3.09.5 The property is also
located in the shoreland under the County Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 32.

¶9 In 1988, Golla’s father, who then owned the property, obtained a
variance to build a residence on the property which is smaller than the applicable
minimum lot size under the County General Zoning Ordinance. The 1988 variance
also permitted placement of the residence within the shoreland setback under the
Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, and within the applicable side yard setback under the
General Zoning Ordinance. The 1988 variance contained certain conditions,
including a five-foot side yard setback and that a “[l]and use permit must be issued

4
On appeal, a party must include appropriate factual references to the record in its briefing.
WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(d)-(e). The vast majority of Golla’s citations in support of her factual
assertions are instead to her appendix. The appendix is not the record. United Rentals, Inc. v. City
of Madison, 2007 WI App 131, ¶1 n.2, 302 Wis. 2d 245, 733 N.W.2d 322. Additionally, the
County at times does not include pin cites within its citations to the record, which requires that we
search the document cited. The confusion and additional complexity caused by these deficiencies
were apparent during the record-intensive discussions at oral argument. We warn Golla and the
County that future violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure may result in sanctions. See WIS.
STAT. RULE 809.83(2).

5
WAUPACA COUNTY, WIS., GENERAL ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 32, § 3.09 (2020). All
citations to provisions of the County General Zoning Ordinance and the County Shoreland Zoning
Ordinance are to the versions of the provisions filed by Golla with the circuit court in October 2020
or cited in the stipulated facts, unless otherwise noted. The parties do not expressly indicate
whether the versions of the specific provisions in the record were in effect at the time that Golla
constructed the addition, but the parties do not contend that they were not. Nor did the parties so
contend at oral argument in response to questioning concerning the cited ordinance provisions.

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PRIOR to start of construction.” Golla’s father submitted a land use permit
application showing the project site plan, and built a one-story residence consistent
with the application and the 1988 variance.

¶10 In the summer of 2015, Golla contacted the County Deputy Zoning
Administrator about what County approval would be necessary for a second-story
addition within the footprint of the existing residence. The Deputy Zoning
Administrator told Golla that a land use permit was required and would not be issued
without a side yard setback variance for the addition.

¶11 In August 2015, Golla applied to the Town of Dayton (“the Town”)
for a building permit for the addition, and the Town issued the building permit in
April 2016. The Town building permit included the following condition: “Please
consult with Waupaca County to determine if any type of L.U. [land use] permit is
required. Issued based on recently passed legislation.” By signing the permit, Golla
certified that she understood that she was “subject to any conditions of this permit.”
The permit also stated: “Failure to comply may result in suspension or revocation
of this permit or other penalty.”

¶12 Golla did not consult with the County about whether a land use permit
was required after receiving the Town building permit, nor did she ever apply for a
County land use permit for construction of the addition. Golla also never applied
for a variance from the side yard setback for the addition

¶13 Between the time of her contact with the County in the summer of
2015 and the Town’s issuance of the building permit in April 2016, Golla spoke
several times with a State Representative. Golla understood from her conversations

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with the Representative that no County land use permit was necessary for
construction of the addition because of a new law that had recently been enacted.6

¶14 On May 13, 2016, the County Planning and Zoning Office sent a letter
to Golla advising her that she was required to obtain a land use permit for
construction of the addition. The letter stated:

It has come to our attention that you are considering an
addition …. We are also aware that the state has revised the
shoreland zoning laws applicable to your property so as not
to require you to obtain a land use permit for certain
structural alterations under Waupaca County’s Shore[land]
zoning ordinance …. The purpose of this letter is to advise
you that the Waupaca County Planning and Zoning Office
still requires a land use permit before any building or
structure is erected, moved, or structurally altered under the
[General] Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 34 Section 14.03(5).
Failure to comply with the permitting requirements may
result in after the fact fees and legal action against you and
the property.

¶15 After receiving this letter, Golla spoke with the Town Building
Inspector and the Representative, and she understood from those conversations that
she was authorized under state law to continue with construction of the addition.
Specifically, Golla was aware that the County required a County land use permit for
construction of the addition, but, according to Golla, she was told by the Town
Building Inspector and the Representative that no County land use permit was
necessary under the newly enacted law.

¶16 On May 23, 2016, Golla began construction of the addition.

6
It is evident from the briefing that the new law to which the State Representative was
referring consisted of amendments to WIS. STAT. § 59.692, which we address in detail in the
discussion section below. See 2015 Wis. Act 55 (creating § 59.692(1k)(a)4. and 59.692(5m)); 2015
Wis. Act 391 (amending § 59.692(1k)(a)4.).

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¶17 On May 27, 2016, the County Planning and Zoning Department
personally served a cease and desist letter on Golla, which stated:

It has come to our attention that you have started a
vertical expansion project … without first applying for and
receiving the applicable land use permits as detailed in the
letter sent to you on May 13th, 2016 …. As previously
indicated, the expansion implicates general County zoning
standards that apply both within and outside the shoreland
zone.

This letter is being sent as a warning to cease and
desist all actions related to the vertical expansion project in
contravention of the County Zoning Ordinance. Failure to
do so by May 31st will result in this office filing a demand
for prosecution with the County Corporation Counsel and
appropriate enforcement officials pursuant to Sec. 14.07 of
the County Zoning Ordinance. Please refer to Sec. 14.07 of
the County Zoning Ordinance for the remedies available to
the County in the event you do not comply with this request.

¶18 Golla met with the Town Building Inspector and the Representative
and showed them the cease and desist letter. According to Golla, they told her that
she had “nothing to worry about” under the new state law. Golla continued with
construction and completed the addition.

¶19 On June 8, 2016, the County Deputy Zoning Administrator issued a
citation to Golla for failing to obtain a land use permit before commencing
construction of the addition as required by the General Zoning Ordinance,
Chapter 34, Section 14.03(5)(a).

¶20 On August 3, 2016, the County filed this action, alleging that Golla
violated and was in continuing violation of the General Zoning Ordinance,
Chapter 34, Section 14.03(5)(a), by failing to obtain a land use permit for
construction of the addition. The complaint also alleged that Golla violated and was
in continuing violation of the General Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 34, Section 4, by

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constructing an addition that encroaches on the side yard setback. The County
sought injunctive relief and forfeitures for the alleged violations.

¶21 This action was consolidated with the citation action.

¶22 Golla filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the parties
filed a stipulation of undisputed facts along with briefs supporting and opposing the
motion. The circuit court heard argument at a hearing in October 2019. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that the undisputed facts established
that Golla had violated both the land use permit and the side yard setback provisions
in the County General Zoning Ordinance. The court focused on the legal effect of
the 1988 variance and determined that it does not exempt Golla from compliance
with the side yard setback regarding subsequent construction, “unless a [new]
variance was sought and obtained.”

¶23 In April 2020, Golla filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the
alleged land use permit violation was an irrelevant “procedural” issue because the
addition complied with the County General Zoning Ordinance “as modified by” the
1988 variance. Therefore, according to Golla, the County erroneously informed her
that a land use permit would be denied without a new variance. The County opposed
the motion, asserting that there were two separate substantive issues before the
circuit court: whether the 1988 variance permitted a new addition in 2016 and
whether Golla completed the addition without a land use permit. The County noted
that Golla conceded the second issue, and contended that Golla’s arguments as to
the first issue relied on inapposite case law and repeated arguments that the court
had rejected. In an order dated June 25, 2020, the court denied Golla’s motion for
reconsideration, adopting the County’s “rationale.”

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¶24 In October 2020, Golla filed a second motion for reconsideration,
arguing for the first time that WIS. STAT. § 59.692, which addresses a county’s
shoreland zoning authority, bars the County from requiring that Golla obtain a land
use permit or a side yard setback variance under its General Zoning Ordinance
before constructing an addition on her shoreland property.

¶25 In January 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on Golla’s second
motion for reconsideration. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court
determined that Golla failed to establish an error of law warranting reconsideration
of the court’s earlier decision granting partial summary judgment to the County.
Specifically, the court determined that WIS. STAT. § 59.692 unambiguously does not
bar the County from enforcing the side yard setback and land use permit provisions
in its General Zoning Ordinance.

¶26 In February 2021, the circuit court held a remedies hearing at which
Golla and the County Zoning Administrator (who had been the County Deputy
Zoning Administrator when Golla contacted the County in 2015) testified. After
hearing the testimony and the parties’ arguments, the court first determined that the
razing statute, WIS. STAT. § 66.0413, does not apply. The court then considered the
applicable factors and granted the County’s request for an injunction requiring that
the residence be brought into compliance by removal of the addition. The court also
denied the County’s request for forfeitures. We will address the court’s decision in
detail in our analysis below.

¶27 In May 2021, the circuit court issued a written “Final Findings and
Order” that reiterated its findings and rulings on partial summary judgment, the
second motion for reconsideration, and remedies.

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¶28 As to partial summary judgment, the circuit court reiterated that the
1988 variance applied only to the structure constructed pursuant to that variance and
does not exempt either Golla’s father or subsequent property owners “from having
to comply with” the side yard setback that applies to “any subsequent changes” to
the structure. The court also stated: “[Golla] ignored many steps …. [Golla] never
applied for a land use permit or for a variance to vertically expand the residence.
Had they done so and been denied they would have had multiple avenues of recourse
but they chose not to engage with the County at all and proceeded with the
addition[.]”

¶29 As to the second motion for reconsideration, the circuit court
reiterated its determination that WIS. STAT. § 59.692 unambiguously does not bar
the County from enforcing the side yard setback and land use permit provisions in
its General Zoning Ordinance.

¶30 As to remedies, the circuit court reiterated its determination that WIS.
STAT. § 66.0413 does not apply because the County sought to bring the property
into compliance with the General Zoning Ordinance, not to raze the residence. The
court then made detailed findings based on the factors applicable to the County’s
request for injunctive relief for Golla’s zoning violations, consistent with its remarks
at the conclusion of the remedies hearing. The court granted the County’s request
for injunctive relief and ordered that Golla “remove the structural alterations made
in the year 2016.” The court denied the County’s additional request for forfeitures

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and awarded no costs to the County. Golla appealed, and on the parties’ stipulation
the court stayed its order pending appeal.7

DISCUSSION

¶31 We first address Golla’s challenge to the circuit court’s decisions
granting partial summary judgment to the County on the County’s claims that Golla
violated the side yard setback and land use permit provisions of the General Zoning
Ordinance and denying reconsideration on this issue. Because we affirm the circuit
court’s determination that Golla violated those General Zoning Ordinance
provisions, we then address Golla’s challenge to the court’s decision granting the
County’s request for injunctive relief for those violations.

I. VIOLATION OF SIDE YARD SETBACK AND LAND USE PERMIT
PROVISIONS

¶32 On appeal, Golla focuses on the issue raised in her second motion for
reconsideration—the legal effect of WIS. STAT. § 59.692 on the County’s
enforcement of its General Zoning Ordinance side yard setback and land use permit
provisions. Specifically, Golla argues that § 59.692 prohibits the County’s
enforcement of its side yard setback and land use permit provisions as to the vertical
addition of her residence. However, the County asserts that Golla would not have
been required to obtain a land use permit if she did not need a variance from the side
yard setback requirement. Thus, we need only reach Golla’s § 59.692 argument if
the 1988 variance does not exempt her from compliance with the side yard setback
provision as to the 2016 addition.

7
After the parties completed their briefing of this appeal, this court ordered oral argument
directing counsel to expand on their arguments with specific attention to the interpretation and
application of certain statutes. We appreciate counsel’s preparation and responsiveness on the
topics discussed at oral argument.

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¶33 Accordingly, we first address the legal effect of the 1988 variance to
determine whether the County properly required a side yard setback variance as a
condition of issuing a land use permit for the 2016 addition (the subject of the circuit
court’s rulings on summary judgment and Golla’s first motion for reconsideration).
Because we conclude that the County properly required Golla to obtain a side yard
setback variance for the 2016 addition notwithstanding the 1988 variance, we then
address the legal effect of WIS. STAT. § 59.692 to determine whether the County
properly required a side yard setback variance and land use permit under that statute
(the subject of the circuit court’s ruling on Golla’s second motion for
reconsideration).

¶34 We review summary judgment de novo, using the same methodology
as the circuit court. R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 2001 WI 73, ¶12, 244 Wis. 2d
497, 628 N.W.2d 781. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; WIS. STAT.
§ 802.08(2) (summary judgment to the moving party) and (6) (summary judgment
to the non-moving party).

¶35 We review a circuit court’s decision on a motion for reconsideration
for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Koepsell’s Olde Popcorn Wagons, Inc. v.
Koepsell’s Festival Popcorn Wagons, Ltd., 2004 WI App 129, ¶6, 275 Wis. 2d 397,
685 N.W.2d 853. “To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, [a] movant must
present either newly discovered evidence or establish a manifest error of law or
fact.” Id., ¶44.

A. Legal Effect of 1988 Variance

¶36 As an initial matter, we note that Golla does not meaningfully address
this issue with any legal analysis beyond the conclusory assertion in a footnote in

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her initial appellant’s brief that, “[n]othing in the 1988 Variance limited the use of
the area variance to a single construction activity.” In her reply brief, addressing
the County’s assertion in its response brief that she thereby waived any argument as
to the effect of the 1988 variance on the 2016 addition, Golla merely states that,
“nothing in the 1988 Variance limited the vertical addition.” As we explain below,
we agree, in that nothing in the 1988 variance “limits” or otherwise applies to the
addition. If Golla means something different, she does not support her conclusory
assertions with any examination of the actual language of the 1988 variance or with
any citation to legal authority. Notably, Golla does not meaningfully develop any
argument that the circuit court erred in its decisions initially granting partial
summary judgment to the County and denying her first motion for reconsideration,
based on the court’s determination that the 1988 variance does not apply to the 2016
addition. We may treat Golla’s failure to challenge the circuit court’s rulings on the
1988 variance issue as a concession that the court’s rulings on this issue were
correct. See West Capitol, Inc. v. Village of Sister Bay, 2014 WI App 52, ¶49, 354
Wis. 2d 130, 848 N.W.2d 875 (explaining that “[f]ailure to address the grounds on
which the circuit court ruled constitutes a concession of the ruling’s validity.”).

¶37 However, we choose to address the issue of the legal effect of the 1988
variance as to the 2016 addition because, as explained above, if the specific 1988
variance in this case also permits the 2016 addition then we need not reach the
broader issue about the application of WIS. STAT. § 59.692. Moreover, the parties
briefed, and the circuit court decided, the issue on summary judgment and on the
first motion for reconsideration. We now explain why we conclude that the 1988
variance does not exempt Golla from compliance with the County General Zoning
Ordinance side yard setback provision as to the 2016 addition.

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¶38 WISCONSIN STAT. § 59.694(7)(c) allows a county board of adjustment
to grant a variance from the terms of a county general zoning ordinance enacted
pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 59.69, where a literal application of zoning regulations
would result in unnecessary hardship. See § 59.694(1) and (7)(a) (referencing the
powers of a board of adjustment vis-à-vis a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to
§ 59.69); sec. 59.69(1) and (4) (authorizing a county to enact a zoning ordinance
applicable to all property within the county). Specifically, a board of adjustment
has the power:

To authorize upon appeal in specific cases variances
from the terms of the ordinance that will not be contrary to
the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a
literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will
result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the
ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done.

Sec. 59.694(7)(c)2.

¶39 “The burden of proving unnecessary hardship [is] on the property
owner.” State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI
23, ¶¶7, 33, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401. The inquiry should focus on “the
circumstances of each individual case,” id., ¶34, and whether the statutory standard
of unnecessary hardship is met “depends upon a consideration of the purpose of the
zoning restriction in question, its effect on the property, and the effect of a variance
on the neighborhood and the larger public interest,” id., ¶¶7, 33. In addition, the
hardship must “be unique to the property and not self-created.” Id. “The power to
grant a variance is an exceptional one and … should be sparingly exercised.” State
v. Outagamie Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, ¶50, 244 Wis. 2d 613, 628
N.W.2d 376 (quoted source omitted).

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¶40 Side yard setback regulations “are intended to provide unoccupied
space for several purposes, including to afford room [for] lawn and trees, to promote
rest and recreation, to enhance the appearance of the neighborhood, and to provide
access to light and air.” Snyder v. Waukesha Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 74
Wis. 2d 468, 479, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976).

¶41 Here, in 1988 Golla’s father sought a variance “for the creation of 2
substandard size lots out of three existing lots, with less than required side[ ]yard
and water setbacks.” At the hearing before the County Board of Adjustment (“the
Board”), Golla’s father explained that he was proposing to put “a decent home” on
the property rather than add to the existing cottage that was “falling down,” and that
none of his neighbors objected to the proposed construction. In response to
questions about the relative sizes of the setbacks on either side of the proposed
construction, Golla’s father explained that the five-foot setback he was seeking on
one side would maintain a sufficient setback on the other side if that lot “may come
up for sale.” The Board granted the 1988 variance for the creation of the two
substandard lots and “for the construction of a dwelling with less than required
side[]yard and water setbacks.” The Board determined, “This would be a good use
of the land in this particular residential area.” The variance imposed several
conditions, including preparation of a certified survey map “showing the distances
as presented at the hearing,” a five-foot side yard setback, and issuance of a land
use permit before the start of construction.

¶42 The record of the Board’s deliberations and decision indicates that the
Board determined that: (1) a five-foot side yard setback for the proposed one-story
residence was appropriate in light of the purpose of the general zoning ordinance
and the effect of the reduced setback on the neighborhood and the larger public
interest at that time; and (2) any hardship was not self-created. However, the

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Board’s assessment of unnecessary hardship regarding construction of a one-story
structure that encroached on the side yard setback in 1988 does not indicate how the
Board would weigh the evidence regarding a second-story addition that encroaches
on the side yard setback in 2016, especially in light of: (1) any changes in the pattern
of construction in the area, the development of neighboring lots, or the larger public
interest in 2016; (2) the purpose of the general zoning ordinance; and (3) whether
the addition could be built without encroaching on the side yard setback. See
Roberts v. Manitowoc Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2006 WI App 169, ¶32, 295
Wis. 2d 522, 721 N.W.2d 499 (it is for the Board to weigh the evidence in a variance
case).

¶43 We discern no language in the 1988 variance that would relieve Golla
from her burden of proving, and the Board from determining, unnecessary hardship
so as to warrant a side yard setback variance for new construction in “the
circumstances” existing in 2016. See Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶34; see also id.,
¶33 (whether the property owner has proven unnecessary hardship in an individual
case depends on consideration of the purpose of the zoning restriction, its effect on
the property, and the effect of a variance on the neighborhood and larger public
interest, and on whether the hardship has been self-created).

¶44 The 1988 variance protects all owners of this property from future
efforts by the County to disturb any aspect of the structure that was legally built
pursuant to that variance. See Goldberg v City of Milwaukee Zoning Appeals Bd.,
115 Wis. 2d 517, 523-24, 340 N.W.2d 558 (Ct. App. 1983) (ruling that variance
allowing use of building on property as a six-family dwelling accrued to subsequent
owners, entitling them to continue to use the building as a six-family dwelling
without needing to apply for a new variance). However, requiring a variance for
the 2016 addition does not disturb any aspect of the structure that was legally built

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No. 2021AP1076

pursuant to the 1988 variance. The 2016 variance requirement pertains only to the
addition, and it applies to the addition because whether to grant a variance for the
new construction that encroaches on the side yard setback is a fact-specific
determination based on the circumstances existing at the time of the proposed
construction. See Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶¶33-34.

¶45 In sum, based on its actual language, the 1988 variance permitted only
the construction of the structure with a five-foot side yard setback for which that
variance was granted, pursuant to a land use permit issued for that structure. The
1988 variance does not extend to subsequent construction of an addition to that
structure that does not comply with the side yard setback provision of the General
Zoning Ordinance. Accordingly, the County properly required that Golla obtain a
side yard setback variance as a condition of issuing a land use permit for the 2016
addition, unless WIS. STAT. § 59.692 prohibits the County from enforcing the side
yard setback and land use permit provisions, which leads to the next part of our
analysis.

B. Legal Effect of WIS. STAT. § 59.692

¶46 Golla argues that the circuit court misinterpreted certain statutory
provisions when it denied her second motion for reconsideration, which raised for
the first time an argument based on WIS. STAT. § 59.692. “The interpretation and
application of statutes present questions of law that we review independently.” Brey
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶9, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1
(quoted source omitted).

¶47 “[T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the
statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect.” State ex
rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681

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N.W.2d 110. When interpreting a statute, Wisconsin courts begin with the statutory
language. Id. The words used by the legislature are to be given their “common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning.” Id., ¶45. In addition, statutory language must be
interpreted “in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole;
in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably,
to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46.

¶48 “Importantly, ‘ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute requires
more than focusing on a single sentence or portion thereof.’” Brey, 400 Wis. 2d
417, ¶11 (quoted source omitted). Courts must read the words in context and with
a view to the place of those words in the overall statutory scheme. Id. (“oftentimes
the meaning … of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed
in context, so when deciding whether language is plain, courts must read the words
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme”
(internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted)). “Properly applied, the plain-
meaning approach is not ‘literalistic’; rather, the ascertainment of meaning involves
a ‘process of analysis’ focused on deriving the fair meaning of the text itself.” Id.
(citing Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46, 52). “Statutory interpretation centers on the
‘ascertainment of meaning,’ not the recitation of words in isolation.” Id., ¶13.

¶49 “‘A review of statutory history is part of our analysis’ because it is
part of the context in which we interpret statutory terms.” County of Dane v. LIRC,
2009 WI 9, ¶27, 315 Wis. 2d 293, 759 N.W.2d 571 (quoting Richards v. Badger
Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶22, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581); see also Brey,
400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶20.

¶50 “‘If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning,
then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to this ascertainment

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of its meaning.’” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee Cnty.,
2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).

¶51 Golla argues that “the County lacks the authority under [WIS. STAT.
§ 59.692] to enforce its General Zoning Ordinance by prohibiting the home’s
vertical addition or requir[ing that] Golla obtain a land use permit or variance before
commencing construction.” Before proceeding, we clarify that “prohibiting” the
addition before construction was commenced and “requir[ing that] Golla obtain a
land use permit or variance” for the addition before commencing construction are
two distinct concepts. Golla points to nothing in the record showing that the County
“prohibited” Golla from constructing the addition before she commenced
construction; rather, the record shows that Golla never gave the County the
opportunity to take any variance or permitting action (which she could have
challenged) before construction commenced.

¶52 The question properly stated is whether WIS. STAT. § 59.692
“prohibited” the County from, pursuant to the General Zoning Ordinance, requiring
a land use permit and, as a condition precedent to issuing that permit, requiring a
variance for construction of an addition that encroaches on the side yard setback.
We first examine the statutory and ordinance framework governing county zoning
authority. We then explain why the answer to this question is no, based on the
statutory language, interpreted in relation to the statute’s scope, purpose, and
context, the language of related statutes, and statutory history. We address Golla’s
arguments to the contrary in the course of our analysis.

1. Pertinent Statutory Framework

¶53 Under Wisconsin law, counties have “only such powers as are
expressly conferred upon [them] or necessarily implied from the powers expressly

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given or from the nature of the grant of power.” Town of Vernon v. Waukesha
Cnty., 102 Wis. 2d 686, 689, 307 N.W.2d 227 (1981). Counties have general zoning
authority under WIS. STAT. § 59.69(1), (4), and (5), which grant counties the power
to adopt general zoning ordinances governing the “territory within” and “areas
within” the counties. Sec. 59.69(1), (4). See also State ex rel. Anderson v.
Newbold, 2021 WI 6, ¶24, 395 Wis. 2d 351, 954 N.W.2d 323 (§ 59.69 grants
counties general zoning authority). Separate from counties’ general zoning
authority, in 1966, the legislature required that counties “enact zoning ordinances
specific to shorelands.” Anderson, 395 Wis. 2d 351, ¶24; WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1c).
“Shorelands” are defined as “the area within” “[o]ne thousand feet” of the “high-
water mark of” “a lake, pond or flowage,” and “[t]hree hundred feet” of the “high-
water mark of” “a river or stream.” Sec. 59.692(1)(b)1.-2. The 1966 legislation
mandating county shoreland zoning represented the legislature’s balancing of public
interests in navigable waters and private interests in the use of privately owned land
with respect to shorelands. Paul G. Kent, On the Waterfront: New Shoreland
Zoning Laws, Wisconsin Lawyer, January 2017, at 14.

¶54 “‘The basic purpose of a shoreland zoning ordinance is to protect
navigable waters and the public rights therein from the degradation and deterioration
which result[] from uncontrolled use and development of shorelands.’” Forest
Cnty. v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 678, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998) (quoted source
omitted). Specifically, WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1c) provides: “To effect the purposes
of [WIS. STAT. §] 281.31 and to promote the public health, safety and general
welfare, each county shall zone by ordinance all shorelands in its unincorporated
area. The requirements in this ordinance shall relate to the purposes in s.
281.31(1).” (Emphasis added.) Those purposes include authorizing municipal
shoreland zoning regulations that promote the “efficient use, conservation,

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development and protection of this state’s water resources,” “relate to lands under,
abutting or lying close to navigable waters,” and “further the maintenance of safe
and healthful conditions; prevent and control water pollution; protect spawning
grounds, fish and aquatic life; control building sites, placement of structure and land
uses and reserve shore cover and natural beauty.” Sec. 281.31(1).

¶55 In 1966, the legislature set minimum shoreland zoning standards for
county shoreland zoning ordinances, as established by the Department of Natural
Resources. Kent at 14; see WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1)(c) (defining “shoreland zoning
standard” as “a standard for ordinances enacted under this section that is
promulgated as a rule by the department [of natural resources].”). These shoreland
zoning standards are codified at WIS. ADMIN. CODE § NR 115.05 (Feb. 2022).8 That
section sets shoreland zoning standards for minimum lot sizes; shoreland setbacks;
removal and management of vegetation; filling, grading, lagooning, dredging,
ditching, and excavating; impervious surfaces and height; and nonconforming
structures and uses. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE § NR 115.05(1)(a)-(g).

¶56 In a series of acts in the 2015 legislative session, the legislature
enacted significant changes to the shoreland zoning scheme that rebalanced public
interests in navigable waters and private interests in privately owned shorelands.
Among other things, the amendments directed that the standards previously
established by the Department of Natural Resources are now maximum regulatory
standards for county shoreland zoning. See Kent at 16; 2015 Wis. Acts 55, 167,
178, and 391. Now, “[a] county shoreland zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to
WIS. STAT. § 59.692 cannot be more restrictive than the standards that have been

8
All references to the Wisconsin Administrative Code are to the February 2022
register.

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No. 2021AP1076

enacted at the state level: ‘an ordinance enacted under this section may not regulate
a matter more restrictively than the matter is regulated by a shoreland zoning
standard.’ [Sec.] 59.692(1d)(a).” Anderson, 395 Wis. 2d 351, ¶25.

¶57 Pertinent here, Golla points to no shoreland zoning standard for side
yard setbacks or land use permits. See also Kent at 16 n. 27 (stating that counties
retain the authority to regulate matters that are not regulated by a shoreland zoning
standard under WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1)(d)(b), and noting that nothing in the statutes
or the state shoreland zoning standards addresses side yard setbacks). Thus, it is
undisputed that the shoreland zoning standards have no application to the zoning
ordinance provisions as issue here.

¶58 In the same series of acts in the 2015 legislative session, the legislature
also enacted additional restrictions addressing specific aspects of shoreland zoning
in addition to the matters addressed by the Department of Natural Resources
shoreland zoning standards. 2015 Wis. Acts 55, §§ 1922b-1922l; 167, §§ 1-6; 178,
§ 6; and 391, §§ 4-10. Among other things, the legislature created WIS. STAT.
§ 59.692(1k) and (5m), which are two of the subsections upon which Golla relies.

¶59 We address in detail in the analysis below the provisions in WIS.
STAT. § 59.692 that Golla argues bar the County’s enforcement action here.

2. Pertinent Ordinance Framework

¶60 The County has enacted a Code of Ordinances that includes both a
General Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 34, and a Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, Chapter
32. WAUPACA COUNTY, WIS., GENERAL ZONING ORDINANCE Chapter 34;
WAUPACA COUNTY, WIS., SHORELAND ZONING ORDINANCE Chapter 32. The
provisions in the General Zoning Ordinance apply “in all of the unincorporated

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areas of the County.” GENERAL ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 34, § 1.03. The
Shoreland Zoning Ordinance provides that more restrictive provisions in the
General Zoning Ordinance that do not relate only to shorelands “prevail” over less
restrictive provisions in the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance that relate only to
shorelands. SHORELAND ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 32, §§ 2.5 and 2.6.9

¶61 This case involves two provisions in the General Zoning Ordinance:
a land use permit provision that applies to structural alterations (Chapter 34, Section
14.03(5)), and a side yard setback provision that mandates a ten-foot side yard
setback for property in a sewered residential district, which includes Golla’s
property (Chapter 34, Section 4.0)). The parties have not in briefing or at oral

9
The Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 32, Section 2.5 states:

The provisions of this ordinance supersede any provisions
in a county zoning ordinance that solely relate to shorelands. In
other words, if a zoning standard only applies to lands that lie
within the shoreland and applies because the lands are in
shoreland, then this ordinance supersedes those provisions.
However, where an ordinance adopted under a statute other than
s. 59.692, Wis. Stats., does not solely relate to shorelands and is
more restrictive than this ordinance, for example a floodplain
ordinance, that ordinance shall continue in full force and effect to
the extent of the greater restrictions.

….

(4) The provisions of the Waupaca County [General]
Zoning Ordinance are hereby incorporated by reference; these
provisions shall only apply to the shoreland area where they
impose greater restrictions than this ordinance otherwise
imposes.

WAUPACA COUNTY, WIS., SHORELAND ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 32, § 2.5 (emphasis added).

Similarly, the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 32, Section 2.64 states: “The
provisions of the Waupaca County Zoning Ordinance are hereby incorporated by reference; these
provisions shall only apply to the shoreland area where they impose greater restrictions than this
ordinance otherwise imposes.” SHORELAND ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 32, § 2.64 (emphasis
added.).

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No. 2021AP1076

argument identified any land use permit or side yard setback provisions in the
Shoreland Zoning Ordinance. Golla does not dispute that, if we reject her arguments
that these provisions do not apply under WIS. STAT. § 59.692 because her property
is in the shoreland, a land use permit and variance would be required for the
addition.

C. Analysis

¶62 Golla argues that the County may not apply and enforce the side yard
setback and land use permit provisions in its General Zoning Ordinance as to Golla’s
shoreland property under three different provisions in WIS. STAT. § 59.692. Golla
frames these three connected but alternative statutory bases for her argument as
follows: (1) the general side yard setback and land use permit provisions can be
applied only to non-shoreland property in the County, because if they were applied
to shorelands they would “relate to” shorelands and thus enforcement of them would
be barred under § 59.692(5); or (2) if these general provisions can be applied to
shoreland property, they become “shoreland zoning ordinance” provisions subject
to the restrictions on shoreland zoning ordinances in § 59.692(1k)(a)4.; or
(3) application and enforcement of these general provisions as to Golla’s addition
are barred under § 59.692(5m).

¶63 We address and reject each of these alternative propositions in turn.
Undergirding each of our conclusions is the following premise: under the statutory
scheme laid out by the legislature, which establishes two distinct zoning regimes,
WIS. STAT. § 59.692 addresses county shoreland zoning ordinance provisions aimed
at protecting shorelands and navigable waters, and WIS. STAT. § 59.69 addresses
county general zoning ordinance provisions aimed at more general, county-wide
purposes.

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1. Enforcement barred because provisions “relate to” shorelands under
WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5)

¶64 In her briefing, Golla begins with WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5), which
states, “An ordinance enacted under this section [§ 59.692] supersedes all provisions
of an ordinance enacted under s. 59.69 [that is, a general zoning ordinance] that
relate to shorelands.”10 Golla argues that general zoning ordinance provisions
“relate to shorelands” whenever they are applied to regulate a shoreland property
like hers. In other words, according to Golla, the phrase, “provisions [of a general
zoning ordinance] that relate to shorelands” means any general ordinance provisions
that can be applied to shoreland property. As we understand her argument, she
interprets subsec. (5) to mean that, as to any shoreland property, the shoreland
zoning ordinances supersede all general zoning ordinance provisions and, as a
result, no general provisions can ever be applied to any shoreland property.

¶65 As we explain, this interpretation is not a fair meaning of the
subsection’s language and would have the absurd result of upending county general
zoning authority. See Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶11 (“ascertainment of meaning
involves a process of analysis focused on deriving the fair meaning of the text itself”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (we
interpret statutory language “reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results”).

a. Fair meaning of WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5)

¶66 The only reasonable meaning of the phrase in WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5),
“provisions [of a general zoning ordinance] that relate to shorelands,” is general

10
The current WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5) pre-existed the amendments in the 2015 legislative
session. It was created in 1965 Wisconsin Laws ch. 614 (the Wisconsin Water Resources Act of
1965), section 22, as WIS. STAT. § 59.971(5), which was changed to the current numbering in 1995
Wis. Act 201, § 476.

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No. 2021AP1076

ordinance provisions that address issues that are specific to shoreland property and
that serve the purpose of protecting shorelands and navigable waters. In other
words, “provisions … that relate to shorelands” means the subset of general
ordinance provisions that specifically relate to shorelands. This interpretation is
consistent with the common meaning of the term “relate to,” as connected with a
specific topic. See Relate to, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/relate%20to (The phrase “relate to” means “connect
(something) with (something else).” “be connected with,” “be about (someone or
something).”) (last visited June 20, 2022).11 Thus, “relate to” does not mean, as
argued by Golla, “can be applied to.” Rather, “relate to” means “connect
(something) with (something else).” Here, that “something else” is the reasons that
shoreland zoning ordinances are enacted—to protect shorelands and navigable
waters by balancing public rights in navigable waters with private rights in privately
owned shoreland property. Expressed more concisely, that “something else” is the
purposes of and interests protected by shoreland zoning.

¶67 Golla’s interpretation would render the phrase “that relate to
shorelands” entirely superfluous. If shoreland zoning ordinances supersede all
general zoning ordinances for shoreland property, then WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5)
would need simply state: “An ordinance enacted under this section [59.692]
supersedes all provisions of an ordinance enacted under s. 59.69.”

¶68 Thus, Golla’s reliance on the “relate to” language in WIS. STAT.
§ 59.692(5) fails based on a fair meaning interpretation of that language because the
General Zoning Ordinance side yard setback and land use permit provisions, which

11
See Lemmer v. Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, ¶10, 314 Wis. 2d 483, 760 N.W.2d 446
(“We may use a dictionary to establish the common meaning of a word.”).

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No. 2021AP1076

apply to all property in the County, are by their terms not connected specifically
with shorelands or the purposes of and interests protected by shoreland zoning.

¶69 Golla points to the General Zoning Ordinance’s statement that it was
enacted “to achieve the objectives outlined in [WIS. STAT. §§] 59.69, 59.692,
59.693, and 87.60.” GENERAL ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 34, § 1.01) (emphasis
added). According to Golla, because the General Zoning Ordinance is intended to
serve the purposes of § 59.692, all of its provisions relate to shorelands and are
therefore superseded when applied in shorelands. This argument paints with too
broad a brush. The cited statement of objectives merely indicates that certain
provisions of the General Zoning Ordinance may have the purpose of protecting
shorelands, as authorized in § 59.692(1c). See § 59.692(1c) (providing that a county
may fulfill the mandate to zone shorelands either as part of its general zoning
ordinance authority or by a separate shoreland zoning ordinance). However, as
explained above, it is only those general ordinance provisions that have the purpose
of protecting shorelands that would “relate to” shorelands, and it is only any such
provisions that would be superseded pursuant to § 59.692(5). Indeed, if the General
Zoning Ordinance was somehow barred from including provisions that have the
purpose of protecting shorelands, then the entire subsec. (5) would be superfluous
because there would be no provisions enacted under a county’s general zoning
authority that would “relate to” shorelands and, therefore, no provisions to be
superseded.

¶70 Golla also cites Hegwood v. Town of Eagle Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
2013 WI App 118, 351 Wis. 2d 196, 839 N.W.2d 111, but that case is inapposite.
In that case, this court ruled that the town lacked authority to enforce a town
ordinance relating to shorelands, specifically a provision that imposed a shoreland
setback. Id., ¶¶1-2, 13-15. In contrast, this case involves neither an ordinance

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relating to shorelands nor a shoreland setback (which could relate only to
shorelands). Moreover, as the County points out, after Hegwood was decided, the
legislature created WIS. STAT. §§ 60.61(3r) and 60.62(5), which expressly provide
that, although towns do not have authority to enact zoning ordinances specific to
shorelands, towns may enact and enforce general zoning ordinances that apply in
shorelands. Secs. 60.61(3r) and 60.62(5). The “relate to shorelands” language in
WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5) similarly does not prohibit counties, which do have
authority to enact zoning ordinances specific to shorelands, from enacting and
enforcing provisions in general ordinances applicable to all property in the counties
including shorelands.

b. Absurd result

¶71 Golla’s interpretation would effectuate a radical transformation of the
interplay between county general zoning under WIS. STAT. § 59.69 and county
shoreland zoning under WIS. STAT. § 59.692. The implication of Golla’s
interpretation would be that, as to shoreland property, counties could apply only
zoning provisions that relate to the specific objectives of § 59.692, to protect
shorelands and navigable waters. If § 59.692(5) preempts all general zoning
provisions that do not relate to protecting shorelands and navigable waters, no
general zoning provisions could ever be applied in shorelands, including those that
have no connection with the purposes of shoreland zoning such as side yard and
road setbacks, land use permits, and district-related use regulations.

¶72 Golla points to, and we discern, no statute that indicates an intent to
nullify all general zoning ordinance provisions as to shorelands, or to abolish for
property in shorelands a county’s authority to impose general zoning requirements,
such as side yard setbacks and land use permits, which do not specifically relate to

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shorelands. Rather, to interpret WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5) as prohibiting counties from
applying general zoning ordinance provisions on any shoreland property would
establish a limitation that does not exist in the statute that gives counties general
zoning authority.

¶73 Golla cited at oral argument WIS. STAT. § 59.69(1) and (4), but she
pointed to no language in those subsections that supports her argument. Section
59.69(1) broadly sets out a county’s planning and zoning authority over “territory
within the county,” and § 59.69(4) similarly broadly sets out a county’s power to by
ordinance adopt regulations that are “best suited to carry out the purposes of this
section” “within the areas within [the] county.” Sec. 59.69(1) and (4). 12 The

12
WISCONSIN STAT. § 59.69(1) states:

PURPOSE. It is the purpose of this section to promote the
public health, safety, convenience and general welfare; to
encourage planned and orderly land use development; to protect
property values and the property tax base; to permit the careful
planning and efficient maintenance of highway systems; to ensure
adequate highway, utility, health, educational and recreational
facilities; to recognize the needs of agriculture, forestry, industry
and business in future growth; to encourage uses of land and other
natural resources which are in accordance with their character and
adaptability; to provide adequate light and air, including access to
sunlight for solar collectors and to wind for wind energy systems;
to encourage the protection of groundwater resources; to preserve
wetlands; to conserve soil, water and forest resources; to protect
the beauty and amenities of landscape and man-made
developments; to provide healthy surroundings for family life; and
to promote the efficient and economical use of public funds. To
accomplish this purpose the board may plan for the physical
development and zoning of territory within the county as set forth
in this section and shall incorporate therein the master plan
adopted under s. 62.23(2) or (3) and the official map of any city
or village in the county adopted under s. 62.23(6).

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WISCONSIN STAT. § 59.69(4) states:

EXTENT OF POWER. For the purpose of promoting the
public health, safety and general welfare the board may by
ordinance effective within the areas within such county outside
the limits of incorporated villages and cities establish districts of
such number, shape and area, and adopt such regulations for each
such district as the board considers best suited to carry out the
purposes of this section. The board may establish mixed-use
districts that contain any combination of uses, such as industrial,
commercial, public, or residential uses, in a compact urban form.
The board may not enact a development moratorium, as defined
in s. 66.1002(1)0(b), under this section or s. 59.03, by acting
under ch. 236, or by acting under any other law, except that this
prohibition does not limit any authority of the board to impose a
moratorium that is not a development moratorium. The powers
granted by this section shall be exercised through an ordinance
which may, subject to sub. (4e), determine, establish, regulate and
restrict:

(a) The areas within which agriculture, forestry, industry,
mining, trades, business and recreation may be conducted, except
that no ordinance enacted under this subsection may prohibit
forestry operations that are in accordance with generally accepted
forestry management practices, as defined under s. 823.075(1)(d).

(b) The areas in which residential uses may be regulated
or prohibited.

(c) The areas in and along, or in or along, natural
watercourses, channels, streams and creeks in which trades or
industries, filling or dumping, erection of structures and the
location of buildings may be prohibited or restricted.

(d) Trailer or tourist camps, motels, and manufactured
and mobile home communities.

(e) Designate certain areas, uses or purposes which may
be subjected to special regulation.

(f) The location of buildings and structures that are
designed for specific uses and designation of uses for which
buildings and structures may not be used or altered.

(g) The location, height, bulk, number of stories and size
of buildings and other structures.

31

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No. 2021AP1076

legislature has not carved out shoreland property from the reach of a county’s
general zoning authority in either of these provisions.

¶74 Golla argues that to reject her interpretation would render WIS. STAT.
§ 59.692 superfluous, in that a county would be able to impose on shoreland
property a requirement in a general zoning ordinance under WIS. STAT. § 59.69 that
would not be allowed under § 59.692. This argument is refuted by the operation of
§ 59.692(1c) and (5), which ensure that any zoning provisions that serve the
shoreland-specific purposes of § 59.692 are superseded by that statute. That
§ 59.692 does not preempt zoning provisions that are not connected to the specific
purposes of shoreland zoning preserves the preeminence of § 59.692 in defining a
county’s shoreland-specific zoning authority.

¶75 In sum, by its language, WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5) establishes the
preeminence of the administrative standards and legislative restrictions established
pursuant to § 59.692 over provisions in a general zoning ordinance that are
specifically connected with or about shorelands. See § 59.692(5). Here, the General
Zoning Ordinance side yard setback provision applies to any property in a sewered
residential district in the County and the land use permit provision applies to any

(h) The location of roads and schools.

(i) Building setback lines.

(j) Subject to s. 66.10015(3), the density and distribution
of population.

(k) The percentage of a lot which may be occupied, size
of yards, courts and other open spaces.

(l) Places, structures or objects with a special character,
historic interest, aesthetic interest or other significant value,
historic landmarks and historic districts.

(m) Burial sites, as defined in s. 157.70 (1)(b).

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structural alteration on any property in the County. Neither provision is specifically
connected with or about shorelands. Thus, § 59.692(5) does not bar enforcement of
the side yard setback and land use permit provisions in the County General Zoning
Ordinance because those provisions do not “relate to” shorelands.

2. Enforcement Barred Because Provisions “Become” Shoreland Zoning
Ordinance Provisions Under WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1k)(a)4.

¶76 Alternatively, Golla argues that, if a county applies a general zoning
ordinance provision to a shoreland property, then that application converts the
general provision into a shoreland zoning ordinance provision that is subject to the
standards and restrictions for shoreland zoning ordinances in WIS. STAT. § 59.692.
Here, the argument continues, if the side yard setback and land use permit provisions
are applied to this shoreland property, they become shoreland zoning ordinance
provisions that may not be enforced under § 59.692(1k)(a)4. That section bars a
county from “enacting or enforcing a shoreland zoning ordinance” that “[r]equires
any approval or imposes any fee … for, or otherwise prohibits or regulates, the
vertical expansion of … a structure of which any part is legally located in the
shoreland setback area by operation of a variance granted before July 13, 2015.”13

13
WISCONSIN STAT. § 59.692(1k)(a)4. states in pertinent part:

The department may not impair the interest of a
landowner in shoreland property by establishing a shoreland
zoning standard, and a county may not impair the interest of a
landowner in shoreland property by enacting or enforcing a
shoreland zoning ordinance that [does any] of the following:

….

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¶77 The parties do not dispute that the addition is a vertical expansion of
a structure that is legally located in the shoreland setback area by operation of the
1988 variance. The parties also do not dispute that the side yard setback and land
use permit provisions in its General Zoning Ordinance “require approval” or
“otherwise regulate” the construction of the addition, which would be prohibited if
the provisions were subject to WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1k)(a)4. And, the parties do not
dispute that § 59.692(1k)(a)4. applies only to shoreland zoning standards
promulgated by the Department of Natural Resources and to shoreland zoning
ordinances enacted by counties under § 59.692. As we have explained above, the
side yard setback and land use permit provisions at issue here are neither shoreland
zoning standards nor included in a shoreland zoning ordinance. Nevertheless, Golla

4. Requires any approval or imposes any fee or
mitigation requirement for, or otherwise prohibits or regulates, the
vertical expansion of a nonconforming structure or a structure of
which any part is legally located in the shoreland setback area by
operation of a variance granted before July 13, 2015, unless the
vertical expansion would extend more than 35 feet above grade
level.

WISCONSIN. STAT. § 59.692(1k)(a)4. as currently worded became effective on April 28,
2016, 2015 Wis. Act 391, § 6, or two days after Golla obtained the building permit from the Town
on April 26, 2016, but before she proceeded with the addition in May 2016. The provision had,
when it was created in July 2015, applied only to nonconforming structures, and the parties agree
that this case does not concern a nonconforming structure. 2015 Wis. Act 55, § 1922F. The
provision was amended in April 2016 to apply also to “a structure of which any part is legally
located in the shoreland setback area by operation of a variance granted before July 13, 2015.”
2015 Wis. Act 391, § 6; see also 2015 Wis. Act 391, §§ 5 and 8 (adding the same language to two
other provisions that had applied only to nonconforming structures). It is this amendment that
would apply to Golla’s addition if we accepted her argument that the County’s general zoning
provisions requiring a variance and land use permit do not apply.

Golla also cites WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1k)(a)2., but that provision does not address additions
to an existing structure.

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No. 2021AP1076

argues that by virtue of being applied to her shoreland property, these general zoning
provisions become shoreland zoning ordinance provisions.

¶78 Golla’s argument fails because it is contrary to the statutory scheme
that establishes two distinct regimes: permissive general zoning that applies to all
property within a county, and mandatory shoreland zoning that applies only to
property in the shoreland. See WIS. STAT. § 59.69(1) and (4) (authorizing counties
to enact zoning that serves a broad array of purposes that concern the promotion of
“public health, safety, convenience and general welfare,” none of which pertain only
to shorelands), WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1c) (requiring that counties enact zoning that
applies only to shorelands and that serves the purposes of WIS. STAT. § 281.31(1),
which concern the protection of navigable waters); see also Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at
678 (“The basic purpose of a shoreland zoning ordinance is to protect navigable
waters and the public rights therein from the degradation and deterioration which
result[] from uncontrolled use and development of shorelands.”).14

14
The County Zoning Ordinances reflect this distinct regime. The General Zoning
Ordinance’s statement of purpose references only countywide concerns and makes no mention of
either shorelands or navigable waters or concerns connected specifically to or about shorelands or
navigable waters:

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No. 2021AP1076

This Ordinance is adopted in order to promote and to protect
public health, safety, comfort, convenience, prosperity, aesthetics,
and other aspects of the general welfare; and, more specifically, to
fix reasonable standards to which buildings and structures shall
conform, to regulate and restrict buildings in all of the
unincorporated areas of the County, to guide the proper
distribution and location of various land uses, to promote the
safety and efficiency of the streets and highways, to provide for
adequate light, air, sanitation and drainage, to conserve natural
resources, to provide safety from fire and other hazards, to define
the powers and duties to the administrative bodies as provided
hereinafter, and to prescribe penalties for the violation of the
provisions of this Ordinance or any amendment thereto.

GENERAL ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 34, § 1.03.

In contrast, consistent with the statutes, the Shoreland Zoning Ordinance expressly
references to and focuses on shorelands and navigable waters in its findings of fact and statement
of purpose:

1.2 FINDINGS OF FACT.

Uncontrolled use of the shorelands and pollution of the navigable
waters of Waupaca County would adversely affect the public
health, safety, convenience, and general welfare and impair the tax
base. The legislature of Wisconsin has delegated responsibility to
the counties to further the maintenance of safe and healthful
conditions; prevent and control water pollution; protect spawning
grounds, fish, and aquatic life; control building sites, placement of
structures and land uses; and to preserve shore cover and natural
beauty. This responsibility is hereby recognized by Waupaca
County, Wisconsin.

1.3 PURPOSE.

For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety,
convenience and welfare, and protect the public trust in navigable
waters this ordinance has been established to:

1.31 Further The Maintenance of Safe and Healthful
Conditions and the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution ….

….

1.32 Protect Spawning Grounds, Fish, and Aquatic Life ….

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No. 2021AP1076

¶79 As statutorily defined, a shoreland zoning provision may be enacted
in a separate shoreland zoning ordinance or in a general zoning ordinance. WIS.
STAT. § 59.692(1c). It is undisputed that the side yard setback and land use permit
provisions at issue here are neither in a separate shoreland zoning ordinance nor
applicable only to shoreland property or directed at protecting shorelands and
navigable waters. Golla points to no language in § 59.692 or WIS. STAT. § 59.69
that converts such general zoning provisions to shoreland zoning ordinance
provisions merely because they are applied to shoreland property. Nor need there
be any such language, because § 59.692(1c) and (5) ensure that § 59.692 governs
shoreland zoning regardless of where a shoreland-specific zoning provision is
located.

¶80 In sum, Golla provides no legal authority to support her argument that
applying the general zoning provisions at issue here to shoreland property converts
the provisions to shoreland zoning ordinance provisions subject to the standards and
restrictions for shoreland zoning ordinances in WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1k)4. As stated,
these general zoning provisions were not enacted for, and do not serve, the purposes
of protecting shoreland and navigable waters and balancing public and private rights
specific to shorelands.

….

1.33 Control Building Sites, Placement of Structures, and Land
Uses Through:

1) Separating conflicting land uses.

SHORELAND ZONING ORDINANCE, Ch. 32, §§ 1.2 and 1.3.

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3. Enforcement Barred by WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5m)

¶81 Finally, Golla argues that this enforcement action is barred by WIS.
STAT. § 59.692(5m). This statute states, “If a county has in effect on or after July
14, 2015, a provision in an ordinance that is inconsistent with subsecs. (1d), (1f),
(1k), or (2m), the provision does not apply and may not be enforced.”15 Golla argues
that the reference in subsec. (5m) to “an ordinance” means “any zoning ordinance,”
regardless of whether the provisions at issue specifically regulate shorelands. She
further contends that the general ordinance provisions the County is seeking to
enforce are inconsistent with subsec. (1k) because they would require an approval
and impose a fee for the vertical expansion of her home.

¶82 While Golla’s interpretation may seem reasonable when portions of
the statutory language are read in isolation, it is not reasonable when the statutory
language is read as a whole. For reasons we now explain, we conclude that the
reasonable interpretation of the phrase “a provision in an ordinance” in WIS. STAT.

15
This provision was created by 2015 Wis. Act 55, § 1922L, effective July 2015.

Of the four subsections referenced in WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5m), the only one that would
address the Golla addition (and the subsection on which Golla focused at oral argument) is
§ 59.692(1k)(a)4. As stated above, that section limits what a county may do by “establishing a
shoreland zoning standard” or “by enacting or enforcing a shoreland zoning ordinance,” which
“[r]equires any approval or imposes any fee … for, or otherwise prohibits or regulates, the vertical
expansion of … a structure of which any part is legally located in the shoreland setback area by
operation of a variance granted before July 13, 2015.”

The first subsection referenced in WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5m), § 59.692(1d), provides that
“an ordinance enacted under this section may not regulate a matter more restrictively than the
matter is regulated by a shoreland zoning standard.” Sec. 59.692(1d)(a). As explained above,
neither side yard setbacks nor land use permits are regulated by a shoreland zoning standard. The
second subsection, § 59.692(1f)(a), limits what “a county shoreland zoning ordinance” may require
as to buffer zones. Neither side yard setbacks nor land use permits apply to buffer zones. The
fourth subsection, § 59.692(2m), provides, “A county shoreland zoning ordinance may not regulate
the construction of a structure on a substandard lot in a manner that is more restrictive than the
shoreland zoning standards for substandard lots.” Neither side yard setbacks nor land use permits
regulate substandard lots.

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§ 59.692(5m) is a provision in an ordinance which regulates shorelands. More
specifically, and consistent with the immediately surrounding subsections as well
as with the scope and purpose of the statute, the reasonable interpretation of the
phrase “a provision in an ordinance” is a provision in a shoreland zoning ordinance
enacted under § 59.692 or a provision in a general zoning ordinance enacted under
WIS. STAT. § 59.69 that relates to shorelands. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46
(Statutory language must be interpreted “in the context in which it is used; not in
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.”). Because
the provisions at issue here are not in a shoreland zoning ordinance and do not relate
to shorelands, application and enforcement of those provisions to Golla’s property
are not barred by § 59.692(5m).

¶83 We begin by looking to the surrounding subsections, WIS. STAT.
§ 59.692(5) and (6), which were previously enacted (in 1965) alongside each other
and are now immediately preceding and following § 59.692(5m).16

¶84 First, because the complete phrase in WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5m) is “a
provision in an ordinance,” we look to a similar phrase in the immediately preceding
§ 59.692(5) to interpret that phrase as a whole. As explained above, subsec. (5)
references “provisions of an ordinance … that relate to shorelands” and ensures
that any provisions in a general zoning ordinance that relate to (i.e., are connected
with or about) shorelands are preempted by an ordinance enacted under § 59.692.
See § 59.692(5) (“An ordinance enacted under this section [59.692] supersedes all

16
As stated in footnote 10, WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5) was created in 1965 Wisconsin Laws,
ch. 614. Section 59.692(6) was also created at the same time, as then-numbered WIS. STAT.
§ 59.971(6). As also stated above, § 59.692(5m) was created in 2015 Wis. Act 391 and placed
between subsections (5) and (6).

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No. 2021AP1076

provisions of an ordinance enacted under [WIS. STAT. § ]59.69 that relate to
shorelands.” (emphasis added)). The repetition of the phrase “provision in an
ordinance” in subsec. (5m) immediately following the similar phrase in subsec. (5)
may suggest that the phrase in subsec. (5m) has a similar meaning—a provision of
a general zoning ordinance which relates to shorelands.

¶85 Second, we look to the repeated use of “an ordinance” in the
immediately following WIS. STAT. § 59.692(6), which provides: “If a county does
not enact an ordinance by January 1, 1968, or if the department, after notice and
hearing, determines that a county has enacted an ordinance that fails to meet the
shoreland zoning standards, the department shall adopt such an ordinance for the
county.” (Emphasis added.) It is not reasonable to interpret subsec. (6)’s three
references to “an ordinance” to mean any ordinance. The only reasonable
interpretation of the first two references to “an ordinance” in subsec. (6) is a
shoreland zoning ordinance or shoreland-specific zoning provisions—provisions
that “relate to” shorelands under § 59.692(5)—in a general zoning ordinance. See
§ 59.692(1c) (providing that a county may fulfill the mandate to zone shorelands
either as part of its general zoning ordinance authority or by a separate shoreland
zoning ordinance). It would not make sense to require the Department of Natural
Resources to adopt a shoreland zoning ordinance for a county where the county has
already enacted, consistent with administrative shoreland zoning standards and
statutory shoreland zoning restrictions, either a separate shoreland zoning ordinance
or provisions that relate to shorelands in its general zoning ordinance, as allowed
under § 59.692(1c). The only reasonable interpretation of the third reference to “an
ordinance” in subsec. (6) is a separate shoreland ordinance. It would not make sense
to require the department to enact zoning provisions related to shorelands to be

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inserted in a county general zoning ordinance, particularly when counties are not
required to enact general zoning ordinances. See WIS. STAT. § 59.69(1).

¶86 The use of the same term, “an ordinance,” in WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5),
(5m) and (6) directly next to each other reasonably indicates that the term has a
similar meaning in all three provisions. See Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Const., Inc.,
2010 WI 74, ¶31, 326 Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462 (“When the same term is used
throughout a chapter of the statutes, it is a reasonable deduction that the legislature
intended that the term possess an identical meaning each time it appears.”). Under
this principle, the reasonable interpretation of “provision in an ordinance” in subsec.
(5m), consistent with the use of “provisions of an ordinance” in subsec. (5) and “an
ordinance” in subsec. (6), is a provision in a shoreland zoning ordinance that is
enacted under § 59.692 or a provision in a general zoning ordinance enacted under
WIS. STAT. § 59.69 which relates to shorelands. This interpretation is also
consistent with the directive in § 59.692(1c) that a county may fulfill the mandate
to zone shorelands either through a separate shoreland zoning ordinance or through
provisions specifically related to shorelands in its general zoning ordinance. The
location of subsec. (5m) between the preexisting subsecs. (5) and (6), when read
together with subsec. (1c), renders it unreasonable to interpret “a provision in an
ordinance” in subsec. (5m) to mean any provision in any zoning ordinance.

¶87 The scope of WIS. STAT. § 59.692(5m) also supports our
interpretation of “a provision in an ordinance.” Importantly, the subject of subsec.
(5m) is “a provision in an ordinance” which is in effect “on or after July 14, 2015”
and is inconsistent with one of four enumerated subsections: § 59.692(1d), (1f),
(1k), and (2m). (Emphasis added.). Those four subsections were enacted effective
July 14, 2015 and they imposed new restrictions on a county’s shoreland zoning
authority. See 2015 Wis. Act 55, §§ 1922 D, E, F, and J (creating § 59.692(1d),

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(1f), (1k), and amending (2m)). Subsections (1d), (1f), and (2m) provide that
shoreland zoning ordinances may not regulate or impose requirements regarding
certain shoreland-related topics or matters; subsec. (1k) provides that a county may
not enact or enforce shoreland zoning ordinances that pertain to other shoreland-
related topics and matters. See § 59.692(1d), (1f), (1k), and (2m). The emphasis in
subsec. (5m) on the effective date of the aforementioned 2015 amendments
reasonably reflects the legislature’s intent to reinforce the preeminence of those
amendments over pre-existing as well as newly enacted provisions in shoreland
zoning ordinances (as referenced in the other subsections cited by subsec. (5m)) and
provisions in general zoning ordinances that relate to shorelands (as referenced in
the immediately preceding, much older, § 59.692(5)) in light of the changes made
to § 59.692 effective on that date. This clarification of the scope of the 2015
amendments via emphasis on the effective date refutes Golla’s argument that our
interpretation would render subsec. (5m) superfluous.

¶88 Our interpretation of the phrase “a provision in an ordinance” in WIS.
STAT. § 59.692(5m) is also supported by the legislature’s explicit focus in § 59.692
on shoreland zoning, from the statute’s title, “Zoning of shoreland on navigable
waters;” to the statute’s statement of purpose in § 59.692(1c) (to require that
counties zone shorelands to effectuate the purposes of WIS. STAT. § 281.31(1),
which as quoted above pertain to the protection of navigable waters; see also Goode,
219 Wis. 2d at 678); to the statute’s detailed directives as to the contents of such
shoreland zoning provisions in § 59.692(1), (1c), (1d), (1f), (1k), (1n), (1o), (1p),
(1r), (1t), (1v), (2), (2m), (4), (5). See Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc.,
2022 WI 1, ¶9, 400 Wis. 2d 1, 968 N.W.2d 661 (a court’s analysis of a statute’s
meaning is “informed by the legislature’s explicit statements of legislative purpose
and those reflected in a statute’s context and structure”).

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¶89 The statutory history underlying the changes to the shoreland zoning
ordinance statute, WIS. STAT. § 59.692, confirms this interpretation. See State v.
Green, 2022 WI 30, ¶44, 401 Wis. 2d 542, 973 N.W.2d 770 (referencing “the
statutory history underlying other amendments” to the statute at issue to “confirm[]”
the court’s interpretation of the statute). As stated, § 59.692(5m) was created among
a series of statutory provisions that were created or amended by various legislative
acts in 2015 and 2016. As set out below, the unifying thread of the amendments
made to these acts was to restrict the reach of county shoreland zoning ordinances,
and provisions in general zoning ordinances that relate to shorelands, to the
statewide standards and restrictions set by either the Department of Natural
Resources by rule or the legislature by statute.

Changes made by 2015 Wisconsin Act 55.

Section 59.692(1d) (created by Section 1922D): “An
ordinance enacted under this section may not regulate a
matter more restrictively than the matter is regulated by a
shoreland zoning standard.”

Section 59.692(1f) (created by Section 1922E),
setting statutory limits on what a county shoreland zoning
ordinance may require with respect to vegetative buffers and
buffer zones.

Section 59.692(1k) (created by Section 1922F),
prohibiting the Department of Natural Resources from
establishing a shoreline zoning standard and a county from
enacting or enforcing a shoreland zoning ordinance from
prohibiting or regulating aspects of outdoor lighting in
shorelands ((1k)(a)1.), aspects of work regarding
nonconforming structures ((1k)(a)2., 3., 4., (b), (c)1., (c)2.),
and impervious surfaces ((1k)(am)1.).

Section 59.692(2m) (amended by Section 1922J),
prohibiting a county shoreland zoning ordinance from
regulating construction of a structure on a substandard lot in
a manner more restrictively than shoreland zoning standards.

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Section 59.692(4)(b) (amended by Section 1922K):
“Notwithstanding s. 59.694(4), the department may not
appeal a decision of the county to grant or deny a variance
under this section but may, upon the request of a county
board of adjustment, issue an opinion on whether a variance
should be granted or denied.”

Section 59.592(5m) (created by Section 1922L): “If
a county has in effect on or after July 14, 2015, a provision
in an ordinance that is inconsistent with sub. (1d), (1f), (1k),
or (2m), the provision does not apply and may not be
enforced.” (Emphasis added.)

Changes made by 2015 Wisconsin Act 167.

Created or amended subsections in § 59.692 limiting
restrictions in a county shoreland zoning ordinance on
activities within the shoreland setback area (Sections 1-6).

Changes made by 2015 Wisconsin Act 178.

Section 59.692(1p) (created by Section 6): “This
section does not authorize a county to impose a requirement,
condition, or restriction on land that is not shoreland within
the county.”

Changes made by 2015 Wisconsin Act 391.

Section 59.692(1k)(a)2. (amended by Section 5):
amending prohibition against shoreland zoning standards or
county shoreland zoning ordinances from regulating
structural alterations other than additions to a
nonconforming structure, to include “a structure of which
any part is legally located in the shoreland setback area by
operation of a variance granted before July 13, 2015.”

Section 59.692(1k)(a)4. (amended by Section 6):
amending prohibition against shoreland zoning standards or
county shoreland zoning ordinances from regulating the
vertical expansion of a nonconforming structure, to include
“a structure of which any part is legally located in the
shoreland setback area by operation of a variance granted
before July 13, 2015.”

Section 59.692(1k)(b) (amended by Section 8):
amending requirement that a county shoreland zoning
ordinance allow structural alterations other than additions to
a nonconforming structure that expand the structure’s

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footprint if necessary to comply with state or federal
requirements, to include “a structure of which any part is
legally located in the shoreland setback area by operation of
a variance granted before July 13, 2015.”

¶90 The legislature through these amendments continued to balance
public rights in navigable waters, protected by county shoreland zoning provisions
as set forth in WIS. STAT. § 59.692(1c), with private rights in privately owned
shoreland property. However, absent from the amendments is any indication that
the legislature was also balancing those private rights with the different set of public
interests protected by county general zoning set forth in WIS. STAT. § 59.69(1). Nor
has Golla pointed to, or has our research revealed, any language in § 59.69
corroborating the curtailment of county general zoning authority over all property
in a county in the respects described in the subsections referenced in § 59.692(5m).
Reading § 59.692(5m) in isolation to privilege shoreland property and exempt it
from county general zoning provisions that do not relate to shorelands would be to
ignore this statutory history and to adopt a “literalistic” approach divorced from the
context and “fair meaning” of the text. See Brey, 400 Wis. 2d 417, ¶11.

¶91 Finally, the legislative history of the amendment creating WIS. STAT.
§ 59.692(5m) confirms our conclusion as to its reasonable meaning. See Brey, 400
Wis. 2d 417, ¶¶11, 21 (noting that legislative history is extrinsic evidence of a
statute’s meaning that “becomes relevant only to confirm” the statute’s fair
meaning). The Legislative Reference Bureau Analyses for 2015 Wis. Act 391, from
its initial proposal through its final amendment, consistently note in pertinent part
that “[c]urrent law” prohibits a county from enacting or enforcing “a shoreland
zoning ordinance” that regulates certain activities in certain ways related to

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nonconforming structures.17 (Emphasis added). The analyses then state that “this”
proposed legislation (which was enacted as 2015 Wisconsin Act 391) “expands
these prohibitions to a structure of which any part is legally located in the shoreland
setback area [] by operation of a variance” granted before July 13, 2015. Id.
(emphasis added). The clear implication is that the expansion is of the restrictions
on shoreland zoning, not on all zoning.

¶92 In sum, neither the 1988 variance nor WIS. STAT. § 59.692 bar the
County from enforcing the side yard setback and land use permit provisions in its
General Zoning Ordinance as to the addition on Golla’s shoreland property. Had
Golla, after her first contact with the County in 2015, applied for a land use permit
and been denied for whatever reason, she could have sought administrative and, if
necessary, judicial review of the denial. If the land use permit had been denied
because a side yard setback variance was required, she could have raised on review
her argument that no variance was required, as well as her argument that § 59.692
bars application of both the side yard setback and land use provisions. At any point
in this process, the variance and land use permit may have been granted for the
addition that she ultimately constructed in 2016. As the circuit court emphasized in
its final order, Golla’s proceeding without taking any of these steps resulted in the

17
The language referenced in the text is in multiple versions of the “Analysis of the
Legislative Reference Bureau” for the original bill and for subsequent amendments. These versions
can be found at https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/related/drafting_files/wisconsin_acts/
2015_act_391_ab_582/02_ab_582/15_3974df.pdf and https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2015/
related/drafting_files/wisconsin_acts/2015_act_391_ab_582/04_asa2_ab582 (last visited June 15,
2022).

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side yard setback and land use permit violations that the County sought to enforce
and remedy, which leads to the next issue on appeal.18

II. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

¶93 Golla argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion
in granting injunctive relief under WIS. STAT. § 59.69(11) in two respects:
(1) injunctive relief is barred because the requirements in WIS. STAT. § 66.0413,
which authorizes counties to order a property owner to raze a building, were not
met; and, alternatively, (2) the court failed to properly analyze the factors that apply
to a decision on injunctive relief under § 59.69(11). We address each issue in turn.

18
Because we conclude that WIS. STAT. § 59.692 does not bar this enforcement action, we
need not address Golla’s companion argument that the circuit court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over this case. See Barrows v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 2014 WI App 11, ¶9, 352
Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508 (2013) (“An appellate court need not address every issue raised by
the parties when one issue is dispositive.”).

Moreover, our supreme court has rejected this argument in a challenge to a zoning decision,
explaining:

The problem with the [property owners’] argument is that
it confuses the jurisdiction of the zoning board with that of the
court. In Wisconsin, circuit courts are courts of general
jurisdiction. Mack v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 287, 294, 286 N.W.2d 563
(1980). They have subject matter jurisdiction of all matters, civil
and criminal, not excepted in the constitution or prohibited by law.
Id. (citing Dumer v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 590, 595, 219 N.W.2d 592
(1974)). This includes the authority to hear zoning enforcement
actions arising from either town or county ordinances.

The [property owners’] claim is better understood as an
attack on the Town's jurisdiction to regulate their property in the
first place. This attack, however, should have been made at the
initial certiorari review. After all, one of the issues certiorari
courts determine is whether the Town kept within its jurisdiction.

Town of Delafield v. Winkelman, 2004 WI 17, ¶¶19-20, 269 Wis. 2d 109, 675 N.W.2d 470. As
we have explained in the text, had Golla applied for and been denied a land use permit, she could
have challenged that denial in a certiorari or other action in the circuit court.

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A. Application of WIS. STAT. § 66.0413

¶94 Golla argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion
in granting the County’s request for injunctive relief under WIS. STAT. § 59.69(11)
because the County did not follow the procedures required for razing a building
under WIS. STAT. § 66.0413. Golla’s argument fails based on the language of each
statute, as well as the lack of any legal authority offered in support.

¶95 The County brought this action under WIS. STAT. § 59.69(11). That
section reads:

PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF COUNTY
ZONING ORDINANCE

….

The rules and regulations and the districts, setback
building lines and regulations authorized by this section,
shall be prescribed by ordinances which shall be declared to
be for the public health, safety and general welfare. The
ordinances shall be enforced by appropriate forfeitures.
Compliance with such ordinances may also be enforced by
injunctional order at the suit of the county[.]

Sec. 59.69(11). This statute authorizes counties to enforce zoning ordinances “by
injunctional order.” See also Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 657 (concluding “that WIS.
STAT. § 59.69(11) gives the county … the option of asking a circuit court sitting in
equity for injunctive relief as a remedy for a zoning ordinance violation”).

¶96 “An injunction is an equitable remedy which a court can use to compel
compliance with an ordinance … or to restrain a threatened or existing violation
….” RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 65:10 (4th ed. April 2022).
“In acting to enforce [an] ordinance, [a municipality] may be considered to be acting
on behalf of all property owners within the municipality to enforce their right to

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acquire conformity with the ordinance as the quid pro quo for their own submission
to the restrictions imposed upon their property.” Id. The injunctive relief that a
court may order ranges from removal of the offending structure in order to obtain
full compliance with the ordinance to an “equitably crafted” alternative injunction
“that does justice.” Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 684.

¶97 “WISCONSIN STAT. § 66.0413 governs a municipality’s authority to
raze buildings within its jurisdiction.” Auto-Owners Ins. v. City of Appleton, 2017
WI App 62, ¶12, 378 Wis. 2d 155, 902 N.W.2d 532. The statute defines “raze a
building” as “to demolish and remove the building and to restore the site to a dust-
free and erosion-free condition.” Sec. 66.0413(1)(a)2. “By its terms,
[§] 66.0413(1) is concerned with protecting the public from unsafe and unsanitary
buildings. Accordingly, the statute authorizes municipalities to ensure public safety
by razing buildings that suffer from various defects and are ‘consequently
dangerous, unsafe, unsanitary or otherwise unfit for human habitation and
unreasonable to repair.’ Sec. 66.0413(1)(b)1.” Auto-Owner’s Ins., 378 Wis. 2d
155, ¶20 (some internal quotation marks and internal citation omitted). “The raze
order statute provides a municipality with a tool to manage dangerous buildings,
nothing more.” Id., ¶30.

¶98 Here, Golla points to nothing in the record to show that the County
requested injunctive relief in order to protect the public from an unsafe and
unsanitary building. Indeed, Golla argues that there is no such evidence. Golla also
cites no law supporting the proposition that the County was required to follow the
procedures in WIS. STAT. § 66.0413 when seeking injunctive relief under WIS.
STAT. § 59.69(11) to enforce compliance with its General Zoning Ordinance;
neither does Golla cite any law supporting the proposition that § 66.0413 limits or
otherwise affects the circuit court’s authority to grant injunctive relief under

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§ 59.69(11) for a violation of a zoning ordinance. Accordingly, we need not
consider this argument further. See Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g
Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82 (“Arguments
unsupported by legal authority will not be considered, and we will not abandon our
neutrality to develop arguments.” (internal citation omitted)).

¶99 In sum, the circuit court properly determined that the procedure set
forth in WIS. STAT. § 66.0413 does not apply, that the County acted consistent with
its authority under WIS. STAT. § 59.69(11) in requesting injunctive relief for the
General Zoning Ordinance violations alleged in the complaint, and that the court
had authority to grant that request.

B. Application of Applicable Factors

¶100 Golla argues that if, as we have concluded, the circuit court had the
authority to grant the County’s request for injunctive relief, then the court
erroneously exercised its discretion because it “failed to properly analyze” the
equitable factors relevant to its consideration of that request. We first state the
applicable standard of review and legal principles, including the relevant factors.
We next provide additional background, comprising the details of the court’s ruling
on the County’s request. We then address and reject Golla’s arguments challenging
that ruling.

1. Applicable Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶101 “Whether to grant or deny an injunction is committed to the circuit
court’s discretion.” State v. CGIP Lake Partners, LLP, 2013 WI App 122, ¶19,
351 Wis. 2d 100, 839 N.W.2d 136; see also Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 683 (concluding
that “WIS. STAT. § 59.69(11), the zoning ordinance enforcement statute, does not

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eliminate the traditional equitable power of [the] circuit court”). The exercise of
discretion standard of review is well established:

A court properly exercises its discretion when it logically
interprets the facts, applies the proper legal standard, and
uses a demonstrated rational process to reach a conclusion a
reasonable judge could reach. In addition, when considering
a request for injunctive relief, a court erroneously exercises
its discretion by: (1) failing to consider and make a record
of the factors relevant to its determination; (2) considering
clearly irrelevant or improper factors; or (3) clearly giving
too much weight to one factor.

Carlin Lake Ass’n v. Carlin Club Properties, LLC, 2019 WI App 24, ¶43, 387
Wis. 2d 640, 929 N.W.2d 228 (citation omitted).

¶102 The parties agree that the factors to be considered by the circuit court
in exercising its discretion are those set out in Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 684. This
court has stated those factors as follows:

The following factors are relevant to a circuit court’s
determination of whether it is equitable to enjoin a violation
of a county zoning ordinance: (1) the interest of the citizens
of the jurisdiction that has established the zoning
requirements in enforcing the requirements; (2) the extent of
the zoning violation; (3) whether the parties to the action
have acted in good faith; (4) whether the violator of the
zoning requirements has available any other equitable
defenses, such as laches, estoppel or unclean hands; (5) the
degree of hardship compliance with the zoning requirements
will create; and (6) what role, if any, the government played
in contributing to the violation. See Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at
684.

Carlin Lake Ass’n, Inc., 387 Wis. 2d 640, ¶48. This list of relevant factors “is not
meant to be exhaustive but only to illustrate the importance of the circuit court’s
consideration of the substantial public interest in enforcing” zoning ordinances.
Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 684.

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¶103 “Once a violation is established, a circuit court should grant the
injunction except, in those rare cases, when it concludes, after examining the totality
of the circumstances, there are compelling equitable reasons why the court should
deny the request for an injunction.” Id.

2. Additional Background

¶104 After the presentation of testimony and argument at the remedies
hearing in February 2021, the circuit court issued an oral ruling granting the
County’s request for injunctive relief requiring the removal of the second story
addition on the home to bring it in compliance. Over fourteen pages of transcript,
the court reviewed the facts and considered the relevant factors. The court
subsequently entered a written order containing written findings consistent with its
oral ruling. In light of Golla’s detailed challenges to the court’s consideration of the
relevant factors, we reproduce the court’s written findings in full, as follows:

3. The Court makes the following findings based on
the standards set forth in Carlin Lake Ass’n v. Carlin Club
Properties, LLC, 2019 WI App 24, ¶48, 387 Wis. 2d 640,
929 N.W.2d 228:

a. The interest of the citizens of the jurisdiction that
has established the zoning requirements in enforcing the
requirements: All citizens have an interest in having to
follow the same zoning rules as their neighbors. Just
because no individual citizen has come forth to complain
about [Golla’s] vertical expansion of [the] home is of no
consequence and not relevant. The idea that [Golla] can just
violate a zoning ordinance and only pay a fine but another
landowner that desires to vertically expand their residence
must comply with the zoning ordinance and obtain a
variance weighs in favor of the County’s request for an
injunction.

b. The extent of the zoning violation: The alleged
zoning violation is extensive. This matter was not a minor
mistake in measurement such as building six inches over the
line. Rather, this case involved the construction of a second

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story on a house that the owners should not have been able
to build without obtaining a variance.

c. Whether the parties to the action have acted in
good faith: Waupaca County acted in good faith. The
County expressed an opinion on what their zoning rules and
the law were and these opinions have been confirmed by this
Court. It is hard for the Court to say that the County did not
act in good faith when the Court agrees with the County’s
position. Any delay in litigation of this matter were not the
result of bad faith by either party. It is hard for the Court to
say that [Golla] acted in good faith. [Golla was] put on
notice time and time again both orally and in writing of the
County’s position and chose to find somebody out there who
agreed with them and relied on that third party to the
detriment of their own situation.

d. Whether the violator of the zoning requirements
has available any other equitable defenses, such as laches,
estoppel or unclean hands: There are no equitable defenses
available to [Golla]. Although the County did not take legal
action until [Golla’s] construction was complete, this does
not provide [Golla] any equitable defense. Whether
Waupaca County could have filed an injunction action
stopping the construction prior to completion is irrelevant
and does not create an equitable defense to [Golla].

e. The degree of hardship compliance with the
zoning requirements will create: There will be a hardship to
[Golla], however, any hardship is unequivocally self-
inflicted. If this were a case where the building of the home
extended a couple inches wider than it should have and the
County was requesting to demolish the home, that would be
extreme. However, [Golla] went ahead with a construction
project that [she was] told [she] could not do by the
[County].

f. What role, if any, the government played in
contributing to the violation: The government played no role
in contributing to this violation whatsoever.

4. Lastly, the concept of deterrence is important to
these kinds of cases. The community must know that if a
landowner is put on notice by the County that the
landowner’s action violates an ordinance, and the landowner
proceeds anyway, it cannot be the understanding in the
community that the landowner can simply pay a fine and
continue with their ordinance-violating conduct. The
community must be aware of other consequences beyond

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just a monetary penalty and be deterred from violating an
ordinance.

3. Analysis

¶105 Golla argues that the circuit court incorrectly analyzed each of the
Goode factors and improperly analyzed the additional factor of deterrence. We
address Golla’s arguments as to each factor in turn.

a. Public’s interest in enforcing zoning requirements

¶106 Golla contends that the circuit court failed to consider her argument
that the 1988 variance indicated that the County Board of Adjustment would be
required to find that the addition’s placement in violation of the side yard setback
does not violate the public interest. However, what the Board of Adjustment might
find as to the public interest in reviewing a variance application for the 2016 addition
is both unknown and irrelevant. It is unknown because Golla never applied for a
side yard setback variance or land use permit, and therefore did not give the County
any opportunity to consider the public interest as it might relate to a side yard
setback variance for the addition. It is irrelevant because the public’s interest in
enforcing zoning requirements, which a court must consider in reviewing a request
for injunctive relief for a zoning violation, Carlin Lake Ass’n, Inc., 387 Wis. 2d
640, ¶48, is not necessarily the same as the “larger public interest” that a board of
adjustment must weigh vis-à-vis the other factors relevant to whether unnecessary
hardship exists so as to warrant a variance. See ¶38 above, citing Ziervogel, 269
Wis. 2d 549, ¶¶7, 33 (enumerating the factors relevant to the unnecessary hardship
showing). Golla simply does not address the citizens’ interest in enforcing the side
yard setback and land use permit zoning provisions that apply to all property in the
County.

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¶107 Golla contends that the circuit court failed to consider her argument
as to the importance of the lack of any complaints regarding the addition. However,
the court did consider that argument and accorded the absence of citizen complaints
no weight. The court explained that no one was given the opportunity to be heard
as to the proposed addition precisely because Golla did not institute any proceeding
at which the public would have had such an opportunity, such as by applying for a
variance or land use permit. See, e.g., GENERAL ZONING ORDINANCE Ch. 34,
§ 14.04(6) (requiring for a variance a Class 2 notice under WIS. STAT. ch. 985 and
mailed notice to property owners within 300 feet of this parcel) (cited by the County
in its respondent’s brief, without objection by Golla in her reply brief). To the
contrary, the court gave significant weight to the public interest in ensuring that all
property owners comply with zoning ordinance requirements and that some are not
able to purchase their way out of those requirements by paying a forfeiture. See
Bouchard v. Zetley, 196 Wis. 635, 647, 220 N.W. 209 (1928) (“The public is
interested in the enforcement of the zoning ordinances .… Such public rights should
not be compromised by private parties.”).

¶108 Golla contends that the circuit court failed to consider her argument
that the County, by not seeking to enjoin the construction or to “diligently prosecute
its case,” did not itself deem this matter to be of significant public interest.
However, the court did consider the County’s failure to seek a restraining order
earlier in the process, but gave that fact no weight, explaining that the County had
from the start advised Golla of the variance and land use permit requirements and
that it was not “the County’s responsibility to save [Golla] from poor decisions.”

¶109 Golla contends that the circuit court overstated the public’s interest in
enforcement of the zoning ordinances given the “unique circumstances” present
here, comprising a vertical addition to a home that encroached on the side yard

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setback pursuant to a prior variance. Golla posits that the public interest is minimal
because “so few properties would ever have such a situation arise.” However, Golla
disregards the broad application of the side yard setback and land use permit
provisions to every property regardless of any such “unique circumstances.”

b. The extent of the zoning violation

¶110 Golla contends that the circuit court should have given minimal
weight to the encroachment into the side yard setback because it was allowed
pursuant to the 1988 variance. However, the court gave great weight to the fact that
the encroachment was neither inadvertent nor a matter of inches but was instead an
entire addition that Golla “should not have been able to build without obtaining a
variance.” Golla fails to show that the court’s weighing of this factor based on the
facts was illogical or irrational. See Carlin Lake Ass’n, Inc., 387 Wis. 2d 640, ¶43.

c. Whether the parties have acted in good faith

¶111 Golla contends that, as to whether she acted in good faith, the circuit
court ignored her reliance on the statements by the Town Building Inspector and
State Representative as to the effect of WIS. STAT. § 59.692 on the County’s
enforcement of the General Zoning Ordinance side yard setback and land use permit
provisions, which conflicted with the information she received from the County.
However, the court did consider this fact and found that it weighed against Golla,
explaining that she was “put on notice time and time again both orally and in writing
of the County’s position and chose to find somebody out there who agreed with
[her] and relied on that party to the detriment of [her] own situation.” The court
underscored that Golla relied on those with “a shared opinion” instead of applying
for a variance or land use permit, as encouraged by the County, or filing an action
in court seeking a declaration of her rights. The court noted that, even in this case,

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Golla failed to raise a defense based on § 59.692 until October 2020, “four years
into the case,” despite her having received the § 59.692-related advice in 2015 or
2016.

¶112 Golla contends that the circuit court ignored the fact that the “addition
was constructed consistent with the [Town building permit] and there were no
concerns of structural safety.” We note that her citations to the record do not
establish this fact, and she offers no record support showing that this “fact” was
presented to the court for its consideration. More importantly, the Town building
permit directed Golla to consult with the County regarding a land use permit, and
Golla’s pointed failure to comply with this condition was one of the facts supporting
the court’s remarks as to this factor quoted above. The structural soundness, or lack
thereof, of the addition was not the basis for the court’s decision.

¶113 Golla contends that the circuit court improperly weighed, as to
whether the County acted in good faith, the County’s “inaction both before and
during this case.” However, the court explained why it found no bad faith from the
County’s failure to do more than it did before filing this enforcement action, namely
alerting Golla numerous times that she needed a variance and land use permit before
commencing and then continuing with construction. The court contrasted this
situation with one in which a county waited until the property owner completed
construction and said, “we got you.” The court also found that the delays in
litigating this action once commenced were not attributable solely to the County,
and Golla does not argue that this finding is clearly erroneous.

d. Equitable defenses

¶114 Golla contends that the circuit court erred in finding that she is not
entitled to the equitable defense of laches. Golla reiterates her arguments as to the

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County’s asserted inaction before and during this case, and we have already
explained why those arguments do not show that the court improperly declined to
weigh the County’s asserted inaction in her favor.

¶115 Golla contends that the circuit court erred in finding that she is not
entitled to the equitable defense of estoppel because the County failed to follow “the
razing requirements” in WIS. STAT. § 66.0413. However, this contention is
meritless given that § 66.0413 does not apply, as explained by both the circuit court
and in this opinion above.

e. The degree of hardship from compliance with the zoning requirements

¶116 Golla contends that the circuit court failed to consider the “fact” that
the hardship here is not self-inflicted, given the conflicting information she received
from the County on one hand and the Town Building Inspector and State
Representative on the other. However, as explained above, the court did consider
the underlying facts, and found that the hardship is self-created. The court
considered that the County repeatedly informed Golla of the need to apply for and
obtain a variance and land use permit, and that Golla relied on conflicting
information from others. Based on these facts, the court found that the hardship is
self-created, explaining that “the only reason this is a hardship is because [Golla]
went and did something that [she was] told [she] couldn’t do.” Golla does not
persuade us that the court’s finding is clearly erroneous.

¶117 Golla contends that the circuit court failed to consider the total cost to
construct and remove the addition. However, it was the court that requested that
Golla provide the cost estimates in preparation for the remedies hearing, and the
court did implicitly consider those estimates when it acknowledged that, “There will

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be a hardship here. No doubt about it.” However, based on all of the undisputed
facts, as explained above, the court attributed that hardship solely to Golla.

¶118 Golla contends that the circuit court ignored the 1988 variance, which
was granted because the “property’s unique limitations created an unnecessary
hardship.” However, beyond making this assertion, Golla does not make a cogent
argument explaining how the hardship based on the land, which the Board of
Adjustment found warranted the side yard setback variance for the one-story
structure in 1988, relates to the hardship resulting from her proceeding with the
addition in 2016 without having obtained a variance and land use permit, which is
the hardship that the court must consider in deciding whether to order injunctive
relief. Accordingly, we do not consider this contention further. See Wisconsin
Conf. Bd. of Trs. of the United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Culver, 2001 WI 55,
¶38, 243 Wis. 2d 394, 627 N.W.2d 469 (stating that we do not address arguments
that are conclusory and insufficiently developed).

¶119 Golla contends that the circuit court “failed to consider Goode’s
acknowledgment of the unique hardship that setback violation cases present.”
However, Golla’s citation to Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 682, in support of this
contention contains no such acknowledgement. Rather, on that page the court cites
a Colorado case as “upholding [the] trial court’s consideration of equitable principle
of relative hardships in [a] setback violation case, where encroachment was done in
good faith pursuant to a permit ….” Id. Golla does not explain how the situation
in that case applies here, where she proceeded without a permit and the circuit court
found that the facts did not show that she did so in good faith.

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f. Role the government played in contributing to the violation

¶120 Golla contends that the circuit court ignored certain facts that
“establish that the County contributed to, and could have prevented, the outcome of
this case.” These facts include the County’s asserted inaction before and during this
lawsuit, the County’s failure to comply with the statutory razing procedure, the 1988
variance based on the unnecessary hardship created by the property’s unique
limitations, and Golla’s reliance on statements by the Town Building Inspector and
State Representative. As explained above, the court found that none of these facts
establish that the County contributed to Golla’s violation, and Golla fails to show
that the court’s findings as to these facts are clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

g. Additional factor: Deterrence

¶121 Golla contends that the circuit court “improperly considered
deterrence as a factor to support an injunction.” Golla provides no legal authority
for the proposition that deterrence is not a proper factor for the court to consider,
and the legal authority is to the contrary. See Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 684 (stating
that the list of six relevant factors is not exclusive). Moreover, the court here
explained why “deterrence is important to these kinds of cases.”

¶122 In the alternative, Golla contends that the circuit court gave this factor
too much weight, because zoning enforcement is “highly fact intensive and
reviewed on a case-by-case basis,” thereby diluting any deterrence effect from this
particular case. However, this argument disregards the reason why the court gave
deterrence significant weight. The court deemed deterrence deserving of weight
based on the undisputed facts that Golla proceeded without applying for and
obtaining a variance and land use permit, pursuant to provisions that apply to all
property in the County, despite the County’s repeatedly advising her that she needed

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a variance and land use permit. The court gave weight to the deterrence factor so
that those facts would not easily repeat themselves: “it cannot be the understanding
in the community that the landowner can simply pay a fine and continue with their
ordinance-violating conduct.”

h. All factors

¶123 As to all factors, Golla essentially contends that the circuit court
should have exercised its discretion differently by weighing the relevant factors
differently, and should have imposed forfeitures rather than an injunction requiring
removal of the addition to bring the structure into compliance with the General
Zoning Ordinance. While the remedy may be harsh, the circuit court acknowledged
its severity and articulated the reasons why, applying the proper legal standards to
these particular facts, nothing short of removal would address the seriousness of the
violation. To repeat, as the court found, Golla ignored her administrative and
judicial remedies by failing to apply for and obtain a variance and land use permit,
after repeatedly being advised by the County, as well as in the Town building permit
she obtained, to do so. As the court reasoned, to require that Golla only pay a
forfeiture could send the message that property owners can purchase their way
around the General Zoning Ordinance provisions and would compromise
enforcement of those provisions. The remedy ordered by the court is squarely
within its discretion, and the court’s written order, which summarizes its oral ruling,
establishes that the court carefully considered the appropriate law and the
undisputed facts and made a reasonable decision.

¶124 In sum, based on our review of the record, which includes the circuit
court’s detailed and comprehensive consideration of the relevant factors, we cannot
conclude that the court erroneously exercised its discretion.

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CONCLUSION

¶125 For the reasons stated, we conclude that the 1988 variance does not
exempt Golla from complying with the side yard setback and land use permit
provisions in the County General Zoning Ordinance as to the 2016 addition. We
also conclude that the County is not barred by WIS. STAT. § 59.692, which governs
the County’s shoreland zoning authority, from requiring that Golla comply with the
side yard setback and land use permit provisions in the County General Zoning
Ordinance as to the addition. Accordingly, we conclude that the County is entitled
to summary judgment on its claims that Golla violated the County General Zoning
Ordinance when she constructed an addition to a structure on her shoreland property
without having applied for and obtained a side yard setback variance and land use
permit, despite being repeatedly advised by the County before and during
construction that a variance and land use permit were necessary. Finally, we
conclude that the circuit court had authority to grant the County’s request for
injunctive relief and that Golla fails to show that the court erroneously exercised its
discretion in doing so. Accordingly, we affirm.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

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