State v. Bradley C. Burgess

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 21, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP1067-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF29

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

BRADLEY C. BURGESS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from judgments of the circuit court for Lafayette County:
KARL HANSON, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Fitzpatrick, and Graham, JJ.

¶1 GRAHAM, J. Bradley Burgess was a passenger in a vehicle that was
pulled over by a police officer because it had a defective muffler. During the traffic
stop, the officer developed reasonable suspicion that Burgess was obstructing his
investigation by providing a false name. The officer eventually searched the
No. 2021AP1067-CR

vehicle, and contraband that the police attributed to Burgess was found in the search.
Burgess filed a motion to suppress the contraband, which was denied, and Burgess
pled no contest to four offenses.

¶2 Burgess appeals his judgments of conviction, arguing that the circuit
court should have granted his motion to suppress. On appeal, he does not argue that
the arresting officer lacked a valid basis for the initial traffic stop, that the officer
lacked a valid basis to search the vehicle, or that there was not reasonable suspicion
that a crime was being committed when Burgess gave the officer a false name.
Burgess’s argument is that the arresting officer unlawfully prolonged the duration
of the stop, contrary to Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348 (2015), first by asking the
passengers for their names, dates of birth, and telephone numbers and running
records checks on the passengers, and second by asking the driver questions
unrelated to the defective muffler. We do not address Burgess’s second claim of
error because he does not develop an argument to support it. As for Burgess’s
argument related to the passenger identification and records checks, we conclude
that Wisconsin law already recognizes such checks to be ordinary inquiries that are
incident to a traffic stop. Therefore, these checks did not unconstitutionally prolong
the stop, and we affirm the judgments of conviction.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In the early morning hours of January 24, 2019, Officer Nicholas
Mantsch conducted the traffic stop that led to Burgess’s arrest. The following
summary of undisputed facts is derived from the circuit court’s findings of fact and
Mantsch’s testimony, which the court found to be “clear and credible.” It is
supplemented by our observations from Mantsch’s body camera footage, which was

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played during the suppression hearing. Our observations are all consistent with the
facts found by the circuit court.

¶4 Mantsch was on patrol when he observed an unoccupied vehicle he
did not recognize that was legally parked outside the residence of a person he
believed to use illegal drugs. Mantsch ran a license plate check and determined that
the vehicle was registered to a person we identify throughout this opinion as “the
driver.” Mantsch learned that the driver had a valid driver’s license and no active
warrants, and that he was under supervision with the state department of corrections.

¶5 Shortly thereafter, Mantsch observed four individuals enter the parked
vehicle, although he did not see where they came from. When the vehicle began
moving, Mantsch could hear that it had a defective muffler. Mantsch suspected drug
activity, and he contacted police dispatch to ask if a K-9 unit was available to
respond to a traffic stop.

¶6 Mantsch followed the vehicle. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., he activated
the emergency lights on his squad car, and the vehicle pulled to the side of the road.
In his initial report of the incident, Mantsch stated that he stopped the vehicle to
address its defective muffler. Mantsch’s subsequent interactions with its occupants
were recorded on his body camera, and we refer to the timestamps from the body
camera footage below.

¶7 At 00:00:22, Mantsch approached the vehicle on foot. The driver
handed Mantsch his license, and Mantsch engaged him in a conversation about the
muffler. Mantsch told the driver that he had stopped the vehicle because the muffler
was loud, and the driver agreed it was loud. Mantsch asked if the driver was aware
of that, and the driver said he was. Mantsch asked if the driver planned on getting
the muffler taken care of, and the driver said he did.

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

¶8 At 00:00:52, Mantsch turned to the passengers and asked, “You guys
got IDs on you as well?” The passengers communicated that they did not have
identification, and Mantsch asked each passenger for their name, date of birth, and
phone number. One of the passengers declined to answer, but the other two,
including Burgess, answered Mantsch’s questions. Burgess identified himself as
“Cody R. Kitsemble” and provided a date of birth.

¶9 At 00:03:05, Mantsch turned back to the driver and asked the
following questions (followed by the driver’s responses) about the group’s activities
that night: “Where are you guys coming from tonight?” (“Over by the
fair[grounds].”); “What’s over by the fair[grounds]?” (“We dropped off a buddy.”);
“Who’s your buddy?” (“Tim”); and “Do you know, was it on Louisa Street over
there?” (“I don’t know street names.”). Mantsch looked at the driver’s license,
confirmed that he still lived in Platteville, and then jotted down his phone number.
Mantsch resumed his questioning of the driver as follows: “Where were you guys
at before where you were dropping him off?” (“Madison”); “What’s in Madison?”
(his buddy was “stuck at a bar.”); and “Just went to pick him up and gave him a ride
home?” (“Yep.”).

¶10 At 00:04:02, Mantsch told the occupants of the vehicle to “hang
tight,” and by 00:04:12, he was back in his squad car running records checks,
starting with the driver. Another officer arrived and, as Mantsch was running the
records checks, he told the second officer that he was “seeing some signs of meth
use on the back seat left passenger,” who was later identified as Burgess.1

1
The State does not argue that the facts Mantsch was aware of amounted to reasonable
suspicion that a drug crime had been committed.

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

¶11 At 00:06:17, Mantsch ran a records check on the name that Burgess
had provided, and at 00:06:52, Mantsch determined that “[Burgess] gave … the
wrong date of birth.” Mantsch returned to the vehicle at 00:07:15 and asked Burgess
to step out of the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, Burgess acknowledged that he had
given a false name because he was worried he had “warrants.” At that point,
Burgess gave a different name and date of birth. It is undisputed that, from that
point onward, Mantsch could detain Burgess based on reasonable suspicion that he
had committed the crime of obstructing an officer’s investigation by providing a
false name.

¶12 Mantsch’s investigation continued and, eventually, he removed the
occupants of the vehicle and searched it.2 During the search, the officers discovered
drugs, drug paraphernalia, and other contraband.

¶13 Burgess was charged with two counts of identity theft. He was also
charged with possession with intent to distribute THC, two counts of possession of
drug paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed knife, all as party to a crime. He filed
a motion to suppress all evidence obtained in the traffic stop arguing, among other
things, that Mantsch had seized the driver and passengers “beyond the time
reasonably required to complete the traffic stop.”

2
According to the State, Mantsch properly searched the vehicle pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 973.09(1d) (2019-20). A search pursuant to that statute, commonly referred to as an “Act 79
search,” see State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, ¶2 & n.2, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285, allows
law enforcement officers to search property under a probationer’s control “if the officer reasonably
suspects that the [probationer] is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a crime” or a
violation of a condition of probation. During the circuit court proceedings, Burgess argued that the
requirements of § 973.09(1d) were not met, but Burgess has not renewed that argument on appeal.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version.

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

¶14 Following the suppression hearing, the circuit court denied Burgess’s
motion to suppress. In its oral ruling, the court cited State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d
90, 93, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), and U.S. v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356 (8th
Cir. 1995), for the proposition that, “[a]s part of a traffic stop, an officer may ask
for the identification of the driver, ask for the driver’s purpose and his/her
destination,” and “that is what Officer Mantsch did in this case.” The court then
cited State v. Gammons, 2001 WI App 36, ¶24, 241 Wis. 2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623,
for the proposition that an officer can ask for “the identification of the other
individuals in the vehicle.” The court stated that, in its view, the discussion in
Gammons about passenger information checks is “harmonious” with the United
States Supreme Court’s guidance in Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348. Accordingly, the
circuit court concluded that Mantsch did not unlawfully prolong the stop beyond the
time needed to conduct its mission by asking the driver about the group’s activities
that night or by conducting passenger identification and records checks—that is, it
was “clear to [the court] that that was all done in the initial part of [Mantsch’s]
investigation and detention of the vehicle and the driver, with regard to the defective
muffler.”

¶15 Additionally, the circuit court determined that, by the time Burgess
gave an alternative name and date of birth, a “second investigation” had begun. At
that point, the court concluded, Mantsch had reasonable suspicion that Burgess was

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committing the crime of obstruction, and that reasonable suspicion justified
continued detention.3

¶16 Burgess filed a motion for reconsideration, which focused on the
passenger identification and records checks. He argued that Rodriguez had
fundamentally changed what officers are allowed to do during a traffic stop without
unlawfully prolonging its duration, and that, following Rodriguez, Gammons is no
longer a correct statement of law. He argued that Mantsch’s “questioning of the
passengers is not one of the Rodriguez Court’s narrowly defined ‘ordinary inquiries
incident to the traffic stop,’” and that instead, the questioning of the passengers
“measurably” and “unlawfully” extended the duration of the stop beyond its
mission. Burgess did not cite or discuss Betow or Johnson in his motion for
reconsideration and did not specifically argue that any questions Mantsch posed to
the driver unlawfully extended the duration of the stop.

¶17 The circuit court determined that “police questions about passenger
identification and verification of that information” are “ordinary inquiries,” as that
term is used in Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, and it denied the motion for

3
The circuit court later explained its reasonable suspicion determination as follows:
Mantsch developed reasonable suspicion “that a crime was afoot based upon the time of day,
location of the unfamiliar vehicle and its occupants near a known drug-user’s home, and, most
critically, based upon information developed after Burgess provided a false identity.” As it
explained, “[i]f Burgess had not provided the false identity to Mantsch, all of the other factors
viewed in the totality of the circumstances … would not have developed into reasonable suspicion
sufficient to extend the traffic stop.” However, “[o]nce Mantsch determined that the false identity
provided by Burgess was not valid, he had reasonable suspicion to investigate further.” Neither
party challenges this determination on appeal.

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

reconsideration. Burgess pled no contest to four offenses and now appeals his
judgments of conviction.4

DISCUSSION

¶18 The review of an order granting or denying a suppression motion
presents an issue of constitutional fact. State v. Johnson, 2013 WI App 140, ¶6,
352 Wis. 2d 98, 841 N.W.2d 302. We uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, and we independently review the application of
constitutional principles to those facts. Id.

¶19 “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable seizures.” State v. Wright, 2019 WI 45, ¶23, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926
N.W.2d 157. The Wisconsin Constitution provides similar protections that are
usually interpreted “coextensively with the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶19, 377
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560. These prohibitions and protections apply to traffic
stops, which are considered seizures for constitutional purposes. Wright, 386 Wis.
2d 495, ¶23. As a passenger in a seized vehicle, Burgess was likewise seized in the
traffic stop, and he has standing to challenge the constitutionality of its duration.
State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 255-56, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996); State v. Malone,
2004 WI 108, ¶¶27-28, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1.

¶20 It is undisputed that Officer Mantsch had a valid basis to stop the
vehicle due to its defective muffler; therefore, the traffic stop was lawful at its

4
WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.31(10) provides that “[a]n order denying a motion to suppress
evidence … may be reviewed upon appeal from a final judgment or order notwithstanding the fact
that the judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty or no contest ….”

8
No. 2021AP1067-CR

inception.5 In such cases, “[a]uthority for the seizure … ends when tasks tied to the
traffic infraction [that justified the stop] are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. A routine traffic stop “‘become[s]
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e]
mission’” of issuing a ticket for the violation. Id. at 354-55 (quoted source omitted).
Additionally, “[b]eyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s
mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’” Id. at 355
(quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)). “Typically such [ordinary]
inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration
and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. “These checks serve the same
objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly.” Id.

¶21 With these principles in mind, we turn to Burgess’s argument on
appeal. Burgess contends that, because the traffic stop was justified based on an
equipment violation, the stop in this case should have ended after 54 seconds.
According to Burgess, the mission of the stop was complete at that point because
Mantsch had finished questioning the driver about the muffler and had determined
that he would issue a verbal warning. Burgess acknowledges that, approximately
seven minutes into the stop, Mantsch developed reasonable suspicion that Burgess
was committing the crime of obstruction and, from that point onward, his continued

5
It is apparent from the transcript that Mantsch’s attention was drawn to the vehicle due
to a suspicion that its occupants were involved in drug crimes. Burgess does not challenge the stop
as pretextual. Courts have explained that the constitutionality of a traffic stop does not depend on
the subjective motivations of the officer, and that “pretextual traffic stops—stops designed to
investigate violations not related to the observed violation—are not per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.” See, e.g., State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶25, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d
143 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).

9
No. 2021AP1067-CR

detention would have been lawful. However, he contends that Mantsch unlawfully
prolonged the duration of the stop between the 54-second mark and the seven-
minute mark by (1) asking for the names, dates of birth, and phone numbers of the
passengers and conducting records checks based on that information, and (2) asking
the driver questions that were unrelated to the muffler and were instead about the
group’s activities that night.

¶22 We do not address Burgess’s assertions about Mantsch’s questioning
of the driver because Burgess has not developed any argument on that point with
citation to and discussion of pertinent authority. As discussed above, the circuit
court cited Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, and Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, for the proposition
that an officer may inquire into a driver’s purpose and destination “[a]s part of a
traffic stop.” Burgess has not cited Betow or Johnson—not in his motion for
reconsideration nor his appellate briefing—and he has not developed any argument
that the court’s analysis or conclusion on this issue is wrong. We observe that the
case law in this area is nuanced,6 and we decline to address this issue without the
benefit of a developed argument from the party that purports to challenge the circuit
court’s determination on appeal. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d
633 (Ct. App. 1992) (providing that an appellate court may “decline to review issues
inadequately briefed”).

6
See State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶¶33-34, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1 (declining
to adopt a bright line rule about the permissible scope of questioning of drivers and passengers
concerning their “destination and purpose” during a routine traffic stop); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3(c) at 538 (6th ed. 2020)
(addressing police questioning of the occupants of a vehicle about their “travel plans” and
“destination and purpose” during a lawful traffic stop). See also Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶¶27-28
(concluding that, although a passenger has standing to challenge the nature of questions posed to
that passenger and the total duration of the stop, the passenger does not have standing to challenge
the “nature of questions” posed to the driver or other occupants).

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

¶23 We turn to the argument that Burgess has developed in the circuit
court and on appeal—that Mantsch unlawfully prolonged the stop by asking for the
passengers’ names, dates of birth, and telephone numbers and by running records
checks based on that information. As a preliminary matter, we agree with Burgess
that Mantsch’s request for the passengers’ identification had nothing to do with his
investigation of the defective muffler because the passengers were not driving the
vehicle. Burgess contends that, because the passenger information was not pertinent
to Mantsch’s investigation into an equipment violation, he lacked authority to
prolong the stop by requesting that information and running records checks on the
passengers. The State counters that Wisconsin courts have recognized that
passenger records checks are part of the mission of any traffic stop, and therefore,
that they are “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,” as that term is used in
Rodriguez.

¶24 The State cites two cases, State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 236 Wis. 2d
48, 613 N.W.2d 72, and Gammons, 241 Wis. 2d 296, for the proposition that
Wisconsin treats passenger identification checks as “ordinary inquiries.” Both cases
predate Rodriguez. They also predate Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, in which the United
States Supreme Court first used the term “ordinary inquiries” in the context of a
traffic stop. However, Griffith and Gammons do not predate the broader
proposition that certain checks can be made incident to a lawful traffic stop without
unlawfully prolonging its duration. See, e.g., U.S. v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924-25
(8th Cir. 2001).

¶25 In Griffith, the arresting officer conducted a traffic stop after he
recognized the driver as someone who did not have a valid driver’s license. Griffith,
236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶9. During the stop, the officer asked Griffith, a passenger, for his
name, date of birth, and age, and Griffith gave a false name. Id., ¶13. The officer

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

knew that Griffith was lying about his identity and directed a fellow officer to arrest
him for obstruction. Id. Officers handcuffed Griffith, who then fled. Id., ¶¶13-14.
After Griffith was apprehended, he was charged with and convicted of obstruction
and escape from custody after a lawful arrest. Id., ¶¶16, 18. During postconviction
proceedings, Griffith argued that his attorney had been ineffective for failing to
challenge the lawfulness of the arrest. Id., ¶4. Specifically, he argued that he could
not be arrested for obstruction because the officer had no lawful authority to ask
Griffith, a passenger, for his name and date of birth. Griffith acknowledged that the
officer could ask him about his identity during a consensual encounter on the street,
but Griffith argued that the same rule did not apply during the traffic stop because
he had been seized in the stop and would have felt compelled to answer. Id.,
¶¶39-40.

¶26 Our supreme court determined that, “when a passenger has been
seized pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, the seizure does not become unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment … simply because an officer asks the passenger for
identification during the stop.” Id., ¶65. The court further explained that
“[p]assengers are free to decline to answer such questions, and refusal to answer
will not justify prosecution nor give rise to any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.
However, if a passenger chooses to answer but gives the officer false information,
the passenger can be charged with obstructing an officer ….” Id., ¶65.

¶27 The Griffith court did not address whether the officer could conduct
a records check of passenger information, nor whether such a check extended the
stop beyond the time necessary to fulfill its purpose, because no such records check
occurred in that case. Accordingly, Griffith does not squarely address the question
posed in this case.

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

¶28 However, in Gammons, which this court decided the following year,
we stated that our supreme court had “explained” in Griffith that passenger records
checks can be performed as part of a traffic stop, and that no further justification for
the passenger checks is required. Gammons, 241 Wis. 2d 296, ¶¶11-13. In that
case, Gammons was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped because it did not
have a rear license plate. Id., ¶2. The officer noticed a temporary registration sticker
as he approached the vehicle, but he nevertheless proceeded to ask its occupants for
identification. Id. The officer then ran a driver’s license check on the driver and
warrant checks on the passengers, id., and he eventually searched the vehicle,
finding drugs. Id., ¶4. Gammons argued that the officer unlawfully extended the
stop by, among other things, asking questions about Gammons’ identification. Id.,
¶¶1, 10.

¶29 Although we ultimately concluded that the evidence obtained in the
traffic stop should be suppressed, id., ¶24, our conclusion was not based on the
officer’s request for identification and warrant checks of the passengers. On those
topics, we unequivocally stated that “such questions and actions are reasonably
related in scope to the purpose of the traffic stop, and no further justification is
required.” Id., ¶13. We explained our reasoning as follows:

During an investigative detention, whether the
intrusion is reasonable depends on whether the police
conduct is reasonably related to the circumstances justifying
the initial police interference. An investigative detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop. The scope of the detention
must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. The
State has the burden to show that any seizure it seeks to
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently
limited in scope.

The supreme court has concluded that “when a
passenger has been seized pursuant to a lawful traffic stop,
the seizure does not become unreasonable simply because an

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

officer asks the passenger for identification during the stop.”
Griffith, 236 Wis. 2d 48, ¶65. In Griffith, the court
identified several reasons why a police officer may need to
investigate the identity of passengers during the course of a
traffic stop. Id., ¶¶45-48. For example, police may need to
determine whether anyone other than the driver in the
vehicle is licensed to drive, or they may need to identify
potential witnesses to unlawful conduct. Id., ¶¶47-48.

[The arresting officer] did not violate Gammons’
Fourth Amendment rights by requesting his driver’s license
and running a check on him. As the Griffith court explained,
such questions and actions are reasonably related in scope to
the purpose of a traffic stop, and no further justification is
required. Id., ¶45.

Id., ¶¶11-13 (some internal quotation marks and quoted sources omitted).

¶30 Gammons squarely addresses the issues presented in this case.
Although the Gammons opinion was issued before the United States Supreme Court
first started using the term “ordinary inquiry,” its analysis is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s explanation and description of what constitutes an ordinary
inquiry. That is, the reasoning in Gammons—that passenger checks are “reasonably
related in scope to the purpose of a traffic stop,” id., ¶13—is another way of saying
that they are “ordinary inquiries incident to [a traffic] stop,” as that phrase is used
in Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, and Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355.

¶31 Burgess does not address Gammons until his reply brief and, even
then, his argument does not engage with the above-quoted language from that case.
Burgess may mean to argue that Rodriguez effectively overruled Gammons, but to
the extent he intends to make that argument, it is unpersuasive.

¶32 In Rodriguez, the arresting officer stopped Rodriguez’s vehicle for a
traffic infraction and then gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of
insurance. Id. at 351. After running a records check on Rodriguez, the officer

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

returned to the vehicle, asked the passenger for his license, and then ran a records
check on the passenger. Id. The officer issued a written warning and returned all
documents to the driver and passenger, but continued to hold them until a drug-
sniffing dog arrived and detected the presence of drugs. Id. at 351-52. The
Rodriguez Court determined that the officer had unlawfully prolonged the duration
of the stop beyond its mission to conduct the dog sniff. Id. at 355-57.

¶33 Although the facts in Rodriguez included a passenger records check,
the Rodriguez Court did not comment one way or another on whether the passenger
records check had unlawfully prolonged the stop. That is, the Court neither
expressly approved nor expressly disapproved of the passenger records check, and
it did not say whether the passenger records check could be considered an ordinary
inquiry incident to a traffic stop. Because Rodriguez was silent on this issue, we
cannot conclude that it effectively overruled Gammons. To the extent that Burgess
is arguing that Gammons should be overruled, that is an issue that should be directed
to our supreme court. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997)
(the court of appeals cannot overrule its own precedent).

¶34 Burgess also argues that Gammons is distinguishable because the
passenger identification and records check in Gammons “occurred before the
investigation related to the traffic stop was complete” and “at the same time the
officer conducted a records check of the driver and related to officer safety.” We
question the accuracy of portions of Burgess’s recitation of facts from Gammons,
but his argument fails for another reason. As we now explain, in Smith, our supreme
court rejected an analogous argument, concluding that an officer may complete
ordinary inquiries even after addressing the specific traffic infraction that justified
the stop because the mission of the stop is not concluded until the ordinary inquiries
are complete. State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶21, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353.

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

¶35 In Smith, the arresting officer lawfully stopped a vehicle that he knew
to be owned by a person with a suspended driver’s license. Id., ¶4. Upon
approaching the vehicle, the officer immediately realized that the driver, Smith, was
not the person whose license was suspended. Id. Therefore, the reasonable
suspicion that had originally justified the stop dissipated as soon as the officer
approached the vehicle. Id., ¶14. The officer nevertheless continued to detain Smith
to check his license and, during the exchange that followed, the officer developed
probable cause to arrest Smith for intoxicated driving. Id., ¶¶4-6. Smith argued that
the officer unlawfully prolonged the seizure to ask for his license, but the court
disagreed. Id., ¶11. Citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, the Smith court stated that
“[t]he mission of a traffic stop includes ‘determining whether to issue a traffic ticket’
and the ordinary inquiries incident to the stop.” Smith, 379 Wis. 2d 86, ¶10.
Therefore, the court determined, the officer was allowed to finish checking Smith’s
license—even though the officer no longer had reasonable suspicion to seize him—
because checking a driver’s license is an ordinary inquiry that is “part of the original
mission” of a lawful stop. Id., ¶2; see also id., ¶¶10, 11, 21.7

¶36 Applying these principles here, we conclude that, because Wisconsin
recognizes passenger records checks to be ordinary inquiries, it does not matter

7
The Smith court distinguished between “ordinary inquiries,” which are “part of” the
mission of a traffic stop, and “unrelated inquiries,” which are not. State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶10
n.9, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353. Officers may engage in unrelated inquiries during the course
of a traffic stop—but, unless reasonable suspicion develops to support such inquiries, they cannot
prolong the duration of the stop beyond the time that it reasonably should take to complete the
mission. Rodriguez v. U.S., 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); see also id. at 356 (“On-scene investigation
into other crimes” are “unrelated inquiries” which impermissibly “detour” from the mission of the
stop.). On the contrary, “[a]n expansion in the scope of the [initial] inquiry, when accompanied by
an extension of time longer than would have been needed for the original stop, must be supported
by reasonable suspicion.” See State v. Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶35, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d
124.

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No. 2021AP1067-CR

whether Officer Mantsch’s investigation of the muffler was complete before he
asked the passengers for identification and ran passenger records checks. This court
established in Gammons that passenger checks are “reasonably related in scope to
the purpose of a traffic stop,” Gammons, 241 Wis. 2d 296, ¶13, and we are not
empowered to overrule our prior decisions. Based on Smith, these checks were
therefore part of the mission of the stop and did not unlawfully prolong its duration.8

CONCLUSION

¶37 For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

By the Court.—Judgments affirmed.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

8
Because we conclude that Wisconsin law recognizes the passenger identification and
records checks conducted by Mantsch as ordinary inquiries, we need not address the State’s
alternative argument that the checks constituted an unrelated investigation that did not measurably
extend the stop.

17