Craig LaFayette Stingley v. Dr. John Laczkowski, OD

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 2, 2021
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP1214 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2017CV2791
2019CV119
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

CRAIG LAFAYETTE STINGLEY,

PLAINTIFF,

V.

JOHN LACZKOWSKI, OD, VISION WORKS
(WEST ALLIS, BUSINESS UNIT), HIGHMARK
INCORPORATED (PARENT COMPANY) AND
VISION WORKS OF AMERICA (SUBSIDIARY),

DEFENDANTS.

------------------------------------------------------------

CRAIG LAFAYETTE STINGLEY,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

WILLIAM JOSEPH VINCENT, OD,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
No. 2019AP1214

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
JEFFREY A. CONEN, Judge. Affirmed and cause remanded with directions.

Before Dugan, Graham and White, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Craig L. Stingley, who is self-represented, appeals
circuit court orders arising from his Chapter 655 medical malpractice claims
against two optometrists, Dr. John P. Laczkowski and Dr. William Vincent. Both
optometrists were employed at relevant times by Vision Works, which is also a
defendant in the ongoing circuit court proceedings.1 Stingley alleges that
Dr. Laczkowski and Dr. Vincent failed to diagnose his glaucoma during
examinations between 2009 and 2014, and that his resulting vision loss could have
been prevented had he been diagnosed at that time.

¶2 Stingley argues that the circuit court erred by partially dismissing his
claims against Dr. Laczkowski and by dismissing his claim against Dr. Vincent.
He also argues that the circuit court erred by sanctioning him for pursuing a
frivolous claim against Dr. Vincent. All of Stingley’s arguments turn on the
interpretation and application of WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2017-18),2 which sets forth

1
Also included as defendants in the circuit court proceedings are Vision Works of
America and Highmark Incorporated. For the reasons we explained in an order dated
November 12, 2019, and that we elaborate on further in the discussion section below,
Dr. Laczkowski, Vision Works, Vision Works of America, and Highmark Incorporated are not
respondents in this appeal. The sole respondent is Dr. Vincent.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2019AP1214

a statute of limitations and a statute of repose for medical malpractice claims.
Stingley argues that his claims against both optometrists were timely because,
among other reasons, Vision Works “concealed” his vision examination records.

¶3 We do not address Stingley’s arguments about his claims against
Dr. Laczkowski because we do not have appellate jurisdiction over those claims.
As to Stingley’s claim against Dr. Vincent, we affirm the circuit court’s orders
because, we conclude, his claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
and the court properly sanctioned Stingley for continuing to pursue an untimely
claim.3 Finally, we grant Dr. Vincent’s motion for sanctions against Stingley for
filing a frivolous appeal, and we remand for the circuit court to determine an
appropriate award of attorney fees and costs related to this appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶4 This appeal arises from two separate lawsuits, which were
eventually consolidated into a single circuit court case. While the legal issues are
relatively straightforward, the factual and procedural history leading up to this
appeal are somewhat complex.

¶5 Stingley had his eyes examined by optometrists at Vision Works on
several occasions between 2009 and 2014. He was subsequently diagnosed with
advanced glaucoma by a different optometrist on April 6, 2016. Shortly
thereafter, he requested a copy of his vision health exam records from Vision

3
The Honorable Glenn H. Yamahiro presided over the proceedings on Dr. Laczkowski’s
motion for summary judgment and entered the order granting partial summary judgment in his
favor. The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen presided over Dr. Vincent’s motion for dismissal and
motion for sanctions and entered orders granting both motions.

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Works. Vision Works provided a copy of two eyeglass prescriptions, and it
informed Stingley that the remainder of his records had been “lost in a flood.”

The Laczkowski Lawsuit

¶6 On March 22, 2017, Stingley filed a request for mediation under
WIS. STAT. § 655.44, and several weeks later, he filed a lawsuit against
Dr. Laczkowski, Vision Works, Highmark Incorporated, and Vision Works of
America. For ease of reference, we refer to this lawsuit as the “Laczkowski
lawsuit” and these defendants as the “Laczkowski defendants.” Stingley alleged
that Dr. Laczkowski examined his eyes on at least three occasions between
January 2009 and January 2014,4 and that Dr. Laczkowski negligently failed to
diagnose his glaucoma on those occasions. According to Stingley, he did not
discover his injury until April 6, 2016, the date that his glaucoma was diagnosed.

¶7 Shortly after Stingley filed the Laczkowski lawsuit, Vision Works
located and produced his vision health examination records. This production
occurred on May 10, 2017—thirteen months after Stingley first requested records
from Vision Works. The records contained, among other things, the name of
Dr. Vincent, a second Vision Works optometrist who had provided care to
Stingley on one occasion.

¶8 The Laczkowski defendants moved to dismiss the claims as untimely
under WIS. STAT. § 893.55(1m). This statute sets forth the statute of limitations
for medical malpractice claims, and it also provides a five-year statute of repose.

4
The parties dispute the number of examinations and their specific dates, but those
disputes are not germane to the issues before us.

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¶9 In an order entered on July 6, 2017, the court dismissed all claims
arising out of acts or omissions on the part of the Laczkowski defendants prior to
March 22, 2012, on the grounds that the statute of repose would bar such claims.5
See WIS. STAT. § 893.55(1m)(b). In so doing, the court rejected Stingley’s
argument that he could pursue claims based on the care he received before
March 22, 2012, under the “continuum of care” doctrine; according to the court,
the examinations performed at Vision Works were too far separated in time to
constitute a single continuum of care. The court also rejected Stingley’s argument
that Vision Works’ alleged “concealment” of his medical records prevented
Stingley from discovering the Laczkowski defendants’ negligence, providing an
exception to the statute of repose. For ease of reference, we refer to the court’s
July 6, 2017 order as the “Laczkowski partial dismissal order.”

¶10 Shortly thereafter, Stingley filed an amended summons and
complaint. The amended complaint rehashed Stingley’s time-barred claims
against Dr. Laczkowski.6 It also attempted to name Dr. Vincent as an additional
defendant. However, Stingley did not timely serve Dr. Vincent with the amended
summons and complaint7 and, therefore, the court dismissed Dr. Vincent without
prejudice from the Laczkowski lawsuit.

5
The circuit court used March 22, 2012, as the cutoff date because it was exactly five
years prior to the date that Stingley filed his request for mediation under WIS. STAT. § 655.44.
6
Additionally, over the following months, Stingley filed multiple motions for
reconsideration of the Laczkowski partial dismissal order. The circuit court denied all of these
motions, and it reaffirmed that Stingley was limited to claims arising from alleged negligent
conduct that occurred after March 22, 2012.
7
See WIS. STAT. § 801.02(1) (providing that an authenticated copy of the summons and
complaint must be served on the defendant within 90 days of filing).

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No. 2019AP1214

¶11 After the deadline for adding parties had passed, Stingley filed a
“motion for joinder,” which asked the court for more time to join Dr. Vincent to
the Laczkowski lawsuit. Stingley argued that he had been unable to locate
Dr. Vincent to serve him with the amended complaint. The circuit court denied
Stingley’s motion on the ground that, “[f]or the purposes of the pending action, all
claims against Dr. Vincent are barred by the statute of limitations per WIS. STAT.
§ 893.55(1m).” At the same time, the court denied a motion from Dr. Vincent
seeking sanctions for what he referred to as a frivolous filing. The court noted that
sanctions could be revisited if “anything else comes up in the future.”

The Vincent Lawsuit

¶12 On January 4, 2019, Stingley filed a separate lawsuit naming
Dr. Vincent as the sole defendant.8 Stingley alleged that Dr. Vincent examined his
vision on one occasion, January 6, 2014, and that Dr. Vincent provided negligent
care on that date. This time, Stingley timely served Dr. Vincent with the summons
and complaint. For ease of reference, we refer to this lawsuit as the “Vincent
lawsuit.”

¶13 Dr. Vincent served Stingley with a “safe harbor” letter and a draft
motion for sanctions in accordance with WIS. STAT. § 802.05(3)(a). Dr. Vincent
asserted that the statute of limitations had expired and that he considered the filing

8
The parties dispute whether Stingley commenced this lawsuit on January 4, 2019, or
January 7, 2019. Dr. Vincent points to the date stamp on the filed summons and complaint,
which indicates January 7, 2019, as the filing date. Stingley points to a notation made by the
circuit court clerk in the electronic docket acknowledging that the date stamp is not accurate, and
that the documents were actually filed on January 4, 2019. Our conclusion would remain the
same applying either of these dates, and we assume without deciding that the date of filing was
January 4, 2019.

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No. 2019AP1214

to be frivolous. He also informed Stingley that he would seek sanctions against
Stingley if he did not voluntarily dismiss the Vincent lawsuit.

¶14 Stingley declined to voluntarily dismiss the Vincent lawsuit, and
soon thereafter, it was consolidated with the Laczkowski lawsuit.

The Consolidated Lawsuit

¶15 In the consolidated lawsuit, Dr. Vincent proceeded to move for
dismissal and sanctions. Shortly thereafter, he filed a proposed dismissal order at
the request of the circuit court. Stingley objected to the proposed order. He
argued, among other things, that Dr. Vincent’s identity had been “fraudulently
concealed,” and that his claims were timely under the concealment exception to
the statute of limitations. See WIS. STAT. § 893.55(2).

¶16 The court disagreed. On June 7, 2019, it entered an order dismissing
Stingley’s medical malpractice claim against Dr. Vincent on the ground that it was
barred under the applicable statute of limitations. We refer to this order as the
“Vincent dismissal order.” Then, on August 5, 2019, it entered an order granting
Dr. Vincent’s motion for sanctions and requiring Stingley to pay Dr. Vincent’s
reasonable attorney fees and costs. We refer to this order as the “Vincent
sanctions order.”

¶17 We present additional background about these motions and other
pertinent facts as needed in the discussion section below.

DISCUSSION

¶18 Stingley appeals the Vincent dismissal order and the Vincent
sanctions order, both of which are final orders relating to Stingley’s claim against

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No. 2019AP1214

Dr. Vincent. His notice of appeal also identifies the Laczkowski partial dismissal
order, as well as the orders denying his multiple motions for reconsideration of
that order, and his appellate briefs advance a number of arguments that
specifically pertain to his claims against the Laczkowski defendants. Among other
things, he argues that the continuum of care doctrine preserves his medical
malpractice claims against the Laczkowski defendants, including those arising out
of alleged negligent acts or omissions prior to March 22, 2012.9

¶19 Our analysis begins by briefly explaining why we do not have
appellate jurisdiction over Stingley’s claims against the Laczkowski defendants.
After addressing this threshold issue, we turn to Stingley’s appeal of the circuit
court orders relating to his claim against Dr. Vincent.

I. Stingley’s Claims Against the Laczkowski Defendants

¶20 With exceptions that do not apply here, the court of appeals has
appellate jurisdiction in two circumstances: (1) under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) if
the circuit court enters an order that is final for purposes of appeal and the party
files a timely notice of appeal of that order; or (2) under § 808.03(2) if the circuit
court enters a non-final order, the party petitions for interlocutory review, and we
grant the petition. Neither set of circumstances is satisfied regarding Stingley’s
claims against the Laczkowski defendants.

9
Stingley’s arguments about the continuum of care doctrine have no bearing on the
claim against Dr. Vincent because Dr. Vincent provided care to Stingley on just one occasion,
which was the final time that Stingley sought medical care at Vision Works.

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No. 2019AP1214

¶21 We do not have jurisdiction under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(2) because
Stingley did not seek interlocutory review of the Laczkowski partial dismissal
order or any of his motions for reconsideration of that order.

¶22 Nor do we have jurisdiction under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) because
there is no final order as to the Laczkowski defendants. An order is final for the
purposes of appeal if it “‘disposes of the entire matter in litigation’” as to one or
more parties. Wambolt v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 35, ¶16, 299
Wis. 2d 723, 728 N.W.2d 670 (quoting § 808.03). Here, the Laczkowski partial
dismissal order is not final because it did not “dispose of the entire matter in
litigation” as to any of the defendants. Instead, it allowed Stingley to continue to
pursue claims against the Laczkowski defendants to the extent that the claims are
based on acts or omissions that occurred after March 22, 2012.

¶23 Turning to the Vincent dismissal order, it is final as to the claim
against Dr. Vincent, but it did nothing to address Stingley’s pending claims against
the Laczkowski defendants. An order may be final as to one defendant but not
another, Culbert v. Young, 140 Wis. 2d 821, 825, 412 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App.
1987), and here, the Vincent dismissal order is final as to Dr. Vincent, but not as to
any other defendant.

¶24 Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s
decisions with regard to Stingley’s claims against the Laczkowski defendants.
Therefore, we address these claims no further.

II. Stingley’s Claims Against Dr. Vincent

¶25 We turn to Stingley’s claims against Dr. Vincent. We first consider
whether the circuit court properly dismissed the claims against him as time-barred

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No. 2019AP1214

under the applicable statute of limitations, and we conclude that it did. We next
consider whether the court properly found that the Vincent lawsuit was frivolous,
and we conclude that the court’s order awarding sanctions was not erroneous.
Finally, we turn to Dr. Vincent’s motion for sanctions on appeal and grant it for
the reasons we explain below.

A. The Vincent Dismissal Order

¶26 The parties agree that Stingley’s claims against Dr. Vincent are
subject to the statute of limitations set forth in WIS. STAT. § 893.55(1m) and (2),
but they dispute how the statute of limitations applies to the facts of this case. To
resolve their dispute, we are required to interpret a statute and apply it to
undisputed facts. This task presents questions of law, which we review de novo.
Kroeger v. Kroeger, 120 Wis. 2d 48, 50, 353 N.W.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1984).

¶27 WISCONSIN STAT. § 893.55(1m) and (2) provides as follows:
(1m) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an
action to recover damages for injury arising from any
treatment or operation performed by, or from any omission
by, a person who is a health care provider, regardless of the
theory on which the action is based, shall be commenced
within the later of:

(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or

(b) One year from the date the injury was
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have been discovered, except that an action may not
be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years
from the date of the act or omission.

(2) If a health care provider conceals from a patient
a prior act or omission of the provider which has resulted in
injury to the patient, an action shall be commenced within
one year from the date the patient discovers the

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No. 2019AP1214

concealment or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the concealment or within the time
limitation provided by sub. (1m), whichever is later.10

¶28 By its plain language, WIS. STAT. § 893.55 sets forth alternative
limitations periods depending on when the injury occurred (para. (1m)(a)), when
the injury was discovered (para. (1m)(b)), and whether a health care provider
concealed from the patient any act or omission resulting in injury (subsec. (2)).
Before discussing the application of these limitations periods to Stingley’s claim
against Dr. Vincent, we briefly recap the dates of pertinent events.

¶29 It is undisputed that Dr. Vincent saw Stingley on only one occasion,
January 6, 2014, and that, to the extent Dr. Vincent was negligent, his negligent
acts or omissions occurred on that date. Stingley discovered his advanced
glaucoma and resulting vision loss no later than April 6, 2016, when it was
diagnosed by a glaucoma specialist. On May 10, 2017, Vision Works turned over
documents that identified Dr. Vincent as the optometrist who had examined
Stingley on January 6, 2014. Finally, Stingley attempted to commence an action
against Dr. Vincent in 2017, but he did not successfully commence a lawsuit
against Dr. Vincent until January 4, 2019.11

10
WISCONSIN STAT. § 893.55(3) contains an additional exception to the statute of
limitations period set forth in subsec. (1m), which applies when a foreign object which has no
therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect has been left in a patient’s body. This exception has
no application to the facts of this case.
11
Some portions of Stingley’s brief appear to suggest that his 2017 amended complaint
naming Dr. Vincent tolls or otherwise affects the limitations period. If Stingley intends to make
that argument, it is incorrect. The filing of a lawsuit alone is insufficient to toll the limitations
period if the lawsuit is not properly commenced by timely serving the defendant. Honeycrest
Farms, Inc. v. Brave Harvestore Sys., Inc., 200 Wis. 2d 256, 262-63, 546 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App.
1996). In such a case, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over that defendant and the limitations
period continues to run. Id.

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¶30 WISCONSIN STAT. § 893.55(1m)(a) sets forth a three-year injury-
based limitations period. Under para. (a), the patient has three years from the date
of injury to commence an action. Although Stingley does not specifically identify
the date of his injury, he does not argue that his lawsuit was commenced within
three years of his injury. The parties appear to agree that by the time Stingley
filed suit against Dr. Vincent in 2019, the three-year injury-based limitations
period found in para. (a) had already expired.

¶31 WISCONSIN STAT. § 893.55(1m)(b) recognizes that patients may not
discover their injuries until after the injury-based limitations period has expired.
To address this concern, para. (b) sets forth a discovery rule, counterbalanced by a
statute of repose. Under para. (b)’s discovery-of-injury rule, the patient can
commence an action within one year of when the injury was or should have been
discovered. Yet there is a limit to how far the limitations period can be
extended—under the statute of repose, the action may not be commenced “more
than 5 years from the date of the act or omission,” regardless of when the injury
was discovered.

¶32 The parties dispute the significance of the five-year statute of repose
in WIS. STAT. § 893.55(1m)(b), and we address this dispute below. For now, it
suffices to conclude that, because Stingley discovered his injury no later than
April 2016, the one-year discovery-of-injury-based limitations period found in
para. (b) could extend the limitations period only so far as April 2017. Stingley
did not file suit against Dr. Vincent until January 2019 and, therefore, para. (b)’s
discovery-of-injury rule does not preserve his claim.

¶33 Finally, WIS. STAT. § 893.55(2) recognizes that a health care
provider may attempt to conceal negligent acts or omissions, thereby preventing
the discovery of the malpractice until after the statute of repose has already
expired. See Pagoudis v. Korkos, 2010 WI App 83, ¶8 & n.6, 326 Wis. 2d 234,

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No. 2019AP1214

784 N.W.2d 740 (discussing the purpose of § 893.55(2)). Subsection (2) sets forth
an exception that comes into play in such circumstances—if a healthcare provider
conceals a negligent act or omission from the patient, the limitations period may
be further extended beyond the five-year statute of repose. Under subsec. (2), the
patient may commence an action “within one year from the date the patient
discovers [or should have discovered] the concealment … or within the time
limitation provided by sub. (1m), whichever is later.”

¶34 Stingley argues that the concealment exception applies because
Vision Works told Stingley that his records were “lost in a flood” and successfully
concealed Dr. Vincent’s identity for thirteen months. We assume without
deciding that the concealment exception applies to these facts.12 Even so, it would
not preserve Stingley’s claims. At most, it would extend the limitations period for
one year after Stingley discovered or should have discovered the concealment.
Here, it is undisputed that Stingley possessed the documents needed to discover
Dr. Vincent’s identity no later than May 10, 2017. Indeed, during a hearing on
June 26, 2017, Stingley informed the court that he was aware of Dr. Vincent and
intended to join him in the Laczkowski lawsuit. Therefore, application of the one-

12
Dr. Vincent makes several arguments against the application of the concealment
exception. Among other things, he argues that any concealment by Vision Works did not delay
Stingley from filing suit. See Pagoudis v. Korkos, 2010 WI App 83, ¶8 & n.6, 326 Wis. 2d 234,
784 N.W.2d 740. Dr. Vincent also argues that any concealment by Vision Works was not
intentional. Finally, he argues that there are no facts suggesting that Dr. Vincent himself
concealed any records. See Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 Wis. 2d 202, 213-14, 456 N.W.2d 852
(Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a hospital was properly dismissed from a medical malpractice
lawsuit when there was no reasonable showing that the hospital itself concealed any negligent act
or omission of the doctor who negligently treated the plaintiff). We need not address these
arguments because we determine that Stingley’s claims were untimely, even if the concealment
exception applies to these facts. See Barrows v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 2014 WI App 11, ¶9,
352 Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508 (“An appellate court need not address every issue raised by the
parties when one issue is dispositive.”).

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No. 2019AP1214

year discovery-of-concealment rule found in WIS. STAT. § 893.55(2) would push
back the limitations period no later than May or June of 2018. It does not preserve
Stingley’s claim against Dr. Vincent, which, again, was not commenced until
January 2019.

¶35 Stingley’s primary argument to the contrary is based on an incorrect
interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 893.55. Throughout his brief, Stingley asserts that
para. (1m)(b)’s five-year statute of repose was “activated” by the concealment of
his records. Consequently, he argues, his claims were timely as long as they were
filed by January 6, 2019.13 In other words, Stingley appears to be arguing that,
because Vision Works concealed his records for a period of thirteen months, the
limitations periods found in para. (1m)(a), para. (1m)(b), and subsec. (2) no longer
apply to his claim. As we understand it, Stingley appears to be arguing that he is
entitled to commence his action at any point within the five-year statute of repose.

¶36 There is no support for Stingley’s argument in the plain language of
the concealment exception statute, WIS. STAT. § 893.55(2). Again, subsec. (2)
provides that “an action shall be commenced within one year from the date the
patient discovers [or should have discovered] the concealment … or within the
time limitation provided by sub. (1m), whichever is later.” As discussed above,
Stingley’s claim was untimely under the three-year injury-based limitations period
found in para. (1m)(a), the one-year discovery-of-injury-based limitations period

13
Stingley is somewhat inconsistent about when he claims the statute of repose was
“activated,” however, we understand Stingley to be arguing that the statute of repose started
running on the date Dr. Vincent examined his eyes and did not expire until January 6, 2019,
exactly five years later. To the extent that Stingley may be asserting that the five-year statute of
repose started running on a later date, such as the date of the alleged concealment or the date that
the concealment was discovered, that assertion is also unsupported by the language of WIS. STAT.
§ 893.55.

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found in para. (1m)(b), and the one-year discovery-of-concealment-based
limitations period found in subsec. (2).

¶37 Stingley argues that these limitations periods no longer apply and
that he can file anytime within the five-year statute of repose, but this argument is
founded on an incorrect understanding of the distinctions between statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose. Both may be relevant in determining whether a
claim is untimely, but there are significant differences between the two types of
statutes. Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI
98, ¶26, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. One such difference is when each
starts running. A statute of repose starts running the moment of a defendant’s
negligent act or omission, regardless of whether the patient’s cause of action has
accrued. Id. By contrast, a statute of limitations starts running when a cause of
action has accrued or been discovered, and it “establishes the time frame within
which a claim must be initiated after a cause of action actually accrues.” Id.

¶38 Contrary to Stingley’s argument, the statute of repose found in WIS.
STAT. § 893.55(1m)(b) does not guarantee a five-year-period within which to file
medical malpractice claims. This remains true even if concealment is proven to
have had occurred. Based on the plain language of subsec. (b), the statute of
repose provides an absolute end point to how far the limitations period can be
extended under the one-year discovery-of-injury rule.14 Nevertheless, a plaintiff’s

14
See WIS. STAT. § 893.55(1m)(b) (providing that the action must be commenced within
“[o]ne year from the date the injury was [or should have been] discovered … except that an
action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from the date of the act or
omission”).

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claim may be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, even when the statute
of repose has not yet expired.

¶39 Simply put, Stingley cannot ignore the applicable statute of
limitations on the grounds that he filed the Vincent lawsuit within the five-year
statute of repose. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed
the claim against Dr. Vincent because it was time-barred under the limitations
periods found in WIS. STAT. § 893.55(1m)(a), (1m)(b), and (2), alike.

¶40 Having resolved Stingley’s arguments about the statute of
limitations and repose, we pause to acknowledge that Stingley puts forward an
array of other arguments within his brief, all of which he contends support the
reversal of the circuit court. Apart from the arguments pertaining to the
Laczkowski defendants that we have already addressed, Stingley’s additional
arguments include, among other things, an assertion that the medical malpractice
damages cap found in WIS. STAT. § 893.55 is unconstitutional,15 an assertion about
informed consent, and an assertion that some or all of the defendants falsified
records. “An appellate court need not address every issue raised by the parties
when one issue is dispositive.” Barrows v. American Fam. Ins. Co., 2014 WI
App 11, ¶9, 352 Wis. 2d 436, 842 N.W.2d 508. None of these arguments pertain
to the interpretation or application of the statute of limitations to Stingley’s claim

15
An additional reason that we do not address Stingley’s constitutional challenge is
because he develops this argument for the first time on appeal. As best as we can discern, the
sole reference to the damages cap in the circuit court record was during a hearing regarding the
Laczkowski defendants’ motion to dismiss. During that hearing, Stingley commented that the
cap was the reason he was unable to find a lawyer to represent him. Stingley never sought a
declaratory judgment or filed a motion asking the circuit court to consider the constitutionality of
the cap. “Except in rare circumstances that are not present here, we will not address an issue that
an appellant raises for the first time on appeal[.]” Green v. Hahn, 2004 WI App 214, ¶21, 277
Wis. 2d 473, 689 N.W.2d 657.

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No. 2019AP1214

against Dr. Vincent, and we have concluded that the Vincent lawsuit was properly
dismissed on that basis. Therefore, we decline to specifically address the
underdeveloped arguments that Stingley has scattered throughout his briefs.

B. The Order Granting Sanctions

¶41 We now turn to the circuit court’s determination that the Vincent
lawsuit was frivolous. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.05(2)(b), any person who
signs a pleading and files it in court certifies that, to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry, the legal
claims in the pleading are “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law.” If a person signing the pleading knew or objectively
should have known that its claims fail to meet this standard, a court may determine
that the pleading is frivolous and impose sanctions. See § 802.05(3). Statutes
authorizing sanctions for frivolous filings help maintain the integrity of the
judicial system and the legal profession. Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 799,
299 N.W.2d 856 (1981). Nevertheless, this is “‘an especially delicate area,’” and
“a court must be cautious in declaring an action frivolous” to avoid stifling the
development of the law. Juneau Cnty. v. Courthouse Emps., 221 Wis. 2d 630,
640, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998) (citation omitted).

¶42 We review a circuit court’s determination of frivolousness as a
mixed question of fact and law. Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d
220, 236, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994). We will not upset a circuit court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Wisconsin Chiropractic Ass’n v. State of
Wisconsin Chiropractic Examining Bd., 2004 WI App 30, ¶16, 269 Wis. 2d 837,
676 N.W.2d 580. Whether a legal theory is justified by existing law or a good

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faith argument for a change in the law presents a question of law, which this court
reviews independently. Id., ¶¶16-17.

¶43 Here, Stingley had extensive exposure to the provisions of WIS.
STAT. § 893.55 as a result of representing himself in the Laczkowski lawsuit. By
the time he filed the Vincent lawsuit, Stingley knew or should have known that the
three-year injury-based limitations period found in para. (1m)(a), the one-year
discovery-of-injury-based limitations period found in para. (1m)(b), and the one-
year discovery-of-concealment-based limitations period found in subsec. (2) had
all expired.

¶44 Dr. Vincent also served Stingley with a detailed, four-page “safe
harbor” letter pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 802.05(3)(a)1., along with a draft motion
for sanctions. Dr. Vincent’s letter explicitly outlined the applicable statutes of
limitations and explained why they barred the claim against him. The purpose of
this letter was to provide Stingley with a grace period to withdraw a frivolous
pleading to prevent sanctions. See Trinity Petroleum, Inc. v. Scott Oil Co., 2007
WI 88, ¶27, 302 Wis. 2d 299, 735 N.W.2d 1. Despite the fair warning, Stingley
decided not to dismiss the Vincent lawsuit. Then, in his response to the motion to
dismiss, he failed to respond to or even acknowledge the specific arguments that
Dr. Vincent had advanced in the safe harbor letter. Instead, as the circuit court
recognized when ruling on Dr. Vincent’s motions to dismiss and for sanctions,
Stingley continued to assert the same arguments that the court had previously
rejected, without articulating any legal basis for asserting that the court’s prior
decisions had been wrong.

¶45 We recognize that statutes of limitations can be complicated to
calculate and apply. However, our supreme court has determined that self-

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represented individuals are bound by the same rules that apply to attorneys.
Waushara Cnty. v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 452, 480 N.W.2d 16 (1992). Here,
based on our review of the record, we are persuaded that Stingley knew or should
have known that more than three years had passed since his injury, more than one
year had passed since he discovered his injury, more than one year had passed
since he discovered the alleged concealed records revealing Dr. Vincent’s identity,
and the statute of repose could not be used to resurrect a claim that was time-
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, Stingley does not
advance any nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law. Therefore, the circuit court properly
awarded sanctions in Dr. Vincent’s favor.

III. Appellate Fees and Costs

¶46 On appeal, Dr. Vincent filed a motion seeking an award for
reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs, and other appropriate sanctions
pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 809.25(3), 809.83(2), and 895.044. To grant such a
motion, we must decide whether this appeal is frivolous. This presents a question
of law, tested by an objective standard based on “what a reasonable party … knew
or should have known under the same or similar circumstances.” Howell v.
Denomie, 2005 WI 81, ¶9, 282 Wis. 2d 130, 698 N.W.2d 621. We conclude that
Stingley’s appeal is frivolous for at least two reasons.

¶47 First, Stingley’s appeal of the dismissal of the Vincent lawsuit is
frivolous for many of the same reasons that we concluded that the Vincent lawsuit
was itself frivolous. Even self-represented litigants are required “to make a
reasonable investigation of the facts and the law before filing an appeal.” Holz v.
Busy Bees Contracting, Inc., 223 Wis. 2d 598, 608, 589 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App.

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1998). Just as we concluded that Stingley should have known that the Vincent
lawsuit was time-barred under any of the applicable statutes of limitation, we
likewise conclude that an objectively reasonable litigant would know that an
appeal of the dismissal of his lawsuit on those precise grounds is “without any
reasonable basis in law or equity.” WIS. STAT. § 809.25(3)(c)2.

¶48 Second, we informed Stingley in an order dated November 12, 2019,
that he could not appeal the Laczkowski partial dismissal order at this time and
that the Laczkowski defendants “are not proper respondents to the appeal[.]”
Despite this warning, Stingley’s brief included a number of arguments about his
claims against the Laczkowski defendants. As a result, Dr. Vincent was forced to
address these improper arguments in his appellate brief, and we had to again
explain why these arguments were improper in this opinion. See supra ¶¶20-24.
We recognize that Stingley is not represented by counsel, however, self-
representation does not grant anyone “a license not to comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46
(1975); see also Holz, 223 Wis. 2d at 608.

¶49 Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is frivolous because
Stingley knew, or should have known, that this appeal was without any reasonable
basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

CONCLUSION

¶50 For all these reasons, we affirm the Vincent dismissal order and the
Vincent sanctions order, we grant Dr. Vincent’s motion for sanctions for filing a
frivolous appeal, and we remand to the circuit court to determine Dr. Vincent’s

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costs, fees, and reasonable attorney fees related to this appeal pursuant to WIS.
STAT. § 809.25(3).

By the Court.—Orders affirmed and cause remanded with directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5.

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