State v. Christopher Drew Helwig

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 4, 2020
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP448-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CT282

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

CHRISTOPHER DREW HELWIG,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Jefferson County:
BENNETT J. BRANTMEIER, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 GRAHAM, J.1 Christopher Helwig appeals a judgment convicting
him of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI). During his trial, the

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(f) (2017-18).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2019AP448-CR

circuit court admitted evidence of his blood alcohol concentration test result
without requiring testimony from the registered nurse who collected the sample of
his blood. On appeal, Helwig argues that the court erred by admitting evidence of
the test result, and also by admitting a form that documents basic details about the
arrest and the blood draw. For the reasons that follow, I reject Helwig’s
arguments and affirm the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

¶2 After Helwig was arrested for OWI, a sample of his blood was
drawn by a registered nurse pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 343.305, commonly referred
to as Wisconsin’s implied consent law. The arresting officer and the nurse filled
out a preprinted “Blood/Urine Analysis” form (the “blood/urine form”). The
officer then sent the sample and the blood/urine form to the state laboratory of
hygiene, where a lab analyst later determined that Helwig’s blood alcohol
concentration was .188 grams per 100 milliliters of blood. The analyst prepared a
one-page laboratory report stating this result.

¶3 Prior to trial, the parties disagreed about the showing that the State
was required to make before the blood test result could be admitted into evidence.2
This disagreement stemmed from the parties’ differing interpretations of WIS.
STAT. § 343.305, including its provision that test results “are admissible” if the
State shows the blood sample was “administered in accordance with this section.”
See § 343.305(5)(d). Helwig argued that the State had to show that the nurse used
certain approved methods when she collected the blood sample. He further argued

2
Separately, Helwig moved to suppress the blood test result on Fourth Amendment
grounds, but the circuit court denied his motion and Helwig does not appeal that ruling.

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No. 2019AP448-CR

that the nurse was the only person who could testify on this subject, and without
her testimony, the test result was hearsay and its admission would violate the
Confrontation Clause. The State contended that neither the statute nor the
Confrontation Clause required the nurse’s testimony.

¶4 Based on documentary evidence submitted by the State, the circuit
court found that Helwig’s blood “was drawn by a qualified person, namely, a
Registered Nurse,” and that Helwig had not challenged that fact. The circuit court
determined that the nurse was not a “necessary witness,” and neither party called
the nurse to testify at trial.

¶5 The arresting officer and the lab analyst both testified at the trial.
Among other things, the officer described the blood/urine form as a document that
“comes in the blood kit,” “goes to the State Hygiene Lab,” and has “the
defendant’s name, incident number, my name, that sort of information just so that
whoever processes the blood at the State of Wisconsin Hygiene Lab knows whose
blood it is.” The State moved to admit the blood/urine form, and then later to
publish it to the jury. Helwig’s attorney did not object to either of these requests,
which were granted by the circuit court.

¶6 The lab analyst testified about the procedures he used to analyze the
sample and the result of his analysis. In the course of this testimony, the State
moved to admit the analyst’s one-page laboratory report, and Helwig preserved the
objection that the circuit court had previously overruled. The court received the
lab report over Helwig’s objection. The analyst did not testify about the
circumstances of Helwig’s blood draw, and on cross-examination, he confirmed
that he would have no way of knowing whether the person who drew the blood
followed any specific protocol.

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No. 2019AP448-CR

¶7 The jury found Helwig guilty, and he appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Helwig argues that the blood/urine form and the test result are
inadmissible hearsay, and that the admission of this evidence without the nurse’s
testimony violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him.
Because many of Helwig’s arguments hinge upon his interpretation of WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305, I begin by considering the proper interpretation of that statute.

I. Interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 343.305

¶9 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that appellate
courts review de novo. Nowell v. City of Wausau, 2013 WI 88, ¶19, 351 Wis. 2d
1, 838 N.W.2d 852. When interpreting a statute, we begin with its language, and
if the meaning is plain, that ordinarily ends the inquiry. State ex rel. Kalal v.
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.

¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.305(5)(d) governs the admissibility of
blood, breath, and urine tests obtained under Wisconsin’s implied consent law. If
a test is “administered in accordance with” § 343.305, it is “admissible on the
issue of whether the person was under the influence of an intoxicant ....” See
§ 343.305(5)(d). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has explained that a test that
complies with the statutory requirements is admissible “by legislative edict.”
State v. Disch, 119 Wis. 2d 461, 473, 351 N.W.2d 492 (1984) (considering an
earlier version of the statute with the same admissibility provision). The question,
then, is what § 343.305 requires.

¶11 Helwig argues that WIS. STAT. § 343.305 requires that blood
samples be collected properly, according to procedures that were approved by the

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No. 2019AP448-CR

state laboratory of hygiene, as a threshold requirement of admissibility. The State
contends that § 343.305 requires only that the blood be collected by a person who
is statutorily authorized to draw blood. Neither party cites any cases interpreting
the relevant statutory language, and this appears to be a question of first
impression.3

¶12 I begin with WIS. STAT. § 343.305(5), titled “Administering the Test;
Additional Tests.” Paragraph (5)(a) provides that “[a] blood test is subject to par.
(b).” See § 343.305(5)(a). Paragraph (5)(b) sets forth the following requirements
for blood draws:

Blood may be withdrawn from the person arrested
for [an OWI offense] to determine the presence or quantity
of alcohol [or controlled substances] in the blood only by a
physician, registered nurse, medical technologist, physician
assistant, phlebotomist, or other medical professional who
is authorized to draw blood, or a person acting under the
direction of a physician.

WIS. STAT. § 343.305(5)(b).

¶13 Plainly, there is nothing in the text of paragraph (5)(b) that requires
blood to be drawn in a particular manner or consistent with any particular
protocol. Id. The sole requirement set forth in paragraph (5)(b) is that the blood
was drawn by a person authorized to draw blood. Id. Helwig argues that “cases
which have directly examined the requirements put forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(5)(b) have not held that the testimony of the person drawing the blood

3
The State cites to State v. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46, 370 Wis. 2d 187, 881 N.W.2d
805, but that case does not assist our analysis. In Wiedmeyer, we concluded that a test result that
does not meet the requirements of WIS. STAT. § 343.305 may be admitted if the State establishes
its proper foundation through another route. We did not consider whether that statute requires
blood samples to be collected according to approved methods.

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No. 2019AP448-CR

was unnecessary,” see, e.g., State v. Penzkofer, 184 Wis. 2d 262, 516 N.W.2d 774
(Ct. App. 1994), but this argument goes nowhere. There may not be any cases
stating that such testimony is unnecessary, but that does not mean that such
testimony is required.

¶14 Helwig’s argument centers around a different paragraph, WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(6)(a), which provides:

Chemical analyses of blood or urine to be
considered valid under this section shall have been
performed substantially according to methods approved by
the laboratory of hygiene and by an individual possessing a
valid permit to perform the analyses issued by the
department of health services. The department of health
services shall approve laboratories for the purpose of
performing chemical analyses of blood or urine … and
shall administer a program for regular monitoring of the
laboratories. A list of approved laboratories shall be
provided to all law enforcement agencies in the state.
Urine specimens are to be collected by methods specified
by the laboratory of hygiene. The laboratory of hygiene
shall furnish an ample supply of urine and blood specimen
containers to permit all law enforcement officers to comply
with the requirements of this section.

WIS. STAT. § 343.305(6)(a) (emphasis added).

¶15 Helwig appears to argue that the first sentence of paragraph (6)(a)
means that a blood sample must have been collected “substantially according to
methods approved by the laboratory of hygiene.” However, on its face, the first
sentence of paragraph (6)(a) refers to the “chemical analyses” of blood and urine
samples, not to their “collection.” For Helwig’s interpretation to be correct, the
term “chemical analyses” would have to mean not just “analysis” but also
“collection,” even though courts are supposed to avoid reading extra words into a
statute. Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 467 N.W.2d 772 (1991).

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No. 2019AP448-CR

¶16 Helwig points to nothing in WIS. STAT. § 343.305 that suggests the
legislature intended the term “chemical analysis” to include “collection,” and the
other sentences in paragraph (6)(a) undermine any such interpretation. See Kalal,
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it
is used”). For example, blood and urine samples are typically collected in the field
or a hospital,4 but the second sentence of paragraph (6)(a) shows that the
legislature understood chemical analysis to be a task performed in a laboratory.5
And paragraph (6)(a)’s fourth sentence specifically mandates that urine must be
collected “by methods specified by the laboratory of hygiene,” but it includes no
similar language for blood. This demonstrates that the legislature knew how to
impose such requirements, but chose not to do so for blood samples. See
Responsible Use of Rural & Agr. Land v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Wis., 2000 WI
129, ¶39, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888 (when the legislature uses words in
one part of a statute but not another part, this shows that “the legislature
specifically intended a different meaning”).

¶17 Helwig’s interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 343.305(6)(a) would also
lead to an absurd result. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. In addition to requiring
certain methods for chemical analyses, paragraph (6)(a) requires that such
analyses be performed “by an individual possessing a valid permit to perform the
analyses issued by the department of health services.” The “permit” the statute

4
Breath samples, which are often collected and then immediately analyzed by a law
enforcement officer using specified equipment in the field, are addressed in WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(6)(b)-(d), which set forth different requirements.
5
That sentence provides: “The department of health services shall approve laboratories
for the purpose of performing chemical analyses of blood or urine ....” WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(6)(a).

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No. 2019AP448-CR

refers to is a permit issued to laboratory analysts authorizing them to conduct
blood alcohol tests. See State v. Wiedmeyer, 2016 WI App 46, ¶4, 370 Wis. 2d
187, 881 N.W.2d 805. If the statutory term “chemical analyses” also included the
“collection” of samples, then blood samples could only be drawn by a qualified
person who also had a valid permit to test them. Such an interpretation would
impose a needless and burdensome hurdle for police departments seeking to
preserve evidence of a suspect’s blood alcohol concentration before it dissipates.
This could not be the result intended by the legislature.6

¶18 In sum, when read together, WIS. STAT. § 343.305(5)(b) and (6)(a)
set forth standards for the collection of blood and urine samples, but the standards
differ based on the type of sample at issue. Urine samples must be collected
according to methods specified by the laboratory of hygiene. Blood samples, by
contrast, must be collected by specified medical professionals who presumably
have training and experience with appropriate collection methods.7 And
6
Helwig asserts that it is the State’s interpretation of the statute that would lead to
absurd results because it “would allow the test results to be admitted at trial without any
testimony from either the person who drew the blood or the person who analyzed the blood.” I
am not persuaded. The State was allowed to present the test result without the nurse’s testimony
because it used documentary evidence to prove that the nurse was qualified to administer a blood
draw, and Helwig did not dispute the nurse’s credentials. But there are additional requirements
for introducing the result of a chemical analysis, including the requirement that the analysis was
“performed substantially according to methods approved by the laboratory of hygiene.” WIS.
STAT. § 343.305(6)(a). This requirement may be less susceptible to proof through documentary
evidence.
7
Helwig asserts that the laboratory of hygiene has approved certain methods for the
collection of blood samples. Yet, the document he submitted that purportedly sets forth these
methods merely provides that the collectors should “[c]ollect the specimen according to [their]
institution’s protocol,” along with generic directions such as “[u]se a disposable, sterile needle”
and “[w]rite the subject’s name on the label.” Rather than setting forth approved collection
methods, this document instead appears to leave such methods to the medical institution. But
even if the laboratory of hygiene has approved any meaningful blood collection methods, that
would not mean that the statute requires a showing that these were followed as a prerequisite to
admitting test results.

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No. 2019AP448-CR

separately, blood and urine samples must both be analyzed “substantially
according to methods approved by the laboratory of hygiene and by an individual
possessing a valid permit to perform the analyses issued by the department of
health services.” See § 343.305(6)(a). If Helwig believed that the nurse’s
collection method compromised the integrity of his blood sample, he was free to
introduce evidence to support that assertion, and such evidence might have called
into question the weight that the jury should give to his test result. But such
evidence is not a prerequisite of admissibility under § 343.305(5)(d). See Disch,
119 Wis. 2d at 477.

II. Hearsay

¶19 I now turn to Helwig’s arguments about hearsay.8 Hearsay is a rule
of evidence, and I review the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings under an erroneous
exercise of discretion standard. See State v. Nieves, 2017 WI 69, ¶16, 376 Wis. 2d
300, 897 N.W.2d 363. “The burden to demonstrate an erroneous exercise of
discretion rests with the appellant.” Winters v. Winters, 2005 WI App 94, ¶18,
281 Wis. 2d 798, 699 N.W.2d 229. I will uphold the court’s evidentiary rulings if
it “examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a
demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach.” Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 415, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).

¶20 Although Helwig argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the
lab report (and presumably any testimony about the blood test result as well), the

8
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
State v. Kreuser, 91 Wis. 2d 242, 250, 280 N.W.2d 270 (1979). “As a general rule, hearsay is not
admissible evidence,” State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶34, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919, but
the rule against hearsay is subject to exceptions provided by rule or statute, WIS. STAT. § 908.02.

9
No. 2019AP448-CR

portions of his appellate briefs that address hearsay actually take aim at a different
target, the blood/urine form. As best as I understand it, his argument appears to be
that the State used an out-of-court statement (the blood/urine form) to prove that
the blood test was “administered in accordance with” the requirements of WIS.
STAT. § 343.305, and that makes the test result hearsay. I address the parties’
arguments about the blood/urine form and the test result in turn.

A. The Blood/Urine Form

¶21 As mentioned above, the blood/urine form is a standard form used to
document basic details about the arresting officer, the defendant, the collection of
a blood or urine specimen, the nature of the requested analysis, and the receipt of
the specimen at the laboratory. According to the State, a blood/urine form is
generally used to establish “chain of custody” for a blood or urine sample. See,
e.g., State v. Martinez, No. 2015AP272, unpublished slip op. ¶9 (WI App Aug. 5,
2005) (unpublished one-judge opinion cited for persuasive value under WIS. STAT.
§ 809.23(3)(b)).

¶22 It is not clear what Helwig hopes to accomplish by challenging the
admissibility of the blood/urine form on appeal. Although he argues that the State
used hearsay to prove that his blood was collected “substantially according to
methods approved by the laboratory of hygiene,” the blood/urine form does not
actually describe any specific method by which his blood was collected. As it
pertains to “specimen collection,” the form documents the date and time the
specimen was collected and the name, signature, and credentials of the person who
collected it. If the State had been required to establish that the blood was collected
according to approved methods, the blood/urine form would not have helped the
State to make that showing.

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No. 2019AP448-CR

¶23 In any event, I agree with the State that Helwig forfeited any
challenge to the blood/urine form by not objecting to its admission before or
during the trial. As a general rule, when a party fails to raise an issue before the
circuit court, the party forfeits that issue on appeal. See Schill v. Wisconsin
Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶45 & n.21, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177.

¶24 Helwig asserts that he did not forfeit his objection to the blood/urine
form, but he does not identify any place in the record where he challenged its
admission, and the transcript clearly shows that he did not object when the State
offered it into evidence at trial. Instead, Helwig’s opening brief cites to a portion
of the trial transcript where he objected to the admission of the analyst’s lab
report. At that point in the trial, the blood/urine form had already been admitted
without objection.

¶25 In his reply brief, Helwig appears to argue that the blood/urine form
and the lab report are part of the same document, such that his objection to the lab
report also constitutes an objection to the blood/urine form. There are at least
three problems with this argument. First, Helwig does not cite anything in the
record that shows that the lab report and the blood/urine form were ever part of the
same document. Second, regardless of whether the two documents had ever been
physically connected, they were labeled as separate exhibits and introduced
through different witnesses at different points in the trial. Finally, Helwig points
to nothing that logically links the two documents such that any objection to the lab
report would also apply to the blood/urine form. The lab report was created by the
lab analyst for the purpose of recording the result of the blood test, while the
blood/urine form was created weeks earlier by the arresting officer and nurse for
the purpose of establishing the blood sample’s chain of custody.

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No. 2019AP448-CR

¶26 Forfeiture is a “rule of judicial administration,” and I have discretion
to overlook a party’s failure to raise an issue in the circuit court. State v.
Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117, ¶7, 320 Wis. 2d 811, 772 N.W.2d 702. But
Helwig offers no reason why I should overlook his forfeiture, and applying the
rule here advances its underlying policies. Had Helwig objected to the blood/urine
form as hearsay at trial, the parties and the circuit court would have had a fair
opportunity to address the objection, and would perhaps have resolved any issue
without the need for an appeal. State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d
653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (explaining that the forfeiture rule “gives both parties and
the circuit court notice of the issue and a fair opportunity to address the objection,”
“encourages attorneys to diligently prepare for and conduct trials,” and “prevents
attorneys from ‘sandbagging’ opposing counsel by failing to object to an error for
strategic reasons and later claiming that the error is grounds for reversal”).
Accordingly, I decline to address Helwig’s arguments about the blood/urine form.

B. The Blood Test Result

¶27 I now turn to the argument that Helwig advanced in the circuit
court—that evidence of the blood test result was inadmissible under WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(5)(d) because the nurse did not testify that she collected his blood
according to the method approved by the laboratory of hygiene. In the absence of
such testimony, Helwig contends that evidence of the test result is hearsay.

¶28 As a threshold matter, the test result was admitted both through the
written lab report and through the lab analyst’s own testimony. To be sure, the lab
report is an out-of-court statement that might be considered hearsay, but Helwig
fails to explain how the analyst’s in-court testimony about the result of his own
analysis could be hearsay. As noted above, the analyst did not testify about the

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No. 2019AP448-CR

method used to collect Helwig’s blood, except to deny any personal knowledge
when Helwig’s attorney specifically asked him about it on cross-examination.

¶29 In any event, Helwig’s argument about the blood test result fails
because it depends on an erroneous interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 343.305(5)(d).
As explained above, that statute does not require the State to show that Helwig’s
blood was collected according to approved methods; it instead requires a showing
that the blood was drawn by a registered nurse or other authorized person.9
Helwig has not met his burden to show that the circuit court erroneously exercised
its discretion by admitting “hearsay” evidence of the test result.

III. Confrontation Clause

¶30 Helwig argues that admission of the blood test result without the
nurse’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause.10 “While a circuit court’s
decision to admit evidence is ordinarily a matter for the court’s discretion, whether
the admission of evidence violates a defendant’s right of confrontation is a

9
At times, Helwig appears to hint at other arguments that the State failed to satisfy WIS.
STAT. § 343.305(5)(d), including an argument that the State failed to show the nurse had the
proper credentials. I decline to address any potential challenge to the nurse’s credentials, since
Helwig did not preserve it in the circuit court. Pretrial, the State submitted the blood/urine form
with the nurse’s name and a credential summary to show that she was licensed as a registered
nurse at the time of the blood draw. The State argues that the court could consider documentary
evidence of the nurse’s credentials under WIS. STAT. § 901.04, which allows a court to consider
evidence that would not itself be admissible at trial when answering preliminary questions about
admissibility. Helwig acknowledges that the circuit court permitted the State to prove the nurse’s
credentials through hearsay submissions and that he “did not challenge that fact.”

To the extent that Helwig intends to make any other hearsay arguments, or any other
argument that the State failed to satisfy § 343.305(5)(d), I decline to address it as insufficiently
developed. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
10
For the same reasons explained in the previous section, I decline to address Helwig’s
forfeited argument that admission of the blood/urine form violated the Confrontation Clause.

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No. 2019AP448-CR

question of law subject to independent appellate review.” State v. Griep, 2015 WI
40, ¶17, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567.

¶31 The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is satisfied when a hearsay
declarant “appears for cross-examination at trial.” Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). However, if a hearsay declarant is not present at trial, and
if the hearsay statement is “testimonial,” the Confrontation Clause is satisfied only
if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. See id. at 58; Griep, 361 Wis. 2d 657, ¶24.

¶32 Helwig’s argument is difficult to follow, in part because he does not
explain how admission of the blood test result could implicate the Confrontation
Clause at all. The lab report that was admitted at trial does not contain any
statements (testimonial or otherwise) that were made by the nurse. It instead
contains statements made by the lab analyst, and therefore that analyst, not the
nurse, is the “declarant” whose absence could implicate the Confrontation Clause.
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. But as noted above, the analyst was present at trial
and cross-examined by Helwig’s counsel.

¶33 In his opening brief, Helwig asserts in conclusory fashion that the
nurse was a “necessary State’s witness, which subjected her to confrontation (and
cross-examination) by the defendant.” The opening brief fails to identify anything
that would make the nurse “necessary,” apart from the interpretation of WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(5)(d) that I have already rejected.

¶34 In his reply brief, Helwig suggests the nurse was a “necessary
witness” because she was in the blood sample’s chain of custody. However, the

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No. 2019AP448-CR

Confrontation Clause does not require “that anyone whose testimony may be
relevant in establishing the chain of custody … must appear in person as part of
the prosecution’s case.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1
(2009). Helwig cites Disch, 119 Wis. 2d at 463, for the proposition that he had the
“right to confront and cross-examine all persons in the chain of custody of the
original blood sample[.]” But Disch addressed the Due Process Clause, not the
Confrontation Clause, and in any event, Helwig does not dispute that he had the
right to call the nurse to testify. To the extent Helwig intends to argue that due
process requires the State to call all individuals in a blood sample’s chain of
custody in its case-in-chief, I decline to address this argument because Helwig
raises it for the first time in his reply brief on appeal. See A.O. Smith Corp. v.
Allstate Ins. Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998) (we
generally do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal in a reply brief).
Accordingly, I conclude that admission of the blood test result without the nurse’s
testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause.11

CONCLUSION

¶35 For all these reasons, I conclude that Helwig has not shown the
circuit court erred when it admitted evidence of the blood test result, and I decline
to address Helwig’s forfeited arguments regarding the blood/urine form.12

11
To the extent that Helwig intends to make other Confrontation Clause arguments, I do
not address them because they are not sufficiently developed. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 647.
12
I do not address the State’s argument about harmless error because it prevails on other
grounds. See Barrows v. American Family Ins. Co., 2014 WI App 11, ¶9, 352 Wis. 2d 436, 842
N.W.2d 508 (2013) (“An appellate court need not address every issue raised by the parties when
one issue is dispositive.”).

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No. 2019AP448-CR

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

16