Stafferd Dean Call v. Lu Ann Kay Call

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 30, 2020
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2018AP1358 Cir. Ct. No. 2015FA238

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

STAFFERD DEAN CALL,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

LU ANN KAY CALL,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for La Crosse County:
RAMONA A. GONZALEZ, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard and Kloppenburg, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2018AP1358

¶1 PER CURIAM. Lu Ann Call appeals an order denying her motion
to vacate a divorce judgment entered pursuant to a marital settlement agreement.
We affirm.

¶2 Lu Ann Call and Stafferd Call were divorced in 2017. The circuit
court held a hearing at that time at which both parties testified about the marital
settlement agreement. Approximately four months later, Lu Ann moved to vacate
the judgment under under WIS. STAT. § 806.07 (2017-18).1 The circuit court
denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.

¶3 The parties agree that WIS. STAT. § 806.07 may be used to vacate a
divorce judgment that was based on a settlement agreement. The parties agree that
a decision on a motion under this section is discretionary with the circuit court.

¶4 Lu Ann argues that the circuit court’s written decision was too
sparse to show an adequate exercise of discretion, and therefore we should either
remand for an evidentiary hearing or decide the motion independently ourselves,
without deference to the circuit court. This argument fails because Lu Ann
focuses only on the court’s written decision, which denied reconsideration in one
sentence. However, the court’s earlier oral decision on Lu Ann’s motion to vacate
covered four pages of transcript. Lu Ann does not cite to any authority that
requires the court’s exercise of discretion to be in writing, and we are not aware of
any.

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
noted.

2
No. 2018AP1358

¶5 Lu Ann argues for relief under several subsections of WIS. STAT.
§ 806.07. We address them separately.

¶6 Lu Ann argues for relief on the ground of mistake, as provided in
WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(a). The one mistake that Lu Ann expressly identifies in
her argument is that Stafferd did not file a financial disclosure statement within
ninety days of the service of the summons. However, she does not develop an
argument explaining how the absence of that filing qualifies as a mistake for
purposes of this statute. Nor does she develop an argument explaining why the
delay in that filing should be a basis to vacate the judgment. We conclude that this
is not a basis to vacate the judgment.

¶7 Lu Ann argues for relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence
under WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(b), which provides that one reason to vacate a
judgment is: “Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a party to a new trial
under s. 805.15(3).” She argues that a medical diagnosis she received after the
judgment qualifies as newly discovered evidence.

¶8 This argument appears to be that Lu Ann should be relieved of the
negotiated agreement because facts have changed since then in a way that has led
her to be dissatisfied with the agreement that was reached. She does not cite any
authority that supports the idea of using this ground for relief in this manner to
vacate a marital settlement agreement. The nature of negotiated settlements is
such that both parties reach agreement based in part on their expectations about
future conditions that are not knowable at that time. If those expectations turn out
later to be inaccurate, that is not normally a basis to vacate such an agreement, and
Lu Ann has not persuaded us that this ground for relief is available in this
situation.

3
No. 2018AP1358

¶9 Lu Ann also argues for relief under WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(h),
which allows relief for “[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment.” In this argument she combines several strands, including
dissatisfaction with her attorney, alleged contradictions in Stafferd’s final financial
disclosure statement, and the new medical diagnosis. The parties agree that the
court should apply the test for extraordinary circumstances that weighs “the
competing interests of finality of judgments and relief from unjust judgments,” as
described in State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 552, 363 N.W.2d
419 (1985).

¶10 In denying the motion, the circuit court emphasized the testimony at
the hearing where the court confirmed the marital settlement agreement. The
court noted that the parties reaffirmed the financial information that was being
provided, and that the parties did not dispute then that the information was
adequate. The court recalled that it had no doubt that Lu Ann was at that time
making a cost-benefit analysis of proceeding with the agreement. The court stated
that this appeared to be a case where the party later regretted the deal she had
made, and the court emphasized that finality is important if stipulated divorces are
to be meaningful.

¶11 We conclude that even if Lu Ann’s factual assertions are true, the
circuit court made a reasonable decision in this case. The court appropriately
emphasized the importance of finality, and reasonably concluded that Lu Ann’s
testimony at the original hearing should not be revisited.

¶12 For future reference of counsel, we note that the respondent’s brief
cites two unpublished cases at page 41 that cannot properly be cited under WIS.
STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

4
No. 2018AP1358

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5.

5