Monroe County v. T. L. B.

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COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED
September 24, 2026 Samuel A. Christensen Clerk of Court of Appeals
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.
A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2025AP2519 STATE OF WISCONSIN
Cir. Ct. No. 2024JG23
IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF G. L. W .:
MONROE COUNTY,
PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,
V.
T. L. B.,
RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Monroe County: RICHARD A. RADCLIFFE, Judge. Affirmed.
11 BLANCHARD, J.1 T.L.B. appeals an order of the circuit court appointing a guardian of the person for her minor child, G.L.W., pursuant to the
1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise noted.

No. 2025AP2519
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court’s authority under WIS. STAT. § 48.977. T.L.B. argues that the court erred by
applying incorrect legal standards in determining whether a guardianship was
available. T.L.B. also contends that the court erred by concluding that there was
clear and convincing evidence that she and her spouse, G.L.B., in managing the
household and childcare together, were unable to parent G.L.W. T.L.B. further
argues that the court clearly erred in finding that: the Monroe County Department
of Human Services (the County) undertook reasonable efforts to make it possible
for the parents to reunite with G.L.W.; and future efforts to reunite G.L.W. with
the parents were not likely to be successful. I conclude that the court did not err in
any of the ways argued by T.L.B., and accordingly the order is affirmed.2
BACKGROUND
¶2 G.L.W. was born in January 2021. While still at the hospital
following birth, G.L.W. was removed from the custody of T.L.B. and G.L.B.
Shortly after G.L.W.’s removal, T.L.B. suffered a stroke. G.L.W.’s out-of-home
placement continued pursuant to a dispositional order that was entered pursuant to
CHIPS proceedings in June 2021.3
¶3 G.L.W. was placed with an aunt and uncle in October 2021, and has
remained placed with them since then.
2 G.L.B. separately appeals the circuit court’s order appointing a guardian for G.L.W., in
appeal No. 2025AP2239, which this court addresses in a separate opinion that is being issued
simultaneously with this opinion.
3 “‘CHIPS’ is a commonly used acronym for ‘child in need of protection or services.’”
Eau Claire Cnty. DHS v. S.E., 2020 WI App 39, ¶1 n.3, 392 Wis. 2d 726, 946 N.W.2d 155,
aff’d, 2021 WI 56, 397 Wis. 2d 462, 960 N.W.2d 391. Procedures specified in WIS. STAT. ch. 48
permit a circuit court to find that a child is need in protection or services and, when such a finding
is made, the court shall issue a dispositional order that can direct that the child be placed outside
of the home of the child’s parents. See WIS. STAT. §§ 48.345, 48.355.

No. 2025AP2519
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¶4 T.L.B. is an enrolled member of the Ho-Chunk Nation. This makes
G.L.W. eligible for enrollment with the Nation, although he was not enrolled at
any pertinent time during this litigation. Because G.L.W. is eligible for
enrollment, the Wisconsin and federal versions of the Indian Child Welfare Act
apply to child custody proceedings involving G.L.W. See WIS. STAT.
§ 48.02(8g)(b) (defining “Indian child” to include any child “who is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe”); WIS. STAT. § 48.028(3)(a) (describing applicability of “Indian child
welfare” statute to “Indian child custody proceedings”).
¶5 In September 2024, the County commenced this action, petitioning
the circuit court to appoint the aunt and uncle as G.L.W.’s joint guardians under
WIS. STAT. § 48.977. The petition alleged facts that the County contended
satisfied the grounds necessary to allow the court to appoint a guardian. See
§ 48.977(2) (the circuit court “may” appoint a guardian if the conditions listed in
sub. (2) are found by the court).
¶6 The circuit court held a three-day trial to determine if the conditions
required for appointing a guardian were present. See WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2),
(4)(d). The County called witnesses who included three “parent coaches”
employed by private service providers. These coaches worked with G.L.W.’s
parents. The County also called two social workers employed by the County who
had also worked with the parents. T.L.B. and G.L.B. also testified.
¶7 The circuit court found that each of the necessary conditions for
appointing a guardian under WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2) were met. The court later
held a disposition hearing at which it appointed the aunt and uncle as guardians for

No. 2025AP2519
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G.L.W. See § 48.977(4)(fm)-(h) (describing procedures for disposition phase of a
§ 48.977 action).
¶8 T.L.B. appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Each of T.L.B.’s arguments on appeal challenges the circuit court’s
determination, following trial, that the conditions for the appointment of a
guardian under WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2) were met. I describe pertinent legal
standards before addressing these arguments.
¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.977 permits a circuit court to appoint a
guardian of a child if the court finds all of the conditions listed in § 48.977(2) have
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. See § 48.977(2), (4)(d). This
court upholds the factual findings of a circuit court unless clearly erroneous.
Robin K. v. Lamanda M., 2006 WI 68, ¶12, 291 Wis. 2d 333, 718 N.W.2d 38.
This court reviews de novo whether the facts found by a circuit court constitute
clear and convincing evidence that meet the statutory conditions in § 48.977(2).
See Waukesha County v. M.A.C., 2024 WI 30, ¶66, 412 Wis. 2d 462, 8 N.W.3d
365 (reviewing de novo whether county met its burden to prove by clear
convincing evidence the statutory elements required for involuntary commitment);
Brandt v. Brandt, 145 Wis. 2d 394, 409, 427 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that whether a party has met the burden of proof presents an issue of law in the
context of applying the clear and convincing evidence level of burden).4
4 As noted above, T.L.B. appears to limit her challenge to the circuit court’s rulings
regarding whether the statutory requirements of WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2) have been met, and she
does not appear to argue that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in deciding to appoint
(continued)

No. 2025AP2519
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¶11 It is not disputed that the following WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)
conditions apply here:
• G.L.W. is a child who “has been adjudged to be in need of protection or
services.” See § 48.977(2)(a).
• Pursuant to the CHIPS proceedings, G.L.W. was placed with the aunt
and uncle, who were nominated to be his guardians, and who were
likely to be willing and able to serve as guardians “for an extended
period of time.” See § 48.977(2)(b)-(c).
• Termination of the parents’ rights to G.L.W. was in G.L.W.’s best
interest. See § 48.977(2)(d).
¶12 What is disputed are two of the WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2) conditions.
The first is whether, as pertinent here, both of G.L.W.’s parents were “unable to
carry out the duties of a guardian.” See § 48.977(2)(e).5 While the circuit court’s
pertinent findings focused on both T.L.B. and G.L.B.’s abilities as guardians, as is
necessary under § 48.977(2)(e), T.L.B. in this appeal challenges the court’s
a guardian. I note that a circuit court’s ultimate decision to appoint a guardian under § 48.977 is a
discretionary decision, as is the case with other child custody decisions. See § 48.977(2)
(explaining that, when specified conditions are met, a court “may” appoint a guardian); see also
Cynthia H. v. Joshua O., 2009 WI App 176, ¶33, 322 Wis. 2d 615, 777 N.W.2d 664 (“A custody
award will be upset only if the appellate court is convinced that the findings of fact upon which
the custody determination is based are clearly erroneous, WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2), or that the
custody determination represents” a clearly erroneous exercise of discretion. (citing Barstad v.
Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 554, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984))).
5 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.977(2)(e), in pertinent part, specifies as a condition for
appointment of a guardian that “both parents are neglecting, refusing[,] or unable to carry out the
duties of a guardian.” The circuit court found that T.L.B. and G.L.B. were not “neglecting” or
“refusing” to carry out the duties of a guardian. The County does not argue that neglect or refusal
to carry out the duties of a guardian could be alternative grounds to affirm the circuit court.

No. 2025AP2519
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findings with arguments that generally involve her own ability as a guardian, or
the abilities of the parents when seen as a unit—without making arguments
challenging findings that are exclusive to G.L.B.
¶13 The second disputed condition, as I discuss in further detail below,
relates to whether the County “made reasonable efforts to make it possible for
[G.L.W.] to return” to the parents’ residence, whether it was likely that G.L.W.
would be reunited with his parents, and whether further reunification efforts would
be in G.L.W.’s best interest. See WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(f).
I. Application of Proper Legal Standards
¶14 T.L.B. argues that the circuit court failed to properly apply pertinent
legal standards discussed by our supreme court in Barstad. T.L.B. frames this
argument first in a more general way and then in a more specific way, and I
address each framing in turn.
¶15 In the more general framing, T.L.B. contends that the circuit court
failed to apply the following principle noted in Barstad. “[I]n custody disputes
between parents and third parties … a parent is entitled to custody of his or her
children unless the parent is either unfit or unable to care for the children or there
are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a third party.” Barstad, 118
Wis. 2d at 568. However, as the County notes, the court recognized the
applicability of Barstad to the guardianship petition here and also devoted a
substantial portion of its discussion to whether the parents were “unable to carry
out the duties of a guardian” under WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(e). As part of this
discussion, the court found that T.L.B. and G.L.B. did not “have the ability to
parent this child.” T.L.B. does not develop an argument explaining how the
court’s discussion of the ability of the parents to carry out guardianship or parental

No. 2025AP2519
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duties differs in any meaningful way from the standard under which a “compelling
reason[]” may be found that a parent was “unfit or unable to care for the child[],”
as discussed in Barstad. See Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 568 (emphasis added).6
¶16 Turning to the more specific framing of T.L.B.’s argument, she
contends that the basis for the circuit court’s parental ability finding does not
constitute a “compelling reason” for a change in custody under Barstad. She
emphasizes that the court rested its decision in part on the fact that G.L.W. had
greater care needs than an average child, reflected in part by G.L.W. having been
diagnosed with autism and related or potentially related conditions. The court
gave T.L.B. and G.L.B. credit for some strengths and motivations as parents, but
ultimately the court found that they were unable to carry out their duties to provide
care for G.L.W. specifically. T.L.B. contends that this reasoning is contrary to the
following point made in Barstad: “Absent compelling reasons narrowly defined, it
is not within the power of the court to displace a fit and able parent simply because
in the court’s view someone else could do a ‘better job’ of ‘parenting[.]’”
Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 567-68. T.L.B. contends that the court’s reasoning here
6 Following the approach of the circuit court—and absent any argument that the ability
to carry out “the duties of a guardian” are distinct from the ability to carry out the duties of a
parent for purposes of WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(e)—in this opinion I sometimes use the phrase
“parental ability” to refer to the court’s discussion related to the topic addressed in § 48.977(2)(e).
Separately, I note that I need not address an argument advanced by the County that
G.L.W.’s placement outside the home since soon after G.L.W.’s birth is itself a “compelling
reason” to award custody to a third party under Barstad. As the County notes, the court in
Barstad identified an “extended disruption of parental custody” as a “compelling reason” that
could justify awarding custody to a third party. See Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 568. T.L.B. argues
in reply that relying on G.L.W.’s placement outside the home here as a basis for appointing a
guardian is “circular” and violates her constitutional rights as a parent to due process. Because I
conclude that the circuit court’s determination on parental ability under WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(e)
is equivalent to a “compelling reason,” I need not resolve this dispute.

No. 2025AP2519
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was essentially that there were others available who could do a better job meeting
G.L.W.’s relatively great needs.
¶17 But it is evident from the circuit court’s analysis that it was not
comparing the parents’ abilities to those of the potential guardians. Instead, the
court assessed the parents’ abilities to meet the basic health and safety needs of
G.L.W. The court described the issue before it as whether “these two parents,”
with their collective strengths and limitations, “are … able to carry out the duties
of a guardian for [G.L.W.], not for a different child, not in a different household.”
For example, the court found that T.L.B. and G.L.B. had “made very little
progress in trying to understand” the many and varied needs that G.L.W. has, such
as not understanding G.L.W.’s need for nebulizer treatments for lung conditions.
The court also found that they were not able to keep their residence clean, that
they had a limited ability to follow through on medical appointments, and that they
had “difficulty” in maintaining productive relationships with providers.7
¶18 G.L.W. may intend to suggest that considering as a factor the
individual needs of a child relative to other children is improper under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.977 or Barstad. However, if intended, this argument is not well developed.
G.L.W. does not address the scope of “the duties of a guardian” under
§ 48.977(2)(e), which would be necessary to develop the point.
¶19 This calls for a clarification regarding the legal standard. Under
WIS. STAT. § 48.977(5), the default duties of a guardian appointed under § 48.977
7 I explain separately below why I reject T.L.B.’s related argument that these findings
did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of an inability to carry out the duties of a
guardian.

No. 2025AP2519
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are defined by WIS. STAT. § 48.023. Pertinent here, these duties include, but are
not limited to, the “responsibilities of legal custody,” see § 48.023(4), which in
turn are defined to include responsibilities “to protect, train and discipline the
child, and to provide food, shelter, legal services, education and ordinary medical
and dental care,” see WIS. STAT. § 48.02(12). It is true that these responsibilities
refer to the provision of “ordinary” medical care. This, taken in isolation,
arguably excludes the need to support G.L.W. in ways that are of special benefit to
G.L.W.’s development as a child with autism and related or potentially related
conditions. But, implied in the circuit court’s discussion of parental fitness was a
finding that keeping up with G.L.W.’s greater needs was not simply beneficial, but
important to his safety and overall wellbeing, implicating the more fundamental
duty of a guardian “to protect” the child. See § 48.023(12). Seen this way,
“protect[ion]” of G.L.W. and tending to his “ordinary medical care” could include
taking the steps necessary to account for his conditions in ways that would keep
him reasonably safe and healthy. With that clarification in mind, T.L.B. does not
show that the circuit court here erred as a matter of law in discussing its
assessment of G.L.W.’s individual needs.
II. Evidence of Inability to Parent
¶20 Setting aside T.L.B.’s arguments about the application of Barstad to
the facts here, she makes the following closely related contention about the circuit
court’s parental ability determination. She contends that the record does not
support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that she was unable to carry
out the duties of a guardian for G.L.W. She asserts that, in order to meet its
burden to prove this inability, the County was required to show that leaving T.L.B.
in place as guardian “posed a substantial, ongoing threat to [G.L.W.’s] safety or
well-being that could not be mitigated through continued supervision and

No. 2025AP2519
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support.” T.L.B. does not cite legal authority in support of this asserted standard.
But, in her favor, I assume without deciding that proving the inability to carry out
the duties of a guardian under WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(e) in part requires proving
the existence of such a threat to G.L.W.’s wellbeing in the absence of a
guardianship.
¶21 Bearing that assumption in mind, T.L.B. more specifically
challenges the significance of the circuit court’s findings, noted above, regarding
the cleanliness of the parents’ residence and their difficulty following through with
appointments. She also contends that the court overemphasized what the court
considered to be the slow pace of progress that the parents made in improving
their ability to meet G.L.W.’s needs. I address each of these points in turn, and
conclude that the court’s findings meet the standard of clear and convincing
evidence of an inability to carry out the duties of a guardian to G.L.W.
¶22 Regarding the cleanliness of the parents’ residence, T.L.B. argues
that the evidence showed only that it was “messy,” full of “clutter,” and lacking in
certain kinds of childproofing. And, she contends, such references are not
sufficient evidence to establish a threat to G.L.W.’s wellbeing. The problem with
T.L.B.’s argument is that the circuit court clearly implied that the court credited
evidence that extreme clutter and dirtiness created genuine safety risks for G.L.W.
I now summarize some of this evidence.
¶23 One of the parent coaches testified that, as an “ongoing issue,” the
parents needed to be coached on “clearing the clutter and maintaining an
environment free of hazards and dangerous materials.” This same coach testified,
based on notes from other in-home visits with G.L.W., that “[t]here’s no safe place

No. 2025AP2519
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to sit or lay [G.L.W.] down in the home.” Another parent coach testified why she
considered the “cluttered and dirty” state of the residence to be a “safety concern”:
There was not a lot of space for [G.L.W.] to play in.
There was clothing and empty drink containers all over the
living room, and then when you walked into the kitchen
there [were] medicine bottles within reach of [G.L.W].
There were dirty dishes that appeared to have like a
white film and mold on them in the sink. There was dirt
and old food on the floor, and the house in general was
cluttered and hard to move [around] in.
¶24 One of the County’s social workers gave the following testimony.
The floors of the residence were “grimy,” and “almost black with dirt,” such that it
obviously had not been mopped or swept “in a very long time.” This and similar
conditions were a problem because G.L.W. was beginning to crawl. As a result,
the social worker decided that the parents’ visits with G.L.W. could no longer take
place in the parental residence. The social worker “gave [the parents] time to
rectify the situation,” but when this worker returned to the residence on two later
occasions, “nothing was changed.” The parents told the social workers that they
disagreed with the workers who said that the state of their residence presented
safety concerns. T.L.B. specifically told the social worker that T.L.B. “wasn’t
going to make any changes” in cleaning up the residence.
¶25 Summing up on the “mess” topic, there was sufficient evidence for
the circuit court to find that the state of the parents’ residence amounted to more
than, as T.L.B. now puts it, “household disorganization.” Rather, T.L.B. does not
show that the court could not reasonably, based on this evidence, view the
condition of the residence as a safety concern that contributed to the court’s ruling
that WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(e) was met.

No. 2025AP2519
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¶26 Turning to the topic of missed appointments, T.L.B. argues that her
struggles with setting and attending appointments did not support a finding that
she was unable to carry out the duties of parenting G.L.W. She contends that this
difficulty does not necessarily establish an inability to understand and consent to
treatment or services. See WIS. STAT. § 48.023 (guardian “has the duty and
authority to make important decisions in matters having a permanent effect on the
life and development of the child and the duty to be concerned about the child’s
general welfare”). But this argument fails to come to grips with the fact that the
circuit court separately found that T.L.B. and G.L.B. did not understand the scope
of G.L.W.’s needs, in addition to struggling to follow through with making and
attending medical appointments. More broadly, T.L.B. does not explain why the
court could not reasonably view the trial evidence as establishing that the parents’
difficulty in following through on appointments put G.L.W.’s welfare in at least
some risk of harm, especially in light of the court’s finding that G.L.W. has greater
needs relative to many children.8
¶27 Turning to T.L.B.’s argument regarding the pace of the parents’
progress, this involves the circuit court’s observation that, despite the fact that
G.L.W. had been removed from the parents’ residence approximately four years
before the trial, progress toward ending the need for that out-of-home placement
had been “stagnant.” T.L.B. argues that the court’s comments do not constitute
8 Along similar lines, T.L.B. argues that she was given only “passive” support by the
County regarding scheduling appointments, which was insufficient given her continued recovery
from a stroke shortly after G.L.W.’s birth and T.L.B. having a learning disability. But T.L.B.
does not explain how this factor cuts against a finding that the condition in WIS. STAT.
§ 48.977(2)(e) was met here. In the final subsection of this opinion, I address a similar argument
as it relates to § 48.977(2)(f), which partly involves whether the County’s “efforts to make it
possible for [G.L.W.] to return” to the parents’ residence were “reasonable.”

No. 2025AP2519
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findings that could support the determination that she was unable to carry out the
duties of being G.L.W.’s guardian. I agree that these comments about the pace of
progress do not, by themselves, support a finding of parental inability under WIS.
STAT. § 48.977(2)(e). Indeed, the court’s reasoning along these lines appears
more directly related to its determination under § 48.977(2)(f), which in part
addresses the likelihood of reunification of a child with his or her parents in the
future. But it remains that the court’s other findings on the topic of parental ability
are not clearly erroneous for the reasons noted above.
¶28 Based on these findings, I conclude that the County met its burden to
prove the condition in WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(e) by clear and convincing
evidence. To recap, these findings include the combination of the extremely
cluttered nature and lack of cleanliness of the parents’ residence creating safety
risks, the difficulty the parents had with setting and following through on medical
appointments, and their difficulty in engaging in productive relationships with
providers. And, as discussed above, the circuit court’s relevant findings on this
topic also include the parents’ lack of understandings regarding the challenges
they had in meeting G.L.W.’s relatively greater needs.
III. Reasonable Efforts and Likelihood of Reunification
¶29 I understand T.L.B. to argue that the circuit court clearly erred in
finding that the County’s efforts to provide services were reasonable under WIS.
STAT. § 48.977(2)(f) and that future efforts at reunifying G.L.W. with the parents
were not likely to succeed. After discussing § 48.977(2)(f) in more detail, I
explain why I reject these arguments.
¶30 In order for the condition under WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(f) to be met,
the agency primarily responsible for providing services to a child must have made

No. 2025AP2519
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“reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return” to the parents’
residence.9 There is no dispute that, here, the County is the responsible agency for
G.L.W. In making the required efforts, the County was required to “assur[e] that
[G.L.W.]’s health and safety are the paramount concerns.” See § 48.977(2)(f).
Section 48.977(2)(f) has two further required showings. The first is a showing
that the reunification of G.L.W. with the parents is either currently unlikely or
contrary to G.L.W.’s best interests. See § 48.977(2)(f). The second is a showing
that future reunification efforts are unlikely to be made or are contrary to G.L.W.’s
best interests. See § 48.977(2)(f).10
¶31 The circuit court summarized the following as reasonable efforts by
the County to provide services to the parents. The County provided or arranged
for transportation of the parents to court hearings and other appointments. The
County could not accommodate travel to appointments in Rochester, Minnesota,
but the court concluded that this particular limitation was reasonable.
9 Unlike in the context of proceedings on the termination of parental rights, “reasonable
efforts” are not defined for purposes of WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2). Cf. WIS. STAT. § 48.415(a)2.a.
(defining “reasonable effort” for purposes of “this subdivision,” i.e., only § 48.415(a)2.).
10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.977(2)(f) also provides alternative requirements addressing the
situation in which a child is subject to a CHIPS order but has not yet been placed outside the
parents’ residence. Here, to repeat, there is no dispute that G.L.W. has been placed outside the
parents’ residence since shortly after his birth.
Separately, I note that WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(f) further directs that the circuit court
“shall make the findings” pertaining to this condition for appointing a guardian “on a case-by-
case basis based on circumstances specific to the child and shall document or reference the
specific information on which those findings are based in the guardianship order.” Thus, an order
appointing a guardian under § 48.977 must do more than “merely reference[] [subpart (2)(f)]
without documenting or referencing … specific information.” See § 48.977(2)(f). T.L.B. does
not argue that the circuit court here, in its remarks at trial or in a subsequently issued written
order appointing the aunt and uncle as guardians, failed to do more than merely reference subpart
(2)(f).

No. 2025AP2519
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¶32 The circuit court said that the County’s efforts in communicating
with the parents were not perfect, and that in hindsight the County could have
“done better.” But the court also noted that the parents “play[ed] a part in the
difficulty with communication,” which was a clear reference to testimony from
multiple witnesses that the parents were often confrontational or verbally
aggressive with social workers. The court also credited testimony by the social
workers regarding the workers’ efforts to find ways to communicate with the
parents, both orally and in writing, that were most likely to be effective. The court
found that the County provided information to the parents about appointments and
meetings, and coordinated the sharing of information with the parents coming
from medical and service providers, school staff, and parent coaches. Similarly,
the County made referrals and coordinated directly with other agencies, medical
providers, and the Ho-Chunk Nation. In this regard, the County “went above and
beyond” what the County “might normally do” for other parents.
¶33 The circuit court also found that the County made reasonable efforts
to support the parents in what should have been the parents’ efforts to make their
residence less cluttered and cleaner, and therefore a safer place for G.L.W., even if
it would have been “possible” for the County to have done more in this regard.
The County also made referrals to providers for supervised visits of the parents
with G.L.W.
¶34 With these findings as background, T.L.B. argues that the County
attempted only a few “core interventions” to help the parents make their residence
more functional and therefore safer for G.L.W. T.L.B. lists these “core
interventions” as: providing the parents with written childproofing packets and
checklists; conducting short, agenda-driven meetings; and discussing with the
parents how to schedule medical appointments. T.L.B. also characterizes the

No. 2025AP2519
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County’s efforts as merely handing the parents “a list of tasks,” instead of offering
more direct support in accomplishing those tasks.
¶35 This argument fails because it presents a skewed summary of the
circuit court’s relevant findings, described above. T.L.B.’s list leaves unaccounted
for many of the court’s findings regarding the County’s efforts to provide services.
For example, T.L.B. does not account for the fact that the court credited testimony
that social workers had many in-person conversations with the parents identifying
the need to improve the safety of the home environment as an important step for
the parents to take. This was coupled with testimony explaining how the social
workers tried to adapt their communication strategies to more effectively work
with T.L.B. and G.L.B. specifically. For example, one social worker testified that
she intentionally used short, agenda-driven meetings because the worker believed
that this would make meetings with the parents more productive.
¶36 T.L.B. makes an argument apparently challenging the following
reasoning by the circuit court regarding the application of WIS. STAT.
§ 48.977(2)(f) here on the topic of whether reunification of G.L.W. with the
parents was likely. The court noted that G.L.W. had, during his most recent
interaction with the parents before trial, not demonstrated a strong bond with
T.L.B. The court viewed this, after four years of G.L.W.’s placement outside the
parents’ residence, as evidence that future efforts at reunification were not likely
to succeed. T.L.B. argues that G.L.W.’s difficulty forming a bond with his parents
was due to restrictions on parental visits with G.L.W. imposed by the County.
Expanding on this point, T.L.B. argues that the less time that T.L.B. has been able
to spend with G.L.W. due to these restrictions, the harder it became for the two of
them to bond, compared with G.L.W.’s ability to bond with other caregivers.
This, T.L.B. contends, creates a self-fulfilling argument in favor of a guardianship:

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the County limited T.L.B.’s contact with G.L.W., which contributed to a weaker
bond, which allowed the County to cite the weaker bond as a reason to
permanently place G.L.W. outside the parents’ residence.
¶37 I reject this argument for at least the reason that T.L.B. fails to
ground it in the pertinent terms of WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(f) or in the overarching
legal principles stated in applicable case law. As a result, T.L.B. does not support
the proposition that it was improper for the circuit court to weigh the strength
G.L.W.’s bond with T.L.B. as an indicator of how close the family might be to
potential reunification. I also note that T.L.B. does not cite evidence in the record
to support the factual premise of this argument that the County, as opposed to the
parents, caused or was at least the primary driver of their reduced contact with
G.L.W. over time.
¶38 T.L.B. argues that the circuit court failed to sufficiently take into
account the likelihood that reunification with the parents could be achieved if
T.L.B. had been given “intensive, in-home, adaptive services,” which would have
been better tailored to her circumstances as someone recovering from a stroke and
who has a learning disability. However, T.L.B. does not offer a detailed
explanation, supported by citation to trial evidence, explaining what theoretical
intensive and adaptive services she is referring to, and how those services differ
from what the evidence shows the County offered to the parents. This would be a
necessary starting point for a supported argument that the court clearly erred in
weighing the evidence regarding the reasonableness of the County’s efforts or the
likelihood of reunification. Further, as noted by the court here, WIS. STAT.
§ 48.977(2)(f) requires reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.

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¶39 Stepping back, another weakness with T.L.B.’s arguments regarding
WIS. STAT. § 48.977(2)(f) is that she bases them in part on whether there was
evidence that the County made “active efforts” to support the parents. These
appear to be references to additional requirements that the Wisconsin Indian Child
Welfare Act imposes for certain kinds of child-custody proceedings involving
children, such as G.L.W., who are subject to the Act. These additional
requirements include, in part, proof by clear and convincing evidence of “active
efforts … to prevent the breakup of the Indian Child’s family” before a circuit
court can “order an Indian child to be removed from the home … and placed in an
out-of-home care placement.” See WIS. STAT. § 48.028(4)(d)2.11 However, as
11 Under WIS. STAT. § 48.028(4)(g)1.:
The [circuit] court may not order an Indian child to be
removed from the home of the Indian child’s parent … and
placed in an out-of-home care placement unless the evidence of
active efforts under [§ 48.028(4)(d)2.] shows that there has been
an ongoing, vigorous, and concerted level of case work and that
the active efforts were made in a manner that takes into account
the prevailing social and cultural values, conditions, and way of
life of the Indian child’s tribe and that utilizes the available
resources of the Indian child’s tribe, tribal and other Indian child
welfare agencies, extended family members of the Indian child,
other individual Indian caregivers, and other culturally
appropriate service providers.
Section 48.028(4)(g)1. then lists activities that the finder of fact must consider when determining
if active efforts have been made. See 48.028(4)(g)1.a.-h. For example, one of the listed activities
is:
to provide natural and unsupervised family interaction in the
most natural setting that can ensure the Indian child’s safety, as
appropriate to the goals of the Indian child’s permanency plan,
including arrangements for transportation and other assistance to
enable family members to participate in that interaction.
(continued)

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explained by the circuit court here, G.L.W. had already been removed from the
parents’ residence based on CHIPS proceedings in which all findings required by
§ 48.028(4)(d) had been made. No party argued that these findings were required
to be made again for the appointment of a guardian under § 48.977. Further,
T.L.B. does not support such an argument on appeal, even if she had preserved it
for appeal. See Brown Cnty. Human Servs. v. B.P., 2019 WI App 18, ¶28, 386
Wis. 2d 557, 927 N.W.2d 560 (court of appeals usually does not address
arguments raised for the first time on appeal).
CONCLUSION
¶40 For all of these reasons, I affirm the circuit court’s appointment of a
guardian for G.L.W.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
§ 48.028(4)(g)1.d. Although the circuit court here concluded that it did not need to find that the
County had engaged in active efforts to appoint a guardian, the court said that it considered the
County’s efforts to be “active” in the sense required by § 48.028(4)(g). I need not reach that
conclusion, because as noted in the text T.L.B. does not develop a supported argument, preserved
in the circuit court, that § 48.028(4) applies here.