State v. Julius Stewart

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215
P.O. BOX 1688
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688
Telephone (608) 266-1880
TTY: (800) 947-3529
Facsimile (608) 267-0640
Web Site: www.wicourts.gov
DISTRICT I
September 29, 2026
To:
Hon. Laura Crivello
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
Anna Hodges
Clerk of Circuit Court
Milwaukee County Safety Building
Electronic Notice
Esther Cohen Lee
Electronic Notice
Christine A. Remington
Electronic Notice
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
2025AP591-CR State of Wisconsin v. Julius Stewart (L.C. # 2023CF4035)
Before Donald, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or
authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Julius Stewart appeals from a judgment, following a jury trial, convicting him of second-
degree intentional homicide with use of a dangerous weapon. He also appeals the order denying
his postconviction motion.1 Based upon our review of the briefs and record, we conclude at
1 The Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom presided over Stewart’s jury trial and sentencing in this
matter and entered the judgment of conviction. We refer to Judge Brostrom as the trial court. The
Honorable Laura Crivello issued the order denying Stewart’s postconviction motion. We refer to Judge
Crivello as the postconviction court.

No. 2025AP591-CR
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conference that this case is appropriate for summary disposition and affirm. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.21 (2023-24).2
According to the complaint, Stewart shot and killed his cousin, Orlando Jones, in August
of 2023. There were numerous eyewitnesses to the incident, and it was captured on surveillance
footage. The State charged Stewart with first-degree intentional homicide with use of a
dangerous weapon.
Pretrial, Stewart filed a motion to admit “other acts/McMorris evidence.”3 The proffered
evidence included evidence that Jones was in a gang, was known to carry a firearm, sold drugs,
got into a fight two months before he was killed, and was arrested in 2019 for possession of
marijuana with intent to sell and in 2018 for carrying a concealed weapon. According to
Stewart, all of this evidence would help him to prove he acted in self-defense. Additionally,
Stewart argued that the evidence would corroborate his testimony about Jones’s reputation for
carrying a concealed weapon.
After listening to the parties’ arguments, the trial court allowed evidence of Jones’s
reputation for carrying a weapon and about the fight that Stewart witnessed. The court excluded
evidence referencing “gang” activity, but it told Stewart he could testify about Jones’s
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
3 Evidence of a victim’s violent character and past violent acts is often referred to as McMorris
evidence. See McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 152, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973) (discussing that when a
defendant has a factual basis to support a claim of self defense “the defendant may, in support of the
defense, establish what the defendant believed to be the turbulent and violent character of the victim by
proving prior specific instances of violence within his [or her] knowledge at the time of the incident”).

No. 2025AP591-CR
3
“organization” and that Jones had pressured him to join the organization. The court additionally
excluded evidence of the prior arrests.
Stewart pursued a self-defense claim at trial. He testified that he was armed with a
firearm the day he shot Jones. Stewart said that he had had severe health problems and testified
to having had open heart surgery a few years before this incident. Stewart said he could not
physically defend himself if something happened. He also testified that he knew that the
neighborhood where the incident occurred could be dangerous.
Stewart testified that Jones was his cousin and that the two were close until a couple of
years before this incident. Stewart knew Jones had a reputation for violence, and he knew that
Jones carried a firearm. He said that Jones had been upset with him because he would not join
his organization. He described Jones as being a bully and testified to seeing Jones beat up an old
man during a separate incident.
Stewart testified that at 6:27 p.m. on the day of the incident, as could be seen in
surveillance footage, Jones physically assaulted him. According to Stewart, multiple times
during the altercation Jones reached for the firearm that Jones was carrying on his waist. Stewart
testified that at that point, he feared for his life because he “knew [Jones] was going to shoot
[him] for a fact.” Stewart testified that he proceeded to shoot Jones because he believed that if
he had not done so, Jones would have shot him. Stewart testified that he fired at Jones five
times. Jones died from multiple gunshot wounds.
The trial court gave the self-defense instruction to the jury and also instructed the jury as
to the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional homicide. The jury convicted Stewart

No. 2025AP591-CR
4
of second-degree intentional homicide with use of a dangerous weapon. The court sentenced
Stewart to thirty years of initial confinement and fifteen years of extended supervision.
Postconviction, Stewart filed a motion alleging that the trial court erroneously exercised
its discretion when it excluded evidence of Jones’s gang affiliation and prior arrests. Stewart
also sought sentence modification, arguing that the trial court’s sentence was unduly harsh or
unconscionable and constituted an erroneous exercise of discretion. The postconviction court
rejected both claims.
On appeal, Stewart renews his two postconviction claims.
I. The trial court properly denied Stewart’s request to admit evidence of Jones’s prior
arrests and involvement in gang activity at trial.
We first address Stewart’s argument that the trial court erred when it disallowed some of
his proffered other-acts evidence. Stewart challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to
introduce evidence of Jones’s arrests for carrying a concealed weapon and for possessing
marijuana with intent to sell and of Jones’s involvement in gang activity.
Stewart claims that the most important evidence in this case was that he knew Jones
always carried a gun and, based on Jones’s actions during the confrontation, he reasonably
believed that Jones intended to use it in that moment against him. See State v. Head, 2002 WI
99, ¶67, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413 (explaining that “if a person reasonably believed that
[he or] she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with [his or] her person and
reasonably believed that the force used was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm, [he or] she is not guilty of either first- or second-degree intentional homicide”). Stewart
submits that the fact that Jones was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon years before the

No. 2025AP591-CR
5
underlying incident corroborated Stewart’s beliefs. Likewise, according to Stewart, the fact that
Jones was involved in gang activity and had been arrested for possession of marijuana with
intent to sell further corroborated that fact that he was known to carry a gun, since drug dealers
are well known to carry guns.
“[T]he decision to admit other-acts evidence is reviewed for an erroneous exercise of
discretion.” State v. Lock, 2012 WI App 99, ¶43, 344 Wis. 2d 166, 823 N.W.2d 378. “A trial
court properly exercises its discretion when it examines the relevant facts, applies a proper
standard of law, and uses a demonstrably rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable
judge could reach.” Id. (citation modified). “We generally look for reasons to sustain the trial
court’s discretionary decisions.” Id.
In addressing the trial court’s decision to admit other-acts evidence, we follow the three-
prong test from State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). First, we ask
whether the evidence is “offered for an acceptable purpose under WIS. STAT. § [] 904.04(2), such
as establishing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident[.]” Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772. Second, we ask whether the evidence is
relevant. Id. Finally, we consider whether “the probative value of the other acts evidence [is]
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence[.]” Id. at 772-73.
Applying the Sullivan test, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the
evidence of Jones’s prior arrests and involvement in gang activity. The court heard Stewart’s
argument in favor of admitting the evidence to show Stewart’s state of mind at the time of the

No. 2025AP591-CR
6
incident. With regard to testimony that Jones was in a gang and the activities that the gang
engaged in, the State objected on grounds that the probative value of the evidence was
outweighed by the prejudicial effect and that the evidence would not explain why such activity
made Stewart afraid at the time of the shooting. The court agreed, noting that the word “gang”
raised the potential for unfair prejudice and said that it would not be fair to the State to suggest
that Jones was a gang member without further corroboration. Ultimately, the trial court allowed
Stewart to introduce testimony that Jones was in an organization that Stewart did not want to join
because Stewart did not think the organization was doing good things in the community.
The trial court additionally excluded evidence that Jones had prior arrests for carrying a
firearm and possessing marijuana, noting “there’s some attenuation in time as to relevance, and
also that Mr. Stewart was not present for either [arrest], and there’s no information that [the
arrests] involved, you know, violence by [Jones].”4 In terms of the carrying a concealed weapon
4 Stewart argues that the case law does not require that Stewart had to personally have
knowledge of the arrests. As support, he relies on McCallister v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 246, 246 N.W.2d 511
(1976), where our supreme court explained that
[a] defendant should not be limited merely to his [or her] own assertion
that he [or she] had knowledge of particular violent acts, but should be
allowed to produce supporting evidence to prove the reality of the
particular acts of which he [or she] claims knowledge, thereby proving
reasonableness of his [or her] knowledge and apprehension and the
credibility of his [or her] assertion.
Id. at 250-51.
Stewart’s reliance is misplaced in that the McCallister court ultimately concluded that the
defendant in that case had no knowledge of the contents of the hospital records sought to be introduced.
Id. at 251. Thus, the court concluded that the defendant’s “state of mind could not have been affected by
them,” and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence. Id.
A similar conclusion was reached here. Moreover, this was only one of a number of factors
articulated by the trial court when it exercised its discretion.

No. 2025AP591-CR
7
arrest, the court concluded that did not necessarily equate with violence, stating “we’ve got lots
of people in this city that are really just carrying illegally because they haven’t gone through
the … process, not to commit violence, but for self-defense.” The court also relayed that the
State had argued “there’s serious doubt about [Jones]’s connection to the THC that was found, he
was never charged, now he’s dead, so he can’t say.” From there, the court concluded that the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Like the postconviction court, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion when it denied Stewart’s request to introduce evidence of Jones’s previous arrests and
his involvement in gang activity. This was a reasonable application of the law to the facts. See
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698 (We will “uphold a
decision to ... exclude evidence if the [trial] court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper
legal standard, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion.”).
II. The trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion.
Next, Stewart renews the argument that his sentence amounted to a probable life
sentence, given that he was thirty-nine years old at the time of sentencing. He claims that the
sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable and constituted an erroneous exercise of the trial
court’s sentencing discretion.
Our review of a sentence is limited to whether the trial court erroneously exercised its
discretion. State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶3, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409. “When the
exercise of discretion has been demonstrated, we follow a consistent and strong policy against
interference with the discretion of the trial court in passing sentence[.]” State v. Stenzel, 2004
WI App 181, ¶7, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20. A sentence is unduly harsh or

No. 2025AP591-CR
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unconscionable “only where the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to
the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable
people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.” Id., ¶21 (citation omitted).
The primary factors the trial court must consider when exercising its sentencing
discretion are “the gravity of the offense, the character of the [offender], and the need to protect
the public.” Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶28. The court may consider a variety of other factors as
well, including the defendant’s criminal history, his or her personality and social traits, the
aggravated nature of the crime, the defendant’s culpability, his or her age and education, his or
her remorse or lack thereof, his or her cooperation, his or her need for close rehabilitative
control, and the rights of the public. Id.
Stewart faced a maximum possible sentence of sixty-five years, consisting of forty-five
years of initial confinement and twenty years of extended supervision. Ultimately, the trial court
followed the State’s recommended sentence of thirty years of initial confinement and fifteen
years of extended supervision. In doing so, the court addressed the primary factors and
explained that its sentencing goals were punishment and deterrence.
Stewart’s argument largely consists of taking the trial court to task for not doing more to
explain why it would take thirty years in prison to rehabilitate him. Stewart claims the court
merely gave “lip service to the goal of rehabilitation” by stating: “In terms of rehabilitative
services, I don’t think there’s a lot of them. I do think you should get a mental health evaluation
and any treatment that would be warranted.” Stewart additionally argues that it did not appear—
to Stewart—that the trial court had adequately taken his age or his very serious and on-going
health issues into account when it sentenced him.

No. 2025AP591-CR
9
The crux of Stewart’s argument is that the trial court did not weigh the sentencing factors
as he would have hoped. That, however, is not an erroneous exercise of discretion. See State v.
Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, ¶34, 316 Wis. 2d 414, 766 N.W.2d 206 (explaining that our inquiry is
whether the trial court exercised discretion, not whether discretion might be exercised
differently).
Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment and order are summarily affirmed. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals