* In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of 	)
)
JONATHAN PAUL PITCHLYNN, 	)
)
Petitioner. 	)
)
No. 100154-1
En Banc
Filed: March 16, 2023
JOHNSON, J.—This case concerns an untimely personal restraint petition
that the petitioner alleges is exempt from the one-year time bar under RCW
10.73.100(5) because the judgment and sentence was imposed in excess of the trial
court’s jurisdiction. We ordered a reference hearing to resolve a material factual
dispute. Based on the factual findings, we conclude the trial court had jurisdiction
to enter the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, we dismiss petitioner’s personal
restraint petition as untimely.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2018, Jonathan Paul Pitchlynn pleaded guilty to third degree rape,
indecent liberties without forcible compulsion, third degree assault, felony
harassment, and unlawful imprisonment. He filed this second personal restraint
FILE
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
MARCH 16, 2023
THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
MARCH 16, 2023
ERIN L. LENNON
SUPREME COURT CLERK
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In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn, No. 100154-1
2
petition more than one year after his judgment and sentence became final, arguing
it is exempt from the time bar under RCW 10.73.100(5) because the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence. Pitchlynn alleged the trial
court lacked jurisdiction because the third degree rape count (count 5) was based
on conduct that occurred in Oregon.
The Court of Appeals recognized this second petition was successive under
RCW 10.73.140, but because it was potentially exempt from the one-year time
limit on collateral relief on the basis that the trial court may have lacked
jurisdiction, the court transferred the petition to this court, where it was not barred
as successive. Ord. Transferring Pet. to Wash. Sup. Ct., In re Pers. Restraint of
Pitchlynn, No. 55320-1-II (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2021).
The Washington Supreme Court Commissioner’s Office called for a
response from the State to admit or deny the allegation that one of the sex offenses
to which Pitchlynn pleaded guilty was predicated on an incident that occurred in
Oregon. The State filed a brief agreeing count 5 was based on the Oregon incident,
thus conceding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment on that offense.
It then “offer[ed] no additional argument as to the propriety of Pitchlynn’s petition
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In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn, No. 100154-1
3
or its timeliness under RCW 10.73.100(5)” and stated the “remaining issue is the
proper remedy.” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 4.
We granted review of this petition to determine the proper remedy where a
trial court lacked jurisdiction over one count in a multi-offense, indivisible plea
agreement. Pitchlynn argued the only proper remedy is to allow him to withdraw
his entire indivisible plea agreement. The State requested we remand to the trial
court to determine the proper remedy after considering whether compelling reasons
exist to deny the petitioner’s initial choice of remedy.
After we accepted review, the State retracted its prior admission that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction. It filed a second declaration pursuant to RPC 3.3(c) “to
correct and clarify false statements of fact” in the State’s initial filing. Second
Decl. of Senior Deputy Prosecuting Att’y Luka Vitasovic Submitted Pursuant to
[RPC] 3.3(c) (Second Decl.) at 2. In that declaration, it asserted that “[w]hile
preparing for this case and reviewing Pitchlynn’s first personal restraint petition,
[the prosecutor] encountered information that contradicted the declaration and, as a
result, [the prosecutor’s] admission.” Second Decl. at 1. In this second declaration,
and contrary to assertions made in the first declaration, Senior Deputy Prosecuting
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In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn, No. 100154-1
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Attorney Vitasovic asserted they do not believe Pitchlynn pleaded guilty to any
crime based on conduct alleged to have occurred in Oregon.
In order to clarify the record, we ordered a reference hearing pursuant to
RAP 16.12 to determine whether count 5 was based only on conduct that occurred
in Oregon. The Clark County Superior Court held a reference hearing and, after
hearing testimony and reviewing the record, entered findings of fact. The superior
court found count 5 of the judgment and sentence is a conviction for rape in the
third degree—domestic violence, and count 5 was not based solely on conduct that
occurred in the state of Oregon. The court found the evidence reflects count 5 was
based on conduct that occurred in Washington State.
ANALYSIS
RCW 10.73.090(1) requires that a personal restraint petition be filed within
one year of the judgment becoming final. Pitchlynn’s judgment and sentence
became final on May 14, 2018. See RCW 10.73.090(3)(a). He filed this second
petition on August 19, 2020, more than one year after his judgment and sentence
became final. Unless he shows that his judgment and sentence is facially invalid or
that one of the exceptions to the time bar contained in RCW 10.73.100 applies to
his petition, it is time barred. Pitchlynn argues his petition is exempt from this time
bar under RCW 10.73.100(5), which provides the one-year time limit does not
apply where the sentence was imposed in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction.
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In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn, No. 100154-1
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Pitchlynn argued that because count 5 was based on conduct in Oregon, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence.
Based on the superior court’s finding that count 5 was based on conduct in
Washington, Pitchlynn’s judgment and sentence was not entered in excess of the
trial court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, his untimely petition is not exempt under
RCW 10.73.100(5).
CONCLUSION
We dismiss the personal restraint petition as untimely.
:(&21&85
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