Ranjiv Hayre, Respondent V. Dean Street, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RANJIV HAYRE and SUKHJIWAN
HAYRE,
Respondents,
v.
DEAN STREET and JANIS L. STREET,
husband and wife, individually and their
marital community,
Appellants,
EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a
Washington corporation; MORTGAGE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION, INC.
("MERS"), a Delaware corporation; and
SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., a
Texas corporation,
Defendants. 	)
No. 68494-9-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: June 17, 2013
U3
to
Appelwick, J. — The Hayres and Street are tenants in common of a 26 acre
investment property that became the subject of a 	partition action. 	The trial court
granted the Hayres motion to enforce a settlement agreement pursuant to CR 2A.
However, the Hayres have not established that the form of deed to be used to transfer
the property is not a material term missing from the agreement. 	We reverse, vacate the
award of attorney fees, and remand.

No. 68494-9-1/2
FACTS
In April 2006, Ranjiv and Sukhjiwan (Jiwan) Havre purchased a 26 acre property
in Enumclaw for $865,000 at a foreclosure auction. 	The Hayres asked their friend,
Dean Street, to invest in the property with them. 	Street agreed to pay the Hayres
$288,333 for a one-third interest in the property. 	Thus, Ranjiv, Jiwan, and Street each
owned a one-third interest as tenants in common. 	They planned to fix the property and
sell it, and they agreed that none of them would transfer their interest to a third party.
They agreed to equally share the cost of maintenance and any profits or losses.
In May 2007, the parties arranged to borrow $1.5 million against the property and
disbursed 	$500,000 to each co-tenant. 	Street is the only 	person who signed the
promissory 	note, 	but the 	Hayres 	each 	signed 	the 	deed 	of trust encumbering 	the
property.
In September 2007, the parties agreed to list the property for $2,795 million.
Street, a licensed real estate agent, has been trying to sell the property ever since.
Throughout this time, Street has been responsible for managing the property. 	He
takes care of mortgage payments, property taxes, and insurance. 	He also pays for
maintenance 	of the 	property. 	He 	kept a 	detailed 	ledger of his 	expenditures 	and
periodically received reimbursement from the Hayres for their two-thirds share. 	The
Hayres stopped reimbursing Street in September 2009. 	They wished to deed their
interest in the property to Street and relieve themselves of their obligation to pay for
two-thirds of the property's expenses. 	Street declined.

No. 68494-9-1/3
In March 2011, the Hayres filed a complaint enumerating three causes of action.
First, they asked the court to appoint a referee to sell the property and distribute the
proceeds. 	Second, they sought a declaratory judgment that they had no obligations
under the 	note. 	Third, they alleged 	that Street 	used 	the 	property to 	operate an
equestrian business, and sought rent for his use of the property at the fair market value
to be determined at trial. 	Although he agreed that the property should be sold, Street
counterciaimed to recover prior and future expenses, and he sought damages for the
Hayres' 	refusal 	to 	cooperate with Street's attempt to 	arrange 	a 	short sale 	of the
property. 	In May 2011, the trial court appointed Rebecca Wiess to serve as a referee at
an hourly rate of $250.
On February 6, 2012, Street's attorney, Michael Hunsinger, called the Hayres'
attorney, 	Lawrence Glosser. 	He 	offered to 	settle for 	$50,000 from 	the 	Hayres, 	a
transfer of the Hayres' 	interest in the property, 	and a mutual 	release of all claims.
Glosser 	verbally 	counter-offered 	for 	$40,000. 	Later 	that 	afternoon, 	Hunsinger
responded to the counter-offer in an e-mail:
Dean rejects [the Hayres'] counter-offer of $40,000. 	He renews his
offer to accept payment of $50,000 and transfer of title to the property to
him and his wife, with mutual releases. 	If that is rejected, Dean would like
to meet briefly with Ranjiv Hayre. 	You may also attend, as long as you do
not participate.
Please respond no later than noon tomorrow.
Two minutes later, Glosser responded:
I am 	authorized 	to 	accept the 	offer 	of 	$50k 	and 	conveyance of the
property to Dean Street in exchange for a full and complete release of all
claims and causes of action related to the acquisition and ownership of the
property whether past, present, future, known or unknown.

No. 68494-9-1/4
If that works, 	I will strike my motion before Judge Heavey and we can
work on an agreeable settlement and release.
Hunsinger replied:
Agreed. 	Please prepare the paper work.
The next day, February 7, the Hayres sent a draft settlement agreement:
Here is a draft of the Settlement Agreement and Release and the QCD
[quit claim deed] and Excise Tax Affidavit. 	I think the exemption on the
Excise Tax Affidavit would apply to this case, but if for some reason it
doesn't work we can probably have the transfer ordered by the Court.
Get back to me with any questions comments, or suggested changes.
The same day that the Hayres sent a draft agreement, Street informed Hunsinger that
he would 	only accept a settlement for $50,000 on the condition that the company
servicing the $1.5 million note, Saxon Mortgage, agreed to a short sale and waived any
deficiency on the loan. 	Hunsinger wrote to Glosser and Wiess on February 8 to inform
them of the bad news:
It was Dean Street's understanding that the agreement to accept
$50,000 and a deed from the Hayres in return for their full release was
conditional upon Saxon's agreement to a short sale that resulted in no
additional obligations from the Streets to Saxon.
Of 	course, 	Saxon 	has 	not 	yet 	made 	any 	such 	agreement.
Moreover, I am sure that [Glosser] and his clients' willingness to enter into
such a 	settlement agreement did 	not contemplate such a 	condition. 	I
apologize for the lack of clarity.
Accordingly, 	I do 	not 	yet 	have 	authority to 	enter 	into 	such 	an
agreement with the Hayres on behalf of the Streets until we know Saxon's
position regarding a short sale, and on behalf of Saxon, David [Elkanich]
understandably first wants to 	know what pending agreement Saxon is
being asked to approve. 	Dean is in the process of providing David with
that information.

No. 68494-9-1/5
The Hayres filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 	They argued
that the e-mail exchange was a binding settlement pursuant to CR 2A. 	The trial court
granted the motion. 	It found 	that the settlement was not 	made or accepted as a
conditional settlement and that Hunsinger was acting as an attorney and agent for
Street. 	It found that the material terms of the settlement were (a) payment of $50,000 to
Street, (b) transfer of the Hayres' interest in the property to Street, and (c) the mutual
release of all claims. 	The order gave the parties eight1 	days to consummate the
agreement. 	If they could 	not do so, 	then the Hayres were ordered to deposit the
$50,000 into the registry of the court and it would fall to Wiess to convey the property
from the Hayres to Street. The trial court also ordered Street to pay the Hayres $500 for
the cost of bringing the motion to enforce settlement.
DISCUSSION
Settlement agreements 	are 	governed 	by general 	principles of contract 	law.
Evans & Son. Inc. v. City of Yakima. 136 Wn. App. 471, 477, 149 P.3d 691 (2006). 	A
valid agreement requires a meeting of the minds on essential terms. ]cL To determine if
informal writings are sufficient to establish a binding settlement agreement, we must
conclude that (1) the parties agreed to the subject matter, (2) all of the provisions of the
agreement 	were 	set 	out 	in the 	writings, 	and 	(3) 	the 	parties 	intended 	a 	binding
agreement prior to the time of the signing and delivery of a formal contract. 	]g\ at 475-
76.
1 The parties had 12 days from the date the order was signed, but 8 days from
the date it was filed.

No. 68494-9-1/6
The purpose of CR 2A is to give certainty and finality to settlements. 	Condon v.
Condon, 	Wn.2d 	, 295 P.3d 86, 	89 (2013). 	The party moving to enforce a
settlement agreement carries the burden of proving that there is no genuine dispute
over the existence and material terms of the agreement. 	Brinkerhoff v. Campbell, 99
Wn. App. 692, 696-97, 994 P.2d 911 (2000). 	We consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether reasonable minds could
reach but one conclusion. 	Id. at 697. 	Where a trial court relies solely on affidavits or
declarations, we review its order enforcing settlement de novo. 	]d at 696.
I. 	Binding Agreement
Parties may enter a contractual relationship with informal writings even when
they contemplate that a subsequent formal contract will be executed. 	Plumbing Shop,
Inc. v. Pitts, 67 Wn.2d 514, 519, 408 P.2d 382 (1965). 	The mere anticipation of a
formal memorialization does not alone suggest that the parties intended to be bound
only by such a document. 	Morris v. Maks, 69 Wn. App. 865, 871-72, 850 P.2d 1357
(1993). 	Street argues that the parties did not intend a binding agreement prior to the
execution of a formal contract. 	He claims that, to the contrary, they merely made an
unenforceable agreement to agree.
Street relies primarily on Evans. 	In that case, the City of Yakima contracted with
Evans & Son, Inc. to perform deep tilling work in a city park. 	136 Wn. App. at 473. 	The
city learned that deep tilling was not necessary in a portion of the park and directed
Evans to stop working until it heard otherwise. 	]a\ 	The city delayed providing further
guidance, and Evans alleged it lost over $150,000 as a result of the delay. 	Id. 	In a
letter, the city offered to settle for $40,000. 	Id at 473-74. 	The letter cautioned that

No. 68494-9-1/7
"'[settlement is contingent on execution of a Settlement Agreement that I will draft.'" 	Id
at 474 (alteration in original). 	Evans's attorney accepted the amount of $40,000 to
"resolve all issues pertaining to the . . . construction contract." 	Id 	The city sent a draft
settlement agreement. 	Jd 	After Evans's attorney revised the agreement, the city
reminded 	Evans 	that 	"'[settlement 	is 	contingent 	on 	execution 	of 	a 	Settlement
Agreement that I will draft.'" 	Jd (alteration in original). 	Evans took the position that the
release in the draft agreement was unacceptably broad, because it released any and all
claims against the city, instead of just claims arising from the specific construction
contract at issue. 	Jd 	Evans refused to release all potential, unrelated claims. 	Jd at
474-75. 	It sued 	the city for delay damages. 	Id 	at 475. 	The Court of Appeals
concluded 	that the 	letters 	between 	the 	parties 	showed 	only 	a 	desire 	to 	reach 	a
settlement and the monetary amount of settlement, and they did not suggest that they
themselves were the binding agreement. 	Jd at 477-78. 	Indeed, the court emphasized
the fact that the city repeatedly and explicitly asserted that settlement was subject to the
execution of a settlement agreement drafted by the city. 	Jd at 474, 477.
In 	contrast, 	Hunsinger 	and 	Glosser 	reached 	an 	unequivocal 	agreement.
Hunsinger made an initial written offer to "accept payment of $50,000 and transfer of
title to the property to him and his wife, with mutual releases." 	Glosser reiterated the
terms of the agreement and told Hunsinger, "If that works, I will strike my motion before
Judge Heavey and we can work on an agreeable settlement and release." 	Hunsinger
unequivocally replied, "Agreed. 	Please prepare the paper work." 	The e-mails did not
contain 	any 	language 	conditioning 	settlement on 	the 	execution 	of a 	more 	formal
agreement. 	They merely contemplated the execution of a conforming settlement and

No. 68494-9-1/8
release. 	The contemplation of a future, formal memorialization did not diminish the
binding nature of their agreement.
The 	unequivocal 	nature 	of 	the 	agreement 	is 	further 	evidenced 	by 	Street's
acceptance of the Hayres' offer to strike a pending motion to compel Street's wife to
appear for a deposition. 	The Hayres had been vigorously pursuing the deposition, and
Street had been vigorously opposing it. 	Street has not offered any explanation of why
he would have agreed to strike the motion if settlement had not been achieved.
Moreover, 	statements 	by 	Street and 	Hunsinger subsequently 	indicated 	their
belief that an agreement had been reached. 	Two days after the parties agreed to
terms, and a day after the Hayres sent a draft agreement, Hunsinger wrote a letter
explaining that Street believed "the agreement to accept $50,000 and a deed from the
Hayres in return for their full release was conditional upon Saxon's agreement to a short
sale." 	He went on to explain that he knew the Hayres' "willingness to enter into such a
settlement agreement did 	not contemplate such 	a 	condition." 	In a 	declaration 	in
response to the Hayres' motion to enforce settlement, Street stated, "It was my belief
that the agreement . . . was contingent upon the lender of the $1.5 million loan . . .
agreeing that my wife Jan and I would not be liable for any deficiency after I finally sell
the 	property. 	Without that 	condition 	I would 	not 	have 	authorized 	the 	settlement
agreement." These statements by Hunsinger and Street clearly indicate recognition that
there was an 	agreement. 	The 	issue they 	identify 	is that Hunsinger had failed 	to
communicate one of his client's conditions in the offer. 	But, Street does not contest the
trial court's determination that Hunsinger was acting as Street's agent and had authority
8

No. 68494-9-1/9
to bind 	him based on that relationship. 	Both the offer and acceptance were clearly
communicated. An agreement was formed.
II. 	Material Terms
Despite 	their 	intent 	evidenced 	in 	the 	e-mail 	language 	to 	enter 	a 	binding
agreement, 	Street 	argues 	that 	he 	and 	the 	Hayres 	nevertheless 	failed 	to 	reach
agreement on four material terms. 	Specifically, he alleges that they did not discuss the
scope of release, which party or parties would pay referee's fees, which party or parties
would pay excise taxes or what the excise tax affidavit would say, or the form of deed
that would be used to effectuate transfer. 	Notably, case law does not provide a clear
definition of "material."2 	Rather, what constitutes a material term is dependent upon the
particular facts of a given case. 	Sea-Van Invs. Assocs. v. Hamilton. 125 Wn.2d 120,
126, 881 P.2d 1035 (1994). 	Black's Law Dictionary defines "material" as, "[o]f such a
nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making; significant;
essential." 	Black's Law Dictionary 1066 (9th ed. 2009).
A. 	Scope of Release
Street argues that he and the Hayres did not agree on the scope of the mutual
release of claims, because they did not discuss "whether the Hayres could be liable for
a deficiency if the lender did not agree to a short sale." But, the parties clearly did agree
on the scope of release. 	Hunsinger wrote to Glosser that the settlement would involve
"mutual 	releases." 	Glosser 	responded 	that 	it would 	include "a 	full and 	complete
2 Although the parties dedicate significant briefing to Morris and Evans, neither
of those cases contains anything more than conclusory statements that a given term is,
or is not, material. 	Neither attempts to comprehensively define the term "material," and
we decline to do so here.

No. 68494-9-1/10
released 	of all claims 	and 	causes of action." 	Hunsinger 	replied, 	"Agreed." 	That
language encompassed any cause of action related to liability on the $1.5 million loan,
which was central to the very claim being settled. 	Street's desire to continue to hold the
Hayres liable on the note, if Saxon did not agree to waive any deficiency resulting from
the short sale, was merely an unexpressed condition on settlement that we will not
consider. 	See, e.g., Hearst Commc'ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503,
115 P.3d 262 (2005). 	Moreover, Street points to release language in the Hayres' draft
settlement agreement to support his assertion that the trial court ordered a broader
release than the parties contemplated. 	But, the trial court did not enforce the Hayres'
draft settlement agreement. 	It enforced the settlement as expressed in the attorneys' e-
mails and ordered "mutual release of any claims."
B- 	Referee's Fees
Street asserts that the parties never discussed who would pay referee's fees.
But, that issue is controlled by statute:
The cost of partition, including fees of referees and other disbursements
including 	reasonable 	attorney fees 	. 	. . shall 	be 	paid 	by the 	parties
respectively entitled to share in the lands divided, in proportion to their
respective interests therein.
RCW 7.52.480. 	The trial court determined the fees to be paid when it appointed Wiess
and directed that she would be paid $250 per hour. 	Under RCW 7.52.480, those fees
were to be paid in proportion to the parties' interest in the property. 	The parties could
have negotiated for a specific division of the fees, but since the statute provides that the
fees are divided in proportion to the parties' interest in the property, the term was not
material.
10

No. 68494-9-1/11
C 	Excise Tax
Street likewise argues that he and the Hayres did not discuss what the excise tax
affidavit would say or who would pay it. 	Again, however, excise taxes are an issue
controlled by statute. 	WAC 458-61A-208 provides a detailed description of whether
excise taxes are owed when property is transferred pursuant to an order of sale by a
court. 	In fact, 	it specifically gives two examples that explain when excise taxes are
owed when there is a transfer of property from one tenant in common to another. 	WAC
458-61A-208(2). 	And, 	RCW 82.45.080 provides that the excise tax 	is the seller's
obligation.3 	The dispute concerning the excise tax affidavit arose after the agreement
was reached, when Street balked at signing the tax affidavit. 	Any such disagreement,
however, does not necessarily alter the materiality of determining which party or parties
would pay any excise tax owed. 	The agreement is not invalid by virtue of missing a
term that is controlled and supplied by statute.
D. 	Form of Deed
Street argues that the parties did not agree on the form of deed that would be
used to transfer the property, which range in quality from a statutory warranty deed to a
quit claim deed. 	In a statutory warranty deed, the grantor warrants:
(1) That at the time of the making and delivery of such deed he or she was
lawfully seized of indefeasible estate in fee simple, in and to the premises
therein described, and had good right and full power to convey the same;
(2) that the same were then free from all encumbrances; and (3) that he or
she warrants to the grantee, his or her heirs and assigns, the quiet and
3 The Hayres asserted at oral argument that the tax issue actually relates to
property tax that may be owed by the seller as a result of removing the property from its
agricultural 	classification. 	Nothing 	in the 	record 	demonstrates 	the 	property 	was
necessarily being changed from its agricultural classification. 	And, that issue is not
contained within Street's briefing on appeal.
11

No. 68494-9-1/12
peaceable possession of such premises, and will defend the title thereto
against all persons who may lawfully claim the same.
RCW 64.04.030. 	At the other end of the spectrum, in a quit claim deed the grantor
conveys 	only 	the 	then 	existing 	legal 	and 	equitable 	rights 	of the 	grantor, 	with 	no
guarantee of what those rights are. 	Roeder Co. v. K&E Moving & Storage Co., 102 Wn.
App. 49, 56-57, 4 P.3d 839 (2000).
In Hubbell v Ward, the Supreme Court listed 13 terms material to a proposed real
estate contract. 	40 Wn.2d 779, 782-83, 246 P.2d 468 (1952). 	Those terms encompass
the form of deed:
"(a) time and 	manner for transferring title; 	(b) 	procedure for 	declaring
forfeiture; (c) allocation of risk with respect to damage or destruction; (d)
insurance provisions; (e) responsibility for: (i) taxes, (ii) repairs, and (iii)
water and utilities; (f) restrictions, if any, on: (i) capital improvements, (ii)
liens, (iii) removal or replacement of personal property, and (iv) types of
use; (g) time and place for monthly payments; and (h) indemnification
provisions."
Sea-Van. 125 Wn.2d at 128 (quoting Kruse v. Hemp. 121 Wn.2d 715, 722, 853 P.2d
1373 (1993) (citing Hubbell, 40 Wn.2d at 782-83)). 	The Sea-Van court concluded that
those material terms are not limited to the context of real estate contracts. 	Id at 128-
29. 	It explained that it had never made such a distinction, and that the terms are
equally applicable in the deed of trust context. ]g\
The Hayres argue that this case is in neither the real estate contract nor deed of
trust context, and that the Hubbell terms do not apply in the CR 2A context. 	But, the
Sea-Van court held that the relevance of the Hubbell terms is not limited to cases
involving real estate contracts. 	]d at 128-29. 	It suggested that the terms have broad
relevance, not that they apply only in the real estate contract or deed of trust context.
Id. 	And, 	the 	same 	rationale 	underlying 	the 	Hubbell 	line 	of 	cases 	applies 	here.
12

No. 68494-9-1/13
Agreements 	concerning the transfer of real property "must be definite enough 	on
material 	terms 	to 	allow 	enforcement 	without 	the 	court 	supplying 	those 	terms."
Setterlund v. Firestone. 	104 Wn.2d 24, 25, 700 P.2d 745 (1985). 	The trial court is
unable to order transfer from the Hayres to Street without specifying the form of deed.
Further, the Hayres rely on readily distinguishable cases to support their assertion that
the Hubbell terms do not apply in the CR 2A context. 	In those cases, the court held that
oral agreements stipulated to in open court are not invalid under the statute of frauds.
See Snyder v. Tompkins. 20 Wn. App. 167, 172, 579 P.2d 994 (1978); Deer v. Deer, 29
Wn.2d 202, 212, 186 P.2d 619 (1947). 	There was no argument in either Snyder or
Deer that the stipulations were insufficiently definite.
However, we also reject the implication from Street's argument that the Hubbell
terms are always material. 	Whether a specific term is material is dependent upon the
facts of a given case. 	Sea-Van, 125 Wn.2d at 126. This case illustrates the truth of that
proposition. 	Many of the Hubbell terms, such as restrictions on capital improvements or
the time and place for monthly payments, are not implicated at all. 	The discussion
above concerning referee's fees and excise tax shows that even those terms that are
arguably implicated are not necessarily material. 	The question remaining is whether the
form of deed is material in this case.
Below, Street argued in his response to the Hayres' motion to enforce settlement
that the form of deed was a missing material term. 	The Hayres did not address that
argument at all in their reply. 	On appeal, their argument that the form of deed is not
material is limited to a bare assertion, supported only by inapposite cases, that Hubbell
and its progeny do not apply here. 	They offer no argument that the form of deed is not
13

No. 68494-9-1/14
material under the facts of this case. 	Yet, they bear the burden to prove that there is no
genuine dispute over the existence and material terms of the agreement. 	Brinkerhoff.
99 Wn. App. at 696-97.
At least three factors suggest the form 	of deed was not material. 	First, the
Hayres 	and 	Street already share the same quality of title as tenants 	in common.
Second, all parties knew the property was encumbered by a $1.5 million loan and the
agreement did not contemplate that encumbrance being discharged. 	Thus, a statutory
warranty deed without exceptions was not available. 	Third, the parties not only knew
the property was encumbered, they knew it was encumbered beyond its market value.
They knew Street had signed the note and the Hayres had not. 	They knew the release
terms included claims related to that note. 	Thus, Street was taking the property subject
to 	that 	liability. 	However, 	the 	record 	contains 	no evidence 	of whether additional
encumbrances existed on the property that should have been addressed in the deed. 	It
does not demonstrate that no 	provisions beyond a 	quit claim were material to the
transaction.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Street, these factors alone are
not sufficient to establish that reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion, that
the form of deed was not material or that a quit claim deed was necessarily sufficient. 	A
genuine dispute concerning whether the parties agreed on all material terms remains.
The trial court erred by granting the Hayres' motion to enforce settlement.4 	This is not
to say that the Hayres could not renew their motion on appropriate evidence.
4 Street also claims that the trial court erred by granting the motion to enforce on
six days notice and denying his motion to continue. 	Because we reverse, we do not
reach that issue.
14

No. 68494-9-1/15
III. 	Attorney Fees
The Hayres requested attorney fees in their motion to enforce settlement, but did
not cite any authority justifying the fees:
The Court has discretion to impose an award of attorneys' fees in
connection with this matter. 	Here, the Plaintiffs incurred attorneys' fees
when 	Michael 	Hunsinger directed 	Mr. Glosser to 	draft the settlement
documents, which were promptly done. 	In addition, the Plaintiffs have
incurred costs in connection with bringing this motion to enforce a legally
binding settlement agreement.
The trial court awarded the Hayres $500, stating only, "judgment is entered against
Defendant Dean Street in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $500.00 for the attorneys
fees incurred as a result [of] their having to bring this Motion." 	Attorney fees may be
awarded 	only when authorized 	by a 	private agreement, 	a 	statute, or a 	recognized
ground of equity. 	In re Marriage of MacGibbon, 139 Wn. App. 496, 504, 161 P.3d 441
(2007). 	On appeal, the Hayres hypothesize that the trial court could have awarded the
fees pursuant to 	its equitable powers or as sanctions for disavowing the settlement
agreement and forcing the Hayres to file a motion to enforce settlement. 	Because we
reverse, we necessarily vacate the award of attorney fees. 	Moreover, even if there was
an equitable basis to impose fees, neither the trial court nor the Hayres identified that
equitable basis. 	Further, the fees cannot be upheld as an award of sanctions, because
the 	Hayres 	did 	not 	request 	sanctions 	and 	the 	trial 	court did 	not enumerate 	any
sanctionable conduct. 	See, e.g., N. Coast Elec. Co. v. Selig, 136 Wn. App. 636, 649,
151 P.3d 211 	(2007) (party should make motion for sanctions as soon as it becomes
aware they are warranted and the trial court must make explicit findings as to which
pleadings 	violated 	CR 	11 	and 	how 	such 	pleadings 	constituted 	a 	violation); 	RCW
15

No. 68494-9-1/16
4.84.185 ("This determination shall be made upon motion by the prevailing party" and
"upon written findings by the judge.").
We reverse and remand.
WE CONCUR:
y^A^^/}.C(T 	fackAt
16