State Of Washington, Respondent V. B.j., Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
B.J.,
Appellant.
No. 86174-3-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — B.J. appeals an order of restitution imposed after he
entered a plea of guilty to one count of reckless burning in the first degree. 	He
challenges the trial court’s finding of good cause to continue the date of the
restitution hearing, as well as the evidence supporting the amount of restitution.
Because B.J. shows no error in the trial court’s imposition of restitution, we affirm
the award. However, we remand for the trial court to strike the DNA1 collection fee
from B.J.’s disposition and to consider whether to impose interest on restitution
pursuant to RCW 10.82.090(2).
FACTS
On September 27, 2021, the State charged B.J. with one count of arson in
the first degree based on his involvement in a fire that burned down an old church
structure known as “Old Cherry Grove Church,” two dwellings, and a storage
structure in Battle Ground, Washington. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State
1 Deoxyribonucleic acid.

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filed an amended information and B.J. entered a guilty plea to a reduced charge
of reckless burning in the first degree. 	According to B.J.’s written statement on
plea of guilty, on July 5, 2021, he drove his friends to the property, which was
owned by Steven Slocum, where B.J.’s friend, M.W., lit a firework and threw it onto
the property. 	B.J. admitted to recklessly causing the fire and driving away. 	The
trial court accepted B.J.’s guilty plea to one count of reckless burning in the first
degree.
On January 5, 2022, the court sentenced both B.J. and M.W. 	Slocum
addressed the court and described his losses resulting from the fire, which
included not only the buildings themselves, but also furniture, vehicles, antiques,
and various items he had collected throughout his life. 	The trial court imposed
identical sentences on both B.J. and M.W. which consisted of 12 months of
probation and 24 hours of community service. 	Additionally, the court ruled that
restitution would be set at a future date and explained that B.J. and M.W. would
“be jointly and severally liable for it.” 	The court also imposed the $100 DNA
collection fee which was mandatory at the time of sentencing.
On July 1, 2022, the State moved for an order to continue the restitution
hearing 	beyond 	July 	5, 	which 	was 	the 	180-day 	statutory 	deadline. 	RCW
9.94A.753(1). 	The State argued there was good cause to continue because
additional documentation “need[ed] to be prepared, provided, and reviewed.” On
July 5, after a hearing on the matter in which both B.J. and M.W. objected, the trial
court found good cause to extend the restitution deadline to August 4, 2022.

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On August 3, the parties agreed to have the restitution hearing extended
again. 	B.J. and M.W. requested an extension of “at least 60 days” to continue
investigating and reviewing “the complex insurance information and documents
that ha[d] been provided.” B.J. expressly waived his right to a speedy hearing in
favor of the 60-day extension and the trial court continued the restitution hearing
to September 28, 2022.
On September 28, before the evidentiary hearing on restitution began, the
State circulated the waiver and extension orders, which the court signed. Defense
counsel noted they were not waiving their original objection to the first extension.
Following the State’s opening, Slocum testified at length to the property that he
lost due to the fire. Slocum purchased the property in 2014 and it was “just shy of
an acre.” According to Slocum, he was “kind of a hoarder” and chose the property
because “it had lots of storage space.” 	Multiple structures were on the property:
the church with “a house attached to it and garage and three classroom buildings
and various carports,” all of which were destroyed. Everything within the buildings
was lost as well, which included Slocum’s extensive collection of antiques, family
heirlooms, and vintage memorabilia. The fire also consumed several vehicles.
On October 7, 2022, the trial court provided its oral ruling on the restitution
award. 	The court found that B.J. and M.W.’s actions caused the damages and
that the damages were a foreseeable consequence of their actions. 	Looking to
the amount of the award, the court cited the State Farm structural damage claim
policy, which “establishe[d] that the replacement cost of the structures on the
property is $999,354.74.” 	The court awarded that amount in restitution as to the

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structural damage. 	Regarding Slocum’s vehicles, the court awarded $7,700 for
his truck, $3,500 for his motorcycle, $2,500 for his Teardrop trailer. 	Turning to
Slocum’s other personal items, the court noted that Slocum requested $900,000
for the contents within the church, home, and additional structures. 	The court
found his testimony “too speculative” to award such an amount. 	However, the
court awarded $165,000 as that was the limit of his State Farm insurance policy
on those items. The total amount of the restitution award was $1,178,054.74.
B.J. timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Restitution Award
A. 	Good Cause
B.J. assigns error to the trial court’s entry of an award of restitution beyond
the 180-day statutory deadline. He avers the court erred in finding good cause to
extend the restitution deadline from July 5 to August 3, 2022. We disagree.
“A sentencing court’s restitution order will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion.” State v. Morgan, 28 Wn. App. 2d 701, 703, 538 P.3d 648
(2023). 	“An abuse of discretion occurs if the court’s decision is manifestly
unreasonable or rests on untenable grounds.” 	State v. Griffin, 173 Wn.2d 467,
473, 268 P.3d 924 (2012).
The sentencing court must determine the amount of restitution “at the
sentencing hearing or within 180 days of sentencing unless the court extends this
period for good cause.” 	State v. Dennis, 101 Wn. App. 223, 229, 6 P.3d 1173
(2000); RCW 9.94A.753(1). 	The same is true for courts imposing restitution on

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juveniles following their disposition. RCW 13.40.150(3)(f). Because the 180-day
time limit is mandatory, any motion to extend it must be made within that time
period. State v. Grantham, 174 Wn. App. 399, 403, 299 P.3d 21 (2013); State v.
Prado, 144 Wn. App. 227, 249, 181 P.3d 901 (2008). 	Here, the trial court
sentenced B.J. and entered the disposition on January 5, 2022. 	As the 180-day
deadline fell on a holiday, July 4, the final date for determining restitution became
July 5, 2022. CR 6(a). On July 1, 2022, the State moved to extend the restitution
hearing date, and, on July 5, after a hearing on the matter, the trial court found
good cause for the continuance, granted the motion, and extended the restitution
deadline to August 4, 2022.
“Good cause requires a showing of some external impediment that did not
result from a self-created hardship that would prevent a party from complying with
statutory requirements.” State v. Reed, 103 Wn. App. 261, 265 n.4, 12 P.3d 151
(2000). “Inadvertence or attorney oversight is not ‘good cause.’” State v. Johnson,
96 Wn. App. 813, 817, 981 P.2d 25 (1999). 	In determining whether good cause
exists, courts consider “the State’s diligence in procuring the necessary evidence”
as well as “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s
assertion of [their] right to speedy sentencing, and (4) the extent of prejudice to the
defendant.” State v. Tetreault, 99 Wn. App. 435, 438, 998 P.2d 330 (2000).
The State sought a 30-day extension to the restitution deadline and averred
there was good cause under the circumstances. 	The State explained that it
received the loss estimates from Slocum around 4:30 a.m. on July 1, which were
shared 	with 	the 	defense 	that 	day, 	and 	the 	State 	noted 	that 	additional

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documentation needed to be “prepared, provided, and reviewed.” 	At the hearing
on the matter, the prosecutor further described the situation as follows:
I can state that as far as victim impact, I have been in contact
multiple times since the cases pended requesting restitution. It took
quite a while for him to compile the information, because it is a fairly
substantial restitution request in this case. It’s an arson. It started as
an arson one, they pled to reckless burning. The victim’s house burnt
down, as well as several cars and vehicles. So, the restitution
information took a while to compile.
B.J. opposed the extension of time to set restitution and stated “[t]his motion
could have . . . been brought well . . . within the timeline. 	This is not the fault of
the respondents.” In response, the prosecutor stated “we provided notice as soon
as we had notice from the victim,” and “it did require quite a bit of . . . emotional
work from him. [Slocum] was emotional at the hearing[,] discussing the loss of his
property was very difficult for him.” Further, the prosecutor noted, “[Slocum] also
indicated it just took a lot of time to get these.”
After hearing from the parties, the court ruled as follows:
This is certainly a difficult situation when we do have a statute
that provides for timeliness in determining kind of the factual basis
for restitution hearing. There are good reasons for that statute. The
statute 	provides 	some 	certainty 	to 	individuals 	who 	have 	been
convicted and/or found to have committed offenses as juveniles.
That said, we also have competing interests. And in this case, I think
there is good cause to continue the hearing.
When I’m looking at good cause, I’m looking at the date of the
offense, the timing of when folks came in, the resolution of the matter,
which was just about 180 days ago, as well as the complexity with
which to determine the restitution.
In situations where we’re involving insured structures, there—
I think that takes additional time. Also, with real estate and other
items, it appears that there was a complete loss potentially. A
complete loss of property. That also takes some time.
I do also find that a victim’s emotional state and concern and
I do have concerns about that also taking some time. That said, I
appreciate counsel[’s] . . . request for no more than a 30[-]day

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extension, [be]cause I do think that it is time to round this up. And so,
30 days max would be the extension time this [c]ourt would order.
This was not an abuse of discretion. First, as B.J. concedes in briefing, the
trial court had authority to extend this restitution date because the State’s motion
was timely. 	Second, the record plainly reflects tenable grounds to support the
court’s finding of good cause. 	This was not a case of inadvertence or attorney
oversight; rather, the evidence shows that the State attempted to obtain the
materials from Slocum, but due to the severity of the damages, the numerous
personal belongings lost, and the unsurprising emotional toll, Slocum did not
provide the necessary documents to the State until just before the restitution
deadline. 	While B.J. argues good cause did not exist because Slocum had an
estimate from his insurance company as early as October 2021, that alone is not
determinative. 	See Tetreault, 99 Wn. App. at 438. While Slocum may have had
evidence at that time showing his insurance policy for $165,000 coverage on his
personal property that was destroyed, Slocum explained that he was “grossly
underinsured” and ultimately sought $900,000 in restitution for the contents of the
church, home, and additional structures.
Contrary to B.J.’s contention, this was not “a self-created hardship” that
precludes a finding of good cause. Rather, the evidence shows that B.J. and M.W.
caused the destruction of an extraordinary amount of property (nearly an acre of
land, multiple buildings, vehicles, and various collections of antiques, instruments,
photographs, 	and 	family 	belongings) 	by 	their 	actions, 	and, 	though 	Slocum
attempted 	to 	ascertain 	the 	value 	of 	the 	numerous 	items 	he had 	collected
throughout his life, he was unable to provide evidence of that within the 180-day

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window. There is no question that this impediment was external. Reed, 103 Wn.
App. at 265 n.4. Furthermore, considering that the delay was for only 30 days, the
specific property at issue was vast and its true value was nearly immeasurable,
and prejudice, if any, suffered by B.J. was minimal, the court did not err in finding
good cause to extend the restitution deadline beyond the statutory 180 days.2 See
Tetreault, 99 Wn. App. at 438.
B. 	Easily Ascertainable Damages
B.J. next avers the restitution award was erroneous because the “amount
was not based on easily ascertainable damages.” 	Specifically, he contends the
insurance appraisal report showing the value of the structures destroyed in the fire
was “internally inconsistent.” The record establishes otherwise.
Trial courts have discretion to determine the amount of restitution awarded.
State v. Kisor, 68 Wn. App. 610, 619, 844 P.2d 1038 (1993). RCW 9.94A.753(3)
provides that the amount of restitution “shall be based on easily ascertainable
damages for injury to or loss of property.” 	However, that “does not mean that
restitution can be awarded only under simple calculations.” 	State v. Kinneman,
155 Wn.2d 272, 285, 119 P.3d 350 (2005).
When a defendant disputes the amount, “the facts supporting a restitution
award must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” 	State v. Deskins,
2 The State also notes that B.J. subsequently waived his right to a timely restitution hearing
by requesting a 60-day extension after the trial court found good cause to extend the initial hearing
to August 3, 2022. While defense counsel for the two juveniles clearly stated that they were not
waiving their objection to the initial extension, B.J. did waive his right to a timely hearing thereafter.
While this waiver was not necessarily inconsistent with the earlier objection, it does weigh in favor
of the trial court’s finding of good cause to grant the 30-day extension under the circumstances.

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180 Wn.2d 68, 82, 322 P.3d 780 (2014). 	“Evidence is sufficient if it affords a
reasonable basis to estimate the loss and does not depend on ‘mere speculation
or conjecture.’” State v. Velezmoro, 196 Wn. App. 552, 564, 384 P.3d 613 (2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d 960, 965,
195 P.3d 506 (2008)). “Courts may rely on a broad range of evidence—including
hearsay—because the rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings.”
Deskins, 180 Wn.2d at 83.
Slocum provided his State Farm structural damage claim policy, filed in the
court as exhibit 21, which was a nearly 100-page insurance appraisal that showed
the value of and damage to the multiple structures on his property. According to
B.J., “the document is internally inconsistent” and thus the “restitution amount was
not based on easily ascertainable damages.” This bare assertion is meritless and
contradicted by the record. 	The insurance document provides that the total
replacement values for the “Dwelling” and “Dwelling Extension” were $373,169.10
and $626,185.64, respectively, for a total of $999,354.74. In accordance with the
document, the trial court awarded $999,354.74 in replacement costs. Because the
document is neither inconsistent nor based on “mere speculation or conjecture”
and it gives a reasonable basis to estimate the damages to Slocum’s property, the
evidence is sufficient.3 Velezmoro, 196 Wn. App. at 564.
3 B.J. also contends that the restitution award violated his “due process rights because B.J.
was afforded no opportunity to rebut the evidence or cross-examine its internal inconsistency.” B.J.
cites to one page of the document that provides estimates for a portion of the structural repair and
replacement costs, but that amount does not, as B.J. contends, represent the entire amount of
losses from the multiple structures that were destroyed. Again, the State Farm insurance estimate
addressed both the “Dwelling” and “Dwelling Extension” and the total replacement value provided
was based on the aggregate of those two. There is no internal inconsistency.
Second, B.J. relies on a distinguishable case for his bald “due process” claim, State v.
Kisor. In Kisor, the defendant challenged the amount of the restitution award because it was “based

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C. 	Interest on Restitution
B.J. also contends the court erred in not exercising discretion to waive
interest on the restitution award.
In 	2022, 	the 	legislature 	amended 	the 	statute 	governing 	interest 	on
restitution and added subsection RCW 10.82.090(2), which gives trial courts
discretion to waive interest on restitution. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 15, 530
P.3d 1048 (2023). 	Though this provision took effect after B.J. was sentenced, it
applies now as his case is on direct appeal. Id. at 16. Accordingly, we remand for
the trial court to determine whether to waive interest on the restitution award after
considering the relevant factors included in RCW 10.82.090(2). See State v. Reed,
28 Wn. App. 2d 779, 781, 538 P.3d 946 (2023).
II. 	DNA Collection Fee
Finally, B.J. asks that we remand his case with an order to strike the DNA
collection fee from his disposition. The State concedes this is appropriate.
After B.J. was sentenced, the legislature eliminated the mandatory DNA
collection fee. 	Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 17. 	While this amendment took effect
subsequent to B.J.’s sentencing, it applies to cases on direct appeal. 	Id. 	Thus,
we remand for the trial court to strike the DNA collection fee from B.J.’s disposition.
solely upon the State’s affidavit,” which reflected one witness’s statement as to the cost of
purchasing and training a new dog and “there was no indication of where [that witness] obtained
the figures as to the cost of purchasing the animal and training it.” 68 Wn. App. at 620. Accordingly,
the court found that the affidavit was not substantial credible evidence of restitution and held that
violated due process. Id.
Here, however, there is an extensive report presented by the State in which State Farm
provided a detailed analysis of the property value and damage resulting from the fire. Because
substantial credible evidence supported the award of restitution, B.J.’s due process argument
fails.

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Affirmed in part, but remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
WE CONCUR: