In Re The Marriage Of Dara Khosrowshahi, Resp V. Kathleen S. Khosrowshahi, App

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
DARA KHOSROWSHAHI,
Respondent,
and
KATHLEEN S. KHOSROWSHAHI,
Appellant.
No. 79493-1-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
APPELWICK, J. — Kathleen Khosrowshahi appeals from the order granting
her request to modify child support. Both parents have monthly incomes in excess
of the top of the economic schedule that is presumptive for child support. The
father’s income is much larger than the mother’s. Kathleen contends that the
transfer payment was so low it contravenes the legislative intent stated in the child
support statute. She also argues that a “child’s helper” is a special child-rearing
expense under RCW 26.19.080, the cost of which should be apportioned between
the parents. Last, she argues that the trial court erred in allowing the father to
revoke his agreement to pay certain expenses for the children above and beyond
those covered in the child support order. We affirm.

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FACTS
Kathleen Khosrowshahi and Dara Khosrowshahi legally separated in 2008
and dissolved their marriage in 2009. They have two children, C.K. (now age 19),
and A.K. (now age 15). A.K. lives with Kathleen1 for a majority of the time at her
home in Sun Valley, Idaho. At the time of this appeal, C.K. planned to attend
college at Brown University in Rhode Island starting in August 2018.
Kathleen has a monthly net income of $22,186 from interest and dividends.
Kathleen is unemployed. Dara has a monthly net income of $1,083,102. He works
as a chief executive officer of a large company. Both parents are wealthy and
enjoy a high standard of living.
Kathleen claims the children have some medical and psychological issues.
She claims that C.K. suffers from anxiety but has not submitted evidence of a
clinical diagnosis to the court. A.K. has a nonverbal learning disorder that impacts
his executive functioning. He has particular difficulty with cognitive shifting in
changing his routine or tasks.
The original agreed child support order was signed on April 23, 2008. At
that time, both parties were represented by experienced family law attorneys.
Dara’s monthly net income was $215,451. Kathleen’s monthly net income was
$21,437. Their combined net monthly incomes exceeded the maximum amounts
on the statutory economic table. RCW 26.19.020. Under the agreement, Dara
paid Kathleen $1,250 per child per month, or $2,500. The agreed upon amount
1 The party’s first names are used to avoid confusion. No disrespect is
intended.

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was above the top of the table. RCW 26.19.020. Dara also agreed to pay other
expenses for the children as follows:
The father shall pay 100% of the following expenses incurred on
behalf of the children listed in Paragraph 3.1:
Agreed upon Educational expenses (private school tuition,
books, fees, uniforms); and
The children’s health insurance premium payments.
The father shall pay 80% and the mother 20% of the following
expenses incurred on behalf of the children listed in Paragraph 3.1:
The children’s agreed upon extra-curricular expenses;
Up to 30 hours per week of a nanny’s salary until [A.K.] enters
1st grade.
Work or school-related daycare.
The day after the order was entered, Dara sent Kathleen the following e-
mail:
KK – I just got another bill from [the bookkeeper] and we are definitely
not on the same page on kid’s expenses. Here is where I am:
 I will not pay for your grocery bills – that should be taken care of
in the $2500 you get every month for the kids.
 I will not pay for your vacations with the kids, incl[uding] airfare,
etc. That is your expense and you can more than afford it.
 What I am willing to pay for presently is additional expenses for
[the] kids like clothes, a bike, skates, etc.
 And obviously education, etc[.] 100% as we discussed.
I looked at [the] bill and [the bookkeeper] is just throwing everything
in there and that’s just not my understanding. I’ll look at the math
and adjust what I pay going forward.
Kathleen continued to invoice Dara for various expenses which she claimed
were related to the children. The parties often disagreed about what Dara was

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responsible for paying for. One such disagreement resulted in the following e-mail
correspondence in November 2011:
Dk,
I am [at] River Run Lodge right now getting the kids their ski clothing
and passes.
There is a card on file under Alex with your name. This is what I am
putting their clothing on now. This will include a 15% discount that I
get as a locker holder.
Could you please put that same card under Chloe’s account.
Currently it is under mine.
Please [let me know] if you have any issues with this. Thanks. I just
want to get their clothes before their sizes sell out.
Thanks.
Kat
Dara replied,
This is not ok with me Kat. I am happy to pay for their ski passes.
Send me an invoice and I will pay it.
But I don’t want you using my credit card EVER again. I have said
this many many times and I just can’t believe that you’ve [done] this
yet again.
You are responsible for clothes, equipment, which is why I pay you
your monthly child support. I am making an exception on the ski
passes. Do not use my credit card.
DK
Kathleen claims that she became afraid to invoice Dara for expenses he was
obligated to pay. She claims she continued to incur these expenses and tracked
them on spreadsheets.

No. 79493-1-I/5
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In June 2017, Kathleen petitioned to modify the child support order. She
requested monthly payments of $40,000, $20,000 per child. She requested that
these payments continue until the children turn 26. She also requested that Dara
pay various other costs. These charges included a “house/assistant/driver/
administrative assistant home organizer, and coach,” and “minimum business
class ticket” flights for her to accompany the children to educational and significant
family events. Last, she requested over $1.6 million in back expenses she claimed
were due under the previous child support order.
Dara proposed a modified child support order that increased his payments
to Kathleen. He proposed increasing his monthly payments to $3,908 until C.K.
entered college, then $2,898 after that time. He also agreed to pay 100 percent of
various educational and extracurricular expenses. And, he paid $68,256 of the
reimbursement Kathleen sought prior to a court order to do so.
The matter was set for trial by affidavit. The commissioner set the monthly
payment amount at $3,522 per child per month. Payments for each child would
continue until the child turned 18 or graduated from high school, whichever was
later. He accepted Dara’s concession to be responsible for 100 percent of various
educational and extracurricular expenses with some caveats. The educational
support includes 100 percent of all postsecondary educational costs, including
tuition, costs, expenses, and a reasonable allowance while the children attend
college until the children are 23 and only if they are in school full time and doing
well. The commissioner viewed Dara’s 2008 e-mail above as an agreement to pay
certain expenses upon which Kathleen relied. However, he found that Dara had

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revoked his agreement with the later 2011 e-mail demanding Kathleen cease using
his credit card. As a result, the commissioner ordered Dara to pay an additional
$76,646 of Kathleen’s $1.6 million in claims for reimbursement. He also appointed
a special master to assess the veracity of other expense claims and adjudicate
future disagreements.
Kathleen moved for revision of the commissioner’s orders. The superior
court affirmed the commissioner’s rulings but made it effective retroactive to the
date of filing of the petition. Kathleen moved for reconsideration. The trial court
denied the motion.
Kathleen appeals.
DISCUSSION
Kathleen makes three arguments. First, she argues that the monthly
transfer payment is contrary to legislative intent for child support under RCW
26.19.001. Second, she argues that the trial court erred in denying her “special
child rearing expenses,” including an in-home “helper with” the children. Last, she
argues that the trial court erred in finding that Dara “revoked” his agreement to pay
additional expenses, such that he should have to pay a higher percentage of her
claimed back child support expenses. Both parties request attorney fees on
appeal.
We review child support adjustments and modifications for abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Ayyad, 110 Wn. App. 462, 467, 38 P.3d 1033 (2002).
The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision rests on unreasonable or
untenable grounds. In re Marriage of Leslie, 90 Wn. App. 796, 802-03, 954 P.2d

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330 (1998). Findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Marriage
of Lutz, 74 Wn. App. 356, 370, 873 P.2d 566 (1994). We review the superior
court’s order, rather than that of the commissioner. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197
Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). A denial of revision constitutes an
adoption of the commissioner’s findings and conclusions by the trial court, and the
trial court is not required to make new findings. Id.
I. Monthly Transfer Payment
Kathleen argues that the trial court erred in determining the monthly transfer
payment award.
The monthly transfer payment amount is determined by calculating the
children’s basic support amount and allocating it to the parents based on their
percentage share of the combined net monthly income. RCW 26.19.080. The
basic child support amount is determined using the economic table at RCW
26.19.020. That table provides the basic support obligation per child per month
based on the combined net income of the parents, and the number of children.
RCW 26.19.020.
The table is presumptive for combined incomes up to $12,000. RCW
26.19.020. When combined income exceeds this amount, the court may exceed
the presumptive amount upon written findings of fact. RCW 26.19.020. If the court
does exceed the presumptive amount, it must do so based on the needs of the
children commensurate with the parents’ incomes, resources, and standard of
living. In re Marriage of McCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607, 619-20, 152 P.3d 1013
(2007). The court should not simply extrapolate the amounts on the table upwards

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to fit the parents’ higher incomes. Id. at 620-21. At a minimum, the court should
consider the parents’ standard of living, and the children’s special medical,
educational, and financial needs when entering its findings of fact. Id. at 620.
Here, Kathleen argues that the monthly child support transfer payment for
her son in the amount of $3,522 is insufficient to meet the child’s basic needs. She
argues that, because her own household expenses are $20,000 per month, the
award is unreasonable because it represents less than half that number. She
further argues that because the transfer payment represents only a small
percentage of Dara’s income, it does not provide the children with a standard of
living commensurate with his own.
The trial court is directed by the statute to determine if it should exceed the
presumptive amount at the top of the economic table. RCW 26.19.020. If it is
inclined to do so, it must consider the children’s needs and the parent’s resources
and the parent’s standard of living. McCausland, 159 Wn.2d at 619-20. These
considerations are complex and vary from family to family. There must be findings
on the basis to exceed the presumptive support amount. RCW 26.19.020. Here
the trial court adopted the commissioner’s findings and conclusions.
Kathleen asserted the child support she was awarded was insufficient
because it did not even cover half of the $20,000 per month of household expenses
for herself and the children. But, that is not an appropriate standard for sufficiency.
Nothing in the statute requires that the child support transfer payment must support
at least half the expenses of the household of the receiving parent. RCW
26.19.020. Nothing in the statute requires that child support be sufficient to raise

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the standard of living in household of the parent receiving the transfer to that of the
household of the parent paying the transfer payment. RCW 26.19.020.
Kathleen asked the trial court to rely on In re Marriage of Krieger, 147 Wn.
App. 952, 199 P.3d 450 (2008) to determine the support should be higher. The
trial court found that case to be distinguishable. The Krieger court overturned a
transfer payment as too low because it effectively left the mother to provide all the
children’s needs beyond basic living with her own income. Id. at 966. This caused
a diminution in the children’s standard of living because they could no longer
participate in the activities they had enjoyed in the past and would have continued
if the parents had stayed married. Id.
Here, Dara was making the required child support transfer payments. The
trial court found no diminution in the activities that the children have enjoyed while
under the existing support order. It rejected the assertion that the children having
to fly economy class or drive a Honda CR-V rather than a Range Rover constituted
a diminution of the children’s standard of living. The trial court concluded that,
unlike in Krieger, the mother here was clearly not left to bear all the children’s
expenses. We agree with the trial court that the facts here are distinguishable from
Krieger.
The trial court did what the statute required. It determined that a transfer
payment above the top presumptive standard in the statutory economic table was
necessary and entered written findings of fact to that effect. In making this
determination, the court considered the needs of the children, the resources
available to the parents, and their standard of living. The trial court appropriately

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considered the ages of the children, their applicable special medical needs, and
the resources and standard of living of both parents. The trial court took note of
the expenses that the father agreed to pay in addition to the transfer payment.
These expenses included trust accounts for the children, all educational expenses,
the children’s medical needs, extracurricular activities, and college preparation
expenses. And, they factor into total support and determination of the children’s
standard of living.
Finally, based on those considerations, the trial court selected a 2.5
multiplier to apply to the presumptive support amount. The trial court has
considerable latitude in determining the amount due so long as it considers the
statutory factors. It is not this court’s role on appeal to substitute its opinion on the
proper amount of support. It is our role to determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion in the course of making its determination.
We find no abuse of discretion in trial court’s determination.
II. Special Child-Rearing Expenses
Kathleen argues next that the trial court erred in not compelling Dara to pay
for certain “special child rearing expenses” she requested. Specifically, she argues
that Dara should have to pay for a “helper” with the children. She argues that the
cost of a helper is not included in the 2008 child support order, but rather is a
special child rearing expense, for which Dara must pay his proportionate share.
Because the expense is not covered by the 2008 agreement, she argues that Dara
is not required to agree to the expense. Rather, she states that she should have
sole discretion as to the necessity of the expense, because the parenting plan

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gives her the right to make decisions regarding the day to day care and control of
the children while they are in her care. However, she concedes that the trial court
ultimately has discretion to determine the necessity and reasonableness of special
child rearing expenses. RCW 26.19.080(4).
Kathleen’s concession is well-taken and exposes the flaw in her argument.
The trial court determined that a helper was not a reasonable and necessary
special child-rearing expense. The court took into account that A.K. has a non-
verbal learning disability that affects his executive functioning and makes it difficult
for him to shift or change routine or tasks. Kathleen argues that this disability
requires A.K. to have a highly structured environment to meet his needs. She
claims that medical providers have told her that if this structure is provided for Alex
by an in-home helper, he will eventually learn to implement such structure himself
over time. However, she does not identify or provide testimony from such
providers. And, the court found that A.K.’s doctor recommends weekly therapy or
attendance at an institution that focuses on non-verbal learning disorders as the
proper treatment remedy for A.K.’s deficits. In weighing this evidence, the court
observed that “[A.K.] does not need someone to schedule for him; [A.K.] needs to
learn how to schedule [for himself].” It concluded that it “will not consider a
personal assistant or someone in the home as a necessary expense.” The trial
court’s decision was in line with the child’s doctor’s recommendations for his
treatment, and is therefore, within its sound discretion. This decision is not
manifestly unreasonable.

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We affirm the trial court’s determination that an in-home helper was not a
necessary special child rearing expense.
III. Recoupment of Expenses for Children
Kathleen argues last that the trial court erred in ordering Dara to pay “only
a fraction” of her claimed additional expenses. Specifically, she argues that Dara’s
2008 e-mail agreeing to pay for “‘additional expenses for [the] kids like clothes, a
bike, skates, etc.’” was an agreement to pay expenses not included in the transfer
payment. She argues that the trial court erred in determining that Dara revoked
this agreement in 2011. She contends that Dara could not unilaterally revoke this
agreement because she relied on it in not seeking higher transfer payments. She
does not otherwise challenge the trial court’s rulings on the additional expenses
she claimed.
The trial court treated Kathleen’s request for additional expenses as a
recoupment action rather than an enforcement action. Kathleen does not
challenge this determination. The trial court found that Dara agreed to pay certain
expenses in the 2008 e-mail which Kathleen relied upon. However, it found that
agreement ended with the 2011 e-mail. Kathleen argues that Dara should not be
able to revoke the 2008 agreement for two alternative reasons. First, the 2008 e-
mail was a part of a contract, separate from the 2008 order that cannot be
unilaterally revoked. Second, the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents Dara
from revoking his 2008 agreement to pay additional expenses.

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A. Equitable Estoppel
Kathleen claims that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should preclude
Dara from revoking his 2008 agreement. Equitable estoppel requires (1) a party’s
admission, statement, or act that is inconsistent with a later claim; (2) an action by
another in reasonable reliance on that act, statement, or admission; and (3) injury
that would result to the relying party from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate the prior act, statement, or admission. Colonial Imps., Inc. v. Carlton
Nw., Inc., 121 Wn.2d 726, 734, 853 P.2d 913 (1993). The party asserting an
equitable estoppel claim must prove its elements by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence. Id.
Kathleen has failed to meet her burden because it was unreasonable to
continue to rely on Dara’s 2008 e-mail after he had sent the 2011 e-mail. Dara’s
e-mail in 2008 indicated that he “presently” agreed to pay for “additional expenses
for [the] kids like clothes, a bike, skates, etc.” In 2011, he sent an e-mail stating in
part, “You are responsible for clothes, equipment, which is why I pay you your
monthly child support.” The text of both e-mails indicates that Dara was seeking
to limit his agreements, not broaden them. A reasonable person would not read
these e-mails as giving them license to front thousands of dollars in expenses
without seeking further agreement. Kathleen was not justified in relying on Dara’s
statements to incur unapproved expenses after 2011.
We reject Kathleen’s equitable estoppel claim.

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B. Contract Claim
Kathleen argues that the 2008 e-mail was part of a larger agreement by
Dara to pay expenses for the children before the 2008 child support order. A
parent may voluntarily and formally obligate themselves to do more than the law
requires by entering into an independent contract with their former spouse.
Untersteiner v. Untersteiner, 32 Wn. App. 859, 864, 650 P.2d 256 (1982). For a
valid contract to exist, there must be an offer, acceptance, and consideration. In
re Marriage of Obaili, 154 Wn. App. 609, 616, 226 P.3d 787 (2010). Such an
agreement must be clear and unmistakable. Riser v. Riser, 7 Wn. App. 647, 651,
501 P.2d 1069 (1972).
The trial court found that Kathleen understood Dara’s 2008 e-mail as an
agreement to pay additional expenses for the children. Dara does not dispute that
the 2008 e-mail evidenced a then present intent to pay additional expenses, but
instead argues that he clarified the scope of that intent with the 2011 e-mail. The
commissioner agreed with Dara and found the 2011 e-mail was notice of a change
in his intent and effectively changed his obligation going forward. The trial court
declined to revise. The challenge here is to whether Dara could unilaterally change
the agreement.
Kathleen argues that the 2008 e-mail was part of a larger agreement,
reached before the 2008 child support order, which Dara cannot unilaterally
revoke. However, she does not point to any evidence of any prior agreement. The
2008 child support order does not reference any other agreement of the parties,

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and she does not explain why the order would not supersede any prior
agreements.
The language of the 2008 e-mail says only that Dara is “presently” willing to
pay for certain expenses. Kathleen claims that she accepted a lower transfer
payment in the 2008 order as consideration for Dara’s agreement to pay additional
expenses. But, the 2008 e-mail was sent after the 2008 child support order was
entered, so it is unclear how an agreement in the 2008 order could have been
given in exchange for the promise to pay expenses in an e-mail sent after that
order. Kathleen points to no other evidence in the record to support this assertion.
The language of the 2008 e-mail alone does not provide clear and unmistakable
evidence of an irrevocable agreement. In the absence of consideration for a
promise, the e-mail language is more a gratuitous offer than an irrevocable
promise. We reject Kathleen’s argument that the 2008 e-mail evidenced an
agreement that Dara could not unilaterally revoke or modify.
The trial court did not err in finding that Dara could revoke his 2008
agreement. Its findings on recoupment are otherwise unchallenged. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s determination as to the amounts Kathleen was entitled to
recoup.
IV. Attorney Fees
Both sides request attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1. Dara argues
he should receive attorney fees because Kathleen has needlessly driven up the
cost of litigation and her appeal is devoid of merit. Kathleen urges this court to
exercise discretion to award her fees largely because Dara has the ability to pay.

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Though we reject Kathleen’s claims, her appeal is not completely devoid of
merit. Likewise, although Dara indisputably has the ability to pay attorney fees, so
does Kathleen. We therefore deny both parties’ requests for attorney fees.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR: