* Steven G. Hopkins, Appellant V. Department Of Labor & Industries, Respondent

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
(not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STEVEN G. HOPKINS and SPOUSE, No. 51891-1-II
Appellants,
v.
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND INDUSTRIES,
PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent.
MELNICK, J. — The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) issued a notice and order of
assessment asserting personal liability against Steven Hopkins and his spouse, collectively
Hopkins.1 L&I sought unpaid workers’ compensation premiums from a company that Hopkins
previously owned but which had dissolved. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hopkins
sought review in superior court. The court affirmed the assessment, and Hopkins appealed to this
court.
Hopkins argues that the statute of limitations precludes L&I’s assessment because the
premiums assessed “became due” more than three years before L&I issued the assessment.
We affirm.
1 Hopkins’s spouse does not appear by name. We intend no disrespect by not referring to the spouse
by name.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 3, 2019
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

51891-1-II
2
FACTS
Hopkins owned 50 percent of Frontier Contractors, Inc. (Frontier), a Washington
corporation. At all relevant times, he had the responsibility of filing Frontier’s workers’
compensation returns.
In 2010, L&I issued a notice and order of assessment against Frontier under RCW
51.48.1202 (the Frontier Assessment). The Frontier Assessment assessed unpaid premiums,
penalties, and interest against Frontier for the fourth quarter of 2006 through the third quarter of
2009. Frontier appealed the Frontier Assessment to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (the
Board).
In 2012, the Board issued an order which slightly modified the Frontier Assessment.
Frontier did not appeal, and the order became binding at that time.
Shortly thereafter, Frontier ceased doing business, and the Secretary of State
administratively dissolved Frontier on July 1, 2013.
2 The statute provides:
If any employer should default in any payment due to the state fund the director or
the director’s designee may issue a notice of assessment certifying the amount due,
which notice shall be served upon the employer by mailing such notice to the
employer by a method for which receipt can be confirmed or tracked to the
employer’s last known address or served in the manner prescribed for the service
of a summons in a civil action.
RCW 51.48.120. The statute has been amended since 2010. LAWS OF 2011, ch. 290, § 7.
However, where there has been no change in the relevant language, we cite to the current version
of the statute.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

51891-1-II
3
In 2015, L&I issued a notice and order of assessment against Hopkins in his personal
capacity under RCW 51.48.0553 (the Hopkins Assessment) for the amount Frontier owed at the
time of its dissolution. At the conclusion of the administrative appeals process, the Board affirmed
the Hopkins Assessment in full. It concluded that “Hopkins willfully failed to pay or cause to be
paid premiums owed to [L&I] between February 12, 2012, and July 1, 2013.” Clerk’s Papers (CP)
at 17. The Board made findings of fact supporting its conclusion. It held Hopkins personally
liable for $60,193.73.
Hopkins appealed to superior court. The court affirmed. Hopkins appeals.
ANALYSIS
Hopkins contends that the Hopkins Assessment “became due” in 2009, over three years
before L&I issued the assessment in 2015. Therefore, Hopkins argues the statute of limitations
precludes the assessment.
L&I argues that the statute of limitations does not preclude the Hopkins Assessment.
According to L&I, the statute of limitations was triggered when Frontier dissolved because it could
not have asserted personal liability against Hopkins until then. We agree with L&I.
3 The statute provides:
Upon termination, dissolution, or abandonment of a corporate or limited liability
company business, any officer, member, manager, or other person having control
or supervision of payment and/or reporting of industrial insurance, or who is
charged with the responsibility for the filing of returns, is personally liable for any
unpaid premiums and interest and penalties on those premiums if such officer or
other person willfully fails to pay or to cause to be paid any premiums due [L&I]
under chapter 51.16 RCW.
For purposes of this subsection “willfully fails to pay or to cause to be paid”
means that the failure was the result of an intentional, conscious, and voluntary
course of action.
RCW 51.48.055(1).
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

51891-1-II
4
“We review appeals stemming from the Board’s review of an assessment of industrial
insurance premiums under the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW.” Dep’t of
Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc., 185 Wn.2d 721, 731, 374 P.3d 1097 (2016); see RCW
51.48.131. “We sit in the same position as the superior court,” and review of the assessment is
limited to the record available to the Board. Probst v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 155 Wn. App.
908, 915, 230 P.3d 271 (2010).
“We review the Board’s findings of fact using the substantial evidence standard.” Lyons
Enters., Inc., 185 Wn.2d at 731. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Dep’t of
Labor & Indus. v. Kantor, 94 Wn. App. 764, 772, 973 P.2d 30 (1999). “We review questions of
law, such as construction of statutes, de novo, but we accord substantial weight to the agency’s
interpretation of the statutes it administers.” Probst, 155 Wn. App. at 915.
In interpreting statutes, “[t]he goal . . . is to ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent.”
Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). We give effect to the plain
meaning of the statute as “derived from the context of the entire act as well as any ‘related statutes
which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.’” Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762
(quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). We
interpret statutes so as to not render any portion of the statute meaningless or superfluous. Rivard
v. State, 168 Wn.2d 775, 783, 231 P.3d 186 (2010). Additionally, “a statute should be construed
so as to avoid unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences.” Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell
Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 305, 317, 884 P.2d 920 (1994).
The statute of limitations under RCW 51.16.190(2), as it relates to both RCW 51.48.120
and RCW 51.48.055, determines the outcome of this appeal.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

51891-1-II
5
RCW 51.16.190(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for actions to collect4 a
delinquent premium or assessment, which is triggered on “the date any such sum became due.”
RCW 51.48.120 allows for actions to collect against employers. It provides, in relevant
part: “If any employer should default in any payment due to the state fund the director or the
director’s designee may issue a notice of assessment certifying the amount due.” RCW 51.48.120.
RCW 51.48.055 allows the agency to hold certain people personally liable under certain
circumstances. It provides:
(1) Upon termination, dissolution, or abandonment of a corporate or limited
liability company business, any officer, member, manager, or other person having
control or supervision of payment and/or reporting of industrial insurance, or who
is charged with the responsibility for the filing of returns, is personally liable for
any unpaid premiums and interest and penalties on those premiums if such officer
or other person willfully fails to pay or to cause to be paid any premiums due [L&I]
under chapter 51.16 RCW.
. . . .
(2) The officer, member, manager, or other person is liable only for
premiums that became due during the period he or she had the control, supervision,
responsibility, or duty to act for the corporation described in subsection (1) of this
section, plus interest and penalties on those premiums.
RCW 51.48.055.
4 RCW 51.16.190(1) provides:
“Action” means, but is not limited to, a notice of assessment pursuant to RCW
51.48.120, an action at law pursuant to RCW 51.16.150, or any other administrative
or civil process authorized . . . for the determination of liability for premiums,
assessments, penalties, contributions, or other sums, or the collection of premiums,
assessments, penalties, contributions, or other sums.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

51891-1-II
6
The parties do not dispute that for employers, the statute of limitations begins to run on the
date the company failed to pay its workers’ compensation premiums. RCW 51.16.060 (“Premiums
for a calendar quarter . . . shall become due and delinquent on the day immediately following the
last day of the month following the calendar quarter.”); Dolman v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 105
Wn.2d 560, 565-66, 716 P.2d 852 (1986). Therefore, L&I cannot begin an action to collect those
premiums more than three years after the employer’s failure to pay. Here, Frontier’s premiums
“became due” between 2006 and 2009 when the company failed to pay its premiums. Thus, L&I
could not have brought an action to collect any premiums against Frontier under RCW 51.48.120
after 2012.
However, this appeal involves determining the triggering date of the statute of limitations
when L&I brought an action to collect against Hopkins personally, pursuant to RCW 51.48.055.
We conclude that the date of Frontier’s dissolution triggered the statute of limitations as to L&I’s
personal liability action against Hopkins.
Our interpretation is in accord with the statutes’ plain language. A simplified reading of
RCW 51.48.055(1) provides that “[u]pon . . . dissolution, . . . any officer . . . is personally liable
for any unpaid premiums . . . if such officer . . . willfully fails to pay or to cause to be paid any
premiums due the department.” Thus, Hopkins could not be held personally liable until Frontier
dissolved, regardless of Frontier’s corporate liability. As a result, the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until that event.
Our interpretation is also in accord with the legislature’s intent. The legislature created a
system whereby the funds used to pay workers’ compensation benefits come from the premiums
collected by L&I. RCW 51.48.010; WR Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 147 Wn.2d 213,
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

51891-1-II
7
216-17, 53 P.3d 504 (2002). Thus, if L&I cannot collect premiums, then it cannot pay workers’
compensation claims.
L&I utilizes RCW 51.48.120 and RCW 51.48.055 as different means to collect premiums.
L&I utilizes RCW 51.48.120 to assess premiums against employers, i.e., companies, not officers.
On the other hand, L&I utilizes RCW 51.48.055 to assess unpaid premiums against former officers
of corporations or limited liability companies in their personal capacity after a company’s
dissolution. Thus, these two provisions work together to allow L&I to file an action to collect
delinquent premiums and assessments against a company that exists, and also file an action against
former officers after a company dissolves. Therefore, our interpretation of the statutory structure
allows L&I to more thoroughly assess and collect workers’ compensation premiums, which it can
then use to pay workers’ compensation benefits.
Hopkins’s interpretation, however, would hinder L&I’s ability to proceed with an action
to collect and would instead incentivize corporate officers to withhold workers’ compensation
premiums. We interpret statutes to avoid such absurd results. As the industrial appeals judge
illustrated,
To rule as Mr. Hopkins requests would severely hamper [L&I’s] ability to
recover under RCW 51.48.055. A financially troubled corporation would only have
to avoid dissolution or abandonment of the corporate form for three years to totally
remove any corporate officer liability. It would also encourage delay in any appeal
of the underlying assessment since each three months of delay would remove
another quarter of premiums, penalty, and interest from potential corporate officer
liability.
CP at 53. Restricting L&I’s ability to proceed with an action to collect would restrict the
effectiveness of Washington’s Industrial Insurance Act because L&I would have less money to
pay workers’ compensation claims. This result would contravene the legislature’s intent because
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

51891-1-II
8
it would potentially hinder L&I’s ability to fulfill its legislative mandate to compensate workers.
See WR Enters., Inc., 147 Wn.2d at 216-17.
Finally, the above interpretation is consistent with RCW 51.48.055(2), which provides that
an officer “is liable only for premiums that became due during the period he or she had the control,
supervision, responsibility, or duty to act for the corporation.” Thus, when RCW 51.48.055(2) is
read as a whole, this provision simply clarifies the officer’s exposure to liability. The language
“became due” in the provision does not affect the date the sum became due as to the officer when
L&I asserts personal liability under RCW 51.48.055(1). Rather, it limits the amount of the
officer’s personal liability to premiums that became due to the company while that officer had
control of the company and was culpable for the withholdings.
Accordingly, we conclude that, when L&I began an action to collect against Hopkins
personally, the triggering date for the three-year statute of limitations was the date Frontier
dissolved. Therefore, the statute of limitations does not bar the Hopkins Assessment.5
We affirm.
Melnick, J.
We concur:
Worswick, P.J.
Cruser, J.
5 Hopkins also argues that he is entitled to attorney fees. Because we conclude that L&I’s
assessment against Hopkins is not barred by the statute of limitations, we decline to award him
attorney fees.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.