State Of Washington, Respondent V. I.m.c., Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 53509-2-II
Respondent,
v.
I.M.C., UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
CRUSER, J.—IMC appeals from his adjudication of guilt on one count of second degree
taking a motor vehicle without permission. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the guilty finding. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS1
On January 15, 2019, at approximately 9:45 AM, Peter Ballatan’s son Andrew2 started
Peter’s car and “left the car running in the driveway to warm up” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 58. Within
five minutes, Andrew heard noises outside the house and “observed a female coming inside the
fenced area.” Id. Andrew knocked on the window and went outside, where he saw “two males on
the sidewalk in front of the house, one dressed all in white standing next to a person wearing all
1 These facts are drawn from the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact, which are verities on
appeal. State v. Escalante, 195 Wn. 2d 526, 531, 461 P.3d 1183 (2020).
2 Because Peter Ballatan and his son Andrew share the same last name, we refer to them by their
first names to avoid confusion.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 23, 2021

No. 53509-2-II
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black with a black puffy coat.” Id. The man wearing white approached the side gate and shouted a
warning “toward the direction of the driveway.” Id. A man in a red or orange jacket drove Peter’s
car out of the driveway “at a high rate of speed” and turned south. Id. “Andrew [also] saw that the
two males in front of his house began running in the same direction that the vehicle was driving.”
Id. Andrew called 9-1-1 at approximately 9:50 AM. Andrew identified the man wearing the black
puffy coat as IMC.
Peter also went outside to investigate and watched as his car left his driveway. Peter
observed two males, including the male in the black puffy coat, standing on the front sidewalk.
“As [the] car turned south onto Portland Avenue, he saw the two males in front of his residence
turn and begin running in the [same] direction.” Id. at 59. Peter also identified the person in the
black puffy coat as IMC.
At about 10:30 AM, an officer found the car, which had been abandoned about four and a
half miles from the Ballatans’ residence. The officer who responded to the 911 call told Peter that
his car had been found. The officer later “estimated that it would take him about two hours to walk
that distance.” Id. at 60.
Shiloh Martindale spoke to the officer who discovered the abandoned car. “Several
minutes” before the officer discovered the car, Martindale had observed Peter’s car pull up and
stop in front of her neighbor’s house. Id. at 61. Martindale noticed that when the car pulled up, it
“appeared to be full of occupants.” Id. When she looked again, Martindale saw two males
examining the car’s flat tire. One of the males was an African-American who was wearing a black
puffy coat. At that time, Martindale “did not see anyone else on the sidewalk or driving on the
street.” Id.

No. 53509-2-II
3
“A few minutes later” Martindale saw “five or six kids,” including the male in the black
puffy coat, walk away from the car to an apartment complex across the street. Id. Minutes later,
while speaking to the officer, Martindale noticed the same group of people walking down the street
and pointed them out to the officer.
Peter drove to the location where the car had been found. He later testified that it was four
and a half miles from his house. Peter estimated that it was about a 90 minute walk from his house.
At approximately 10:50 AM, officers stopped the group of juveniles about five blocks from
where the car was found. An officer drove Peter to where the juveniles were, and Peter identified
IMC as the “African-American male in the black clothing who had been standing in front of his
house” when the car was stolen. Id. at 63.
The State charged IMC with second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission.
IMC was 17 years old at the time of the crime, so the case proceeded to a bench trial before the
juvenile court.
After hearing testimony, the trial court entered the written findings of fact described above.
The trial court entered the following conclusions of law:
II.
That [IMC] is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of TAKING A
MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT PERMISSION IN THE SECOND DEGREE in
that in Pierce County, Washington on January 15, 2019 he did unlawfully and
feloniously, without permission of the owner or person entitled to possession,
intentionally take or drive away an automobile or motor vehicle that is the property
of another or did voluntarily ride in or upon the automobile or motor vehicle with
knowledge of the fact that it was unlawfully taken, contrary to RCW 9A.56.075(1).
III.
On January 15, 2019 at approximately 0950 hours Peter Ballatan’s 2001
Toyota Avalon was stolen from his driveway by three individual[s]: an African-

No. 53509-2-II
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American male in all red clothing, a dark-complected male in dark clothing and
wearing a dark hat, and a female in a black sports suit with white stripes on the side.
IV.
[IMC] knew that the Toyota had been stolen, as he was at the scene of the
incident when it was stolen.
V.
[IMC] was a passenger in the stolen vehicle because he was identified at the
scene where the Avalon was abandoned approximately 4.5 miles from the Ballatan
residence no more than 45 minutes after it was stolen. [IMC] reasonably could not
have walked from the Ballatan residence to the location where the Avalon was
abandoned in 45 minutes. There was no evidence submitted that [IMC] obtained a
car ride to the location where the Avalon was abandoned.
VI.
[IMC] was a passenger in the stolen vehicle because he was identified with
the group of juvenile suspects who were arrested approximately five blocks away
from the location where the Avalon was parked on Golden Given Road East
approximately 20 minutes after the car was abandoned by the group.
Id. at 64-66.
IMC appeals.
ANALYSIS
IMC argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because there was
no evidence that he rode in the stolen vehicle or that he assisted others in taking the vehicle.3 We
disagree.
3 IMC’s issue statement suggests that IMC is also arguing that there was no evidence that he took
or assisted others in taking the car. But because the trial court found only that IMC had ridden in
the car while knowing it was stolen, and IMC’s argument focuses only on that method of
committing the offense, we do not address those arguments.

No. 53509-2-II
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We review sufficiency of evidence claims for whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, “‘any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” State v. Frahm, 193 Wn.2d 590, 595, 444 P.3d 595 (2019) (quoting State v. Salinas, 119
Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). A sufficiency of the evidence challenge admits the truth
of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.
Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243,
266, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). “[I]nferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and
cannot be based on speculation.” State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013). We
defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and persuasiveness
of the evidence. State v. Ague-Masters, 138 Wn. App. 86, 102, 156 P.3d 265 (2007).
To prove the crime of second degree taking of a motor vehicle without permission, the
State had to prove that IMC “voluntarily [rode] in or upon the automobile or motor vehicle with
knowledge of the fact that the automobile or motor vehicle was unlawfully taken.” RCW
9A.56.075(1). Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is
sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that IMC had ridden in the stolen car.
The Ballatans both identified IMC as one of the people who was outside their home when
the car was stolen, and they observed that IMC was wearing all black and a black puffy coat at that
time. They also testified that IMC ran off in the same direction as the car with the other person
who had shouted a warning to the people stealing the car.
Then, less than 40 minutes later, and approximately four and a half miles away, Martindale
observed the Ballatans’ car stop near her house and observed that the car “appeared to be full of
occupants.” CP at 61. Martindale also observed that there were no other people or vehicles around

No. 53509-2-II
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and, soon after the car stopped, she observed an African-American male wearing the same clothing
IMC had been observed wearing at the Ballatans’ house examining the car’s flat tire. IMC was
also among the juveniles that Martindale had identified as having been at the car. This is strong
circumstantial evidence that IMC had been in the car.
IMC is correct that witnesses testified only about how long it would potentially take to
walk the four and a half miles between the Ballatans’ house and Martindale’s house, one testifying
that it would take 90 minutes and another testifying that it would take about 120 minutes, and that
no evidence was presented regarding how quickly someone could run this distance. But a jury
could still reasonably conclude that it was highly unlikely that IMC ran the four and a half miles
to where the car was abandoned, reaching that location at exactly the same time as the car. Not
only was this a significant distance from the Ballatans’ house, but when Martindale first saw the
car, it was full of people, and there were no other people or vehicles around. And a short time later,
Martindale saw a person wearing the same clothing as IMC standing near the car. It is a reasonable
conclusion, based on the evidence, and not mere speculation that IMC had arrived in the car and
not on foot.
These facts are sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to infer that IMC had
arrived in the car with the others. And since IMC was present when the car was stolen, a fact that
IMC does not dispute, the jury could also conclude that IMC knew the vehicle was unlawfully
taken. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.

No. 53509-2-II
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
CRUSER, J.
We concur:
SUTTON, A.C.J.
MAXA, J.