* In Re The Detention Of T.S., Appellant V. State Of Washington, Respondent

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re the Detention of:
T.S.,
Appellant.
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No. 80534-7-I
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — T.S. challenges the order revoking his less restrictive
treatment under the Involuntary Treatment Act,1 arguing it exceeds the statutory
maximum commitment period allowable for most restrictive treatment. We affirm.
FACTS
T.S. suffers from schizoaffective disorder. On June 27, 2019, T.S. stipulated
to the entry of an order for involuntary treatment under less restrictive alternative
conditions for 365 days. 	See RCW 71.05.320(7). 	The order was set to expire on
June 26, 2020.
On August 21, 2019, a designated crisis responder filed a petition to revoke
the less restrictive order (LRO), alleging T.S. failed to comply with several of the
LRO’s conditions. 	After hearing testimony from a clinical supervisor and a social
worker, the court found T.S. violated the LRO. It revoked the LRO, remanding T.S.
1 Chapter 71.05 RCW.
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No. 80534-7-I/2
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to inpatient treatment “for a period not to exceed 365 days from June 27, 2019”—in
other words, the remaining 10 months of the LRO.
T.S. appeals.
ANALYSIS
T.S. argues the order revoking the LRO exceeded the statutory maximum
commitment period. T.S. contends while RCW 71.05.320(7) allows a court to enter
an LRO of up to 365 days for any person previously committed for intensive inpatient
treatment 	in 	a 	state 	hospital, 	RCW 	71.05.320(1)(c) 	only 	permits 	involuntary
commitment in an inpatient setting for up to 180 days. 	The State contends the
duration of T.S.’s commitment is governed by RCW 71.05.590(4)(d), not by RCW
71.05.320(1)(c). The State has the better argument here.
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo, giving effect
to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s language. In re Det. of R.H., 178
Wn. App. 941, 948, 316 P.3d 535 (2014). “‘As civil commitment statutes authorize
a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.’” 	Id. (quoting In
re Det. of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996)).
Under RCW 71.05.590(1), an agency or facility designated to monitor or
provide services under an LRO may petition to revoke the LRO. 	If a petition to
revoke is filed and, as a result, the court orders detention for inpatient treatment,
“the treatment period may be for no longer than the period authorized in the original
court order.” RCW 71.05.590(4)(d).
Here, the original court order—the LRO—required that T.S. remain under
court supervision under less restrictive conditions for 365 days from June 27, 2019.
The challenged order remanded T.S. to most restrictive treatment for the same
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No. 80534-7-I/3
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amount of time as the LRO it revoked—“for a period not to exceed 365 days from
June 27, 2019.” 	It did not exceed the treatment period authorized in the original
court order and, therefore, did not violate RCW 71.05.590(4)(d).
T.S. argues the court should harmonize RCW 71.05.590(4)(d) with the time
limit of RCW 71.05.320 and limit the period of more restrictive treatment to 180 days,
even when based on a revoked LRO. This argument is inconsistent with the plain
language of RCW 71.05.590(4)(d) and would render a portion of that provision
meaningless. 	We must construe statutes to give effect to all of the language and
cannot 	construe 	them 	in 	a way 	that 	results 	in 	unlikely, 	absurd, 	or 	strained
consequences. 	Mason v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 166 Wn. App. 859, 870, 271 P.3d
381 (2012). 	The interpretation T.S. advances violates this rule of statutory
construction.
T.S. also argues commitment orders can never exceed 180 days, and if the
State wants to commit someone for longer than 180 days, it should file a new petition
and bear the burden of proving a statutory basis for involuntary commitment. 	The
only authority he provides for this proposition is In re Detention of Morgan, 180
Wn.2d 312, 330 P.3d 774 (2014). But that case mentions RCW 71.05.320 only in
passing to distinguish Involuntary Treatment Act commitments from sexually violent
predator commitments under Chapter 71.09 RCW. 	Id. at 322-23; see also RCW
71.09.010. Furthermore, it does not mention RCW 71.05.590 and the procedure for
revoking 	LROs. 	By 	passing 	RCW 	71.05.590(4), 	the 	legislature 	specifically
authorized an order of commitment exceeding 180 days. 	T.S. fails to show the
duration of in-patient treatment under these circumstances must be limited to 180
days.
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No. 80534-7-I/4
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Because the order revoking T.S.’s less restrictive treatment did not exceed
the treatment period authorized in the original court order, we conclude T.S. has
failed to show error.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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