* Marcellus Bucheit And Lisa Bucheit-ekdahl, Respondents V. Christopher Geiger, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MARCELLUS BUCHHEIT and
LISA BUCHHEIT-EKDAHL,
Respondents,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. GEIGER,
Appellant.
J
No. 72548-3-1
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	February 16, 2016
Becker, J. — This is an appeal from an antiharassment order issued to
protect the owners of a lakeside lot from alleged abusive conduct and trespass
by their upland neighbor. 	The petitioners dispute their neighbor's claim to an
easement over their lakeside property. 	Because the neighbor's claim is
cognizable, the dispute is not one that can be resolved by an antiharassment
order issued under chapter 10.14 RCW. The order is reversed.
The parties own adjoining parcels of property on the north side of Lake
Stevens. They acquired their respective lots in 2013 from Kenneth and Laurie
Withrow. Appellant Christopher Geiger owns and lives on lot 1, the upland lot.
Lot 2, a waterfront parcel south of Geiger's, is owned by respondents Marcellus
Buchheit and his wife, Lisa Buchheit-Ekdahl. The Buchheit lot has a dock, boat
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/2
ramp, and bulkhead. 	The Buchheits plan to construct a residence on their lot in
the future. 	In the meantime, they use the lot for recreation.
Geiger began to use lot 2 without the permission of the Buchheits. Among
other things, he affixed a floating dock to the Buchheit property, stored personal
items on their property, and walked across their property to go between his dock
and his home. 	When the Buchheits confronted him about trespassing, he
claimed to have an easement.
The Buchheits filed a petition for an antiharassment order of protection
under chapter 10.14 RCW. The petition alleged that Geiger had ignored their
repeated requests not to trespass and that he was intimidating and aggressive in
his conversations with Buchheit-Ekdahl. The petition asked the court to order
Geiger to stay off their lot and their dock.
Chapter 10.14 RCW creates a cause of action for an order of protection in
cases of unlawful harassment. 	The chapter "is intended to provide victims with a
speedy and inexpensive method of obtaining civil antiharassment protection
orders preventing all further unwanted contact between the victim and the
perpetrator." 	RCW 10.14.010. The authority of the court to issue an
antiharassment order is set forth in RCW 10.14.080. The court has "broad
discretion to grant such relief as the court deems proper." 	RCW 10.14.080(6).
The statute limits the court's discretion in several ways. 	One limitation is
designed to ensure that an antiharassment order is not used to resolve a dispute
involving real property to which the respondent has a "cognizable claim":
The court in granting an ex parte temporary antiharassment
protection order or a civil antiharassment protection order, shall not
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/3
prohibit the respondent from the use or enjoyment of real property
to which the respondent has a cognizable claim unless that order is
issued under chapter 26.09 RCW or under a separate action
commenced with a summons and complaint to determine title or
possession of real property.
RCW 10.14.080(8).
Geiger moved to dismiss the antiharassment petition under RCW
10.14.080(8). 	He submitted a document that he argues gives him a cognizable
claim to a 23-foot-wide easement over the Buchheit property for lake access.
The document in question, a "Declaration of Easement and Restrictions,"
was recorded in the chain of title before the Buchheits purchased lot 2. 	The
declaration identifies lot 1 (Geiger) as the dominant tenement and lot 2
(Buchheit) as the servient tenement. The document is carelessly drafted. 	The
easement granted for the benefit of lot 1 is access over a 23-foot-wide strip of
land on the easterly edge of lot 1, Geiger's own lot. The commissioner who
presided over the hearing on the antiharassment petition was not convinced
Geiger had a valid easement:
Cutting to the chase, it seems to me the pivotal issue right now is
how does this easement, if there is one, question get resolved. And
at this point it is not clear that the respondent, in my opinion, has an
easement. 	I mean it is contradictory, it is internally inconsistent and
I cannot interpret it in this forum, in this context and make a ruling
one way or the other. 	Other than to say, it doesn't appear to grant
Mr. Geiger access across the petitioner's property. 	I am going to
grant the unlawful harassment protection order. .. . Now, I would
preserve his right to come back to court if this easement matter is
resolved in his favor and he has this matter reviewed. At this point,
he has no right to use their property.
The commissioner entered an order of protection as requested by the Buchheits.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/4
Geiger appeals and argues that the commissioner lacked statutory
authority to enter an antiharassment order that prevented him from entering lot 2.
In Geiger's view, his claim to an easement transformed the dispute into one that
must be resolved through a quiet title action. 	He describes the case as "a
property dispute dressed up as a harassment claim." According to Geiger: "What
was going on between the parties over the months leading up to the petition was
nothing more or less than the unpleasant interactions that are, unfortunately,
common between neighbors who have conflicting views of their property rights."
Geiger's appeal requires us to interpret the term "cognizable claim" as it is
used in RCW 10.14.080(8). This court reviews issues of statutory interpretation
de novo. 	Price v. Price. 174 Wn. App. 894, 903, 301 P.3d 486 (2013).
Price is the only published decision discussing RCW 10.14.080(8). The
respondent in Price successfully appealed an antiharassment order restraining
her from coming within 100 yards of beachfront property in which she held a
majority ownership interest. 	Price deals with an undisputed claim to real
property. 	It does not shed any light on what makes a claim "cognizable" if it is
disputed.
When we interpret a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. We begin with the statute's plain language
and ordinary meaning. Where the legislature has not defined a term, we may
look to related statutes and dictionary definitions, as well as the statute's context,
to determine the plain meaning of the term. 	Cornu-Labat v. Hosp. Dist. No. 2
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/5
Grant County. 177 Wn.2d 221, 231-32, 298 P.3d 741 (2013); Dep't of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn. LLC. 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
Chapter 10.14 RCW does not define the term "cognizable claim." Geiger
calls our attention to dictionary definitions of "cognizable" such as, for example,
"capable of being judicially heard and determined." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 440 (2002). 	See also Blacks Law Dictionary 316
(10th ed. 2014): "Capable of being judicially tried or examined before a
designated tribunal; within the court's jurisdiction."
The dictionary definitions are too broad to be helpful. Almost any dispute
about the use and enjoyment of real property is capable of being tried in superior
court. 	In cases adjudicated under RCW 10.14.080, the very purpose of the
"cognizable claim" limitation in subsection (8) is to draw the line between those
cases in which the court is authorized to prohibit the respondent from the use or
enjoyment of real property and those cases in which the court lacks that
authority.
We have not found a definition of "cognizable claim" in any statute, let
alone a "related statute." 	But as Geiger points out, a common legal usage of the
term "cognizable claim" is in connection with the standard for considering a
motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6). 	See, e.g., Talarico bv Johnston v.
Foremost Ins. Co.. 105Wn.2d 114, 115, 712 P.2d 294 (1986) ("Under the law
and facts pleaded in the complaint, the child stated no legally cognizable claim
against his parents and the child and the parents pleaded no valid claim against
the insurer; consequently, the trial court did not err in dismissing their respective
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/6
claims for 'failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted'"), quoting CR
12(b)(6); Kumar v. Gate Gourmet. Inc.. 180 Wn.2d 481, 506, 325 P.3d 193
(2014) ("This case was dismissed at the pleading stage, and the employees'
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was dismissed without analysis.
In light of this fact and in light of Washington's relatively liberal standard for
stating a cognizable claim, we reverse the dismissal.")
We accept Geiger's proposal to define a cognizable claim under RCW
10.14.080(8) as one that would survive a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6) if
pleaded in an ordinary civil action. 	Under CR 12(b)(6), a plaintiff states a claim
upon which relief can be granted if it is possible that facts could be established
that would support relief. 	McCurrv v. Chew Chase Bank. FSB. 169 Wn.2d 96,
101,233P.3d861 (2010).
On its face, the "Declaration of Easement and Restrictions" creates an
easement over lot 1 for the benefit of the dominant tenement, which is also lot 1.
It does not give the owner of lot 1 any particular claim to the use of any part of lot
2. 	But Geiger contends the language declaring an easement over lot 1 (his own
property) is merely a scrivener's error that could easily be corrected by
reformation. 	Geiger argues that facts could possibly be established to support
reformation of the declaration to create an effective easement over lot 2 for the
benefit of lot 1.
One who seeks reformation of an instrument must prove by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence that (1) both parties to the instrument had an identical
intention as to the terms to be embodied in a proposed written document, (2) the
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/7
writing which was executed is materially at variance with that identical intention,
and (3) innocent third parties will not be unfairly affected by reformation of the
writing to express that identical intention. 	Asotin County Port Dist. v. Clarkston
Cmtv. Corp., 2 Wn. App. 1007, 1011, 472 P.2d 554 (1970).
In the purchase and sale agreement between Geiger and the Withrows,
the Withrows agreed to provide lot 1 with an "ingress/egress easement from the
easterly property line including the easterly bulk head and the boat ramp for
shared use between lots 1 & 2." 	Geiger likely could establish that he and the
Withrows had the identical intention that the easement would burden lot 2. The
question less easily answered is whether it would be fair to the Buchheits to
reform the easement to conform to what Withrows and Geiger intended.
The "speedy and inexpensive" procedure for obtaining a civil
antiharassment order is not well-suited for addressing the legal issues involved in
answering that question. 	Reformation will be granted even against a subsequent
purchaser who obtained title with notice of the mistake. 	Shaw v. Briggle, 193
Wash. 595, 598, 76 P.2d 1011 (1938). 	In Shaw, the subsequent purchaser was
personally involved in the drafting of the mistaken instrument and tried to profit
from it. 	Geiger does not posit that the Buchheits were personally involved in the
transaction whereby he acquired lot 1. But the declaration of easement does
identify lot 2 as the servient tenement, and the declaration was recorded before
the Buchheits purchased lot 2 from the Withrows. Arguably, the Buchheits might
be deemed to have notice that the lot they purchased was burdened by a
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/8
23-foot-wide easement. 	In a hypothetical lawsuit involving Geiger, the Buchheits,
and the Withrows, we cannot say that Geiger's claim for reformation would
necessarily be dismissed on a CR 12(b)(6) motion.
Although the commissioner said he could not interpret the easement "in
this forum," the commissioner did in fact interpret the easement as being invalid
when he declared: "At this point, [Geiger] has no right to use their property." The
commissioner's conclusion that Geiger has no right to use lot 2 was the primary
basis for issuing the antiharassment order. 	The commissioner allowed that the
order could be changed if Geiger obtained a favorable ruling on the easement
from some other forum. 	It is not clear, however, that in some other forum, Geiger
would be able to avoid the collateral estoppel effect of the commissioner's
determination that the easement gives him no right in the property. With the legal
uncertainty that hangs over the easement, this seems to be exactly the kind of
situation the legislature intended to avoid by adopting the "cognizable claim"
limitation in RCW 10.14.080(8).
We conclude Geiger has a cognizable claim to use and enjoy a
23-foot-wide easement over the lot owned by the Buchheits. 	It follows that the
trial court lacked authority to issue an antiharassment order prohibiting him from
entering their lot. To the extent the Buchheits allege harassing conduct by
Geiger unrelated to his claim of easement, they may renew their petition and
seek narrower prohibitions.
8
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 72548-3-1/9

Reversed.

WE CONCUR:

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