Erik And Diana Moseid, Appellants V. Us Bank Et Al, Respondents

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ERIK MOSEID, an individual, and
DIANNA MOSEID, an individual,
Appellants,
U.S. 	BANK, 	N.A., 	a 	national 	banking
association, 	as 	trustee 	for 	SERIES
#2011-1 CERTIFICATES and successor
in 	interest 	to 	CREDIT 	SUISSE
FINANCIAL 	CORPORATION, 	a
business 	entity, 	form 	unknown, 	LAW
OFFICES OF KAREN L. GIBBON P.S.,
a 	business 	entity, 	form 	unknown, 	and
DOES 1 through 15, inclusive,
Respondents.
No. 70823-6-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	March 2, 2015
Leach, J. — Representing themselves, Erik and Dianna Moseid appeal the
trial 	court's 	summary 	dismissal 	of 	their 	complaint.1 	After 	unsuccessfully
attempting to restrain a nonjudicial trustee's sale of their home in federal district
court, 	the 	Moseids filed 	this 	postsale action 	in King County Superior Court
against lender U.S. Bank, its servicer, Selene Finance LP,2 and trustee Karen L.
1 Pro 	se 	litigants 	are 	"bound 	by 	the 	same 	rules 	of 	procedure 	and
substantive law as attorneys." 	Westberg v. All-Purpose Structures, Inc., 86 Wn.
App. 405, 411, 936 P.2d 1175 (1997). We have "no obligation to grant special
favors to ... a pro se litigant." 	In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626,
850 P.2d 527 (1993).
2 Selene Finance LP, which identifies itself as U.S. Bank's loan servicer
and attorney-in-fact, is not listed in the case caption but is named extensively in
the complaint.

No. 70823-6-1 / 2
Gibbon PS. 	They contend that foreclosure was wrongful and the sale invalid
because the lender unfairly refused to modify their loan. 	On appeal, the Moseids
claim 	that the 	trial court 	improperly denied 	them 	a 	chance to 	amend 	their
complaint and erred by dismissing their complaint. 	But the Moseids never asked
the trial court for permission to amend their complaint, and the complaint they
filed does not state any claim for which the law provides a remedy. 	We affirm.
Background
In 	November 	2006, 	Erik 	Moseid 	and 	Dianna 	Moseid 	financed 	the
purchase of a home by signing a promissory note for $600,000, payable to Credit
Suisse Financial Corporation, and a companion deed of trust. 	They fell behind in
payments on the note due to economic hardships. 	In March 2011, the Moseids
received a written notice of default.3
In June 2011, the loan servicer, Acqura Loan Services,4 sent the Moseids
a 	letter inviting them to contact its offices to learn more about a "specialized
program" to refinance their loan. 	In August 2012, a new loan servicer, Selene
Finance 	LP, similarly offered 	in a 	letter to "discuss your 	situation 	and 	help
determine the best course of action for you." 	By this time, the Moseids had
3 The second amended notice of trustee's sale refers to the initial notice of
default, which is not a part of the record before this court. 	The Moseids do not
dispute that they received proper notice of default or assert any other procedural
irregularities in the nonjudicial foreclosure process.
4 By this 	time, 	the 	original 	beneficiary, 	MERS 	(Mortgage 	Electronic
Registration Systems Inc.), had 	assigned its beneficial interest in the deed of
trust to U.S. 	Bank Trust, 	National Association, "whose address is c/o Acqura
Loan Services."

No. 70823-6-1 / 3
missed more than two years of mortgage payments. 	The Moseids contacted
Selene, which agreed to "perform research" in order to review their loan.
On October 25, 2012, successor trustee Karen L. Gibbon PS recorded a
second amended notice of trustee's sale. 	This notice informed the Moseids that
they had 20 days to pursue mediation and advised them to contact a housing
counselor or attorney immediately for assistance in keeping their house. 	The
letter described the amount in arrears. 	This included 33 months of mortgage
payments, taxes, and fees and totaled $110,605.92. 	The notice also stated that
the trustee's sale would occur on March 1, 2013, unless the Moseids cured the
default on or before February 18, 2013. 	No evidence in the trial court record
indicates that the Moseids pursued mediation or other foreclosure assistance.
Nor does the record indicate that the Moseids attempted to cure their defaults
before the sale.
On 	December 21, 	2012, 	Selene sent the Moseids a 	letter requesting
documents about income and hardship in order to "review [their] loan for a loan
workout." 	The letter stated, "Please understand that there is no guarantee that
your loan will be approved for a loan workout, but we will do everything we can to
assist you."
On January 15, 2013, Selene sent the Moseids a 	letter denying their
request for a loan modification due to insufficient income.
On 	February 28, 	2013, 	the Moseids filed a 	lawsuit against Selene in
federal district court and an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order and

No. 70823-6-1 / 4
permanent injunction. 	The complaint alleged 	wrongful foreclosure, 	breach of
contract, 	intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander of title, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of quasi-fiduciary duty, violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act,5 violation of the 	Fair Credit 	Reporting Act,6 and 	violations of
RESPA.7 Finding that the Moseids were not likely to succeed on the merits and
that "[w]ith the information available, there is no reason to believe the nonjudicial
foreclosure is improper," the court denied the motion for a temporary restraining
order. 	The court noted in its order that the Moseids gave no reason why they did
not file their action sooner, given that they received the notice of foreclosure sale
four months earlier, and also noted that they "have not demonstrated that effort
was given to notify the Defendants of this TRO [temporary 	restraining order]
motion."8
Selene asked the court to dismiss with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). The Moseids did not respond to Selene's motion.
515U.S.C. §§1692-1692p.
6Ch. 19.182 RCW.
7 RESPA refers to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12
U.S.C. § 2601. 	This information about the Moseids' federal court claims comes
from the district court's orders denying the Moseid's request for a temporary
restraining order and granting Selene's motion to dismiss. 	The complaint the
Moseids filed in federal district court was not among the materials considered by
the superior court in the second lawsuit. 	Therefore, although Selene attaches
this complaint as an appendix to its brief of respondent, we decline to consider it.
See RAP 10.3(a)(8).
8 The court observed that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b), it may issue a
temporary 	restraining 	order without notice to the opposing 	party only if "(A)
specific facts in an 	affidavit or verified complaint clearly show immediate and
irreparable injury and 	(B) the 	movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts
made to give notice and the reason why it should not be required."

No. 70823-6-1 / 5
On March 15, 2013, U.S. Bank purchased the property at the trustee's
sale. 	On April 23, 2013, the district court dismissed the 	Moseids' 	complaint
without prejudice.
On May 13, 2013, the Moseids filed this lawsuit against U.S. Bank and
Law Offices of Karen L. Gibbon PS in King County Superior Court. 	They asked
the court to set aside the trustee's sale and cancel the trustee's deed delivered to
U.S. Bank. 	The Moseids also alleged damages from wrongful foreclosure and
that U.S. Bank and Selene were estopped from denying reformation. 	Selene
filed a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6).
On July 19, 2013, the superior court heard oral argument on the motion to
dismiss. 	On 	July 	30, 	2013, 	the 	court 	dismissed 	the 	Moseids' 	claims 	with
prejudice.
The Moseids appeal.9
Analysis
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6)
de novo, as a question of law.10 	A CR 12(b)(6) motion challenges the legal
sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.11 	A trial court properly dismisses
9 The correspondence file for this court contains communications related
to the appealability of the superior court's July 30, 2013, order. 	On December
11, 2013, a commissioner of this court entered a notation ruling stating that the
trial court's order of dismissal is "an appealable order under RAP 2.2(a)(1) and/or
(a)(3)."
10 FutureSelect Portfolio Mqmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc.. 180
Wn.2d 954, 962, 331 P.3d 29 (2014).
11 Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.. 88 Wn.2d 735, 742, 565 P.2d
1173(1977).
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No. 70823-6-1 / 6
under CR 12(b)(6) only when it appears beyond doubt that the claimant can
prove 	no 	set 	of facts, 	consistent 	with 	the 	complaint, 	which 	would 	justify
recovery.12 	We accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true, and we "'may
consider hypothetical facts not included in the record.'"13 	But "[i]f a plaintiffs
claim remains legally insufficient even under his or her proffered hypothetical
facts," a trial court properly dismisses under CR 12(b)(6).14
If the trial court considers material outside the challenged 	pleading, 	it
treats the CR 12(b)(6) motion as a summary judgment motion under CR 56.15
We will affirm an order granting summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.16
Here, Selene supported its motion to dismiss with a "request for judicial
notice in support of motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint." 	It attached to this
request the federal 	district court's order denying 	the 	Moseids' 	request for a
temporary restraining order, the district court's order granting Selene's motion to
dismiss, several assignments of the deed of trust, the second amended notice of
trustee's sale, and the trustee's deed upon sale. 	The hearing record shows that
the trial court considered these materials but does not indicate if the court took
judicial notice of any of them.
12 Tenore v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 136 Wn.2d 322, 329, 962 P.2d 104
(1998).
13 Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 422, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005) (quoting
Tenore. 136 Wn.2d at 330).
14 Gorman v. Garlock. Inc., 155 Wn.2d 198, 215,118 P.3d 311 (2005).
15 CR 12(b)(6).
16 CR 56(c).

No. 70823-6-1 / 7
The Washington deeds of trust act, chapter 61.24 RCW (DTA or Act),
regulates transactions in which a borrower secures a promissory note or other
debt instrument with a deed of trust.17 	The Act provides the requirements for
nonjudicial foreclosure in the event of borrower default.18 	Courts construe the
Act to further three basic objectives: an efficient and 	inexpensive 	nonjudicial
foreclosure process, adequate opportunity to prevent wrongful foreclosure, and
promotion of the stability of land titles.19 	Because the Act "dispenses with many
protections commonly enjoyed by borrowers under judicial foreclosures, lenders
must strictly comply with 	the 	statutes and 	courts 	must strictly construe 	the
statutes in the borrower's favor."20
The 	DTA 	contains 	safeguards 	to 	ensure 	the 	fairness 	of 	nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings; for 	example, a 	trustee 	may begin the foreclosure
process only after giving a borrower statutorily adequate notice and opportunity
to cure.21 	A borrower who receives a notice of default may contest the default,22
restrain the sale,23 or contest the sale.24 	The DTA "sets forth the only means by
17 Walker v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 176 Wn. App. 294, 305, 308 P.3d
716(2013).
18 RCW 61.24.030, .040, 090, .130.
19 Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383, 387, 693 P.2d 683 (1985).
20 Albice v. Premier Mortq. Servs. of Wash., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 560, 567, 276
P.3d 1277 (2012).
21 RCW 61.24.030(8), .040(2).
22 RCW 61.24.030(8)(j), 61.24.040(2).
23 RCW 61.24.130.
24 RCW 61.24.040(2); Cox, 103 Wn.2d at 387.

No. 70823-6-1 / 8
which a [borrower] may preclude a sale once foreclosure has begun with receipt
of the notice of sale and foreclosure."25
First, the Moseids claim that the trial court should have given them a
chance to amend their complaint. 	Under CR 15, a party may amend a pleading
once "as a matter of course" any time before service of a responsive pleading
and may amend later than that "by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."26 	The
rule provides the steps to follow "[i]f a party moves to amend a pleading."27
Here, the Moseids never moved to amend their complaint by either written
motion or a request at oral argument. 	Although they assert in their reply brief
that "Mr. Moseid did indicate to the trial court that amendment was possible,"
they do not support this claim with any citation to the record. This assertion may
refer to paragraph 35 of their complaint, in which they state, "Plaintiffs will either
seek leave to amend this Complaint to set forth the 	nature and 	amounts of
damages when ascertained or, in the alternative, will amend this Complaint to
conform to proof at trial." 	But this boilerplate cannot be read as a motion to
amend. 	And the cases they cite28 to argue that the court abused its discretion by
"denying" leave to amend without giving its reasons do not support their position
because the claimants in those cases moved to amend.29 The Moseids made no
25 Cox, 103Wn.2dat388.
26 CR 15(a).
27 CR 15(a).
28 Wilson v. Horslev, 137 Wn.2d 500, 974 P.2d 316 (1999); Rodriguez v.
LoudeveCorp., 144 Wn. App. 709, 189 P.3d 168 (2008).
29 Wilson, 137 Wn.2d at 502; Rodriguez. 144 Wn. App. at 729.
-8-

No. 70823-6-1 / 9
request to amend. 	The trial court could not abuse discretion it never was asked
to exercise.30 This claim fails.
The 	Moseids 	also 	contend 	that the 	court erred 	by granting 	Selene's
12(b)(6) motion "based on the so-called 'waiver' rule in RCW 61.24.040." 	RCW
61.24.040 describes the requirements for notice of a trustee's sale. 	A proper
notice tells the recipient that an objector to a sale who does not bring an action to
restrain the sale risks waiving any grounds to invalidate it:
Anyone having any objection to the sale on any grounds
whatsoever will be afforded an opportunity to be heard as to those
objections if they bring a lawsuit to restrain the sale pursuant to
RCW 61.24.130. 	Failure to bring such a lawsuit may result in a
waiver of any proper grounds for invalidating the Trustee's sale.[31]
Courts have found waiver of a postsale action where a party (1) received
notice 	of the right to enjoin the trustee's sale, (2) had 	actual or constructive
knowledge of a defense to foreclosure before the sale, and (3) failed to bring an
action to enjoin the sale.32 	Our Supreme Court has noted that "waiver is an
equitable doctrine, 	and 	'we apply waiver only where it is equitable under the
circumstances and where it serves the goals of the act.'"33 	RCW 61.24.130(1)
and (2) allow a borrower to move to restrain a trustee's sale "on any proper legal
or 	equitable 	ground," 	provided 	he 	or 	she 	complies 	with certain 	procedural
30 See also Wash. Coop. Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wn.2d 460, 466, 256
P.2d 294 (1953) 	(appellate court could not consider abuse of discretion claim
because plaintiff did not ask trial court for leave to amend).
31 RCW 61.24.040(1 )(f)(IX).
32 Plein v. Lackey. 149 Wn.2d 214, 227, 67 P.3d 1061 (2003); Steward v.
Good, 51 Wn. App. 509, 515, 754 P.2d 150 (1988).
33 Klem v. Wash. Mut. 	Bank, 176 Wn.2d 771, 783 n.7, 295 P.3d 1179
(2013) (quoting Albice, 174 Wn.2d at 570).

No. 70823-6-1/10
requirements. 	However, "bringing a suit objecting to the alleged default or to the
foreclosure 	proceedings 	but 	without obtaining 	a 	restraining 	order 	does 	not
prevent the sale from going forward."34 	And while parties may properly raise
challenges to the foreclosure 	procedure itself in a postsale action, allowing a
challenger to delay asserting a defense to default until after the sale 	would
"'defeat the spirit and intent of the trust deed act.'"35
The 	Moseids contend that 	RCW 61.24.040 "doesn't apply because it
requires an action to stay the trustee's sale be filed before the sale, and that's
exactly what Appellants did here." 	But while the Moseids attempted to restrain
the sale in federal district court, they did not "persuade the court of the merits of
[their] defense."36 	Moreover, they did not comply with RCW 61.24.130(1) and
(2), which require the applicant for a restraining order to give the trustee five
days' notice of the attempt to seek the order and pay to the court clerk the sums
then due on the obligation secured by the deed of trust. 	The court denied their
request for a restraining order, and the sale went forward.
The Moseids did not, and do not now, contest the amount of default or the
procedural correctness of the foreclosure proceedings. 	They argue that waiver
does not apply but do not assert any of the statutory exceptions to waiver.37 	The
34 	Plein. 	149 	Wn.2d 	at 	227 	(citing 	27 	Marjorie 	Dick 	Rombauer,
Washington Practice: Creditors' Remedies—Debtors' Relief § 3.61, at 202-
04(1998)).
35 Steward, 51 Wn. App. at 516-17 (quoting Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash.
v. Ostrander, 6 Wn. App. 28, 32, 491 P.2d 1058 (1971)).
36 RCW 61.24.040(2).
37 RCW 61.24.127(1) makes exceptions to waiver for damages claims that
assert fraud, violation of Title 19 RCW, failure of the trustee to materially comply
-10-

No. 70823-6-1 /11
Moseids cite Albice v. Premier Mortgage Services of Washington38 to argue that
the trial court unfairly applied waiver to their situation. 	Unlike the plaintiffs in
Albice, however, they do not show that they lacked adequate opportunity to seek
presale remedies to prevent wrongful foreclosure.39 	The trial court equitably
applied the waiver doctrine.
The Moseids also argue that the trial court erred "insofar as [its judgment
was] based on claim preclusion doctrine." 	Claim preclusion, also known as res
judicata, prohibits relitigating claims that were, or could have been, raised and
litigated in an earlier action.40 This doctrine precludes a subsequent claim where
that action is identical with an earlier action in four respects: (1) persons and
parties, (2) subject matter, (3) cause of action, and (4) quality of the persons for
or against whom 	the claim 	is made.41 	Causes of action are the same for
purposes of claim preclusion when (1) prosecution of the second action would
destroy or 	impair 	rights 	or 	interests established 	in 	a 	prior 	judgment, 	(2)
substantially the same evidence is involved in both actions, (3) the two suits
involve infringement of the same rights, and (4) the two suits arise out of the
"'same transactional nucleus of facts.'"42
with the terms of chapter 61.24 RCW, or violation of RCW 61.24.026 (pertaining
to notice to senior beneficiary of sale).
38 174 Wn.2d 560, 276 P.3d 1277 (2012).
39 See Albice, 174 Wn.2d at 570-71.
40 Loveridge v. Fred 	Mever. 	Inc.. 	125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898
(1995).
41 Schoeman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 106 Wn.2d 855, 858, 726 P.2d 1
(1986).
42 Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 663-64, 674 P.2d 165 (1983) (quoting
Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982).
•11-

No. 70823-6-1/12
Here, 	the trial court could 	not properly dismiss on the basis of claim
preclusion. 	While the Moseids do not dispute that the parties are the same and
the subject matter of both actions is the foreclosure of the loan secured by the
deed of trust, the fact that the district court dismissed without prejudice means
that the federal 	court action established 	no 	rights or interests that would 	be
destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the state court action. 	Thus, the causes
of action are not identical for purposes of claim preclusion.
Selene counters that the trial court could properly dismiss the Moseids'
claims under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. 	We disagree.
Collateral 	estoppel 	prohibits 	parties 	from 	relitigating 	issues 	in 	a
subsequent proceeding, even when they assert different claims or causes of
action.43 	A party asserting collateral estoppel must show that (1) the issues in
both actions are identical; (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a judgment on the
merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to,
or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding; and (4) applying collateral
estoppel does not work an injustice on the party precluded from bringing an
action.44
The doctrine of collateral estoppel does 	not 	apply here. 	Washington
courts follow federal law and treat a CR 12(b)(6) dismissal as a final judgment on
43 Christensen v. Grant County Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wn.2d 299, 306, 96
P.3d 957 (2004) (quoting Rains, 100 Wn.2d at 665).
44 World Wide Video of Wash.. Inc. v. City of Spokane, 125 Wn. App. 289,
305, 103 P.3d 1265 (2005) (quoting Christensen, 152 Wn.2d at 307).
-12-

No. 70823-6-1/13
the merits and with prejudice, unless otherwise specified.45 	But here, the federal
court dismissed the Moseids' complaint without prejudice. 	Therefore, contrary to
Selene's assertion, the federal court order was not a final judgment on the merits.
Selene's collateral estoppel argument fails.
Like the 	Moseids' 	waiver argument, 	however, 	the 	parties' 	arguments
about claim 	preclusion and issue preclusion do not answer the question of
whether the superior court erred in dismissing the Moseids' complaint under CR
12(b)(6). 	We 	conclude that even 	accepting the 	Moseids' allegations and
additional hypothetical facts as true, they do not state a claim for which the law
provides a remedy. The trial court properly dismissed the complaint.
The record does not support the Moseids' allegations that Selene "literally
misled 	[them] 	into 	believing 	they 	would 	be 	fairly 	evaluated 	for 	a 	loan
modification," only to "strong-arm[ ] the trustee's sale of their home without
affording 	them 	any 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to 	mitigate 	loss 	and 	avoid
foreclosure." 	Selene's letter specified that it offered 	no guarantee of a 	loan
modification. 	And while the Moseids contend that the reason Selene gave for
denying their request for modification was "specious and false," they allege no
facts that support their bare assertion that their income was sufficient to support
modified loan payments.
45 In re Pers. Restraint of Metcalf, 92 Wn. App. 165, 175 n.6, 963 P.2d 911
(1998); see also McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2009).
-13-

No. 70823-6-1 /14
But even accepting the Moseids' assertion that Selene "failed and refused
to consider [the Moseids] for any loan modification or default resolution program,"
chapter 61.24 RCW does not provide the remedy the Moseids requested—to set
aside the trustee's sale. 	The Moseids do not dispute that they executed the deed
of trust to secure repayment of their loan. 	Nor do they dispute the 	default
amount alleged in the notice of trustee's sale. 	And they expressly state in their
complaint that they do not base their suit on any failure of Selene to comply with
the procedural requirements of chapter 61.24 RCW.
The Moseids' second cause of action, to cancel the trustee's deed upon
sale, asserts that the deed is "invalid, void, and of no force or effect." 	The
Moseids' recitation of facts about their pursuit of a loan modification, however,
together with their admission that they allege no procedural violations of chapter
61.24 RCW, presents no set of facts justifying recovery for such a claim.
In their third cause of action, the Moseids allege "failures, refusals, and
neglect in conducting the purported foreclosure sale." 	If these alleged failures
refer to violations of the requirements of chapter 61.24 RCW, this contention
contradicts the Moseids' statement that they do not allege procedural violations
in conducting the sale. 	If the Moseids refer instead to their pursuit of a loan
modification, they have again failed to state a claim for which the DTA provides a
remedy.
Finally, in their fourth cause of action, the Moseids contend that Selene's
actions "establish an agreement... to revise the loan arrangement" by "disputing
-14-

No. 70823-6-1/15
the existence of the agreement to revise while not expressly disclaiming it" and
that Selene is estopped from denying this agreement. 	To the extent that the
Moseids allege that Selene improperly denied them a loan modification under the
federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP),46 their claim fails as a
matter of law because courts have consistently held that HAMP does not create
a 	private 	right of action.47 	And the 	Moseids' 	pleadings 	do 	not show any
agreement or guarantee by Selene or any breach of good faith or fair dealing
under RCW 61.24.160.
"When trustees strictly comply with their legal obligations under the act,
interested parties will have no claim for postsale relief, thereby promoting stable
land titles overall."48 	The Moseids do not dispute that the trustee here complied
with its legal obligations under the DTA. 	They do not state any other claim for
which the law provides a remedy. 	The trial court did not err in dismissing their
complaint under CR 	12(b)(6). 	To the extent that the trial court considered
materials outside the 	pleadings, 	our conclusion 	under a 	summary judgment
standard 	is the same. 	The 	Moseids 	have 	not 	raised 	any genuine issue of
46 HAMP, which offers financial incentives to mortgage lenders to modify
the home loans of borrowers in danger of foreclosure, was created under the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 	12 U.S.C. § 5201; Citimortgage.
Inc. v. Bermudez. 	III. App. 	, 6 N.E.3d 268, 271 n.2, 379 III. Dec. 191
(2014).
47 See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 555 (7th Cir.
2012); Miller v. Chase Home Fin.. LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012);
Brosius v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 2199627, at *8 (E.D. Mich. 2014)
(court order) (collecting cases).
48 Albice. 174 Wn.2d at 572.
-15-

No. 70823-6-1/16
material fact, and the trial court did not err in granting Selene's motion to dismiss
as a matter of law.
Conclusion
Because the Moseids do not state a claim in their complaint for which the
law provides a remedy or raise any genuine issue of material fact, the trial court
did not err in dismissing their complaint under either CR 12(b)(6) or CR 56. 	We
affirm.
WE CONCUR:
-16-
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