Dep. Of Loe, Lbe, Lje Patricia Ann Walsh, Appellant V. Dcyf, Respondent

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In re the Dependency of:
Le.E. (DOB: 05/20/2013),
Lo.E. (DOB: 05/14/2008),
Li.E. (DOB: 11/14/2005),
Minor children.
PATRICIA ANN WALSH,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN,
YOUTH, AND FAMILIES,
Respondent.
No. 80430-8-I (consolidated with
No. 80431-6-I and No. 80432-4-I)
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
L EACH, J. — Patricia Walsh challenges a superior court’s order terminating
her parental rights to her three children. 	She argues that the court violated due
process when it allowed her to relinquish her parental rights without conducting
an in-court colloquy on the voluntariness of the relinquishment. Because Walsh
fails to establish a due process violation, we affirm.
FACTS
Patricia Walsh is the mother of three children: Le.E. (May 20, 2013), Lo.E.
(May 14, 2008), and Li.E (November 14, 2005). 	In 2017, a juvenile court found

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the children to be dependent because Walsh was unable to adequately care for
them due to her substance abuse. In 2018, the Department of Social and Health
Services1 filed a petition to terminate Walsh’s parental rights to the children.
Before the termination trial, Walsh agreed to relinquish her parental rights
and consent to the adoption of all three children. 	On August 17, 2019, at 11:40
a.m., Walsh signed a four page document entitled “Relinquishment of Custody,
Consent 	to 	Termination/Adoption 	& 	Waiver 	of 	Right 	to 	Receive 	Notice 	of
Proceedings.” 	Walsh agreed that she consented “freely, voluntarily and with full
knowledge of the consequences” and that “the consent is not the result of fraud
or duress nor am I acting under the influence of anyone.” The relinquishment
document provided that Walsh had 48 hours in which to change her mind and
revoke her relinquishment for any reason and that any revocation must be made
in writing. 	The document also stated, in all capital letters, “I hereby waive notice
of presenting this consent to the court and notice of further proceedings in this
matter, including proceedings for the relinquishment, termination of parental
rights, and adoption.”
At 2:03 p.m. on August 19, 2019, the superior court held a hearing on
Walsh’s relinquishment. Counsel for Walsh told the court that he met with Walsh
on August 16 about the relinquishment. 	He stated that they “discussed in
significant 	detail 	the 	contents 	of 	the 	relinquishment” 	and 	that 	Walsh 	“fully
understood what she was signing at the time.” 	Counsel stated that Walsh knew
1 As of July 1, 2018, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families has
assumed the functions and duties of the Department of Social and Health Services
related to child welfare services.

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she would not be successful at trial and that “her best chance to have any
contact with her children” was by relinquishing her parental rights and entering
into an open adoption agreement. 	Walsh negotiated changes to the open
adoption agreement with the Department regarding the number of visits she
could have with the children. Counsel also stated:
“Since that time, she has been in touch with me a number of times,
and some of her emails and texts indicated to me a significant
reluctance to do this. And because I was concerned about that, I
have very recently on two separate occasions said to her, ‘if you
intend to revoke your relinquishments you must be here in court’
and I told her exactly what it was.”
The superior court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law accepting
Walsh’s relinquishment and terminating her parental rights. Walsh appeals.
ANALYSIS
Washington’s adoption statute, chapter 26.33 RCW, provides a procedure
for parents to petition to voluntarily relinquish their parental rights. 	A parent
petitioning for relinquishment must file a consent to adoption with the court.2 The
court must set a time and a place for a hearing to determine whether the consent
has been validly executed.3 The court may not hold this hearing until at least 48
hours after the parent signs the consent to adoption.4 The court “may require the
parent to appear personally and enter his or her consent to adoption on the
record.”5 	In the case of a non-Indian child, a parent “who has executed a valid
2 RCW 26.33.080.
3 RCW 26.33.090(1)(3).
4 RCW 26.33.090(1).
5 RCW 26.33.090(3).

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waiver need not appear at the hearing.”6 	The waiver must “contain language
explaining the meaning and consequences of the waiver and the meaning and
consequences of termination of the parent-child relationship.”7 Only if the child is
an 	Indian 	child 	must 	the 	court 	“require 	the 	consenting 	parent 	to 	appear
personally…to enter on the record his or her consent to the relinquishment or
adoption.”8 	The court also has discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem to
assess whether the parent’s consent to adoption “was signed voluntarily and with
an understanding of the consequences of the action.”9
Walsh contends that the court’s failure to perform an in-court colloquy with
her before accepting her consent to adoption violates due process. 	Walsh did
not raise this issue below. 	Generally, a party may raise on appeal only those
issues raised at the trial court.10 RAP 2.5(a)(3) provides an exception for claims
of manifest error affecting a constitutional right. 	To be manifest error, the party
must demonstrate that he or she suffered actual prejudice.11 	Actual prejudice
requires a “plausible showing by the [appellant] that the asserted error had
practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.”12 	“If the facts
necessary to adjudicate the claimed error are not in the record on appeal, no
actual prejudice is shown and the error is not manifest.”13
6 RCW 26.33.060.
7 RCW 26.33.310(4).
8 RCW 26.33.090(3).
9 RCW 26.33.070(1).
10 RAP 2.5(a), In re Det. of Brown, 154 Wn. App. 116, 121, 225 P.3d 1028
(2010). 11 State v. Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 8, 17 P.3d 591 (2001).
12 State v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339, 345, 835 P.2d 251 (1992).
13 State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756 (2009) (quoting State v.
McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

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Walsh fails to show actual prejudice. 	She appears to argue that the court
would have found her relinquishment to be involuntary if it had conducted a
colloquy on the record. 	The record does not support this claim. 	It contains no
evidence suggesting Walsh’s relinquishment was not voluntary. Walsh’s counsel
stated only that Walsh was “reluctant” to sign the consent to adoption. 	But, he
also noted that Walsh knew her rights would be terminated at trial and that she
made the decision to relinquish them in order to maintain contact with her
children. Walsh’s counsel explained how she could revoke her consent if she had
truly changed her mind. Walsh chose not to do so. Under these circumstances,
Walsh fails to make a plausible showing that the outcome of the relinquishment
hearing would have been different if the court had required an in-person colloquy.
Consequently, there is no manifest constitutional error.
We also address the merits of Walsh’s claim. Walsh does not make clear
whether she is raising a facial or an as-applied challenge to the relinquishment
procedure. Either challenge fails.
We review constitutional challenges de novo.14 Statutes are presumed
constitutional and the burden falls to the “challenger of a statute [to] prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional.”15
The essential elements of procedural due process are notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.16 	But, due process guarantees no particular
14 Dependency of M.-A.F.-S., 4 Wn. App. 2d 425, 445, 421 P.3d 482 (2018).
15 In re Welfare of A.W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 701, 344 P.3d 1186 (2015).
16 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84
L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).

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form 	of 	procedure.17 To 	determine 	whether 	Walsh 	received 	constitutionally
adequate 	process, 	we 	consider 	the 	three 	factors 	identified 	in 	Mathews 	v.
Eldridge18 (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneously depriving a
person of that interest through the procedure used, and (3) the State’s interest.
Contrary to Walsh’s claim, these factors do not weigh in favor of requiring an on-
the-record colloquy in every hearing on a relinquishment petition.
The 	private 	interest 	at 	stake 	is 	the 	parent-child 	relationship, 	which
“undeniably warrants deference.”19 	The State also has a parens patriae interest
in “promoting the welfare of the child” with the goal of providing “a safe, stable
and 	permanent 	home 	and 	a 	speedy 	resolution 	of 	any 	dependency 	and
termination proceedings.”20 	Thus, the critical inquiry is whether chapter 26.33
RCW, which does not require an in-court colloquy for the relinquishment of
parental rights to a non-Indian child, risks erroneously depriving a parent of their
parental rights.
We conclude that any such risk is minimal. 	Chapter 26.33 RCW contains
significant safeguards against the erroneous relinquishment of parental rights.
The relinquishment petition and consent to adoption must be in writing. 	The
court may not hold a hearing and accept the relinquishment until a waiting period
of at least 48 hours has passed. The petitioner must notify the parent of the time,
17 Mitchell v. W.T Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610, 94 S. Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed. 2d 406
(1974). 18 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
19 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101
S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981).
20 In re Dependency of T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 157-60, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001).

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date, and location for the hearing. 	Until the court accepts the relinquishment, a
parent may revoke their consent at any time and for any reason. 	A parent may
only waive their appearance at the hearing if they acknowledge in writing the
consequences of relinquishment. 	Even then, a court may exercise its discretion
and 	require 	an 	in-person 	appearance. 	The 	statute 	also 	allows 	for 	the
appointment of a guardian ad litem if there are questions about the parent’s
ability to voluntarily consent to adoption.
As discussed above, Walsh fails to show that she received anything less
than constitutionally adequate process. 	She explicitly waived her appearance at
the hearing in accordance with RCW 26.33.310(4). Walsh’s counsel explained to
Walsh how she could revoke her consent. 	Walsh did not do so and chose to
proceed with the relinquishment hearing. 	Evidence that Walsh was reluctant to
relinquish her parental rights, without more, does not show that Walsh’s consent
was involuntary. Walsh does not demonstrate a due process violation.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: