* State Of Washington, Respondent V. Dennis L. Tolles, Appellant

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FILED
COURT UP APPEALS
DIVISM II
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF W
DIVISION II
2013 MAY 4 AM 8
KIN SH1 OM	O
BY EPU
STATE OF WASHINGTON, I
I No. 41854 -1 -	II
Respondent,
V.
DENNIS L.TOLLES, ORDER WITHDRAWING
PART PUBLISHED OPINION
AND FILING ATTACHED
OPINION
The opinion in this case was filed as a part published opinion on April 9, 2013. It is the
court's intention to submit a new opinion. The court withdraws the April 9, 2013 opinion and
replaces it with the attached opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this day of A , 2013.
I
I
PANEL: Jj.Worswick, Quinn -Brintnall,Van Deren.
Worswick, C.J.
Quinn-Brintna11, J.
Van Deren,.J. ¢
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

FILED
COURT OF AP EALS
DIVISION II
2013 HAY,14 AM 5: 59
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTOS IHGP B
DIVISION II Pl3
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
V.
DENNIS L.TOLLES,
0
No. 41854 -1 -II
PART PUBLISHED OPINION
WORSWICK, C.J. —	A jury found Dennis Tolles guilty of first degree child rape and
attempted first degree child molestation of KJ. He argues (1)the trial court violated his court
rule time for trial rights and (2)the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony from a child
abuse investigator. In a statement of additional grounds, he argues that the trial court erred (1)in
ruling that KJ's hearsay statements were spontaneous and thus admissible and (2)by denying his
midtrial motion to sever the attempted child molestation charge from the other charges. We
affirm.
FACTS
In 2003, KJ told her mother that Tolles had attempted to sexually molest her. She later
revealed that Tolles had raped her on at least four prior occasions. The State charged Tolles with
three counts of first degree child rape, and Tolles was arraigned May 30, 2003. When KJ refused
to cooperate with the State, it dismissed the charges on July 7,2003. At the time the State
dismissed the case, Tolles had been in continuous custody for 37 days.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 41854 -1 -II
In 2010, KJ decided to cooperate with the State regarding the charges against Tolles.
The prosecutor accordingly filed a new information on July 7,charging Tolles with four counts
of first degree child rape and one count of attempted first degree child molestation. When the
new information was filed,Tolles was on probation in Oregon. Tolles failed to appear for his
summonsed arraignment and the trial court issued a warrant. He was arrested in Oregon on
August 13 and brought to custody in Clark County on August 17. Tolles's trial was set for
September 13. Tolles moved to dismiss the charges against him for violation of his court rule
time for trial rights.
The trial court found that Tolles spent 37 days in jail before the 2003 charges were
dismissed and that when the charges were refiled on July 7,2010, Tolles was "subject to
conditions of release"in Oregon. Clerk's Papers (CP)at 26. Tolles was in custody in Clark
County beginning August 17, and his trial was set for September 13.
The trial court ruled that the 2003 version of the time for trial rule, CrR 3.3,would apply.
But the trial court further ruled that Tolles's challenge failed under both the 2003 version and the
present version of CrR 3.3. The trial court concluded that undercurrent
CrR 3.	3(	e)(	6), "[	s]	ince the defendant is subject to conditions of release in the state of Oregon the
Washington speedy trial time is excluded."CP.at 27 -28.
1
Tolles incorrectly states that his trial was set for September 16 in his brief. He makes no
argument that the trial court erred in finding that trial was set for September 13.
2
Tolles does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact on his CrR 3.3 motion, making them
verities on appeal. State v. Bryant, 74 Wn. App. 301, 305, 872 P.2d 1142 (1994).
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No. 41854 -1 -II
Pretrial, Tolles filed a motion in limine to exclude "opinion evidence on delayed
reporting or changing of story's [	sic]by child witness ... since no expert on that subject matter
has been identified."CP at 88. The trial court reserved ruling on this motion.
At trial,the State called retired child abuse investigator Steven Norton, who interviewed
KJ in 2003. Before Norton's testimony, defense counsel addressed the possibility that Norton
would testify about "delayed reporting,"arguing, "I don't know what —	his expertise, I think, is
based on his experience. I don't know beyond that."2B Report of Proceedings (RP)at 370.
The trial judge replied that he would rule on any objections raised during Norton's testimony.
During the State's direct examination of Norton, the following colloquy occurred:
Q. Mr. Norton, in your experience, is it unusual for kids to limit their
disclosures when they talk to somebody about abuse?
DEFENSE]:Objection. Lack of foundation. He's not in an [sic]
position to give an expert opinion.
STATE]:I believe the foundation has been established. He is a child
abuse investigator for thirty years. He has interviewed thousands of kids.
COURT]:I'm going to allow the answer. You may answer.
MR.NORTON: Could I hear the question again, please?
Q. I was asking —	Mr. Norton, based on your experience and the interviews
that you have done, is it —	is it unusual for kids to limit the disclosures that they
make to investigators or to other people?
A. I would say yes, that can happen and I have a [ sic] seen it happen
numerous times. A lot of times you will see thatthe disclosure regarding abuse
is —	you know, they will see how you react to that. If you show no reaction then
more will be disclosed, kind of on a continuum. I don't believe it is unusual to
see children make an initial disclosure to the investigating officer and then, by
the-
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No. 41854 -1 -II
DEFENSE]: Still objection. I think it is somewhat non -responsive in
terms that he is lecturing the jury.
COURT]:I'm going to permit him to go ahead with what he is doing.
He's answering the question.
A.] And then, by the time that the prosecutor's office and the defense
interview them, there is more information that comes out.
2B RP at 378 -80.
The jury found Tolles guilty on one first degree child rape charge and on the charge of
attempted first degree child molestation, and not guilty of the remaining three first degree child
rape charges. Tolles appeals.
ANALYSIS
TIME FOR TRIAL
Tolles first argues that the trial court violated his time for trial rights. He argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by ruling that former CrR 3.3 (2003)applied, and that his time
for trial rights were violated under the current rule. We agree that the trial court erred by
applying former CrR 3.3,but we hold that Tolles's time for trial rights were not violated under
the current version of the rule. We hold that Tolles's time for trial was tolled during his
conditions of release in Oregon and began to run once he was in custody in Washington.
We review a trial court's application of the time for trial rule, CrR 3.3,de novo. State v.
Kindsvogel, 149 Wn.2d 477, 480, 69 P.3d 870 (2003);State v. Nelson, 131 Wn. App. 108, 113,
125 P.34 1008 (2006).Failure to strictly comply with CrR 3.3 requires dismissal, whether or not
the defendant can show prejudice. State v. Raschka, 124 Wn. App. 103, 112, 100 P.3d 339
2004).A trial court's unchallenged findings of fact on a CrR 3.3 motion to dismiss are verities
on appeal. State v. Bryant, 74 Wn.App. 301, 305, 872 P.2d 1142 (1994).
M
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 41854 -1 -	II
A. Current Version of CrR 3.3 Applies
Tolles argues that the trial court erred by applying former CrR 3.3 instead of the version
in effect at the time of Tolles's motion to dismiss. The State concedes this point.
The trial court here ruled that former CrR 3.3 would apply "in the interest ofjustice"but
gave no rationale for this conclusion. This was error. Although a trial court may apply a
previous version of the criminal rules in the interest ofjustice under CrR 1.	3(	b),	it must provide a
rationale and may not simply state its conclusion. State v. Jack, 87 Wn.2d 467, 469, 553 P.2d
1347 (1976).However,the trial court also ruled that Tolles's rights were not violated under the
present version of CrR 3.3. As analyzed below, the trial court was correct on this point.
B. No Time For Trial Violation Occurred
Tolles argues that his time for trial rights were violated because the time for trial began to
run on July 7,2010, when the charges against him were refiled. We hold that because Tolles
was under conditions of release in Oregon until brought to custody in Clark County on August
17, his time for trial rights were not violated.
Under CrR a defendant who is detained in jail must be brought to trial within
60 days after the time for trial commencement date. Under CrR 3.	3(	c)(	1),	the initial
commencement date is the date of arraignment. But under CrR 3.	3(	e),	certain occurrences
trigger excluded periods that do not count toward the 60 day time limit for trial.
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No. 41854 -1 -II
Under CrR 3.	3(	b)(	5),	the time for trial cannot expire less than 30 days after the end of
any excluded period. In other words, if fewer than 30 days remain on the time for trial period at
the end of an excluded period, the State has a full 30 days to bring the defendant to trial.
Because Tolles had already spent 37 days in jail on the charges in 2003, the State had 30 days to
bring him to trial after the end of any excluded period.
Under CrR 3.	3(	e)(	4),	one such excluded period is "[t]	he time between the dismissal of a
charge and the refiling of the same or related charge."Another excluded period is "[t]	he time
during which a defendant is detained in jail or prison outside the State of Washington or in a
federal jailor prison and the time during which a defendant is subjected to conditions ofrelease
not imposed by a court ofthe State of Washington."CrR 3.	3(	e)(	6) (	emphasis added).Both of
these excluded periods are relevant here because the State dismissed the 2003 charges against
Tolles and refiled them on July 7,2012, when Tolles was under conditions of release in Oregon.
Tolles argues that the time for trial began to run again when the State refiled the charges
on July 7. Tolles's trial was set for September 13, 68 days after the refiling of the charges, well
outside the 3 0 days normally allowed under CrR 3.3 b 5 But Tolless time for trial rights were	Y Y OO• ' g
not violated on this basis because on July 7,when the charges were refiled; another excluded
period still applied: Tolles was under conditions of release imposed by an Oregon court. CrR
3.	3(	e)(	6).	We hold that this excluded period did not end until Tolles was brought to custody in
Clark County on August 17. The September 13 trial date was 27 days after this
3
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 41854 -1 -II
additional excluded period ended, within the 30 day limit that CrR 3.	3(	b)(	5)	imposes. Tolles's
claim on this point fails.
State v. Chhom, 162 Wn.2d 451, 173 P.3d 234 (2007)supports our holding. In Chhom,
our Supreme Court considered former CrRLJ 3.	3(	g)(	5) (	1995),which has been recodified
without substantive changes as CrRLJ 3.	3(	e)(	6).	162 Wn.2d at 454 n.l.Under former CrRLJ
3.	3(	g)(	5),	the time when a defendant was detained in jail "outside the county"was an excluded
period for time for trial purposes. The Chhom court addressed whether an excluded period
existed when a defendant was detained in jail outside the county,pursuant to a city's agreement
with the outside county to house the defendant. 162 Wn.2d at 454 -55. The court eschewed a
literal reading of former CrRLJ 3.	3(	g)(	5),	holding that the words "outside the county"meant
outside the trial court's jurisdiction. 162 Wn.2d at 459 -60. And the court noted that the heading
of the current rule, CrRLJ 3.	3(	e)(	6), "	Defendant Subject to Foreign or Federal Custody
Conditions,"clarified the jurisdictional focus of the rule. 162 Wn.2d at 460.
The court found further support for this interpretation in the analogous superior court
rule, former CrR 3.	3(	g)(	6) (	2001 -162 Wn.2d at 460. Former CrR 3.	3(	g)(	6)	has been recodified
3
The State notes in its briefing that a summons was issued to Tolles, and that he failed to appear
at the designated hearing. A failure to appear resets the time for trial commencement date to the
date of the defendant's next appearance. CrR 3.	3(	c)(	2)(	ii).	Here,the State may have had 60
days from Tolles's next appearance on August 17 to bring Tolles to trial. But neither party
addressed this issue below, nor do they address it on appeal. Because the effect of Tolles's
failure to appear has not been briefed or argued, we do not consider it.
The time during which a defendant is detained in jail outside of Washington is also an
excluded period. CrR 3.	3(	e)(	6).	The prosecutor stated on the record that Tolles was arrested in
Oregon on August 13. Presumably, this means that Tolles was held in jail in Oregon until he
was brought to Clark County on August 17. But the trial court made no findings on this issue,
neither party addressed it below, and neither party addresses it on appeal. We accordingly do not
address this issue.
7
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 41854 -1 -	II
without amendment as CrR 3.	3(	e)(	6),	which is the rule at issue here. The court noted that former
CrR 3.	3(	g)(	6)	created an excluded period when the defendant was "beyond the jurisdictional
reach of the State and thus not amenable to process,either because the defendant is outside the
State's geographical borders or because the defendant is subject to federal process."162 Wn.2d
at 460.
The Chhom court did not address the portion of former CrR 3.	3(	g)(	6)	and current CrR
3.	3(	e)(	6)	at issue here, that an excluded period exists when the defendant is "subjected to
conditions of release not imposed by a court of the State of Washington."But Chhom's rationale
applies. The focus of CrR 3.	3(	e)(	6)	is jurisdictional. Therefore, the excluded period created by a
defendant's foreign conditions of release ends when a Washington court obtains jurisdiction over
the defendant by way of the defendant's being brought to custody in Washington.
Tolles relies on Chhom to argue that the trial court erred by finding that he was under a
continous excluded period even while incarcerated in Clark County. He argues that under
Chhom, the excluded period ended when he was brought to custody in Clark County on August
17 We agree, although by being correct on this point, Tolles shows why his time for trial rights
were not violated. Because trial was set 27 days after the end of the excluded period when he
was brought to Washington custody on August 17; the trial was held within the time limit that
CrR3.3(	b)(	5)	imposed and Tolles's time for trial rights were not violated. His claim to the
contrary fails.
4 We do not decide that a defendant's being brought to custody in Washington is the only way
for a trial court to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant and end the excluded period at issue.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 41854 -1 -II
A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion
will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public.
record in accordance with RCW 2.	06.	040,it is so ordered.
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Tolles next argues that because Norton was not a psychologist or psychiatrist, the'trial
court violated his right to a fair trial by admitting Norton's testimony regarding delayed reporting
by child witnesses. Because Norton was qualified based on experience and training, we
disagree.
We review a trial court's admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 762, 168 P.3d 359 (2007).A trial court abuses its discretion
when it relies on unsupported facts, applies the wrong legal standard, or when it adopts a view
that no reasonable person would take. State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638
2003).ER 702 provides, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert b knowledge, experience; training,	or education may testify thereto in the form of -	exp Y e	g> P g> - Y '
an opinion or otherwise."
Tolles argues that Norton was not qualified to testify about whether children sometimes
delay reporting abuse because Norton was not a psychologist or psychiatrist, and his testimony
had no "scientific basis."But the facts underlying an expert's opinion may be based on
experience, rather than scientific research. State v. Flett, 40 Wn. App. 277, 284; 699 P.2d 774
1985) (	witness qualifications need not be based on academic credentials);State v.Aaron, 57
Wn. App. 277, 283, 787 P.2d 949 (1990) (	expert testimony, based on experience, about using
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 41854 -1 -II
gloves, socks, or.handkerchiefs to avoid leaving fingerprints was not sophisticated expert
testimony requiring scientific basis).As our Supreme Court recognized in State v. Ortiz,
practical experience is sufficient to qualify an expert witness. 119 Wn.2d 294, 310, 831 P.2d
1060 (1992).
Moreover, the record reflects that Norton had both experience and training that qualified
him as an expert on child abuse investigations. He had ample experience interviewing children,
having spent 30 years as a child abuse investigator during which time he investigated several
thousand cases of sexual abuse. He had received training on interviewing child witnesses,
became a trainer himself, and co -wrote a book on the subject. The record reflects no abuse of
discretion in admitting the challenged testimony. See State v. Holland, 77 Wn. App. 420, 427-
28, 891 P.2d 49 (1995) (	school counselor's expert testimony on delayed reporting was properly
admitted based on academic course work and experience counseling abused children).Tolles's
argument fails.
5 Tolles also argues that in State v. Maule, 35 Wn. App.287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983),the court found
that an expert qualified to testify about child abuse was not qualified to testify about the specific
question of child abuse by biological fathers. He argues that, analogously, Norton was not
qualified to testify about the specific question of delayed reporting. But Tolles has misread
Maule. The Maule court held under ER 403 that an expert's testimony that most child abuse is
committed by father figures, in particular biological fathers, was inadmissible. 35 Wn. App. at
292 -93. The State in Maule had argued that the evidence came in merely to buttress the expert's
qualifications, but the court rejected this argument, holding that the evidence was substantive and
prejudicial. 35 Wn. App. at 292 -93. Tolles misinterprets Maule's holding. Maule does not
support his argument.
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No. 41854 -1 -II
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS
SPONTANEOUS REPORTING
In his statement of additional grounds (SAG),Tolles first argues that KJ's allegations
were not reported spontaneously. We treat this as an argument that the trial court erred by
admitting KJ's hearsay statements under RCW 9A.44.	120 because they were not spontaneous
and,thus, not reliable. Tolles's argument fails.
We review a trial court's decision to admit child hearsay for abuse of discretion. State v.
Kennealy, 151 Wn. App. 861, 879, 214 P.3d 200 (2009).Under RCW 9A.44.	120,the hearsay
statements of a child under ten years may be admissible in a sex abuse case if the court finds
sufficient indicia of reliability and the child either testifies or is unavailable as a witness. Our
Supreme Court has set forth a list of factors to consider regarding whether child hearsay is
sufficiently reliable to be admitted under RCW 9A.44.	120.State v. Parris, 98 Wn.2d 140, 146,
654 P.2d 77 (1982).One such factor is whether the statements were made spontaneously.
Parris, 98 Wn.2d at 146. "Spontaneous"in this context includes statements made in response to
questioning that is not leading or s Kennea _ 151 Wn.A at 883..	q g g gg lY pp.
The trial court held a hearing on the admission of KJ's hearsay statements to Norton and
subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that KJ
disclosed details of the abuse to Norton during interviews conducted in a non -leading and non-
directive fashion. The trial court concluded that KJ's statements to Norton were spontaneous.
These findings and conclusions were supported by the evidence. Norton testified at the
child hearsay hearing that he received training about how to interview child witnesses using
6
Tolles asks us to read "the 2 letters put into evidence"on this issue, but the letters have not
been made part of the record on appeal. SAG.
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No. 41854 -1 -II
open -ended and non -leading questions. He further testified that he did not ask KJ leading
questions, and that he asked her open -ended .questions.
Based on this record,there are no grounds to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion by concluding that KJ's statements were spontaneous, reliable, and thus admissible.
Tolles's argument fails.
MOTION TO SEVER
Tolles next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to sever the attempted first degree
child rape charge from the other child rape charges against him. Because Tolles's motion to
sever was untimely,we disagree.
Refusal to sever charges will be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Kalakosky, 121 Wn.2d 525, 537, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993).Under CrR 4.	4(	b),	the trial court shall
sever the charges against the defendant if "	the court determines that severance will promote a
fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. Under CrR 4.	4(	a)(	1),	a
defendant must move to sever the charges before trial,or "before or at the close of all the
evidence if the interests ofjustice require." _	Failure to move for severance at the appropriate time
waives the issue. CrR 4.	4(	a)(	1).
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved to sever the single attempted first
degree child molestation charge from the four first degree child rape charges. Defense counsel
argued that the attempted child molestation charge was the only charge supported by any
evidence, and thus Tolles would be prejudiced by having all the charges considered together.
Counsel did not move to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence. The trial judge denied
defense counsel's motion to sever as untimely.
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No. 41854 -1 -II
In State v. Harris,we suggested that a motion to sever may be dismissed on the basis of
untimeliness, but a defendant must be permitted to raise severance during trial when the
prejudice resulting from joinder of the charges arises during trial. See 36 Wn.App. 746, 749,
677 P.2d 202 (1984) (	upholding denial of motion to sever as untimely on first day of trial,before
prejudice had arisen, but reversing denial of motion to sever made during trial,after prejudice
became clear).
Tolles makes no argument regarding the trial court's refusal to sever. The record does
not reflect that any prejudice from joinder arose during the trial. Therefore, the record does not
show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to sever as untimely.
Tolles's claim fails.
13
WP affirm TnIIPC'c rnnvinfinnc