Percash Ramnath, Appellant V. Ling D. Wang, Respondent

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2016 OCT-3 	PMI2--55
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of
PERCASH RAMNATH,
Appellant,
and
LING D. WANG,
Respondent.
No. 74743-6-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	October 3, 2016
Leach, J. — Percash Ramnath appeals several trial court orders in this
dissolution action. 	The Supreme Court's decision that Ramnath's appeal was
timely 	only 	as 	to 	the 	December 	2014 	writs 	of 	garnishment 	precludes 	our
consideration of his challenge to other trial court actions. 	And because Ramnath
fails to support his challenge to those writs with any citation to legal authority or
reference to the record in assigning error to those writs, we do not consider that
challenge either. 	We affirm. 	Because Wang did not file a financial declaration as
required by court rule, we deny her attorney fee request.
Background
Ramnath and Ling Wang separated in 2013 after 20 years of marriage.
The two signed a CR 2A settlement agreement in May 2014. 	Earlier, the trial
court granted Ramnath's request to continue the trial date from May 12 to August
26, 2014, so that the parties could attend the settlement conference that resulted

No. 74743-6-1 / 2
in this 	agreement. 	Wang 	prepared 	the 	documents 	needed 	to 	finalize 	the
dissolution 	based 	on 	the 	CR 	2A 	agreement. 	Ramnath 	disputed 	certain
provisions 	in those 	documents. 	As 	required 	by the 	settlement agreement,
Ramnath and Wang participated in binding arbitration. 	The arbitrator ordered
Ramnath to pay Wang $130,000.1 	On July 16, 2014, Ramnath filed a notice that
he 	would 	be absent from 	July 	31 	to 	December 31, 	2014. 	Wang 	provided
Ramnath with notice of a trial court hearing on July 30, 2014, to consider her
motion to enter final dissolution documents. 	Ramnath did not attend. 	The trial
court denied her request.
The trial court held a short trial on the scheduled date, August 26. 	It found
that Ramnath's reasons for not appearing were "transparent" and his absence
not excusable. 	It entered a decree of dissolution. 	In September 2014, the trial
court found that Ramnath had violated temporary restraining orders by selling
assets from a joint account. 	Because the settlement agreement and decree
awarded 	these 	assets 	to 	Wang, 	the 	trial 	court 	ordered 	him 	to 	pay Wang
$155,339.10 plus fees and costs. 	In December 2014, the trial court issued writs
of garnishment directed to two of Ramnath's banks.
Analysis
Ramnath presents no cogent argument for relief on appeal.
1 A week 	after the 	arbitrator issued 	his 	decision, 	Ramnath's 	counsel
withdrew, effective June 29.

No. 74743-6-1 / 3
The law does not distinguish between litigants who elect to proceed pro se
and those who seek assistance of counsel.2 	Both must comply with applicable
procedural rules, and failure to do so may preclude review.3 	This court generally
will not consider arguments a party does not support with pertinent authority,
references to the record, or meaningful analysis.4 	The appellant has the burden
to provide a record sufficient to review the issues raised on appeal.5
Ramnath did not comply with these requirements. 	His briefing contains no
citations to authority, no description of the applicable standards of review, and no
meaningful 	legal analysis. 	To the extent he 	makes factual 	assertions, they
consist primarily of accusations of misconduct by Wang's counsel. 	Ramnath fails
to cite any evidence from the record supporting his accusations, and we find
none. 	These deficiencies prevent our consideration of the merits of Ramnath's
appeal. 	Nevertheless, we address the essence of his claims as best we can.
First, Ramnath challenges the decree of dissolution the trial court entered
August 26, 2014, and the contempt order and judgment it entered a month later.
The Supreme Court has already ruled that this challenge is time barred.
Ramnath filed a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court in January 2015.
The Supreme Court clerk ruled 	that Ramnath's appeal was timely only with
2 In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).
3 Olson, 69 Wn. App. at 626; State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452,
969P.2d501 (1999).
4 Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d
549 (1992) (arguments not supported by authority); State v. Camarillo, 54 Wn.
App. 821, 829, 776 P.2d 176 (1989) (no references to the record), affd, 115
Wn.2d 60, 794 P.2d 850 (1990); RAP 10.3(a).
5 Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 52 Wn. App. 334, 345, 760 P.2d 368 (1988).
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respect 	to 	writs 	of 	garnishment 	the 	trial 	court 	entered 	in 	December 2014.
Because Ramnath appealed more than 30 days after the August and September
decisions, the clerk decided that his appeal of those decisions was time barred
unless the Supreme Court granted him a motion for extension of time to file a
notice of appeal. 	Ramnath made this motion, and the court denied it.
Thus, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	already 	decided 	that 	Ramnath 	waived 	his
appeal of all trial court decisions except the orders authorizing the court clerk to
issue writs of garnishment to Wells Fargo Bank and JP Morgan Chase Bank.
This court cannot review Supreme Court decisions.
Ramnath offers no basis for his challenge to those writs of garnishment
other than the challenges he waived.
Garnishment is a statutory remedy to enforce the obligations of debtors.6
It "requires strict adherence to the procedures expressly authorized by statute."7
Garnishment involves three parties: 	a judgment creditor, a judgment debtor, and
a garnishee, which holds property belonging to the debtor.
The 	garnishment statute, 	ch. 	6.27 	RCW, 	permits 	garnishment of 	the
debtor's property if the creditor serves "'a writ of garnishment on a party who is
indebted to the 	[judgment] debtor at the time of service.'"8 	"[U]pon a proper
showing by a creditor, a court must enter either a default judgment against, or a
6 Watkins v. Peterson Enters.. Inc.. 137 Wn.2d 632, 638, 973 P.2d 1037
(1999).
7 Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 640.
8 Seven Sales LLC v. Otterbein, 189 Wn. App. 204, 211, 356 P.3d 248
(2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Calloway Ross, Inc.,
133 Wn. App. 621, 624, 137 P.3d 879 (2006)); RCW6.27.250(1)(a).

No. 74743-6-1 / 5
judgment in the amount held by a garnishee."9 A writ of garnishment directs the
garnishee not to deliver the debtor's property but to appear and answerthe writ.10
Ramnath appears to base his challenge to the writs of garnishment solely
on challenges to the 	underlying judgment against him, not on any failure to
satisfy the garnishment statute's requirements. 	These are the arguments that
the Supreme Court found Ramnath waived by failing to appeal those orders
within 30 days.
Wang requests attorney fees on appeal. 	RAP 18.1 allows this court to
award attorney fees when applicable law authorizes them. 	RCW 26.09.140 gives
this 	court 	discretion 	to 	award 	attorney 	fees 	on 	appeal. 	In exercising 	this
discretion, we consider the 	arguable 	merit of the 	issues on appeal and the
parties' financial resources.11 	"A party must timely file a financial declaration for
his or her resources to be considered."12 	Because Wang did not file a financial
declaration with this court, we deny her fee request.
9 Watkins, 137 Wn.2d at 645; RCW 6.27.250(1 )(a).
10 Sadler v. Wagner, 3 Wn. App. 353, 355, 475 P.2d 901 (1970).
11 In re Marriage of Raskob, 183 Wn. App. 503, 520, 334 P.3d 30 (2014).
12 Raskob, 183 Wn. App. at 520; RAP 18.1(c).
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No. 74743-6-1 / 6
Conclusion
Because 	Ramnath 	waived 	any 	challenge 	to 	the 	dissolution 	decree,
contempt order, or judgment against him and offers no basis for challenging the
writs of garnishment, we affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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