* State Of Washington, Resp. vs. Casey F. Porter, App.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
CASEY FREDRICK PORTER,
Appellant. 	) 	FILED: July 6,2015
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No. 71801-1-1 	t73 '
DIVISION ONE
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PUBLISHED OPINION 	t '"":•
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Appelwick, J. — An offender's date of discharge is the date the trial court receives
notice that all sentence requirements have been satisfied. 	By December 18, 2008, the
trial court had 	notice that Porter completed all of his sentence terms; 	however, 	he
remained subject to a no-contact order, which expired on January 23, 2012. 	Porter
petitioned the court for discharge after the expiration of his no-contact order. Accordingly,
the trial court determined that his date of discharge was the date the no-contact order
expired. 	For purposes of discharge, a no-contact order is not a sentence requirement.
We reverse and remand for amendment of the certificate of discharge to reflect an
effective date of December 18, 2008.
FACTS
On December 11, 2006, Casey Porter pleaded guilty to one count of violation of a
domestic violence court order. 	Porter was sentenced to six months confinement, 12
months of community custody, $500 in legal financial obligations (LFOs), and no contact
with his ex-wife for five years. 	The no-contact order was entered on January 23, 2007.
Porter's confinement began on February 1, 2007.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71801-1-1/2
On July 1, 2007, Snohomish County Corrections notified the trial court that Porter
had 	completed 	his term 	of confinement. 	On 	March 	24, 	2008, 	the 	Department of
Corrections notified the trial court that Porter had completed his term of community
custody. 	On December 18, 2008, the county clerk notified the trial court that Porter had
paid his LFOs in full. On January 23, 2012, the no-contact order expired.
On April 13, 2013, Porter moved to vacate his conviction. 	The State responded
that Porter was not yet discharged and thus had not met the requirements for vacating a
conviction under RCW 9.94A.640. 	No further action was taken on Porter's motion to
vacate.
On February 28, 2014, Porter petitioned the court for a certificate of discharge.
The State agreed that discharge was proper, because Porter had satisfied all terms of his
sentence. 	However, the parties disputed the effective date of discharge. 	Porter argued
that, under RCW 9.94A.637(2), a no-contact order is a not a sentence requirement for
purposes of discharge. 	Therefore, he asserted, the effective date was December 18,
2008, when the trial court had notice that he satisfied all actual terms of his sentence.
The State argued that RCW 9.94A.637(2) requires an offender to seek a certificate of
discharge while the no-contact order is still active. 	Because Porter did not do so, the
State maintained that the effective date was January 23, 2012, when the no-contact order
expired.
The trial court ruled in favor of the State and entered a certificate of discharge with
the effective date of January 23, 2012. 	Porter appeals.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71801-1-1/3
DISCUSSION
A certificate of discharge restores an offender's civil rights lost as a result of
conviction. 	State v. Miniken. 100 Wn. App. 925, 927, 999 P.2d 1289 (2000). 	RCW
9.94A.637 sets forth the process by which an offender is discharged. When the trial court
receives notice that an offender has completed all conditions of his sentence, the court
must issue a certificate of discharge. RCW 9.94A.637(1). The effective date of discharge
is the date the trial court receives notice that all sentence requirements have been
satisfied. 	State v. Johnson, 148 Wn. App. 33, 39, 197 P.3d 1221 (2008).
In 2009, RCW 9.94A.637 was amended to include current subsection (2), which
provides, in relevant part:
(2)(a) For purposes of this subsection (2), a no-contact order is not a
requirement of the offender's sentence. An offender who has completed all
requirements 	of 	the 	sentence, 	including 	any 	and 	all 	legal 	financial
obligations, is eligible for a certificate of discharge even if the offender has
an existing no-contact order that excludes or prohibits the offender from
having contact with a specified person or business or coming within a set
distance of any specified location.
(b) In the case of an eligible offender who has a no-contact order as
part of the judgment and sentence, the offender may petition the court to
issue a certificate of discharge and a separate no-contact order by filing a
petition 	in the 	sentencing 	court and 	paying 	the 	appropriate filing fee
associated with the petition for the separate no-contact order. This filing fee
does not apply to an offender seeking a certificate of discharge when the
offender has a no-contact order separate from the judgment and sentence.
(i)(A) The court shall issue a certificate of discharge and a separate
no-contact order under this subsection (2) if the court determines that the
offender has completed all requirements of the sentence, including all legal
financial 	obligations. 	The 	court 	shall 	reissue 	the 	no-contact 	order
separately under a new civil cause number for the remaining term and under
the same conditions as contained in the judgment and sentence.
Laws of 2009, ch. 288, § 2.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71801-1-1/4
Here, Porter petitioned for a certificate of discharge after his no-contact order
expired. 	We are 	asked to determine the effective date of discharge 	under these
circumstances.
Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. 	Stuckev v.
Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 129 Wn.2d 289, 295, 916 P.2d 399 (1996). 	If a statute is
unambiguous, the court does not engage in statutory construction; rather, the statute's
meaning must be derived solely from its plain language. 	Rozner v. City of Bellevue. 116
Wn.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991). 	If a statute is ambiguous, courts may "resort to
statutory 	construction, 	legislative 	history, 	and 	relevant 	case 	law 	for 	assistance 	in
discerning legislative intent." 	Christensen v. Ellsworth. 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d
228 (2007). 	"A statute is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted in two or more
ways, but it is not ambiguous simply because different interpretations are conceivable."
Berqerv.Sonneland. 144Wn.2d91, 105, 26 P.3d 257 (2001).
The parties present two readings of RCW 9.94A.637, each focusing on subsection
(2). Porter takes the position that, under RCW 9.94A.637(2)(a), a no-contact order is not
a sentence requirement. 	Therefore, he asserts, his effective date of discharge was
December 18, 2008, when the trial court had notice that all actual sentence requirements
were completed. 	Under the State's interpretation of the statute, a 	no-contact order
remains a sentence requirement until it expires or is replaced with a civil order under the
petition process set forth in RCW 9.94A.637(2)(b). 	The State contends that, because
Porter did not bring a (2)(b) petition prior to the expiration of his no-contact order, his date
of discharge was January 23, 2012, when the no-contact order expired.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71801-1-1/5
In focusing 	so 	heavily 	on 	subsection 	(2) of the 	statute, 	the 	parties 	neglect
subsection (6). 	Subsection (6)—which predates subsection (2) by nine years—states,
Unless otherwise ordered by the sentencing court, a certificate of discharge
shall not terminate the offender's obligation to comply with an order that
excludes or prohibits the offender from 	having contact with a 	specified
person or coming within a set distance of any specified location that was
contained in the judgment and sentence. An offender who violates such an
order after a certificate of discharge has been issued shall be subject to
prosecution according to the chapter under which the order was originally
issued.
RCW 9.94A.637(6) (emphasis added); see also Laws of 2000, ch. 119, § 3. 	The plain
language of this provision acknowledges an offender's ability to obtain a certificate of
discharge notwithstanding a no-contact order. 	Necessarily, the legislature did not regard
a no-contact order as a sentence requirement that must be satisfied to obtain a certificate
of discharge. Therefore, the existence of a no-contact order in a judgment and sentence
could not delay the effective date of discharge.
Subsection (6) was part of Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 6400 (S.B.
6400), 	which 	was 	passed 	in 	March 	2000 and 	became 	effective 	June 	8, 2000.1
Engrossed Second Substitute S.B. 6400, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000); Laws
of 2000, ch. 119, § 3. On May 30, 2000—before S.B. 6400 became effective—the Court
of Appeals held that a no-contact order was a sentence requirement, and thus the trial
court properly denied a request for discharge prior to the order's expiration. Miniken, 100
Wn. App. at 927. The earlier version of the discharge statute considered in Miniken was
silent as to whether a no-contact order was a sentence requirement. 	See former RCW
1 At the time, the provision became former RCW 9.94A.220(4) (2000). 	Laws of
2000, ch. 119, § 3. It has since been recodified as RCW 9.94.637(6). See Laws of 2001,
ch. 10, § 6; Laws of 2009, ch. 288, § 2.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71801-1-1/6
9.94A.220 (1994), recodified as RCW 9.94A.637 (Laws of 2001, ch. 10, § 6); see also
Laws of 2000, ch. 	119, § 3. 	The Miniken court noted that another provision of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, authorizes a sentencing court to
enforce a 	no-contact order beyond an offender's term of community supervision or
placement. 	100 Wn. App. 	at 928. 	Accordingly, the court reasoned, the legislature
"necessarily intended that the sentencing court retain jurisdiction over the offender after
he or she has met the supervision and placement requirements." 	id. at 928. 	The court
therefore concluded that "the no-contact order is properly characterized as a 'requirement
of the 	sentence' 	and 	the 	sentencing 	court 	retains 	jurisdiction 	until the 	offender's
completion of his or her sentence requirements." JdL at 929.
Miniken's holding was premised on the concern that a certificate of discharge
would render a no-contact order unenforceable. 	See id. at 928-29. 	S.B. 6400 provided
that a certificate of discharge does not terminate an offender's obligation to comply with
his or her no-contact order. 	Laws of 2000, ch. 119, § 3. 	This necessarily rejected the
premise in Miniken that the no-contact order was a "'requirement of the sentence'" for
purposes of discharge. 	See 100 Wn. App. at 929. For if the order were a requirement of
the sentence, the certificate of discharge could not have been granted at all. 	Plainly, the
statute superseded Miniken.
Due to timing, 	however, neither S.B. 6400 	nor Miniken addressed the other.
Concern remained years later that Miniken, though based on prior law, was inconsistent
with S. B. 6400 and represented a potential threat to the legislative policy stated in S.B.
6400. 	See H.B. Rep. on Engrossed Substitute H.B. 1002, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2009). 	In 2009, the legislature enacted Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1002 to clarify
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71801-1-1/7
the intent of S.B. 6400. 	See Laws of 2009, ch. 288, § 1; H.B. Rep. on Engrossed
Substitute H.B. 1002, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). The intent section of the bill
declared,
The legislature finds that restoration of the right to vote and serve on a jury,
for individuals who have satisfied every other obligation of their sentence,
best serves to reintegrate them 	into society, even if a no-contact order
exists. 	Therefore, the legislature further finds clarification of the existing
statute is desirable to provide clarity to the courts that a 	certificate of
discharge shall be issued, while the no-contact order remains in effect, once
other obligations are completed.
Laws of 2009, ch. 288, § 1 (emphasis added).
The legislature added a process by which a person may petition for a certificate of
discharge and a no-contact order could be separated from the judgment and sentence.2
RCW 9.94A.637(2)(b). 	The relevant portion of the amendment made explicit that for
"purposes of this subsection (2), a no-contact order is not a requirement of the offender's
sentence." 	RCW 9.94A.637(2)(a). 	Subsection (6) was retained.3 	See Laws of 2009,
2 The State's argument suggests that RCW 9.94A.637(2)(b) is a mandatory
process for obtaining a certificate of discharge while a no-contact order is still active. We
need not decide whether subsection (2)(b) is optional or mandatory. 	However, we note
that subsection (2)(b) uses the word "may" rather than "shall" in setting forth the petition
process for discharge and separation of the no-contact order. 	RCW 9.94.637(2)(b). 	Use
of the word "may" creates the authority to petition; use of the word "shall" would have
created the duty to petition. 	RCW 9.94A.637(1) instructs the court to issue a certificate
of discharge when it receives notice that the requirements of sentence are met. 	If the
petition process was intended to be mandatory, one would expect an amendment to
subsection (1), cross-referencing subsection (2)(b), to require a petition prior to discharge
if the sentence contained a no-contact order. 	On the other hand, the petition process
might have been intended merely to facilitate discharge for those who had not been
properly discharged between 2000 and 2009 because of a no-contact order. 	See also
Laws of 2009, ch. 288, § 1 (finding that "clarification of the existing statute is desirable to
provide clarity to the courts that a certificate of discharge shall be issued, while the no-
contact order remains in effect").
3The legislature made one change to subsection (6). See Laws of 2009, ch. 288,
§ 2. S.B. 6400 was domestic violence legislation, and subsection (6) previously pertained
only to no-contact orders issued under chapter 10.99 RCW. 	See Engrossed Second
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 71801-1-1/8
ch. 288, § 2. As a result, a no-contact order was not a sentence requirement for purposes
of discharge after the enactment of subsection (6) in 2000, and it did not become one
after the enactment of subsection (2) in 2009. 	The effective date of discharge is
independent of any provisions for a no-contact order in the judgment and sentence.
Porter's effective date of discharge was December 18, 2008, the date the trial court
received notice that all actual sentence requirements were satisfied. 	We reverse and
remand for correction of the date of discharge.
WE CONCUR:
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Substitute S.B. 6400, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000); Laws of 2000, ch. 119, § 3.
In 2009, the legislature removed the reference to chapter 10.99 RCW, thereby making
subsection (6) applicable to all no-contact orders. Laws of 2009, ch. 288, § 2.
8