State of Washington, Respondent v. Yolanda Evette Ostrom, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59954-6-II
Respondent,
v.
YOLANDA EVETTE OSTROM, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
LEE, J. — Yolanda E. Ostrom appeals the superior court’s order terminating her from a
mental health court program and the superior court’s sentence, imposed after her termination from
the mental health court program, based on her subsequent convictions for harassment and first
degree extortion. Ostrom argues that (1) the superior court erred by terminating her participation
in the mental health court program without complying with the requirements of the Mental Health
Sentencing Alternative (MHSA) codified under RCW 9.94A.695; (2) the superior court erred by
imposing a sentence that included 12 months of community custody without the authority to do so
under the MHSA; and (3) she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her defense
counsel failed to raise legal arguments related to the MHSA at the termination hearing and
sentencing.
Ostrom was terminated from a mental health court program. Ostrom was not serving a
sentence under the MHSA. Therefore, the MHSA is inapplicable. Accordingly, we hold that
Ostrom’s arguments fail and affirm.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
January 27, 2026

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FACTS
A. BACKGROUND
In 2022, the State charged Ostrom with one count of harassment (threat to kill) and one
count of first degree extortion. On December 1, 2022, the superior court approved Ostrom’s
participation in a mental health court program.
To participate in the mental health court program, Ostrom agreed to the terms of the mental
health court program contract. Under this contract, Ostrom agreed “[t]o take all prescribed
medication as directed,” “[t]o not consume any non-prescribed mood-altering substances (this
includes alcohol, marijuana, and other substances that affect mood or perception),” and “[t]o notify
the Program Coordinator within 24 hours if the Defendant has contact with Law Enforcement.”
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 18, 19, 20. The mental health court contract provided that after successful
completion of the program, the superior court would “dismiss . . . the pending charge(s) with
prejudice and the Prosecuting Attorney will not be able to prosecute those charges in the future.”
CP at 22. Ostrom further agreed that failure to abide by the terms of the contract may result in
termination from the mental health court program. And if Ostrom was terminated from the mental
health court program, the superior court would determine guilt based upon stipulated facts.
From December 2022 to June 2024, Ostrom reported to Sophia Limacher, who was the
mental health court program coordinator. During Ostrom’s monthly program reviews with the
mental health court, Limacher reported Ostrom’s progress, and, until June 2024, the mental health
court found that Ostrom was in compliance with the mental health court program.
Prior to Ostrom’s program review hearing on June 6, 2024, the State informed Limacher
that Ostrom had new charges: driving with a suspended license and hit-and-run from the preceding

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weekend and a speeding ticket from March. Ostrom did not report these contacts with law
enforcement to Limacher as required by the mental health court program contract. At the June 6
hearing, the mental health court ordered Ostrom to 24 hours of community service based on the
unreported contacts. The mental health court also directed Ostrom to take a uranalysis (UA) test
after the review hearing. Ostrom failed to provide a proper UA sample.
B. TERMINATION HEARINGS
On June 13, 2024, the State filed a petition to terminate Ostrom from the mental health
court program based on Ostrom’s failure to report law enforcement contacts that resulted in her
2024 charges, an admission by Ostrom that she did not always take her mental health medications
as prescribed, and Ostrom’s failure to provide a proper UA sample. During the June 26 hearing
on the State’s petition, the mental health court determined that because “[t]here has been some
compliance” from Ostrom, the court would not terminate Ostrom from the program. Verbatim
Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (June 26, 2024) at 77. The mental health court ordered Ostrom to provide a
new UA sample that day.
On July 1, the State filed a second petition to terminate Ostrom from the mental health
court program based on the results of Ostrom’s UA sample provided on June 26. At the second
termination hearing, Ostrom admitted that her uranalysis test was positive for methamphetamine
and alcohol. The State argued that Ostrom violated the main components of her mental health
court contract: using non-prescribed mood-altering substances, new law violations, and lack of
candor to the court and to Limacher. The mental health court terminated Ostrom from the mental
health court program, citing Ostrom’s new offenses, lack of honesty, and continued use of non-
prescribed mood-altering substances.

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C. STIPULATED FACTS TRIAL AND SENTENCING
At Ostrom’s subsequent trial on stipulated facts per the mental health court contract, the
superior court accepted the stipulated facts presented by the parties and found Ostrom guilty of
harassment and first degree extortion.
The superior court sentenced Ostrom to 50 months of confinement on the harassment
conviction. On the first degree extortion conviction, the superior court sentenced Ostrom to 62
months of confinement and 12 months of community custody.
Ostrom appeals.
ANALYSIS
Ostrom argues that the mental health court erred by terminating her from the mental health
court program without complying with the requirements of RCW 9.94A.695, which governs
sentences imposed under the MHSA. Ostrom also argues that the superior court erred by imposing
12 months of community custody because the superior court lacked authority to impose
community custody under the MHSA. And Ostrom argues that she received ineffective assistance
of counsel because her defense counsel failed to raise legal arguments related to the MHSA at her
termination hearing and at sentencing. We conclude that Ostrom’s arguments fail.
A. TERMINATION FROM MENTAL HEALTH COURT PROGRAM
Ostrom argues that the mental health court erred by terminating her without complying
with the requirements to revoke the MHSA under RCW 9.94A.695. Because Ostrom was a
participant in a mental health court program, not serving a sentence under the MHSA, we disagree.

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The MHSA is one of several sentencing alternatives authorized by the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1981, ch. 9.94A RCW. The MHSA is governed by RCW 9.94A.695. The MHSA is
available to defendants that meet the following criteria:
(a) The defendant is convicted of a felony that is not a serious violent
offense or sex offense;
(b) The defendant is diagnosed with a serious mental illness recognized by
the diagnostic manual in use by mental health professionals at the time of
sentencing;
(c) The defendant and the community would benefit from supervision and
treatment, as determined by the judge; and
(d) The defendant is willing to participate in the sentencing alternative.
RCW 9.94A.695(1). When terminating a defendant’s MHSA, the superior court “must issue
written findings indicating a substantial and compelling reason to revoke this sentencing
alternative.” RCW 9.94A.695(12)(c).
Here, the mental health court did not err by terminating Ostrom without complying with
the requirements of the MHSA because Ostrom was a participant in a mental health court
program—Ostrom was not serving a sentence under the MHSA. Ostrom could not have been
serving a sentence under the MHSA because at the time of her termination, she had not been
convicted of a felony. Rather, Ostrom was a participant in a mental health court program with the
understanding that, after successful completion of the program, the superior court would “dismiss
. . . the pending charge(s) with prejudice and the Prosecuting Attorney will not be able to prosecute
those charges in the future.” CP at 22 (emphasis added). Further, Ostrom agreed that if she was
terminated from the program, the superior court would “determine the issue of guilt on the pending
charge(s).” CP at 21. Because Ostrom was a participant in a mental health court program, she had
not yet been convicted.

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Ostrom was not serving a sentence under the MHSA. Accordingly, the mental health court
did not err by terminating Ostrom without complying with the requirements to revoke a sentence
imposed under the MHSA because the MHSA is inapplicable.
B. COMMUNITY CUSTODY SENTENCE
Next, Ostrom argues that the superior court erred by imposing 12 months of community
custody during sentencing. We disagree.
Under RCW 9.94A.701(3)(a), “[a] court shall . . . sentence an offender to community
custody for one year when the court sentences the person to the custody of the department for . . .
[a]ny crime against persons under RCW 9.94A.411(2).” First degree extortion is considered a
crime against persons under RCW 9.94A.411(2).
Ostrom argues that the superior court lacked authority to impose community custody
because Ostrom was sentenced under the MHSA. As discussed above, Ostrom was not serving a
sentence under the MHSA; rather, Ostrom was a participant in a mental health court program.
Accordingly, Ostrom’s challenge based on the MHSA fails.
Further, under RCW 9.94A.701(3)(a), the superior court was required to sentence Ostrom
to 12 months of community custody because she was convicted of first degree extortion—a crime
against persons. Therefore, the superior court did not err in sentencing Ostrom to 12 months of
community custody.
C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Finally, Ostrom argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her
defense counsel failed to raise legal arguments related to the MHSA at her termination hearing and
at sentencing. We disagree.

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The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the
Washington Constitution guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Estes,
188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017). When a party claims ineffective assistance, the party
must demonstrate “(1) deficient performance and (2) resulting prejudice.” Id. at 457-58. “If either
element of the test is not satisfied, the inquiry ends.” State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d
177 (2009).
Counsel's performance is deficient when it “falls ‘below an objective standard of
reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances.’” Estes, 188 Wn.2d at 458
(quoting State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)). Reasonable conduct
for an attorney includes researching the relevant law. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862.
Here, Ostrom argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her defense
counsel failed to argue the legal standards relevant to the MHSA at her termination hearing and at
sentencing. But Ostrom fails to show that her defense counsel was deficient at either hearing
because the MHSA did not apply to Ostrom; she was a participant in a mental health court
program—not serving a sentence under the MHSA. Thus, Ostrom’s defense counsel was not
deficient by failing to argue inapplicable standards. Accordingly, Ostrom’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Ostrom’s challenges are based on the failure to comply with or present arguments related
to the MHSA, which is inapplicable to Ostrom because she was a participant in and terminated
from a mental health court program. Ostrom was not sentenced under the MHSA. Accordingly,
Ostrom’s challenges fail. We affirm.

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Lee, J.
We concur:
Glasgow, J.
Veljacic, A.C.J.